

SUBJECT: REDACTED INTELLIGENCE REPORT 001

DATE: SPRING 2007-EARLY 2008

SOURCE: DEBRIEFING OF DETAINEE UNDER COALITION FORCES CONTROL

UNCLASSIFIED (AS REDACTED)

Summary:

Detainee and [REDACTED] traveled to Amarah for a meeting prior to traveling to Iran for their second trip for paramilitary instructor training. Detainee and [REDACTED] met the other trainees at the same house they met the other trainees at prior to traveling to Iran on their first trip. When Detainee and [REDACTED] arrived at the house, the other trainees were already there. The group spent one night at the house and learned the next morning from Naji that the trip had been cancelled. Everyone returned to their respective areas.

Approximately 10 days after returning to Kut, [REDACTED] called Detainee and [REDACTED] and told them that they needed to come to Amarah because it was time for their trip. Detainee and [REDACTED] took a taxi to the Baghdad Garage in Amarah where they met [REDACTED] the individual who takes people to [REDACTED]'s houses in Amarah. Detainee and [REDACTED] arrived at a house where they saw all of the other trainers waiting. This may have been the same home Detainee was at approximately 10 days earlier, but it may have been another house. [REDACTED] was not present at this house prior to going to Iran. [REDACTED] from Baghdad and [REDACTED] from Basra did not show up at the house and did not attend the second trip to Iran for paramilitary instructor training. [REDACTED], the support weapons trainer from Amarah was responsible for coordinating all travel for the second trip. [REDACTED] is also the individual who was in charge of Detainee's payroll. [REDACTED] took the group to the Baghdad Garage where they took a taxi-bus to the Shalamchah border crossing. After crossing the border legally, the group took a taxi-bus to Ahvaz. [REDACTED] knew where to go because [REDACTED] had traveled this route several times before. The group went to a three or four story house in Ahvaz, the same one that the group stayed in on their first trip to Iran. The structure was a house but was divided in to apartments. The house had an Iraqi caretaker named [REDACTED]. Detainee saw other individuals who were staying at this house but none appeared to be other individuals receiving training. No one who stayed at or came to the house wore a military uniform. This house was designated for the travel; [REDACTED] and the rest of the group were required to stay the night there in Ahvaz. A large traffic circle was located across the street from the house. The traffic circle had an approximately two and a half meter tall statue of a teapot in the middle. Detainee could not hear any airplanes from the airport in Ahvaz while staying in the house. Detainee can not remember anything else significant about the area other than the enormous teapot.

The group spent one night in Ahvaz, and then traveled to the airport in Ahvaz the following morning. Detainee rode in a pickup truck while several other individuals rode in a Mercedes van. [REDACTED], the caretaker took the individuals to the airport and gave out

the tickets. The group got on a large white and blue airplane and flew to Tehran. An unidentified Iranian met ██████ at the airport in Tehran and put everyone in vehicles. The vehicles drove directly from the airport to the training camp. The group arrived at some time between 0000 and 0300 and immediately went to sleep. No training was conducted the following day and people woke up at various times through the day. Everyone was very tired after traveling to Iran and arriving late.

After the day off the paramilitary training began. Detainee provided the following breakdown of the paramilitary training received during Detainee's second trip to Iran:

Day 1 – Woke up at 0800. The instructors gathered the group in a classroom. Four instructors were introduced, named ██████ or ██████, ██████, and an additional Iranian instructor who was called ██████ in honor of the late ██████ who was killed between Detainee's first and second trips to Iran ██████ and ██████ were both Lebanese Hizballah (LH). Abu Amin, or Hajji Amin, and Yusif were both Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). All instructors were in uniform, the IRGC instructors wore different uniforms than the LH instructors. Hajji Amin introduced the instructors briefly and then prepared the class for their first day of training. The class was issued pistols and moved outside to the soccer field at the northwest corner of the camp. This training was called 'skills'. Hajji Amin walked around telling the group how to hold their pistol while moving left and right and while walking and shooting. If someone looked lazy, Hajji Amin would hit the persons arm. The trainees were not happy with the training, and were constantly joking around and slacking off. No firing was done while conducting any of the 'skills' training.

Day 2 and Day 3 – Additional 'skills' training with pistol.

Day 4 – 'Skills' training with AK-47 assault rifle.

Day 5 through Day 7 – Additional 'Skills' training with AK-47 assault rifle.

Day 8 – This was an entire day off because it was Friday and the 'skills' training was completed. All the trainees felt like the 'skills' training was a complete waste of time and was very boring and tiresome. All the trainees felt that the 'skills' training was conducted because the cadre did not have enough real training to last the entire trip, and because the cadre did not like the Iraqi trainees because they were constantly goofing around.

Days 9-18 – ██████, the LH instructor pulled all the students into a classroom. Abu Fadil taught all the students about how to act and dress in order to make a good impression as an instructor. Abu Fadil's instruction was a general class that applied to all specialties. The instructor training consisted of 10 days of studying ones' specialty, and taking turns giving mock periods of instruction. The trainees did not take it very seriously, and were constantly making fun of each other while they attempted to demonstrate their teaching skills. Everyone made fun of ██████ while he was teaching because ██████ looks funny and has only four long hairs on his head that were always blowing around. Even ██████ was laughing at ██████ when he attempted to teach his

classes. During some periods of instruction Abu Fadil would show videos and pictures of successful LH operations. Detainee specifically remembers seeing a video of Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of LH meeting with suicide bombers immediately prior to an operation. These suicide bombers then blew up an embassy immediately following the meeting. [REDACTED] then showed photos and videos of the aftermath of this attack, saying it was a very successful LH operation and took place in 1981. The group did not view any photos or pictures of the bombing of the U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut. Detainee was not given any of these videos or photos to have in Iraq, this was only shown in the camp in Iran. This is one of the specific events that gave Detainee the impression that the instruction they received was developed mostly by LH, and not IRGC.

Day 19 – On day 19, the groups split up in to four groups based on the specialties designated. Detainee and [REDACTED] from Karbala were switched from Information to Tactics. No one trained on Information during the second trip. The four groups were put in four different classrooms where they all studied their specialty. Tactics consisted of Detainee, [REDACTED] from Karbala, [REDACTED] from Amarah and [REDACTED] from Nasiriyah. Day 19 was an introduction to Tactics, in which the instructor informed the group that Tactics is the most important of all subjects, because the other subjects were useless on their own. On Day 19 the group began studying tactics used to guard an area or a building including how to set up a perimeter and how to designate fields of fire. All tactics classes were designed around the idea that a team consisted of four people. Multiple teams can be used. The teams will function mostly autonomously but with a single goal in mind.

For example, an engineer team may be responsible for emplacing and detonating IEDs on a convoy while a Support Weapons team is simultaneously responsible for launching mortars or rockets at the same vehicles. A conventional weapons team would then be responsible for firing at the vehicles with small arms and assaulting the vehicles. The Support Weapons team would be responsible for launching mortars at the vehicles again once the conventional weapons team pulled back. Each team functions together but does not get involved in what the other team is doing. A plan would be worked out ahead of time for this, and one individual in each team would be responsible for coordinating with the other team leaders during the attack.

Day 20 – The Tactics group continued to study how to guard an area, a building and set up a perimeter.

Day 21 – The group learned about different types of terrain such as mountains, valleys, hills and open areas and how these different types of areas can be used to an attackers advantage. For example, if an attack is being conducted on a convoy then it is good to attack from a hill or mountain because you can see more of what is going on.

Day 22 – The Tactics class went to the training area south of the IRGC camp to conduct field training. The tactics class spent two straight days digging large V-shaped holes. These holes were to be used as shelter in the event of an attack or more importantly in

the event that a perimeter needs to be set up around something. The holes were dug with a small ditch at the bottom to collect rainwater. The trainees did not do so, but were told that in the event that camouflage is needed the trainees can cover the tops of their holes with branches and leaves.

Day 23 – The trainees were shown how to dig trenches connecting foxholes. The trenches are used to move from foxhole to foxhole without exposing yourself from enemy fire. The trainees did not see much use for this training, but were told by the LH instructors that this is what is done at the front lines in Palestine.

Day 24 – The trainees were shown how to fill and stack sandbags in order to create a large sturdy structure that one can hide behind for cover. The group filled and stacked sandbags to create a circular structure approximately two meters high, that had a window in the front that someone can look or shoot out of.

Days 25 & 26 – The Tactics group conducted calisthenics for both the 25th and 26th day. The tactics group high-crawled and low-crawled around the obstacle course located in the northeast corner of the training camp. Some of the movement techniques were conducted with an AK-47 and some were not.

Day 27 – The tactics group was instructed on how to apply camouflage to hide. The group was taught how to pick leaves and trees from the surrounding areas and cover themselves with these things, as well as use them to disguise their positions from aircraft. The group was also taught how to apply camouflage face paint. The group was told to take black camouflage face paint and cover either the left or right half of the face with it. The other half of the face should have three diagonal lines running parallel from the middle of the nose down to the persons' neck.

Day 28 – The group practiced walking in different formations. The group was taught how to walk in a single file line, where the first person looks forward, the people behind alternated which side to watch, and the last person looks to the rear. The group was also taught how to walk in a side-by-side formation with each person looking away from the group for security, and a 'zig-zaggy' formation which is like side-by-side but with people staggered. Detainee can not remember how far apart people are supposed to be when walking in each formation. The group was taught how to break up a protest. In order to break up a protest, the group should form a V shape while staying very close together. Upon entering the protesters, the group should attempt to split the group and push them back. The group learned about fighting at night. When fighting at night, a group must stay closer together than during the day time. The group must also be quieter as there is less background noise to cover up movements. When moving at night smoking is not allowed, neither is fire. If you have to fight at night, you should only do it in an area that you are familiar with so you always know where you are.

Day 29 – Ambushes – There are many different kinds of ambushes. The most important are destruction ambushes, specific target ambushes and trick ambushes.

The goal of a destruction ambush is to destroy the target and then pull back. When conducting a destruction ambush it is very important that support weapons are utilized as much as possible before sending conventional weapons teams in. This is done to limit the amount of resistance the conventional weapons team will encounter. The conventional weapons team will assault the objective and neutralize any threats. Then the engineer team will go in and destroy any equipment or facilities that are still in tact. Once the engineers have destroyed the facilities and equipment, the engineers and conventional weapons teams will pull back. The support weapons will launch mortars and rockets at the objective to facilitate the withdrawal of the conventional weapons and engineer teams.

A specific target ambush is normally conducted against a convoy of vehicles. A specific ambush will begin with engineers detonating roadside bombs focused on one vehicle of the convoy. The support weapons teams will then attack the other vehicles with mortars and rockets to force them back, while the conventional weapons teams assault the objective with small arms and RPGs. The conventional weapons teams will assault the target vehicle and take whatever equipment is available. If there is a person still alive in the target vehicle, then that person should be kidnapped if the situation permits. The indirect fire teams are responsible for keeping enough pressure on the other vehicles to prevent them from helping the target vehicle. The conventional weapons teams will withdraw with the seized equipment and persons while the indirect fire teams keep the other personnel from responding.

A trick ambush is not actually an ambush. It is the emplacement of a device that is obviously a roadside bomb, and is normally used to stop enemy forces from entering an area, or forcing them in to a different route for the purpose of another type of attack.

Day 30 – Day 30 of tactic training focused on how to respond to an ambush. When ambushed, a team should attempt to stay together and get behind something that will provide them safety from incoming fire. The team should then throw smoke grenades and attempt to flee the area undetected.

Day 31 – Day 31 covered the type of fighting that is used in urban environments. This was referred to as ‘American street fighting’. The group was told that CF always leaves one way out when they seal an area. The group needs to find this area and use it to escape.

Day 32 – Day 32 was instruction on how to move over long distances on foot with a large pack full of supplies and a weapon. This topic was discussed briefly. The trainees were told that when this is done there needs to be a perimeter security force on each side of the movement element. The perimeter force is responsible for responding to an attack by the enemy.

The trip did not have any type of group exercise. The groups did not cross-train on their specialties following the specific instruction.

None of the training focused on CF tactics or how to overcome them. The only topics like this that were discussed, were about CF vehicles. The trainees were told that the CF vehicle is very well armored, and that penetrating this armor is difficult by regular weapons. The trainees were told that the two weak spots on CF vehicles are the windows, and the horizontal portion between the front and rear doors. This topic was discussed on the Detainee's first trip and was discussed by Hajji Yusif.

Detainee has heard that weapons and EFPs are stored in and moved through Badrah. Detainee heard this [REDACTED] aka [REDACTED], [REDACTED] driver. Detainee overheard [REDACTED] talking [REDACTED] about this topic but can not remember when. Detainee did not hear [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] mention any specific locations where weapons are stored. Detainee also overheard [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] discuss the town of Aziziyah being used to store weapons. Detainee has no other knowledge on weapons storage locations.

During Detainee's second trip to Iran for paramilitary training, Detainee got in an argument with one of the interpreters at the IRGC training facility. Detainee was upset because the instructors would not issue the trainees any socks to wear with their boots. Detainee and the other trainees repeatedly asked for socks until it escalated in to a larger issue about how they were being treated. The interpreter became upset, and called Detainee a very disrespectful name in front of the other trainees. Detainee did not want to cause a larger problem for everyone so Detainee did not make a comment back to the interpreter. [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] all showed up the following day to address the problem. Other trainees informed [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] about what the interpreter had said to Detainee. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] did nothing about it and sided with the interpreter.

Detainee overheard the LH and IRGC instructors talking about the fact that Iraqis train in Lebanon for paramilitary training and that this training is far superior to the training conducted in Iran.