Presidency of the Republic
Intelligence Service
IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE COMPASSIONATE, THE MERCIFUL

Presidency of the Republic
Intelligence Service
Anti-Espionage General Office

Study

on the Disloyal Badr Corps

Working paper prepared by the Anti-Espionage General Office at the Intelligence Service pertaining to the disloyal Badr Corps.

/signed/
Regards,
Jamal Al-Jannabi
IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE COMPASSIONATE, THE MERCIFUL

((Don't trust those who deceive God because those who deceive God don't trust but the losers))

God, the Almighty, is trustworthy

((Put your enemy before your eyes and precede him and don't leave him behind your back))

The Comrade Leader
Introduction:

The disloyal Badr Corps is the product of the security services and the religious establishment in the evil Iran which wanted from this military force to be a disloyal tool during the glorious battle of Qadisiyat Saddam in order to stab Iraq, harm it and use it as a mean of controversy for the Iranian Organization of Mujahidi Khalq. After ending the military chapter of the immortal battle of Umm al Ma’arik, the Corps wanted to harm Iraq by resorting to all the hateful and evil enemies and many countries renewed their support and assistance to it, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United States since it supplied them with a larger capability for hurting our country in accordance with their plan hostile to Iraq. Everybody participated to help Iran. The participation of the disloyal Corps in the events of the Chapter of Treason and Betrayal and in the joint planning is just one of the phases of the agreement between all the parties to conspire against Iraq and what it stands for; being unique in its military organization and power compared to what is called the disloyal opposition and having a direct influence because of its available military capabilities and its geographic location along the borders with Iran.
Its beginning and formation

In 1985, the creation of the Corps began, composed of fugitives to Iran who belonged to the disloyal Al-Dawa party. The latter formed a regiment it called (Martyr Al-Sadr) Regiment. Al-Dawa party was the unique political gathering on the Iranian arena which possessed the capabilities to create an armed regiment. At the time the headquarters of the regiment was in Al-Ahwaz, in the camps of Ghayour Asla. Later on, another regiment was formed by (Al-Tawabeen [i.e. the repentants]) who were renegade prisoners to whom was given the name of Imam Al-Khomeini Regiment, led by the fugitive Abu Ali Al-Basri (it attacked our units in the battle of Qurrah Dagh [Margin reads: To confirm it with a date], in the Northern region and the traitors incurred huge losses at that time. He and whoever was left with him fled to the evil Iran). After him, the leadership of the regiment was assumed by the Iranian Zu Al-Qadr… who is presently the Commander of the Iranian Naval Force [Margin reads: To make sure of it]. Later on, both regiments merged and to them were added whoever fled to Iran, the renegade prisoners and the exiled. The new formation was given the name of (Badr Brigade 9)… It was given this name after the name of the great battle of Badr which was for us the first battle of the Muslims against the polytheists in which they won although they were a minority. It was in the month of Ramadan which is the (9th) of the lunar months. It was given this name for this reason. After the creation of this brigade, it was attached to the Ministry of the Revolutionary Guard (Al-Sibat) and it was led by the Iranian officer named Abdel Rahman Naqdi (also known as Diya' Shams, he is presently the Director of the Police Intelligence). [Margin reads: To make sure of it] Later on, the Iranian Ismail Daka'iiki assumed the command of the brigade. He was killed by our courageous army during the glorious battle of Qadisiyat Saddam. The brigade remained under Iranian command until the end of Qadisiyat.

Two months prior to the agreement of Iran on the Security Council Resolution No. 598 and the discontinuation [Margin reads: discontinuation, Arabic had a typing error] of the military operations in 1988 A.D., the fugitive criminal Mohamed Baqer Al-Hakeem (President of what is called the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq) announced
that the forces of his suspected council have become a brigade and not a division. He gave it the name of “Badr Brigade 9.” It included (12,000) twelve thousand elements. When the war was over, a not so small number of its elements stopped working for it. Following the reactions to the Day of the Call and the liberation of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, Iran represented by its intelligence services began paying attention to this Corps to recruit it in the chapter of subsequent aggressions carried out by the evil Iran within the US plan to attack Iraq. Indeed, this disloyal Corps and whoever was supervising it had an effective role in the subversive activities in most of the governorates of our country since the beginning of March 1991.

[Margin reads: After the events.] Iran entrusted the declared command of the Corps to the fugitive traitor Adnan Ibrahim Muhsin Al-Najjar, also known as Abu Ali Al-Basari, to give the impression that it was not interfering in the Iraqi opposition's affairs and to accentuate its international role. It was also an attempt on its behalf to ascertain its non-interference in the internal affairs of Iraq.
Organization of the disloyal Badr Corps (See Annex (A) -Organization of the Corps)

The Corps is composed of a headquarters and four infantry divisions going on foot and a number of support formations and units attached to the headquarters of the Corps. The headquarters is located in Karmanshah (Tanakah Kanch) as shown below:

1 - **Headquarters of the Corps**

A- General Staff of the Movements to which are attached three divisions as follows (Training, Intelligence (Al-Ittila'aat) and Operations) and to the Operations are attached all the divisions.

B- General Staff of the Administration composed of the Department for the Affairs of Sacrificing Individuals, Department of Daily Rations, Supply and Transportation (Tadarukat) and an administrative unit.

C- Security (Al-Hifadat)\(^{(x)}\) attached administratively to the headquarters of the Corps and technically to the Presidency of the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Iranian Army – Security Section.

D- Welayat Al-Faqih Representation to which are attached two departments; the Department of Information (religious guidance) and the Department of Political Belief (political guidance).

E- Accounting Division.

F- Legal Section.

G- Intelligence Department.

H- Medical Treatment.

I- Command of Wilayat Al-Faqih Camp.

J- The Corps has a recruitment headquarters for the administration of the units in the Southern sector.

\(^{(x)}\) Iranian terminologies exchanged during the conversations among the Corps' members.
2 - **Composition of the Divisions**  (See Annex (B) – Organization of the Division)

A- **Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division**
It is composed of six Special Regiments, a Defense and Duties Regiment and a Support Regiment. (Annex C – Organization of the Division Support Regiment) and as explained in Annex (1-B).

B- **Ansar Al-Hussein Division**
It is composed of five Special Infantry Regiments, a Naval Regiment, a Support Regiment and a Defense and Duties Regiment. Annex (2-B) explains it.

C- **Haydar Al-Karrar Division**
It is composed of six Special Regiments, a Support Regiment and a Defense and Duties Regiment. Annex (3-B) explains it. It is located in what is called Martyr Al-Sadr Regiment (Al-Kawthar) and its commander is the criminal Hasan Kazim Hasan Al-Arsahd (Abu Ahmed Al-Rashed).

D- **First Division (Merging of Al-Hamza and Imam Ali Divisions)**
It is composed of six Special Regiments, a Support Regiment and a Defense and Duties Regiment. Annex (4-B) explains it. It is located in Sarbil Zihab sector and it is opened along the region of Khanekeen. Its commander is the criminal Mohamed Ali Hasan Abbass (Abu Ahmed Al-Rumaythi).
3- Malek Al-Ashtar Brigade (Artillery Support Brigade) (See Annex (D))
   It is composed of a headquarters and three battalions as shown hereafter:
   A- Al-Muntazer Battalion composed of three batteries equipped with 130, 122 and 152 millimeter field cannons.
   B- Adawat Sayyed Al-Shuhada' Battalion composed of three batteries equipped with 130 millimeter mortar cannons, 107 and 122 millimeter tubular launchers.
   C- Al-Mikdad Battalion composed of three batteries equipped with 105, 130 and 122 millimeter cannons.

4- Al-Hasan Tank Battalion Annex (E)
   It is composed of a headquarters and three armored companies as shown hereafter:
   A- First Company – Composed of four troop carrier and wheeled armored platoons.
   B- Second Company – Composed of four tank platoons.
   C- Third Company – Composed of four armored and scattered combat vehicle platoons.

5- Anti-Armor Defense Regiment Annex (F)
   It is composed of a headquarters and three companies equipped with anti-tank weapons in addition to a Support Company equipped with a 60 millimeter mortar cannon and 145 millimeter quadruple machine guns and s.b.g./9 cannons.
6- **Al-Mehdi Anti-Air Defense Battalion** Annex (G)

It is composed of a headquarters and three batteries equipped with antiaircraft cannons and Strella Missile Bases.

7- **Defense and Duties Regiment** Annex (H)

It is composed of a headquarters and four patrol companies in addition to the headquarters company.

8- **Al-Mustafa Brigade** Annex (I)

The location of the brigade is in Qasr Shereen and it is composed of three regiments and the headquarters of the brigade. They are:

A- First Regiment located in the Camp of Meedan in the governorate of Al-Sulaymaniyah. Its commander is Hasan Salman (Abu Ali). It includes (100) renegades, is divided in three companies and comprises an intelligence (Ittila'aat) group.

B- Second Regiment located in Banjuween Camp in the governorate of Al-Sulaymaniyah. Its commander is Kareem Kamel (Abu Raja'), in the vicinity of Nal Barizah village and it includes approximately (100) renegades.

C- Support Regiment located in Banjuween Camp in the governorate of Al-Sulaymaniyah. Its commander is Jamal Abdel Saheb (Abu Ammar) and it includes approximately (100) renegades.

D- A post for the brigade of two offices in the city of Al-Sulaymaniyah and the district of Halbaja which is used to lodge their agents to go to the inside of the country for their subversive operations and come back.
Locations where the Headquarters and Formations of the Disloyal Badr Corps are opened

Below are the details on where the disloyal Badr Corps locations are opened:


2- Recruitment Center – Ghayour Asli Camp in Al-Ahwaz.

3- Haydar Al-Karrar Division – It is located in Abu Karrar Station in Al-Huwaiza with all its units.

4- First Division (Product of the merging of Imam Ali Division with Al-Hamza Division).
   This Division was in Sankar Camp and later on was moved to Sarbil Zahab due to the take over of the camp by the Guard. It carried out joint military maneuvers with Iranian units in the middle sector at the beginning of 2001.

5- Ansar Al-Hussein Division
   It is located in Ghayour Asli Camp in Al-Ahwaz with the exception of the Naval Regiment in Hor Al-Huwaiza in addition to some temporary locations in the Western Ahwar which are used most of the time to collect information and to explore the targets in the two axes of Baghdad and the Southern region.

6- Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division
   It is located in Dayzafoul Camp (on Dayzafoul – Shusheshter Road in the direction of Shusheshter at a distance of 15 kilometers).

7- Al-Hussein Tank Battalion
   Hajj Foujan Camp in Al-Ahwaz – Sifhat Al-Shamariya.
8- Malek Al-Ashtar Brigade
Located in Welayat Al-Faqih Camp in Bakhtaran, with the exception of Al-Mikdad Battalion which is in Al-Shahid Madani Camp in Dayzafoul.

9- Anti-Armor Regiment and Defense and Duties Regiment of the Corps.
Located in Welayat Al-Faqih Camp in Bakhtaran.

10- Al-Mehdi Anti-Air Defense Battalion
Distributed on all the camps occupied by the Corps and prepared to defend the Corps from an air attack.

11- Al-Mustafa Brigade
Its headquarters is located in Qasr Shereen and its regiments are in the two camps of Banjuween and Meedan.
**System for the Administrative Division of the Corps:**

The agents were distributed in the Corps based on the date of their retrogression and work with the Corps in the following manner:

1- The old ones who escaped to Iran before the events of 1991 A.D. and considered the best and capable of leading. They are divided in two groups:
   - Official or Honorary Guard.
   - The Fighter who gets his salary from Al-Sibat.

Therefore, those referred to are divided in two groups. The first group was entered in the register of the Guard and the second one was not entered and their sequence goes from (1 to 20,000).

2- Sessions of (Al-Ahrar – Al-Tawabeen). Those are the renegade prisoners. They are divided into sessions and there are (19) sessions only. They are considered to be the category supporting the command of the criminal Mohamed Baqer Al-Hakeem and their overwhelming majority imitates Al-Khomeini. Their sequence number begins from (20,000 to 30,000).

3- The volunteers from the cities. They are the exiled Iraqis and they are listed among the category of the old.

4- The insurgents (resistance). They are the criminals who participated in the events of the Chapter of Treason and Betrayal. They presently form two third of the Corps and their sequence numbers are divided as follows:
   - From (60,000 to 70,000) volunteers in the Southern axis.
   - From (90,000 to 95,000) volunteers in the Western axis.
   - From (40,000 to 60,000) military volunteers, inside Iran who escaped from their military units during the Chapter of Treason and Betrayal.
   - From (70,000 to 90,000) the so-called insurgents and city volunteers.

To take into account the sequence of the numbers.

(11)
Military operations carried out by the disloyal Badr Corps 9 against Iraq

1- 1986 A.D., Al-Ahwar operations, evidence of treason.
2- 1986 A.D., Hajj Omran operations, evidence of treason and participation with the Iranian army in the battle.
3- 1987 A.D., East Basrah operations, evidence of treason.
4- 1988 A.D, Halabja operations, participation in the battle and occupation of the city of Halabja, detention of Iraqi prisoners until they were handed over to the Iranian forces.
5- 1988 A.D., operations of Darbandakhan lake – subversive operation aiming at Darbandakhan dam.
6- 1988 A.D., the Iranian army assisted in obstructing the operations of Mujahidee Khalq.
7- 1991 A.D., it contributed effectively in the Chapter of Treason and Betrayal.
8- 1994 and 1998, targeting the units controlling the borders in the sector of Misan.
9- 1999 A.D., participation in the subversive operations in the governorate of Basrah.
10- Missile launching operations on Baghdad and the governorates and targeting of the presidential palaces, the security offices and important government offices.
11- A booby-trapped vehicle was seized in the sector of Kut to target the lines of Mujahidee Khalq.
12- 2000 A.D. a booby-trapped vehicle was seized to target Babil Al-Gharra' newspaper.
Iranian plan to embrace the Corps - (Indirect) Iranian Administration of the disloyal Corps

1- To attach the Corps to the highest authority in the military decision making which is the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and to directly supervise it, supply it with camps on the Iraqi borders, divide its operations into axes according to Karar Kah map in order to coordinate and avoid breaking off the relations. Since its formation in the year 2000, the Iranian intelligence introduced selected groups of the Corps elements to sessions specialized in blasting, surveillance, collection of information, opening of locks, forging of documents and targeting of prominent figures. The training operations are still going on and the trainees were distributed on the axes.

2- The Corps relies directly on Iran to get training, weapons, material support and it participates with the Iranian army in joint sessions on the arts of combat. It also participated with the Iranian army in the maneuvers which occurred in 2001 in the sector of Sarbil Zihab close to the Iraq borders.

3- To rely on some officers of the Corps to create the academic schools specialized in the military sciences to take advantage of the experience of the Iraqi army in the planning and recruitment. A staff school was created belonging to the disloyal Corps located in Teheran under the supervision of the renegade Ali Fekri.

Conflicts inside the Corps:

1- Conflict between the Old and the (Tawabeen).
   As mentioned at the beginning of the study, the first cell of the disloyal Corps was constituted of elements belonging to the disloyal Al-Dawa party and it was called (Martyr Al-Sadr) Regiment and the Tawabeen were called the (Old) (14).
The second regiment was called the Khomeiny Regiment. After merging them, the command was given to the Old for several reasons:

A- They claimed to have the priority in Islam on the Tawabeen.
B- They were considered a partisan organization which carried out the goals of (Al-Dawa) party.
C- Because the Tawabeen made a mistake which was to fight of the Muslims of Iran.

Due to the difference in the allegiance of both categories; the Old were loyal to the Guard and in secret they were loyal to Al-Dawa Party and the Tawabeen were loyal to the Council and the Command of Al-Hakeem, many conflicts arose between them. The worst was the revolution of the Tawabeen in which they attacked the command of the Corps and occupied it. Abu Ali Al-Basari fled in his car. The following day, the Guard interfered and the situation was settled to the advantage of the Old. Later on, a large group of Tawabeen was dismissed from the Corps. The Old still believe that the Tawabeen are not competent to command and their repentance is not accepted. As to the Tawabeen, they accuse the Old of being against the rule and of taking advantage of the animosity the Old have towards Mohamed Baqer Al-Hakeem who was appointed by an order coming from Khomeiny. He is the Vice-President of (Saheb Al-Zaman) and disobeying him is considered a disobedience to the order of the (custodian of Muslims).

2- Conflict between the (Insurgents) on one hand and the (Old and Tawabeen) on the other hand.

At the end of the glorious battle of Qadisiyat Saddam, the Iranian regime tried to coordinate with the Syrian regime in power at the time by transferring the activity of what was called the opposition, including the Corps, to Syria. Indeed, the agent Al-Hakeem went with a group of renegade officers to explore one of the camps to move in. The events of 1991 A.D., the acceleration of events and the desire of Iran to take advantage of them prevented that. The opposition inside Iran remained and here begins the struggle between the two abovementioned groups. The demagogues claimed that they were the ones who restored the opposition after
it was subjected to disappear and others claim that they were the ones who created it. The other group is the stronger for being supported by the Guard. Besides, the majority of the demagogues support Al-Khawa'i and in return the Tawabeen and Al-Dawa don't support him and keep away from him in their statements. That's what upset them and led to the separation of authority which developed sometimes into a clash.

3- Conflict among the command of the Corps
There are axes in the command of the Corps. The first one is Abu Ali Al-Basari, a civilian, (Al-Dawa Party), supported by the Guard in the command of the Corps. The second one is under the command of the renegade Abu Lika' Al-Safi (Margin reads: *We explain his military formation*). He is a supporter of Al-Hakeem command. He adopted the idea that the Corps command be for the officers and the military commander because the Corps is an army and it should be commanded by militaries. He is supported by the officers and the Tawabeen. As a result of that, the Southern axis has been separated from the headquarters of the Corps and there has been an attempt to create a Corps under the command of Abu Lika' in the South. The Guard interfered immediately after and the conflict was settled in 1993 A.D. by making Abu Ali Al-Basari commander of the Corps and Abu Lika' his assistant and his role was curtailed. After Al-Hakeem interfered, he was appointed as (General Commander) of the Iraqi Armed Forces whether in the Corps or outside it which means the forces working with Karar Kah.

**Figures of the Corps**
1- Abu Mehdi Al-Muhandess (Commander of the Corps)
   A- Graduate from the School of Engineering / Basrah University, resident of Al-Ma'akal, his parents reside in Basrah, married to an exiled Iranian. He fled to Iran
for his connection with the disloyal Al-Dawa party. He resides in Teheran, Al-Fardous Street.

B- He was living in Kuwait and in 1984 A.D., he blasted the US embassy in Kuwait. He was also accused of blasting oil wells. He fled immediately after to Syria, then to Iran. He was commanded at the time by the Khomeiny Guard.

C- In 1984, he volunteered in the disloyal Corps and was appointed Assistant of the Political Belief. Presently, he got promoted to the position of Commander of the Corps for his special connection with the Khomeiny Guard and the agent Al-Hakeem.

D- He is a man calm, ambitious who looks at the opposition command. He doesn't like to get public in conflict with anyone. He is intelligent, sophisticated, humble and he doesn't have military information.

E- His particulars.. Slim, tall, grey hair and moustache, 45 to 50 years old, wears medical glasses, always smiling. He uses two cars. A Mitsubishi Land Cruiser and a Crusade Salon, new model.

2- Hadi Farhan (Abu Hasan Al-Farahi)

A- He was an employee of the Supreme Council until 1986 in his capacity of Official in charge of the Investigations.

B- In 1988 A.D., he was selected as Assistant to the Khomeiny Forces (Forces of the disloyal Corps).

C- He works presently as an official of the General Intelligence Service (Al-Ittila'at) at the headquarters of the Corps and President of the Corps Administrative Panel.
D- Resident of Al-Khales district, graduate from Baghdad University, School of Administration and Economy, born in 1956 A.D., short, tanned complexion, loud voice, uneducated, coward, married to an exiled Kurdish/Iranian from the residents of A'aylam, resides in Karmanshah/Ballura – Tak Bustan – Shahrak Muften / Residential complex of the officials.

E- He uses a Nissan car, 1998 car, his driver is an exiled by the name of Abu Qaiss.

F- He is from (Hizballah) group to which he is affiliated for interest. He participated in the demagogic events in the sector of Khanekeen. One of the operations he carried out was to enter Kasba Kafawi, burn the Post Office, destroy the station of electric power in addition to intercepting the military units in the sector of Sankawa. At the time, he was ordered to escape and he left the subversive groups which were with him.

3- Adnan Ibrahim Muhsin Al-Najjar (Abu Ali Al-Basari)

A- He occupies presently the position of Assistant Commander of the Cops and Official in charge of the Western axis (to explain). He occupied previously the position of Commander of the disloyal Corps.

B- Resident of Basrah city – Shatt Al-Arab – Al-Tanuma district. Graduate from the School of Arts – English Language Section.

C- He fled to Iran in 1980 A.D. after disclosing his ties with the disloyal Al-Dawa Party and being one of its cadres.

D- He is 50-55 years old. His particulars… Short, tanned complexion, thin hair, wears glasses from time to time.
E- Married to an Iraqi, has grown-up children, resides in Karmanshah – Dur Al-Sibah. He uses a grey/black Land Cruiser car bearing a Karmanshah number.

4- Nouri Ja'afar Muhsin Faraj Al-Safi (Abu Lika')
   A- He is presently in charge of the Corps intelligence (Ittila'at) (handwriting reads: before his escape in 1980) and supervises the middle axis, having the rank of First Lieutenant of the Intelligence Section.
   B- Born in 1955 A.D. in Baghdad, graduated from the First Military Academy. He previously resided in the governorate of Kut – Al-Hay district / Al-Mua'alemeen quarter.
   C- On 11/8/1980, he escaped to the Iranian enemy side when his unit was in the sector of Obadan and he belonged to the unit of Division 9 / Brigade 33, Intelligence Section.
   D- All his family is affiliated with the disloyal Al-Dawa party, even his sisters.
   E- He is married to an Iraqi, resides in Al-Shush and has another residence in Dur Al-Sibah.
   F- One of the very trusted elements of Al-Hakeem criminal. His particulars… Tall, big, with white hair, having a beard and moustache. Generally, he wears a military uniform and for the occasions he is in civilian clothing. He uses a 1990 Mitsubishi and a grey Patrol.

5- Hasan Kazim Hasan Al-Rashed (Abu Ahmed Al-Rashed)
   A- Born in 1963 A.D. in Basrah. He resides presently in Iran/Al-Ahwaz, married with 4 children.
   B- He escaped during the 1991 events. He is tall with a black beard and moustache, white complexion face and medium structure.
C- He previously entered an Iranian intelligence session in Kum. He uses a Land Cruiser Toyota.

D- He participated in the subversive events of the Chapter of Treason and Betrayal. Later on, he escaped to Iran and got affiliated with the disloyal Badr Corps. He is presently Commander of Haydar Al-Karrar Division and has a direct connection with Karar Kah Kuds (Ali Khamansi).

E- The subversive operations he carried out:

First: Assassination of Comrade Settar Mohamed Lazem in the district of Karnah after placing a mine in front of his house.


Third: Placement of a booby-trapped poster in the district of Karnah which resulted in the martyrdom of four partisan comrades.

Fourth: Attack on the Karnah Intelligence Center of and the party division with Katyoucha missiles.

Fifth: Attack on the party division in Al-Shursh region.

6- Mohamed Ne'emeh Hasan (Abu Zul Fiqar)

A- A renegade prisoner, First Lieutenant, Intelligence Section, handwriting reads: before his escape/ he belonged to Brigade 33, Intelligence Section.

B- Married with two wives. One is Iraqi, residing in Urdakah Mathari and the other one is Iranian, residing in Shahraq Khomeini. He had the intention of moving to the village of Shamirani on Shuheshter - Dayzafoul Road.

C- He was the commander of Haydar Al-Karrar Division. He is presently the Commander of Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division operating in the Southern axis.
D- His particulars: Tall, full, with a belly, beard and moustache. He wears black medical glasses. His face is red with a long nose.

E- He has a brother named Abu Du'a (Moussa), graduate from the School of Agriculture and Forestry / Al-Karma. He escaped in 1996 A.D. to Iran, married, residing in Al-Khaffajiya.

7- Hamza Qassim Sabet Al-Darraji (Abu Haytham Al-Saddaki)
A- Born in 1959, A.D. A fugitive Deputy Officer, married to an Iranian, with three children, residing in Karmanshah / residential building for the Corps officials. He was previously a resident of Misan. Later on, he moved with his family to the city of Baghdad – Saddam city.

B- he escaped in 1989 A.D. to Iran and joined the organization of the disloyal Al-Dawa party in 1981 A.D. He created the first platoon of the disloyal Badr Corps which he named Moussa Kazim Platoon (For the Mujahideen).

C- He occupied several positions in the disloyal Corps including the position of Commander of Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division and official in charge of the Corps operations. He is presently in charge of the Baghdad axis and he is in A'aylam.

D- One of the hostile elements and a protégé of the Iranian Intelligence inside the Corps. In coordination with them, he collects the information with Karar Kah Zafr connected with Ali Khamansi. He was brought to find elements and move inside the city of Baghdad with restrictions.

E- It was reported that he collects information on the members of the command and their families including Mr. Qusay Saddam Hussein to target them.
8- Ali Fekri Hasan Abdel Kareem Al-Najjar

A- Born in 1949 A.D. in Basrah, resides with his parents in Baghdad – Al-A'azamiyah – Balal Al-Habashi Street – In front of the Intermediary School of A'eesah For Girl – House No. 1/59.

B- On 6/5/1982, he was imprisoned by the Iranian enemy when he was a Major, Commander of the Second Infantry Regiment/48. He remained in Al-Ahwaz Camp for prisoners for a short while. This camp was called (School of Martyr Jameeran). He joined the renegade agents the same year and he is from the old sessions of renegades. The first mission he did was the investigation of the resisting prisoners in the same camp.

C- He used to be released from time to time from the camp and for limited period of time by the Intelligence of the Khomeini Guard, along with a number of other prisoners, to present military information on the Iraqi regions on the border line of the Iranian military units.

D- He has an Iraqi wife living in Iraq and she has from him Ammar and Ihsan. He has a brother called Kareem (he resembles his renegade brother a great deal) and works at the real estate bank.

E- In 1991, and in August of that year, he asked his parents to come and meet with him in the Northern region but they refused meeting with him.

F- He has a wife in Iran belonging to the Isfahan community. She resides in Dawlat Abad in the vicinity of Teheran and he has from her (Kareem, Melkiya and Abdelazim). It was reported that he has
that he has a second residence, a kind of villa, in Bazdaran.

G- He is Sunnite. The Iranian asked him to change his rite but he refused. That's the main reason for not getting appointed to a commanding position in the disloyal Corps, knowing that he is one of the most educated renegade officers and reads daily for long hours.

H- He held the following criminal positions in the Corps:
First: Teacher at the Corps Staff School.
Second: Commander of the (Martyr Daka'iki) School which is specialized in training the elements of the Corps.
Third: Official in charge of the Corps military unit for a short period of time.
Fourth: Commander of one of the Corps' brigades.

I- In 1986 A.D., the said person was replaced in the position of official in charge of the military unit by an individual called Abu Ali Al-Mawla (a resident of Mosul and a Shiite; a turbaned religious man) under the instructions of the criminal Al-Hakeem which deepened the disagreements he had with the turbaned religious men connected with Al-Hakeem to the point of an armed fight in which the Guards interfered. He was imprisoned for six months. His disagreements with the Corps' officials continued until recently. The information indicated that he has a large support from the Corps' officers.

J- The said person is presently in charge of the Corps Training Staff Panel in addition to the fact that Al-Hakeem relied on him and made him his military consultant. He accompanied him to the Gulf countries and Syria.
9- Tahseen Abd Matar Hussein Kulaib Al-E'ezawi

A- Born in Baghdad in 1961 A.D., married to an Iranian from whom he has a daughter. He was imprisoned by the Iranian enemy in the sector of Jannanah in 1982 A.D. during the glorious battle of Qadisiyat Saddam in which he was First Lieutenant. He was a Ba'ath member with the rank of supporter.

B- His father and brothers reside in Baghdad – New Baghdad – Al-Mua'aleemeen quarter – House No. 6559/3.

C- He joined the disloyal Badr Corps and held several positions including:
   First: Committee member
   Second: Platoon Commander in Bin A'akil Regiment / Hamza Brigade and Company Commander in the same brigade.
   Third: He entered the school's staff session of the late Iranian Ismail Daka'i'ki, founder of the disloyal Badr Corps.
   Fourth: Official in charge of the Hamza Division's movements.
   Fifth: He occupies the position of Commander of Ansar Al-Hussein Division belonging to the disloyal Corps.

D- His father was an employee at the Presidency Office and retired on pension. He was approached according to a plan to take advantage of him with regard to his son and to specify the future practical course to pursue with him. The matter is still followed-up.
Factors of weakness reported to us after conducting a follow-up

1- The Corps is composed of three competing ideological trends consisting first of the Islamic Labor Organization. It plays a minor role which is almost inexistent. The second trend is the so-called Hizballah which gets its power from Al-Hakeem and presently considered the most important faction inside the Corps. Then, there is the disloyal Al-Dawa party which gets its power from the Guard. Because of its supportive attitude towards the Guard's directions, it took hold of the important positions inside the Corps. The disloyal Al-Dawa party considers itself entitled to the command and considers the take over by Al-Hakeem of the command of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution and therefore, the Command of the Corps, a fraud since they were the ones who brought him from Syria.

2- There is a continuous rivalry between the supporters of Al-Sadr and Al-Khaw'i on one hand and most of them are fugitives after the Chapter of Treason and Betrayal and the supporters of Al-Hakeem on the other hand. This rivalry reached the degree of clashes with machine guns between the supporters of both trends, since the followers of Al-Hakeem pledge allegiance to Al-Faqih (Ali Khamansi). As to the followers of Al-Sadr, they ask for an Iraqi rule and consider Al-Sadr more entitled to the command because he is more knowledgeable and gives better advisory opinions during Friday prayer.

3- The presence of Ja'afar Al-Sadr on the Iranian political arena made him a competitor to Al-Hakeem known for his connections with the Iranian intelligence. He claimed to be more entitled to the command by the fact that his father was late Al-Sadr who was executed by the Iraqi government. But the Iranian intelligence finds in him a danger to its politics for not supporting the reign of Al-Faqih. This matter had an impact on the Corps and he finally decided to go to Syria and to reside there.
But the Iranian intelligence prevented him from doing so. He presently asks that the position for the command of the Council be filled by election and opened to all those present in Iran.

4- All the renegade prisoners try to leave Iran. Some of them wanted to work with the Corps in order to return home. We learned that in 2000 A.D. the Red Cross represented by its member for international relief (Emma Nichols – Member of the British House of Commons) visited the renegade prisoners and distributed survey forms to know their opinions on whether they want to return to Iraq or stay in Iran or travel to a third country. All of them wanted to leave Iran with the exception of the disloyal commands.

5- All the fugitives during the battles of Al-Qadisiyat and Umm al Ma’arik were between the ages of 18 and 20 years old. Now, they are married to Iranians and they are facing three problems which are the military service, working with the enemy and their Iranian wives.

6- /Margin reads: Move it under Strength/ Most of the renegade officers have been presently granted positions inside the Corps and they have properties, real estates and families. They basically involved themselves in material interests and considered their work with the Corps as secondary for them.

7- They are poorly convinced of the nature of their work and some of the renegade prisoners fled from Iran in the direction of a number of foreign countries, including Australia because they felt frustrated, they discovered the falsity of their commanders' claims and their salaries were low compared to the high cost of living in Iran.
8- Increase of mental illnesses. The majority of the Corps' agents are elderly, have families in Iraq and think to go back there. Iran buys their services and facilitates their travel outside Iran.

9- To limit the place of residence of the Corps' elements and to forbid them from moving without permission. Besides, Iran doesn't allow the children of those renegades and agents to attend the Iranian schools without special permissions because most of the agents and renegades are of a limited educational background and teaching their children will create a class of educated people which in the future will be a problem for them and will make the work of the Iraqi intelligence easy.

Reported elements of strength:

1- Military support from the Command of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.

2- Most of the Corps' elements are fugitive soldiers and renegade prisoners. They are well trained on weapons. They are exiled and followed by Al-Dawa party. They are elements who hate the command in addition to the fact that they fled during the Chapter of Treason and Betrayal.

3- Weakness of the national guided media. The instructions pertaining to the prisoners and the explanation of the content of the decisions taken by the command don't reach these renegades and at the same time there is a counter media from the Iranian regime.
4- Recruitment of the renegades and agents members of the Corps under several designations to carry out the work missions of the Iranian intelligence inside Iraq and among its targets are the locations of the Iranian organization of Mujahidi Khalq in Iraq, the collection of information about the military sectors, the technological advancement in the field of armament and the targeting of officials.

5- Members of the Corps were pushed to the inside and were entrusted with subversive operations to give them a role and to use them as a card in every operation of rapprochement between Iraq and Iran so they would be the peers of the Iranian organization of Mujahidi Khalq.

6- After the creation of what is called the United Iraqi National Conference and with the blessing of the United States and the support of the region countries and Iran, the latter emphasized the role of the Corps, claimed that it was the unique military force in the ranks of what is called the opposition and made it present in the vicinity of the Southern and Northern sectors.

7- The Corps cannot be considered a capable military force because as admitted by the group in charge of its supervision, it is incapable of resisting the Iraqi army, when we come to compare their armament and training. But this weak Corps could be a source of threats to the security of Iraq should the imperialist forces use it. These forces are represented by the US, especially that the criminal Al-Hakeem has meetings with the rulers of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait regarding the improvement of the Corps and the support of its role by resorting to the international conspiracy against Iraq.

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Remedies:

Through organized and accurate intelligence work on the disloyal Badr Corp done last year in accordance with a plan, we obtained categorized information in addition to the withdrawal of a number of renegades and the disruption and neutralization of the agents' plans. It was an excellent and precise work done pursuant to the following directions:

1- To work on modernizing the database of the Corps' formations, its command and influential elements, locations, alternative locations, amendments and changes entered on it.

2- To try to know the conspiratorial plans the Corps has against Iraq, the Corps' extensions in Iran and inside Iraq, its subversive intentions and the covers its elements use inside the country or its infiltration in depth in Iran.

3- To try to elect qualitative command members having an effect on the Corps' decision making and to move in their direction to recruit them or neutralize them or burn them when they don't agree on that.

4- To create an influential in depth group to be used as front probes and early warnings. Its effectiveness was proved in notifying us about some of the Corps' plans and their orientation and led to the elimination of some of the subversive performances directed against Iraq. /Handwriting reads: To target some of its codes./

5- To push the Corps in a direction to disrupt its movements and activities through
skillful misguidance and concealment done with accuracy to insure
the performance of fictitious and fallacious operations.

6- To work on checking and verifying the renegade prisoners coming
back to Iraq. To take advantage of the information they possess and to
use them in the opposite direction by sending these prisoners back.

7- To work on penetrating the Corps' computers and medical treatment
division to use the information obtained for the benefit of our
intelligence work.

8- To maintain our penetration of the Corps by recruiting qualitative
sources selected from its influential commanders to insure that the
decision making sources are reached in a time record. To widen this
process so it allows the control of the Corps' locations.

9- To identify the officers working for Iran in general and for the Corps
specifically. To limit their transfer unless there is an approval from the
competent office. To differentiate them from their peers by rewarding
them for their additional work efforts and to fill the vacant positions in
order to monitor the activity of this faction.

10- To continue working on the commands inside the Corps. To limit the
scope of their connection inside Iraq and to take action with them in
accordance with three lines. The first line is to be approached so it
would work with us. To let the second line work in the Corps and
leave Iran. To target the third line.

11- To work on the axes existing in the Corps and hostile to Al-Hakeem
by spreading division among them to increase their splitting. To
support
the viewpoints hostile to Al-Hakeem and to work on dismantling the Corps by guiding our sources in this direction.

12- To study the expansion of the role of the national media by conveying the instructions of the command and the decisions issued on how to transfer the information to the Corps' elements by video or audio media or by resorting to friendly media reaching Iran. To create a steady program on the Iraqi satellite to be broadcasted weekly in which there are interviews with the families which took advantage of the pardon decision, provided that the interviews be conducted in their work places or homes.

13- To charge our stations abroad to study the possibility of conveying inside the Corps the decisions pertaining to the prisoners.

14- To allow the wives of the renegade prisoners to travel legally to Iran to explain to us the condition of their husbands after their return to Iraq, on the condition of meeting with this category and recruiting it.

15- To issue a pardon decision for the fugitives and to oblige the tribal sheikhs to move against their fugitive relatives, especially in the border regions.

16- To create a guided radio in the sector of the border line where the Corps' camps are present to disclose the bluffing methods used by the Corps' command, in addition to using the special cases we receive about the Corps from our sources in order to weaken the persons involved in them and gradually degrade them.
17- To /Handwriting reads: continuously/ take action with respect to the relatives of those working in the Corps and to be in touch with them by phone or directly in order to recruit them or neutralize them or keep them away from any act against Iraq. In case they approve to work with us, we keep them inside the Corps to watch the intentions the agents have and their moves against Iraq.

18- To target the locations of departure of the agents on the borders which are equivalent to a point of entrance and exit for them.