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### A Mother's Deep Sorrow

I was informed that Isma'il died as a result of a blood infection (gangrene). The Arab physicians have agreed that the Afghani doctor, who treated him at Miranshah was responsible. The doctor stitched the wound ignoring the known fact that battle wounds are not supposed to be stitched. Stitching battle wounds leads to infections which was what happened to Isam'il.

Doctor Khalid, who works at the same hospital, had previously warned that the doctor was a jackass and he did not know anything about the medical field. He also caused the deaths of many of the Mujahdins. Due to this fact, Doctor Khalid and others have started to suspect that this doctor is deliberately killing the Mujahdins.

They believed that he is still a communist, due to the fact that he had fled the capital, Kabul, a short time ago. The Afghanis called those immigrants (Sakir Bist), in reference to the Egyptian rockets (Sakir 20) which were launched by the Mujahdins at the capital Kabul, causing a wave of immigration. Those immigrants were sympathizers of the communist government. They fled because they feared for their lives and not because they wanted to join the Jihad.

Unfortunately, this killer or jackass doctor, as Khalid described him, was able to kill many because he advocated Afghani nationalism among the Afghani workers at the hospital. He also conspired with the hospital workers against the Arab Wahabi doctors. He allowed the corrupted employees to steal medicine from the hospital and sell it on the black market, thus gaining their support and protection. This protected him from being investigated, despite the many complaints that were filed by the victims' families. However, Haqani interfered and fired him from the hospital after the killing of Isma'il. Haqani was very lenient in that decision because others, including myself, were calling for putting the doctor on trial.

Isma'il was infected at Miranshah, and after his condition deteriorated he was promptly transferred to the military hospital in Rawalpindi. A Pakistani helicopter transferred him there. However, it was too late. One of his kidneys had stopped functioning and then his other kidney stopped functioning as well. He died and the helicopter brought his body back to Miranshah in order to be buried there.

Strangely, his mother was being treated at the same hospital for an advanced case of cancer. She was slowly dying. A few steps from her, the second of her children died and she witnessed his final moments at the hospital. She accompanied him in the plane in order to oversee the washing and the preparing of his body for burial. She also wanted to be at his funeral. A few days later she died.

For the third time my wife finds herself in the middle of a tragic death. The first time was when she lost her son and a few days later she lost the orphan infant she had been raising with our children since 1988. She lost her mother in 1988 at a hospital in Bshouar. My wife was the closest to her mother's heart among her eleven children.

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This time we shared our sadness with this Afghani society. This society opened its heart and door to us. We have shared with this society its happiness and its sadness as if we were an essential part of it. Isma'il was a compartment of the heart that supplied this Jihad group of men, women and children with life. His three brothers represented the other compartments of this strong beating heart. They supplied this heart with strong belief and instinctive heroism which only shows at the times when men are hard to find. However, this instinctive heroism does not appear when there are an abundance of men with their heads held up high, and it is difficult to distinguish any of them over the other. Fate made the death of her loving son, Isma'il, the last death the Great Mother witnessed in an endless chain of losses of the men in her family. Perhaps solving the mystery of this mother, who is a legend, could help solve the secret of the miracle that happened in Afghanistan. The minds might be able to understand the miracle that was accomplished by people, who are living in extreme poverty and a backward civilization, who were able to stand up to the biggest military force in the world and defeat it. Then, they confronted the world and imposed their will and religion over their own land. They did this in a tyrannical world that does not allow a religion or will, which opposes the will of the great Satan of the world, to exist.

The Great Mother was the safety valve of this society of immigrants. This society included her sons and daughters and also the families of her relatives who lived in close by homes in the immigrants district in Miranshah.

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Most of the time, the "Great Mother" was also responsible for the 'homeland front' in the absence of most men. There were men who were in charge of guarding and serving the homes and the families. On the other hand, the Great mother was in charge of organizing the domestic affairs at home. She made sure that the children went to the mosque, memorize the Quran and stopped them from arguing with each other. She stopped the fights among the women which occurred for different reasons. She took care of the orphan children and their mothers who lost their men in the Jihad battles. All of those assignments were part of the Great Mother's duties. She handled her duties with toughness and kindness at the same time. She held a stick, in one hand, to wave in the faces of the violators be they men or women. In her other hand, she held a rosary to pray with.

In addition, she was in charge of managing the campaigns, which were launched from the front of the homes, led by one or more of her sons. She kept the children away from the passing cars. She would hit one of the children with her stick to remind them of the safety rules. She reminded them to stay away from the dangerous spots when the convoy was moving. The convoy might have contained tens of trucks that carried armed men. The great convoy moved along getting goodbye hugs and hearing shouts of God is Great from the people, all having conflicting thoughts of hope and worry. They worried because the trip for many of the men might have been their last Jihad battle, and they would have been leaving their wife, children and family for the last time.

The Great Mother was the most active and fit among all of them. She was the hidden force who pushed and moved everyone. With her skinny body, her slightly hunched

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posture, and her facial features that showed her inner goodness and firmness, she ran everything with controlled quickness. She surrounded her sons, and all the men, with motherly love, and the firmness of an Arab woman who did not allow weakness to find its way to her soul.

She bid me many farewells and she prayed for me, as well, when I joined some of those missions. She said my name repeatedly, Mustafa, accompanied with other words. I did not understand those words, but I was happy to hear them as if my mother came to bid me a final farewell.

I purposely used to watch her for the longest possible time. My eyes were filled with tears several times while I was watching the moments of goodbyes. The men were going to their death. The mother was being strong while she was sending her sons to do their duties. The men were focused and full of laughter while they had mixed emotions.

My car was the last one in the caravan. I use to be last, on purpose, in order to watch how the mother would react after the caravan left carrying her beloved men who loved her.

They loved her as a mother and a maker of heroes.

She raised her hands when the caravan moved to pray. With a rosary in her hand she prayed until the last vehicle disappeared. Her eyes were full of tears as she was taking the children towards her house and then she closed the door. It was strange to see her cry as if I forgot that she is a mother. She cried even more during the time the caravan moved, while she was helping prepare the group to leave.

I used to go to our car, which was waiting in a distant place, after she left. I was hoping that she did not see me miss the caravan that just left. She would have hit me with her stick on my back or my head. You might think that my old relationship with the family and the area might protect me from the punishment for not joining the men for jihad.

However, the Great Mother does not play favors to anyone.

The mother moved her wheel chair to a room where her son, Isma'il, was being prepared for his coffin. Although she was in a deteriorating condition, she supervised the procedure. After she finished supervising the procedure, she took her son's body to a big room so that the family could bid him farewell.

Isma'il was wrapped in white cloth with his face exposed. His white face was more bright and vibrant, which is a sign of the martyrs. It is as if they are telling the people they leave behind that they are happier as martyrs rather than staying with family and children. His face was surrounded with roses and flowers, as usual. His five children and his wife came to bid him a farewell before the men and the women started to come. The Great Mother sat in her wheel chair near the room's door. Her body was solid and her facial features were frozen. When my wife stood next her, without looking around, she called her; Wafaa. My wife came to her

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and gave her a hug. The mother put her head on my wife's shoulder and she cried hard until her sons came and asked her to stop crying so that the other women would not start wailing. Hakani and his brothers Ibrahim and Khalil were trying hard to stop the women from crying and wailing. They asked my wife to help calm down the women. Some of

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them were crying because they were sad and others were crying just to be polite and to follow traditions.

The way my wife looked would make anyone cry and be full of sadness. She was crying with heavy tears. She still feels the hurt, for her son Khalid's grave is only a few meters away. The new sorrows have awakened her old sorrows and did not help her to forget them. The sadness and misery have exhausted her, and she was moving as if she was a machine that is falling apart and on its way to the junk yard after a long and exhausting trip. In spite of all that, she was successful in controlling the wailing women. This is an impossible mission to accomplish even for an international agency. Despite the fact that she did not speak their language, yet she was able to accomplish this. She was speaking to them with a mixture of different languages and with different types of vocal expressions which she created herself. She did know the meaning of those vocal expressions. She never explained to me the secret of her success. I thought that she used a combination of a mystery language, her uncontrollable tears, and her exhausted voice to awake their pity or also their fears. They felt that they are in front of a real life tragedy which made them forget the tragedy they were crying about...they were hit with deep silence.

After Isma'il was buried, they continued accepting condolences at home for several days. Those days were very crucial for my wife who had somewhat performed some of the duties of the "Great mother," whom the cancer had trapped her in a wheel chair and almost sent her to her death. With all this, my wife was feeling sorry for her Yemeni friend, Hakani's new wife. She was worried that the tragedies surrounding her would get to her heart. She was always trying to calm her down and give her encouragement. However, she was not as strong as the Great Mother, so she collapsed and she lost consciousness for several hours. They thought that she was going to die. At that time, I was at the front lines working on the long and [arduous plan](#) for the new airport project. They tried to call a doctor from the city for her but they did not find anyone. So they had to call an Arab doctor, a friend who worked at Miranshah Hospital. He treated her with shots and medications until she was able to regain consciousness. Then he told them to move her to the house so that she could get some rest. However, that did not happen because she stayed next to the Great Mother in order to comfort and take care of her. On the morning of August 29, a car came from Hakani's home. In it was one of his younger sons. He was asked to come quickly, because the Great Mother was dying and wanted to see [her](#).

My wife went quickly to their home. She went to the Great Mother's room. When she opened the door, she found girls and women around her bed. The Great mother was lying down on the bed covered in a white sheet and her head was directed towards the door so that she can see who is coming and going from the room. As soon as my wife opened the door, the Great Mother called her; Wafaa. My wife went to her and gave her a hug and kiss on the forehead. She took a copy of the Quran in order to join the girls and the women in reading Yassin chapter.

The Great Mother used to sense that my wife was approaching, and then she would call her name. At first, the women around found this strange, but they got used to it. There

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was a great love between the two of them. Death was taking away from Wafaa her second mother, and it was taking from The Great Mother her beloved daughter. The women in the room were reading the Yassin Chapter in the room until Hakani asked for permission to enter the room to see his mother. They fixed up the place and the women got covered up. He stood next to her bed, with his tall and skinny body and his exhausted smiley face. He exchanged a quiet talk, and then he laughed when she spoke to him. He talked to her for a few moments, and he prayed for her then, he left. Hakani told me later about this last talk. It is still in my heart. It stirs up pain and admiration in my soul.

Later, Hakani told me, "I found my mother crying. So in order to comfort her I told her, "Mother, are you afraid of dying? It is inevitable for all of us. Be strong, remember God, and ask for his forgiveness." So, she said to me crying, "My son I do not cry because I am afraid of death, because I know it is inevitable for all of us. I am crying, because I wanted to know what is going to happen to Afghanistan before I die." I laughed and told her, "Do not worry my mother. God will never let our Jihad and the blood of the martyrs go to waste. Take care of yourself. Remember God and ask for his forgiveness."

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This mother had surprised me and given me confidence that victory is near in the battle of Afghanistan. She also gave confidence in the fate of Islam in Afghanistan. This land and its people will stay as the Islamic force in attacking the world until the Day of Judgment. Islam is safe on this earth which produces women like the Great Mother. This mother was able to give Islam men like Hakani, Isma'il, Ibrahim and Khalil, who can fill the world with belief, courage, and advancement. This wonderful mix of human beings and believers on earth will make Afghanistan on the top of humanity. It will be a strong heaven for Islam on the face of the earth and on top of the world.

As darkness fell, they brought my wife to her home. However, they called her again, on August 30<sup>th</sup>, to attend the funeral of the Great Mother, who died during the night.

At the big family home, Wafaa continued to perform her role during the long and sad days. She was there to stop everyone from crying and wailing, as if she was putting out fires. She did not have to work too hard this time because the women were exhausted from crying so much. The men and the women felt like they were orphans after they lost the Great Mother. Even the children were not getting into their usual mischief. Their eyes have gotten bigger in disbelief that they lost the Great Mother. She never forgot to take care of them even if their parents forgot about them because they were too busy. Even the war caravans that left from the desert square that faced the immigrants' houses felt the loss enthusiasm, and they seemed like they were in a funeral processions. This was how I perceived it.

I think it was apparent in the eyes of the other men after they lost the Great Mother. She used to supervise all those caravans and she was there to bid them farewell. I asked myself if it's possible for a weak being like her, with a skinny body and veined palms, and with no weapon except a rosary in her right hand and her short cane in her left hand,

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to give courage and hope to all those strong men who were fully armed with weapons of war and struggle which they hold with their rough, strong palms and muscular shoulders and backs.

Where does this weak woman get her strength? And how can she flood this huge gathering of strong and rough men who were armed with weapons of death which they played with as children play with a wooden dummy?

In spite of all that, they were so attached to this weak being in order to get, from her, a prayer, a blessing and hope for a victory over the enemy. Why do I feel like an orphan again after I passed the age of 45? Why does this square of greatness, where countless military campaigns have been launched, now seem like a huge cemetery waiting for the corpses? The caravans that used to shake my inner feelings in the past, have now become meaningless, cold and routine, in my opinion. There is no happiness in life and no fear in death. They have become the same. The death of Isma'il and his mother in the past few days has renewed in me sorrows which are less than two years old. In one year, I lost three of the most beloved people in my life, my friend 'Abd Al-Rhman, my son Khalid and my friend and brother, Abd Al-Mnan, who was the leader of Alkutshi.

However, God's blessings have been placed upon me as it was placed upon others like Hakani and his brothers. We've had several victories this year until it was stopped with the conquering of the city of Khost and then, in less than six months, we conquered Kabul. In less than two years, communism fell.

Friday, August 13, 90

Today, the news confirmed that Iraq invaded Kuwait. The Sheik of Kuwait has narrowly escaped capture. However, some members of his family were either captured or killed.

-A phone call from Islamabad informed me that my friend 'Basil' had arrived in Pakistan to work as a correspondent for radio Abu Dhabi.

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-Sayaf arrived at night in Miranshah and he went directly to meet Abu Al-Harith. A heated discussion occurred between the two of them. Sayaf doubted the importance of the military operation in a town called Khost. He was also belittling its importance. He reiterated his theory that there is no benefit from occupying any city except Kabul, because that will end the war.

I commented on his thoughts when I heard him. I used the metaphor of a street beggar starving yet he refuses to eat any food except kabobs.

Saturday, August 4, 90

We bought three donkeys from Miranshah for our camp, the leader Abu Al-'Abbas. Now we have completed our herd of riding animals.

Also a truck moved towards Abu Al-'Abbas carrying 70 rockets. The truck drivers used to refuse to carry more than that because the road passed through rough terrain.

I talked to 'Abd Al-Rhman before he left to the command center at Abu Al-'Abbas. He told me that we are set with the rockets around the airport and we will be using 12

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rockets. I was surprised by that number because to send up the strike you only need about 1/3 of that number. In addition, our backup ammunition was insufficient and was being replenished at a slow pace. He added that the young men's morale was high because of the strikes that occurred yesterday. He advised me to do one strike so that the morale of the young men would not be affected if they have to wait a long time for the start of the final strike.

I explained to him that the objective of the project would not be reached if I did that. The plan was to create a complete network of launchers which will prevent the enemy from using the airport at anytime, night or day.

One launcher will not be able to cover a runway that is 3km long and 3 launchers is the minimum required to accomplish this goal. This will create a firing obstacle which will prevent the airplanes from landing without being hit, for sure.

Collectively, we were able to organize the ammunition storage in the tunnel located between the launching cave and the cave next to it. We put the new mortar rockets in the launching cave quickly because we were afraid of a surprise air strike. From there we moved it to the storage in the tunnel. I was very impressed with the storage set up because the mortar rockets were very well organized according to their types and well protected against humidity. They were lifted off the ground with wooden beams and were away from the cave walls. We organized the lines in fours.

We dedicated a specific space for incendiary bombs so we may easily reach them when needed.

We created a log for this ammunition according to its type, date of arrival, from whom it was issued and to whom it was issued by date. We kept good records of the items which were stored until the end of the operation. This was one of the big factors in our historical operation.

Sunday, August 5, 90

I started my daily program at camp Abu Al-'Abbas as usual by performing the morning prayer in the living cave which was in the interior of the camp, while the "launching cave" was located in the front section of the camp. The kitchen cave was next to the living cave. And then comes the assignment cave, then the ammunitions cave and at the end we have the launching cave. They were all in one line in the shape of an arc and they were all connected.

I have prevented the young men from gathering outside the caves in big groups to pray, eat or to entertain each other in order to avoid unnecessary losses should we get a surprise attack by an air strike or mortar rockets.

I decided, and only once and it will never be repeated, that we will eat breakfast with tea in a group sitting in front of the caves. That decision created enthusiasm and lots of happiness among the young men. They prepared the setting very quickly and they helped prepare the tea, bread and plates of food. They also prepared the plate which we always had in our camp which was potatoes. However, nobody noticed or commented on that plate. And that's exactly what I was aiming to do when I made my revolutionary decision in the morning of that day.

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We started to complete the work we had commenced the day before, that is, arranging the rocket storage. Upon examining one of the launchers we found that some parts needed to be repaired in Miransha.

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We started our outside rounds and we saw Majbur in his suspended cave. He said that the fighter planes have struck some of the Mujhadin on the front line in order to create a cover for the parachute drops carrying supplies. He said that he tried to strike the drop area but his launcher broke after the first mortar rocket was fired because of an electrical malfunction. We promised him that we would examine it after we finished our rounds. We went in a car to Al Kutshi center in the southern part of Druazjy. We have not received it from them because we have been too busy in other matters. We received very few of them because we were busy with other matters and didn't have enough people. We had three young men with us who were doing location surveying and determining the height of some important locations. I climbed with them to the top of the future center at Druazjy. We were in contact with another group from our main center. They have located the precise location of the Druazjy Mountain. With this, we can strike with our launchers when the time of the operation arrives.

We asked the group in Al Kutshi to give us a guide to show us a route that had no mines in the high mountain in the north of Druazjy. They assigned us a person who went with us there.

Our car stopped in front of the mountain. We were supposed to climb over 100 meters to the top of a hill which had dense bushes and then climb to the top through a path full of mine fields which had occasionally claimed many victims from the shepherds.

We got out of the car. The guide pointed with his hand and said, "This is the mountain." I felt like something was wrong. I told him, "We know this is Druazjy Mountain. We brought you here to guide us to a path to climb to the top. It has to be clear of mines." He said, "But I haven't climbed this mountain before." I felt a lot of rage and I told the driver to take him back to the south of Druazjy. The young man's enthusiasm escalated and they were convincing Ibrahim to climb to the top without a guide but I absolutely refused and told them we would find another guide or we will find a point to survey the location. They agreed hesitantly and they kept their objections to themselves. Abu Tami criticized me about this decision later on in the day when we were alone in the car on the way to the camp going towards Miransha. He said, jokingly, you have applied the saying, live like a coward, you die without shame. I didn't like the joke; I just consider it an unsuccessful attempt at humor. It was a hard test. God help me to keep a good relationship with Abu Tmim when we are working together, even though his nature and his ways of dealing with others are not much help.

I decided that it would be a shock to the young Arab men when they discover that I was not looking for them to be martyrs on their own terms. We accomplished our operation, or the airport project, using one location for surveying and command without going through the mine fields and without the help of a guide. We have gone through them, unknowingly, or on other occasions, were forced to.

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We took all the usual security precautions, the creative ones and the unusual ones. With the help of God, none of us was injured or martyred, although, we were attacked fiercely while we were working. Everyone, Arabs and Afgani, attested to the fact that this was an unusual attack.

We came back to Majbur center. Abu Al-Shahid examined the electric circuits of the launcher and fixed the problem. There was a location at Majbur which was surveying the nearby mountain. I asked Abu Al-Shahid to climb it in order to determine the possibility of using the location as a watch spot. He found that there are two mountains blocking the view from the runway at the airport and our original location was much better.

We learned from Majbur that he is preparing for an operation to heavily attack the defensive line of the enemy which is facing him. A thought came to me to join the operation in order to trick the enemy and to use it as training for Abu Alshid on this type of operation. He was supposed to use this technique against fighter planes in order to distract them when we start our operation.

We toured the area which separated the defensive line of the Mujhadin and the first line of the enemy. The Majbur men went with us on the tour. We walked in a narrow winding valley until we got to a location that was not far from the mountains of the enemy. The guys told us that here is the start of the enemy mine field. We stopped and consulted with Abu Alshid regarding an idea to start a smoke screen from here and, at the same time, we launch Katyusha rockets from the same location. This will be enough to make the enemy think that the attack is from Majbur artillery. This will be a cover for a ground attack from the valley. This attack has occurred before, however, was stopped at the mine field obstacle.

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Abu Al-Shahid added that he is going to work on special sound effects of tanks moving using a voice recorder and big, powerful bull horns. He also said that he will try to obtain one or more sniper guns in order to disturb the enemy's defensive line. I liked his enthusiasm. I gave him a push forward when I said we are going to start immediately on this project. I also told him he needs to prepare a list of needed supplies and equipment. Also, he needed to choose the individuals necessary to help him from the members of our camp or any other place. We started to work together with great enthusiasm which reminded me a little of our childish enthusiasm while I was working with Abd Al-Rhman five years ago.

We asked Majbur about the possibility of finding a guide to lead us on a climb of the mountain in north Druazjy. However, he couldn't find anyone he knew who would be able to help us.

Abu Zayd suddenly contracted Malaria. So I decided to move immediately to Miranshah to take him back there for rest and treatment. Then I will search for his replacement to accomplish his duties from the Abu Al-Harth group.

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Abu Al-Nur came with us in the car after the sunset prayer. In our house, I found my son, Walid, who came from Pishawar in order to join a short training course in the camp of Jihad Wal.

Monday, August 6, 90

In the early morning, Abu Al-Shahid started to buy what he needed for "Operation Smoke". In the Arab house I met Abu Al-Harith and I asked him for an individual who can substitute for Abu Zayd temporarily. I also asked him to supply us (BM-1) rockets to support our fire power in the airport project. He said that he would give us his final answer on this matter when he comes to our camp, with his brother, the next day. I reminded him of what we previously had discussed regarding the military value of Torgar Mountain. We were going to use it as a launching pad against tanks and I expected exceptional results from this operation. A location such as Sheikh Amir will not resist for long and it will fall. As a matter of fact, even the mountainous defensive line facing us will not be able to last for long either. The route from Todashni to mountain Torgar is very important. We could not pass it over the mountain and it has to go from behind it until it gets to Todashni directly with (Borikhil). This will save the cars from traveling three to four hours on rough terrain. Abu Al-Harith said that these operations need a bulldozer but the Algerian Arabs are using it now to prepare a cave under the command and surveillance center mountain that is used by Hakani. Also, he personally, Abu Harith, is busy guarding Hakani because the guards around him are careless.

In a different discussion, I talked with Mubashir about purchasing ammunition which has been going very slowly. He asked Mubashir to buy six incendiary rockets and flare rockets which could be launched from 82 mm mortars. All of this was intended to light the airport runway during our operation. Darkness was an obstacle for precise targeting of the airport runway. However, it would prevent planes from landing.

Mobashir said that he obtained 60 mortar incendiary rockets from the commander, Nur Ahmad Shah, who is part of Mujadidi party. I asked him to look for more and send them to the main quarters.

The car started moving from Miranshah to Jihad Wal Camp. Our group consisted of Abu Al-Shahid, Hadji Ibrihim, Abu Talha and my oldest son, Walid. We left Walid at the camp with Ibrihim and Talha after we obtained new surveillance binoculars. From there, we went to Al Faruk camp nearby. From this camp we got my Russian sniper rifle, however, it wasn't in good condition. The sun had set while we were at the Al Faruk camp. So I suggested to Abu Al-Shahid that we either spend the night at Al Faruk camp or go back to Miranshah and leave from there in the early morning to return to our camp, Abu Al Abbas. I told him that I haven't been on that new road that connects the areas of Jihadwal and Buri Kail. There was a possibility that we would run into an ambush by the hypocrites as it happened with commander, (Shirin Jamal). The man lost a number of his aides in that ambush and he himself almost became one of the victims. However, Abu Shahid said he knows the road very well and it is a safe road.

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Abu Shahid drove the car for more than an hour through a very narrow road in the middle of two walls of solid mountains which did not widen except for a very short period of time.

As darkness was settling in we arrived at the entrance to the valley where Hakmtiar men used auxiliary cannons (D.C) and where they have several small caves near their auxiliary cannons. Abu Al-Shahid knew some of them so they invited us to spend the night with them and eat some food. However, we were in a hurry. So Abu Al-Shahid rushed and made a sharp left in an area that was flat and wide. On the edges of the area there were two hills with medium length bushes and some wild trees.

I didn't realize until several months later that I was in the place where we brought the paratrooper's commander in 1985. At that time, we were also looking for a place where we can strike at the airport with mortar rockets. The martyr, Abd Al- Rahman and Abu Hafs Al-Msri were with me at that time. Abu Al- Shahid drove us speeding over a winding creek and a ground which was covered in fine pebbles. That made it very tempting to speed. I noticed that the area was getting quieter as we drove and the narrow valley was opening up to the wide main valley. I noticed that we are going north. A far away light started to appear. I said to Abu Al Shahid, I think you and I are about to invade Khost City. This is a good omen. We thought that we are now in Khost valley. He was staring at the far away lights. I told him to turn off the car headlights immediately before we get hit with a tank rocket, and to turn around without hitting the breaks in order for the break lights not to come on. Abu Al -Shahid repeated what I said and then executed what I recommended immediately. He went back with at a high speed until we got to the location where the auxiliary cannons were. We found a number of the Mujhdin who were anxiously awaiting our return. They were screaming behind us to warn us but we didn't hear them. They congratulated us for coming back safely and they guided us to a returning road.

Ten minutes after we left them we stopped to perform the sunset prayer. We washed up in cold fresh-water from the creek and we prayed alongside the road. I felt like I was born again and I said to Abu Al Shahid, "It's a good omen and we will invade the city but not tonight." We had a fun conversation until we got to Bury Khail. We got four Arab volunteers to help Abu al-Shahid in "Operation Smoke" as we named it. We stopped in Todashni because of heavy air strikes. We performed the evening prayer while the bombs were falling at a close by distances from us. The heavy air strike continued though the night. The planes were landing at the airport under the cover of the strike while the bombs from Mujadidi cannons were still hitting the airport. I had a feeling of regret that we were very late starting the "airport project."

Tuesday, August 7, 90

The air strike continued despite the sunrise. Also, the Mujhadin's strike continued as well. It seems there is something at the airport. We drove the car early with Ibrahim and Abu Al-Shahid towards the first line that is located in front of Majbur facing the first defensive lines of the enemy on top of the mountain. This was the last chain that belonged to the enemy at the edge of Khost valley. Talha drove the car and we picked up two Mujhadin from Al- Kuthy. Shortly after we passed Majbur center, we made a left

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towards the “first line.” Then, the fighter jets attacked the place that we were at and dropped the bombs they were carrying. Other fighters attacked Al –Rajmat Valley (Darjat Stan) with bombs in a vicious surprise attack. Talha drove the car back to Abu Al-`Abas to pick up a group of young men in order to repair the old Majbur center which was destroyed by the strike in case we needed to use it for the individual launchers that Abu Al-Harth and his group will bring us. The heavy air strikes were repeated. The fighters even struck the no man’s land which lied between the first line of Mujhadin and the communists. This surprised me and I didn’t understand the reason for it. I spoke to the commander of the first line about ‘operation smoke’ but he wasn’t very enthusiastic about it and said that the enemy would not be fooled by it. We spent two hours at the location. We have taken more than 60 pictures of the first line of the enemy and the airport runway as it appeared from there. I came back with Abu Al-Shahid to old Majbur center and we examined the suggested location of operation “Smoke”.

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In the old Majbur center, the young men were cleaning up the caves and the locations of the launcher and the heavy mortar rockets (Al-Ghrnai) with enthusiasm. We saw Musatfa Al Turki (Al-Darwish) carrying his bag and walking by himself in the valley (Dazjat Stan) that was facing the location. He was surprised when our presence in that location that has been abandoned. We told him of the possibility that we were going to use the location as a launching site. We were not prepared to serve him tea. We sat on the hill where the launcher and the mortars were located. We were facing the (Drjat Stan) street. We talked to him about Turghar and the idea of using the tanks from its top. He was enthusiastic about the idea since we talked about it last time. He said that he found three locations on the top of the mountain which were suitable for attacking tanks. There was also a location that was suitable for protecting our tanks from the enemy fire. He also obtained the approval of the commander of the site, Major Fahim, to use the location for the tanks. However, he, Mustafa Al-Turki, does not know how to follow up on this matter with them, so I told him that I would follow up as much as I can with Hakani and his brothers Ibrahim and Khalil. I asked him about the possibility of using bazooka to attack the planes while they are parked on the runway. He said that it is technically possible but the Al-bazooka itself is under repair.

Due to the difficulty we were facing in getting enough ammunition for our operations, I was looking for an alternative weapon which can cover the runway or at least a part of it. This weapon needed to provide heavy firing with minimum cost. The heavy automatic weapons were the most suitable but we had two problems; the range of the weapon and protecting the weapons from the enemy fire. As far as the firing range of the weapons, there were very few locations that allowed the shells to reach the runway. At a later time, we discovered that this fact only applies to the heaviest shell we have (23.5 millimeter) which was the shoulder to air missile. At first, we thought that there was a location that will allow the automatic weapon (Zicoiak) which was 14.5 millimeter, to reach its intended target. However we discovered later that we were wrong.

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We came back to Abu Al-' Abbas Camp. We found out that two of our Mujahdins' neighbors were wounded in an air strike. They were wounded in the head and the chest. We transported them to the back of the Center so that the ambulance to take them to Miranashoh. They were badly wounded.

The air strikes were causing delays in the work of the surveying group. They did not accomplish much today. Abu Ahmad Al-Libiy, who is the leader of the group, lost his communications equipment in the stream. He was very nervous all day. When we got back, we heard the news that a transport plane was disabled because of the shelling of the Mujahidins. In the morning the plane was hit by a rocket and it was completely destroyed. I think that our friend Jamal delivered the news to us.

Wednesday, August 8<sup>th</sup> 90

Darwish Al-Turki arrived at our center in the early morning. Although I was exhausted from the flu, I sat and spoke to him. We continued what we discussed the day before about the tanks in Torghar and using the bazooka to shell the runway at the airport. We also talked about political and military issues as well as some general subjects. I admired very much his vast knowledge of all aspects of life. He gained most of his knowledge from his many trips around the world. He had soft Sufi personality which contradicted the personality of the Arab Afghan Mujahdins.

After Darwish left in order to continue his trip between the tops and the weeds, I went to get my full rest before I continued the daily program. The summer flu had a very strong affect on me.

Two hour later, I went with Abu al-Shahid by car to look for a new site to place the single launcher because everyone was against using the old Majbur location as a launching site. We went around till noon prayer, but could not locate the proper site.

Finally, the launcher from Shah Khan arrived which he had promised to deliver long time ago. His brother brought it with its launching team. We accepted the launcher and we told him that we will need only three from the launching team later. In any case this was a nice surprise. We had enough supplies to work with, but that caused us more pains. We did not have skilled individual to operate the launcher well. We had to look for someone who could operate the third launcher. However, we could never accomplish

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that. "Al-Qaeda" was not generous at all in supporting the airport project with its staff. They also did not provide enough administrative support in order to fulfill the needs of the project. They had promised to provide us with this support from the beginning. However, we had a worst surprise waiting us.

Abu Zayd and Abu Tamim arrived in a vehicle from the Arab Hospitality Center. That in itself was supposed to be a happy occasion. However, they carried a message from Abu Abdullah, Usama Bin Ladin, advising the Gulf young men and specially the Saudis to be on alert and calling upon them to procede to Saudi Arabia to defend their land against a

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possible Iraqi invasion. He specified four names among them was Abu Shahid. He also asked for a telescope that pinpoints distance. This is the text of his message:

Dear beloved brother Abu walid. May God protect you.

Peace upon you and God's blessings . . . Hereafter:

Please send the brothers Abu Shahid Al-Qatari, Abu Suhaib AL-Dosari, Abu 'Abd Al-Rahman Al-Muhajir, and Abu Talaha Al Muhatsib. This is an order from Brother Abu Abdullah to the brothers in Peshawar. They are asking for all the Gulf brothers except for the trainers. Iraq spread destruction in Kuwait and many residents left. Kuwait became a battle field. The latest news this morning stated that 4000 from the American troupes are on the way to Saudi Arabia in order to protect it. Matters are changing. Please send the brothers quickly and send the telescope that pinpoints the distance. This is an order from Abu Hafs. May God reward you.

I was really bothered with the decision to pull those young men. Our project was suffering from a lack of man power. We were able, with great difficulty, to provide man power for the look-out point, fire correction and two of the three launchers. This was the minimum requirement for our project. Now, everything might have to stop. I considered the telescope that pinpoints the distance is the property of Hakani. I gave it to him in Peshawar in 1987 in order to repair it in one of the shops controlled by Sayaf's Arabs.

The telescope was very expensive (ten thousand dollars at that time). When it disappeared Hakani was very embarrassed. I just told him that we found the telescope. What am I going to tell him if Abu Hafs took it? I am sure that he is not going to return it. They insisted that the telescope belongs to them, and it is not the old one that was under repair at the shop when it was lost. Their stubbornness about the telescope was enough for me to sever my relationship with them and risk the airport project. So I sacrificed the telescope in order to keep my hopes of continuing the project alive. I spoke to Abu Shahid about the risk of pulling those young men. I told him that this will cause our project to stop. He was enthusiastic about continuing the project to the end. He said that he is not going to leave and he will talk with Mubashir and Abu Hafs in order for him to stay.

His statement gave me hope. I was wondering about the leadership of Al-Qaeda. They pulled their staff from such a crucial project, and risk stopping it and at the same time they did not pull the trainers from their training camps that are full of "tourists" from Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

Abu Tamim told me that Mubashir is upset because of the delaying of the airport project, and he blamed me for that. Maybe Mubashir was looking for a good excuse to stop his involvement with the project. Pulling those men was enough to accomplish that. We had reasons to delay the project, but most of it would delay the project for only a few days. As far as the two launchers we got, they both needed parts and parts of them were being repaired in Miranshah. The other reason he had was the problems of the surveying project which was caused by Abu Ziad being ill. He worked on the survey project for only one

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day. To continue working without completing the area survey would mean wasting ammunition due to the inaccuracy of shooting. Specially that we have decide to launch heavy shelling in order to increase the possibility of hitting many planes and demoralize of the enemy.

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We contacted Mubashir via wireless communications in Miranshah, and he agreed to leave Abu Shahid to continue with the project. However, we were asked to send him the telescope that pinpoints distances. We also decided that I will go to Miranshah for discussion.

We have decided to open a new center in the south of Drwazji. Uthman Al-S'idi was to run the launcher and be in charge of the location. We will also move a launcher, shells and other necessary supplies there.

Thursday August 9<sup>th</sup>, 90

Abu Zayd left with seven members of the surveying team in order to finish his work so we can start shooting next Saturday. The vehicle moved with Ibrahim, Uthman Al-S'idi and seven others in order to open the new Drwazji Center. We called it "Al-Qadisia" then.

The vehicle came back and picked up some supplies. The vehicle was very late coming back which caused us to worry. The vehicle was carrying the launcher and we were worried that something bad might have happened to it. Something bad has actually happened because of our new young driver who was a Bedouin from the Arabian Peninsula. He introduced himself as an excellent driver. So we tested him on this first trip. As a result of his high speed and lack of attention to the road, he lost control of the vehicle and it flipped over after it went into a ditch. The accident could have been a disaster because one of Al-Kutshi Bedouins was sitting in the back next to the box that contained the launcher for (B.M, 12) rockets. They picked the Bedouin up on the way and he asked them to take him to the same center in Drwazji. After the vehicle flipped over, the Al-Kutshi Mujahid, who in the back flat bed ,was suppose to became ground meat after the steal box fell on top of him. The accident happened near the new center in the south of Drwazji. The young men saw the accident and they rushed to get their colleagues from the flipped over vehicle. They had bumps and bruises. They were screaming to save the man who was in the back flat bed next to the launcher. They had no doubt that he was dead or he was grasping his last breath. The young men worked together until the vehicle became upright, then they moved the heavy steal launcher box. They found the young Kutchi in perfect health, and he came out smiling. He said that he is well and he has light injuries in his leg. Finding this unique man was the bright spot of this unfortunate accident.

He introduced himself by the name Haji Muhammad Fridi from the Julab tribe. We called him Haj Muhammad. He was friendly, nice, and he liked the Arabs for religious reasons only. He was courageous, fearless with no military experience worth mentioning.

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After that, we had many funny situations involving him. He tried to depend on us to provide him with ways to execute his military projects. He was like me in this aspect, because I depended on my personal contacts to provide me with means to execute my military projects. I was very sympathetic to him and concerned about him at the same time. He noticed how I felt about him somehow. He used to have love and great respect for me, although our relationship was new.

My concern for him drove me to stop his most important military operation. He was trying to place a heavy automatic anti-aircraft weapon on top the mountain of the first line in the Malisi area. So, I sat down with him with members of our camp. The man spoke the Arabic language with a Gulf accent because he worked there for many years. I gently explained to him that in order for him to use anti-aircraft weapon from the top of the mountain facing the enemy, he has to dig a covered bunker. This bunker will protect him from the mortar rockets. I also told him that they have used the anti-aircraft weapon in an uncovered location and they were hit by mortar rockets.

He said that he wanted to fix the weapon himself and he will use it in the same manners again. He explained that the covered bunkers are done by the communists who do not believe or depend on God. He added that all he needed from us is to fix the anti-aircraft weapon in order for him to use it against the government forces there.

I agreed with Abu Tamim, who was closest to him, on a general method in dealing with the new friend. We treat him as he was one of us. Also, we decided to drag our feet on the issue of the anti- aircraft weapon in order to stop him from executing his ambitious program.

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Commander Shah Khan's Group was situated near the entrance of our narrow valley before it opened to Drzjat Stan valley which was wider in comparison. This was considered the main route for the Mujahidin.

They did simple bunkers on the other side of the hill that they lived in. They put their launchers a few meters away from their simple caves. They asked us to carve a good cave for them on our own expense, in order to strengthen their location. They also asked for sand bags to put around the launcher in order to protect it from bombs fragments. This was a positive improvement. At the beginning, they were objecting to surrounding the launcher with sand bags, because they thought the bags would catch fire if they get hit with bomb fragments.

We promised them that we will ask Mubashir to dig a cave for them on his own expense. We have previously agreed with Mubashir to divide up the work among us when it comes to such demands. We did not want our front to be so affected with the pressure of the heavy demand to the point where if we could not meet those demands, this would reflect negatively on our relationship with the groups that are working with us. However, we took the issue of securing their bunkers seriously, because if they endure any damage then that will affect our fire power, which I wanted to increase to five launchers.

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Shah Khan's Group had another surprise, beside their agreement to use the sand bags to secure their launcher. They told us that a friend of theirs, who came from the city of Khost after he visited his brother in jail, went to Mira Shah. He was able to take detailed pictures of the airport. He told them that the plane, after it lands, goes to a side road to empty its cargo away from the runway. This information was correct, and it confirmed the conclusion we came to from our surveillance information, despite the fact that one of the hilltops obstructed our view of this specific area. This was the only part that was obstructed from our view. Obtaining those pictures was priceless. We wanted to obtain them, so that we wanted to accompany the man to Mira Shah to meet his friend and get the pictures at any cost.

After some give and take and some negotiations, the man refused our request. So, we took him with us in our vehicle that was damaged today in the accident. We also took with us Haji Muhammad Fridi in order for him to get some medical care for his foot in Mira Shah. When we got there I was informed that my wife and the children had left Mira Shah to Islamabad. They did not tell anyone the reasons for their departure, so I started to get worried. Nobody mentioned that they were in an accident that caused them to leave. So, I decided to call them by telephone the next morning.

In the evening I had a long talk with Mubashir to get information about the situation in the Gulf area. The information we had was very limited. I got the impression from our conversation that the Gulf area was under an Iraqi –American occupation. Iraq had occupied Kuwait and was threatening Saudi Arabia. The American forces arrived the day before or will arrive today to defend Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf countries. I imagined that is an Iraqi –American plan which they had agreed upon earlier. Mubashir said that Abu Abdulla (Usama Bin Ladin) had urged the young men from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Country to go to Dhahran Airport specifically. As far as Mubashir is concerned, he said he would proceed to Saudi Arabia soon and that he would deliver the ammunitions we had agreed upon for the “Airport Project”, including the fifteen hundred rockets which he had bought.

Friday August 10, 90

We started in the morning to try to find the person who was coming back from Khost with the pictures of the airport. After several tries, we learned that he left to Peshawar and he will come back in four days. We asked his friend to leave him a message asking him to come to the camp as soon as he came back.

The empty house without my wife and kids was very sad looking. I left the house and went to the market in the city to contact my family in Islamabad by phone. Mubashir and a young Arab man joined me on the way.

We walked around for a little bit in the market. We stopped at several gun stores. Mubashir was looking for some supplies for the training camps. I enjoyed visiting those stores to examine the new and old guns and even the swords, the antique daggers.

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I wish I had the financial capability to buy the antiques. However, even if I had the financial ability, protecting those antique in a police state, such as the one we live in, is impossible.

I learned the children's school had started two weeks ago. There were four of them studying in the Saudi Schools in Islamabad.

My wife did not know that there was a big problem waiting for her and the four children. The Saudi schools insisted on interrogating the children in order to gain information about my activities. When the children complained to their mother, she had a huge problem with the school at first, then the Saudi consulate, then the Saudi Embassy. The problem ended when the children were pulled from the school and all of them came back to the front line of the battles in Mira Shah as we will see later.

We left our vehicle in Mira Shah to be repaired which meant delaying the 'Airport Project'. Mubashir promised to provide us with a vehicle to take us to one of their secret training centers in the Bari area. The center was called Khalad Center. We have not seen it before. It held an advance class on the usage of explosions. The vehicle was there in any case in order to take supplies to the camp. From there, we had to borrow a vehicle to the Khalad camp to take us to our main center Abu 'Abbas. We got in the vehicle. Before we moved, our neighbor, who rode with us in order to get the airport picture, came with a friend. They rode on the flatbed in the back.

One of the young Arab men came and whispered in my ear that today is graduation day for the young men who completed the explosives class at the Khalad Camp. They have invited Mubashir and any other member of the leadership to come from Peshawar. Abu Hafs was expected to come. He promised them to do an ambush with explosives. Since we were leaving, it was possible that our vehicle might get caught in the ambush. I thanked him for the warning which was useful.

We arrived to Bari area. At the tip of the area our vehicle veered left into narrow path that was surrounded by mountains. It was the "Press Street" as 'Abd AL-Rahman and I used to call it in our golden days. It was full of huge centers which we discovered by coincidence. The centers were full of arms and ammunition which had no connections to the current military operations. We looked at them as centers full of suspicious characters and the unemployed.

The driver was a young Arab man. He pointed to a room made of mud on a hill on the left and said that this is Khalad Center. On the right, the mountain was covered with short trees which had the leaves with pointy edges that Khost Mountain was famous for. I noticed two people running between the trees and a third person was giving a signal from the top of the mud room. The word ambush jumped to my mind. At the same moment, a big explosion went off and one of the trees jumped in the air and landed directly on the front of our vehicle. Its branches covered the front windshield. Then, bullets were being shot sporadically, and then there was heavy shooting for a short time.

The warning, which I got in Mira Shah, was useful. It helped me keep my usual calm and dignity. I calmly got out of the vehicle to find our two Afghani friends, who jumped out of the flatbed, hiding under the vehicle. They thought that we fell into a real ambush. Luckily, they were unarmed, or they might have opened fire on our Arab brothers.

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The young Arab men surrounded the vehicle laughing. They all knew me and I knew some of them. The engineer of the ambush was Saif Al-'Adil. I saw him for the first time. He has narrow Asian eyes which showed intelligence and deceit. His skinny strong body was full of energy. He came to greet us laughing and I think he was sorry that I did not show that I was bothered. However, he was really gloating about the embarrassment of our Afghani brothers who came out from under the vehicle laughing. Their clothes were wet and covered with mud. Then Saif took us to our room on the top of the hill. The young men surrounded us. Looking at them filled my chest with happiness and confidence. The eye cannot mistake their strength and their high moral. I blame the Islamic leadership for its failure in defeating the world with such strong and wonderful young men.

After a year and a half from that day Saif Al-'Adil became the husband of my oldest daughter, Asma', who was fifteen when she got married.

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We drank tea with them in a hurry in order to leave before dark. The young men tried to ask about what is going on in the Gulf. I briefly told them the little information that was available by following the news, because we were busy preparing the Airport Project. They gave us their vehicle with a driver to take us to Abu-Al-'Abbas and return the next morning.

We arrived at Martyr 'Abd Al-Rahman Center shortly after sunset which was near Toda Shini Village. This was the last center we worked in together. It was very quiet and the sky was full of clouds. The place is full of memories and pictures of the martyrs who left marks of sadness in the heart which will never go away.

We prayed the sunset and the evening prayers together in a group as we always did on the frontlines. We continued our journey to Abu AL-'Abbas Center. To take full advantage of the vehicle we have decided to supply Al-Qdisia Camp or as we called it Uthman Al-S'idi Center. So, we put thirty rockets in the vehicle and some other supplies. Abu Al-Shahid Al-Qwai drove with one of the members of our camp. However, during our drive through the rough terrain one of the tires blew up, which resulted in delaying him until eleven o'clock in the evening.

Saturday August 11, 90

With the first light, we put fifty four rockets in the vehicle to transport them to Uthman Center. I wanted to have one hundred rockets at Uthman Camp before the start of the operation. I was not sure about the daily quantity of rockets we will be able to supply during the operations. It is possible that we could not supply the camp with rockets on a daily basis. This could happen because of either the air strikes, or the loss of our vehicle due to a breakdown which was common occurrence.

We bought a lamb from Mira Shah yesterday. We slaughtered the lamb in the early morning in order to take the meat to Uthman Center.

Abu Al-Shahid drove us there. The young men, who were with us yesterday from Khlad Center, came with us in order to watch the preparation for the Airport Project. They

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climbed to top of the mountain at Uthman's to look at the airport runway. Abu Al-Shahid went with them to explain to them the situation in the actual location. We also wanted to explain to them our ideas on how to work the launchers. They were very enthusiastic about the project. However, their leadership had other ideas and other projects in far away places.

We returned to the Abu Al-'Abbas camp. Our friends from Khlad Center got ready to return to their bases with the vehicle. We tried to delay them for an hour in order to utilize their vehicle to transport Abu Zayd and the surveying group to their working area. However, they refused and left to their camp.

So, Abu Zayd finished his work walking, while I went with Abu Al-Shahid to visit Muhammad Fadil in their center near by in order to ask them about a suitable location for our new launcher. We had to drink green tea with him before we moved to a location deep into the mountain in the middle of the imaginary straight line between his center and Uthman Center (Al-Qadsia). The location was a center for the Mujahdins in the past during the liberation war in the Druazji area. They had auxiliary and rockets launchers located their.

The location, which we have not discovered before, was wonderful. The location had a half-circle shaped cave with two entrances. The downfall was that the holes in the cave were sloping downward which would allow the rainwater to get inside. Also, it was carved in a hill which was not very high and not very solid. As a result parts of the ceiling collapsed and it needed of cleaning. On top of the hill, there was a place which was previously used for a launcher and in front of that there was a place for mortar rockets. Then, there was a narrow path and at the end of it there was a room made out of stones. The room had a door but no windows and it seems that it was a winter shelter. The room opened to an area that was full of holes and nooks and it ended at a creek half kilometer away. This was the same creek which passed by Uthman Center. Both centers depended on the same water creek. We climbed to the hilltop near by the location. We found it full of trenches on the south side. These trenches belonged to the Mujahdin. In the north direction, Majbur location with its suspended cave was exposed from the hilltop. The foot of the mountain, which slopped sharply, separated them and it was full of rocks with a few wild trees. There was also a flattened path for people to use. We wanted to go to Majbur and his men to greet them, but our friend warned us that the foot of the mountain and the path are dangerous because they were mined and have not been cleared yet.

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I liked an area on the top of the mountain which was extremely flat and its ground looked like a natural trench. However, Muhammad Afdal said that it is a rain waterway. So my idea died before it saw the light. The experience of Muhammad Afdal in the area and his participation in the battle to control it were very useful to us.

They were raging battles as was apparent from the damages caused by the air strikes. The holes in the ground were deep and spread in the area around the cave and the location of artillery guns on the top of mountain itself.

Afdal told us that there is an old road for vehicles which connects this center and Uthman's group. This was valuable information, so we asked him to take us through it.

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He took us through the rough terrains which were also so beautiful It made us feel joyful. The place was ideally more suited for the type of fighting the Mujahdins conduct rather than a conventional army.

In a place that is not that close to the Al-Qadsia center, we found Alq'qa' the second in command at the center. He was standing by the water creek and he was surprised to see us. We went to the center, and we found the same surprised look from the people on the road. Then, they started to welcome us and to hug us.

After Abu Zayd and his group arrived, we all had a big lunch for the first time in approximately a month, which consisted of rice and meat. We laughed as we reminisced about Abu Al-'Abbas Camp. We talked about Abu Al-Nur who always cooked potatoes with everything even meat. We use to have nightmares about potatoes. We took Abu Zayd and his group and some members from Uthman Center to show them the new center. Abu Zayd was able to easily pinpoint the location on his military map because it was very close to several locations that we pinpointed this morning. Everything seemed to be going well, and the group's morale was high. All our assignments were being accomplished with ease and comfort.

We took Afdal back to his center after we agreed that he will accompany us to one of the hilltops suitable for placing Zicoiak on it. We did not mention the Al-Shilka project to him because we did not want the word to spread about it before we are able to execute it. Abu Tamim was involved in repairing Muhammad Afdal's launcher, which had electrical and mechanical breakdowns. He was also repairing the launcher from our Abu al-'Abbas camp that was in need of more repairs.

We were trying to stop the planes from landing at the airport. However, the opposite happened. We started heavy bombing of the planes at nine o'clock in the evening until two o'clock in the morning. When the mujahdin got exhausted and their artillery stopped, the planes started to land without any worries. That made me and every member of the project sad because we were still unable to operate successfully

Sunday August 12, 90

No one went to sleep tonight because the air strikes on our Abu Al-'Abbas Camp were very heavy. They were clearly targeting us more than any other time. More than ten heavy bombs were dropped on the hill where the caves were. In addition many bombs hit the mountain facing us. The planes bombed all the mujahdin's centers that had the ability to use its guns against the airport runway. The enemy was focusing on hitting our centers with force more than any other time. I was suspicious that they found out what we are planning on doing and they pinpointed our location or at least our main center.

At that time we had a group of young men who just finished their training, and they were visiting our center for a few days. They had never seen a such a heavy air strike like this one before. So they started to experience different emotions. Generally, some emotions were positive and full of enthusiasm. However, I became wide awake because of all that, and I felt exhausted after I got dehydrated because of the long walks we went through yesterday under the hot sun. I was happy with the fortifications we put in front of the caves because it stopped the hot fragments from entering and injuring someone inside those caves.

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I did not need to ask the night guards to come inside the caves during the bombing because the planes made them come inside laughing. The lights that were coming from the flames in the valley and the bombs fragments were stopped by the sandbags that I was grateful to.

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The orders to the guards were always to take shelter in the caves during the direct air strikes on our positions. The first part of the morning program I accomplished with Abu Al- Sahid who was to visit our neighbor Muhammad Afdal to look for a location for Al-Shakla. While we were drinking the green tea with him, we were interrupted by the fighter plane so we had to go inside his small cave.

As for the mountain he recommended to place the heavy automatic rifle on top of it, we found out it was mined, and Afdal did not know the safe paths and so we canceled this plan. Abu al-Shaid suggested that we focus today on preparing the new center until Ibrahim arrives to join us in the Al-Shilka project in order to have precious translation. We initiated the program by borrowing a donkey from Karim Group and used our three donkeys to move our belongings from Abu Al-' Abbas center to the new center since we have not gotten our vehicle back from Miranshah where it is still being repaired.

After sunrise I felt exhausted so I went to the cave to get some sleep but to avail because I heard a big explosion in not a far distance. Then, I heard another explosion. No one knew where the sound of the explosions was coming from. However, we found the source of the explosions after a short while. A number of Bedouins came running to the camp. They looked very disturbed, and a look of horror was in their eyes. They spoke very fast while they were pointing towards the mountain of Turghar. We understood from them that mines blew up some their companions while they were collecting fragments of the bombs that were dropped by the planes last night. They asked us for wood to make a stretcher. The young men from the camp helped them to bring the wounded. They brought three men with severe injuries in their legs which were almost severed and the only thing holding them was a piece of burned skin. The first one got into the mines field and when he was blown up he fell in his place. When two of his companions went to him to save him they were blown up by another mine that destroyed their feet.

We borrowed a vehicle from a center nearby in order to transport the three injured individuals to Miranshah. We were not able to administer first aid due to the lack of medical supplies and experience. In order to fulfill the need Doctor Jamal joined us. He is a skilled doctor. He joined the Airport Project for a limited time which allowed us to utilize his medical experience. He also spread a spiritual atmosphere around him by giving advice, reading the Quran and leading the prayers. He made the men praying with him cry because he read with a deep belief and fear. Doctor Jamal was full of medical energy and spiritual energy as well.

Two of our young men left on vacation with the vehicle that transported the wounded. This increased our personal shortage. I sent a letter to Mubashir with them asking him to send the vehicle back even if it was not repaired. I also asked him to send communication radios. I wrote in my memoir the following text:

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“We are still complaining about Al-Qaeda’s handling of the airport project and the fighting in Khost. It is lacking focus and interest. It is clear that they are focusing on the camps and it is impossible for them to focus on a battle unless Abu Abdulla – Usama Bin Ladin – is leading it. I see this as an unhealthy approach. As Abu Al-Shahid told me when we were walking together on the road: they got involved in this battle because we embarrassed them. I hope that his words were wrong.”

Abu Al-Shahid went with three young men to the new center but he got sick and he could not continue with them. He asked them to continue to their destination but they got lost for many hours in the middle of the mountain until a young Yemeni man named (Ibn Umar) found them. He was driving a pickup truck and he took them to Abu Al-‘Abbas Camp. He found them in an area that was far from the area we were in. Meeting Ibn Umar was the one good thing that came out of this unfortunate incident. I worked with him extensively during the battles to invade Khost. He was one of the best people I met in the Afghan war. Although he was saved from the communist forces in Afghanistan, unfortunately he was killed by the communist forces during the battle to unite Yemen in 1994. After he was captured by them, they killed him in his cell before they escaped after their government collapsed in the south.

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We wanted to utilize the vehicle Bin Umar brought with him. We were in need for a modern mode of transportation. We loaded the vehicle with supplies from the new camp. We loaded the launcher from Uthman Camp which was under repairs after the vehicle flipped over with it. I rode next to Umar and Abu Bakir and ‘Abd Al-Malik rode in the back. They were both Muslims from the United States with African origins. They were courageous and physically strong with soft personality and great manners.

I thought that we would find Abu al-Shahid in Uthamn Center but he was not there. I was very worried about him so we sent him a group to look for him in the surrounding mountains. Ibn Umar went with the vehicle to search for Abu Al-Shahid in the surrounding Mujahdins centers to no avail. We returned to Mujahdins center in the area with no result. We returned to our Abu Al-‘Abbas center and we found that Abu Al-Shahid returned a short time earlier. He was asleep in the main cave.

Then a violent air strike started in the evening in order to protect the planes landing in the airport. Our center was targeted from the beginning. However, we were able to get some interrupted sleep until it was time for Abu Bakir, the American to start his shift. At two fifteen, a big bomb fell near the entrance of the main cave which was the large living room for our camp.

We did not like the sound of the explosion but we liked voice of Abu Bakir screaming God is Great. We thought that he was injured, so everyone went outside the cave running to check on him. We found that he was fine and in a good health. We asked him to take shelter in the cave until the bombing stopped. He pretended that he agreed then he snuck out. This situation was repeated three times until they pulled him by force inside the cave while he screamed in a perfect Arabic: Either Victorious or a martyr.

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Monday August 13, 1990

After the dusk prayer I went to examine the effect of the air strike we had yesterday. We immediately discovered the first of our losses from the previous night air strike. One of the bomb fragments broke the water pottery under a tree near the entrance of the living area cave. This was the only loss. Umar's vehicle was safe because it was parked in a protected curved area in the hill we lived on. We started to reinforce this curved area in order to protect the vehicles that parked overnight in the center.

Near our cave there were three big holes. The Bedouins were working in them to collect the fragments of the bombs that caused those big holes. There were big anti-cave bombs. Their heads were made out of thick steal in order to go deep into the ground. The Bedouins were not about to lose this treasure, so they continued to dig. We discovered later that some of those adventure seekers used to climb the high mountain facing the hill that sheltered us. Then, he would wave to the planes with a color cloth so that they bomb the place and he would get the fragments. They did not care what that meant to us and to the rest of the Mujahdin. We failed completely to stop them from doing that. We punished them by forbidding them from collecting the fragments from the bombs which fell near us. We would collect them ourselves and sell them. This way they will not benefit from waving to the planes and attract their attention to us. We failed to stop them by this method as well, but we gained some money from it which helped improve the food quality at the camp. Ibn Umar left with his vehicle in the morning going to Khalil Center in Bary. Abu Al-Shahid went with him so he can go from there to Miranshah in order to pressure on Mubashir to finish what is missing for the operation. Also, he was going to bring our vehicle from there. We needed small communication devices because we only had three and one of them was missing an antenna. We also had a big shortage in the personnel we needed to complete the new center.

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I carried my bag and I went to the surveillance mountain in order to check the latest developments regarding the airport and the valley. Abu Hamid Al-Libi asked to go with me to Nshah Jani Center where our friend Muhammad Afdal works on a launcher in order to borrow a brush that cleans launchers and an antenna for the small communication device. I was preparing for shooting practice today. Abu Hamid used the time we spent on the road, which was not long, to talk to me about the political situation in the Gulf area after Iraq occupied Kuwait. He talked about bringing the American forces and its western allies from Afghanistan to defend Saudi Arabia against the forces of Saddam Abu Hamid asked if Abu Abdulla would work with the American to defend Saudi, but I did not think that was possible. He was uneasy about the stand the famous Saudi scholars took and their support for the Americans' arrival.

I explained to him my opinion about what is happening and my enthusiasm about the confusing events because that will wake the Muslims up and the Islamic movement. This will explain the facts which were clear to all but they chose to ignore it. They cannot do that now. I told him that our modern history will be split in two periods, one pre-American landing in the Arabian Peninsula and the second post-American invasion.

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I arrived at the surveillance top at eight o'clock in the morning. I sat behind the telescope until eleven o'clock. The sun was very strong so I felt thirsty and exhausted. I lied down on the rocks under a cactus near by. I was unconscious; I was awake and asleep at the same time until I heard the voice of Abu Zayd AL-Tunisi and his assistance. I was comfortable working with that well mannered courageous young man. He had technical and scientific background. He was calm and fun. He stayed away from arguments and disagreements which a few of us in the project were addicted to.

Abu Zayd brought with him a telescope like the one pirates use. It was stronger than any other telescope we had. Its angle of vision was limited but it fulfilled my curiosity to see new details. I was able to see the number on the destroyed planes on the runway. I put the telescope on top of a metal stand, and I started surveying the new area. Abu Zayd started to correct the aiming of the launcher. He started with the first launcher. This is Abu Tamim's launcher which is located in Abu AL-'Abbas Camp. This launcher and Uthman's launcher in Druazji at AL-Qadisia Camp use a modern method in adjusting the aiming via a computer program. As for the two launchers, which are going to be part of our program and belong to the Afghani Mujahdins, they follow the traditional methods of adjusting the aiming. In any case, the advanced technology method does not have a great impact on improving our operation due to the nature of the operation itself. The operation does not require changing the aiming angles during its usage, but it stays stationary during the bombing which happens in the evening.

After four tries with Abu Tamim's launcher, Abu Zayd said that he had to go there to fix a computer problem, and then he will continue working tomorrow with the four launchers. He will go to Uthman to make sure that the computer program does not have the same problem.

We were working with the members of Karim Camp in guarding the surveillance location due to our big shortage in personals. Although, we did not get along with this disorganized group, because they still kept the anti- aircraft rifle after we told them not to use it. They still use it from time to time. Their leader went to shoot a barrage of shells at the enemy mountain using the anti- aircraft rifle. I screamed hysterically in his face so he stopped. He did not expect such a strong reaction from me. However he decided to get his revenge from me, so after the evening prayer he came with his rifle and big number of bullets. He started to shoot, but luckily for everyone his rifle broke after the third shot. The rifle had several problems and breakdowns, but I think now it has completely broke to my delight. The enemy did not notice the anti-aircraft shots, and the air traffic was very calm during the whole day. There were no attempts to use the airport at night. There was an unusual peaceful state in Khost, as if the war has ended suddenly. We enjoyed deep sleep and a quiet night that we have not seen in a long time.

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Tuesday August 14, 1990

We performed the Morning Prayers in group inside the tent, because this was the only flat area available. I went to the surveillance point through a winding and rough path. I was surprised to find out that a member of Karim's group has beaten me there. I found him

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checking the anti- aircraft rocket launcher, and he tried to fire it but it did not work. I have no doubt that he was trying to challenge me because of the tough stand I took against them yesterday. When he saw me he said with sadness “Dushka Khtm” which means the anti-aircraft launcher is finished. I said to him with a smile and happiness: thank God. I considered this a good omen to start the work today.

I sat behind the black rocks with the telescope in my hand to watch the airport. Visibility was not clear due to clouds. Sometimes I had a cloudy sky and other times I had a hot bright sun. I chose a closer and more comfortable spot to watch from. The fighter planes past over our location without striking us. A little after ten a man came from the tent to invite me to lunch. It was still early, but I did not object, because there will not be any more food before dark.

Abu Zayd Al-Tunisi and two of his assistance, one of them was Abu Hamid. He joined us for lunch. We then continued the surveillance. Abu Zayd had a tough job fixing Abu Tamim’s launcher. The wireless communications with the center was very difficult and inconsistent. That continued to cause problems, because of the low location of Abu Al-‘Abbas Center and number of mountains between it and the center. We could not convince Al-Qeada to supply a device to enhance the signal.

During the operations, some of the young men from Abu Al-‘Abbas Center were able to accomplish very daring operations by communicating with surveillance point despite the air strikes. They were safe. May God keep them safe. This was one blessing of many that God gave us during the “Airport Project”

During the launching practice Abu Tamim’s launcher made wonderful hits on many important points. It was supposed to only hit one of them. It hit the first point where the wheels of the planes touch the ground of the airport. Then it hit the main point where the planes stop to unload, or to be repaired. Another time the planes were there to hide until it is time to takeoff again. We did not discover the importance of this point until we took control of the city. The next point we suspected to be a secondary unloading location. He then aimed the launcher to the east and he hit the middle of the runway. Abu Zayd pinpointed those important locations and Abu Tamim registered the angles in order to aim at them when needed. Then we pinpointed the main point, as we called it, and our choice was correct.

After we finished firing a Jeep arrived at the airport runway, and two military individuals got out of it. I thought they were officers. The only thing they did was to inspect the damage from the rockets strikes on the runway. I thought that if they had watched the launchers from the beginning and watched its movement from one point to the other, they would have realized that there was new action being taken against the airport.

I discussed with Abu Zayd some adjustment to the original plan for surveillance and targets in order to save time to start work sooner.

We have decided to cancel the idea of establishing an additional surveillance point, and to work according to the military map that we had. Due to the efforts in the past days by the surveillance group, we were able to pinpoint several important locations on the military map.

I felt a strong pain in my eye and a headache. This was a result of using the telescope for a lengthy period of time. I felt that I needed to throw up. I thought that I had a sun stroke. I went to my tent. The leader of Karim group came to our center. Although, our

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relationship was strained because of previous confrontations over the anti-aircraft weapon, he volunteered to treat me. He warped my head with a bandana. The pain subsided and later was gone. So, I went to continue working at the surveillance point. The relationship between me and Karim Group became friendly again; he even invited me to drink tea and milk several times after they found out that it is my favorite drink. I was at ease with that relationship as long as the anti-aircraft weapon remained broken.

At the beginning of the day Haji Ibrahim and Abu 'Abd Al-Rahman (B.M.) arrived from Mirna Shah. Abu 'Abd Al-Rahman asked me to meet him at Abu Al-'Abbas Center, so I told him that I will meet him there in the evening. I have no doubt that he stayed busy most of the day helping Abu Tamim with targeting practice.

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After we finished with the launcher, Abu Zayd asked me if I am expecting the enemy planes to land at the airport. I told him that if the weather stayed sunny and the clouds did not come from the west, they will land.

I and Abu Zayd's group started to climb down the surveillance mountain towards Abu 'Abbas Center. It was in the afternoon when we were surprised by the planes which fired bombs near us on the road to our main center.

This air strike could be in retaliation to our firing at the airport, or it could be preparation for a night landing operation. I decided to go back in order to monitor the situation at the airport at night. Abu Zayd and his group did not feel that it was proper to retreat because of the air bombing by the enemy, and allow that to prevent us from going to the camp. I did not want to enter into a debate about courage, so I let them continue and I quickly went back to the surveillance point. I continued to monitor the situation until nine o'clock in the evening. The situation was calm, so I fixed my bed near the surveillance point. I slept on a sloped ground that was covered with sharp rocks.

At two fifteen, the sound of helicopters filled the sky. They were the "Buffalos" as we used to call them. In a few moments they started to bomb Turghar with two heavy bombs and two others over Abu AL-'Abbas Center. In a few more moments, the fighter jets came in waves over our area, and they bombed the surveillance area with six bombs four of them landed directly in front of the surveillance location. The air strikes stopped. The planes dropped few bombs, but they were very close to their targets. I suspected that one plane had landed at the airport while the bombs were dropping over our heads. However, I was not positive about that, and I did not have any communications with Turghar or 'Abd Al-'Aziz in order to ask them about what happened at the airport. However, one of the mujahdin fired at the airport. I stretched over the sharp rocks, which reminded me of the poor Indian man sleeping over a bed of nails. He was in better shape than I was because his bed was not sloped.

Wednesday August 15, 1990

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I woke up at five o'clock in the morning. I looked at the airport then I washed up for prayer with water from a bottle I had. I performed the Morning Prayer. I wanted to go to Al-'Abbas Center, but I was tired so I slept for an extra hour.

At Abu Al-'Abbas Camp a preliminary discussion took place about the disagreement between Abu Nur and Abu Tamim over assigned duties. We spent stressful time assigning duties and area of authority for each one of them. It bothered me to deal with such problems because both of them should have been above such issues. They were both older than most men at the camp. Abu Zayd agreed with me in silence, and he did not participate in the discussions.

Abu 'Abd Al-Rahman talked to me about the reason he came to the camp. He wanted to issue a magazine in order to improve the Islamic awareness without any religious or political interferences. The magazine needed to cover the Islamic rulings, politics and history. He asked me to join him, and he wanted a final answer in two days, that is before he leaves. I told him that I do not have solutions to life's problems which deal with work and stability. So he gave some suggestions about commerce and light manufacturing.

In the morning, Abu 'Abd A-Rahman will go to Uthman Center to help fix the launcher as he did yesterday with Abu Tamim's launcher. He will take Abu Hamid AL-Libi, food, and some other necessities with him. Then, he will come back from there with the extra bed covers they have. We did not have enough bed covers for everyone which caused several men to catch cold.

In the afternoon I left the camp with Haji Ibrahim going towards the surveillance center in order to communicate with 'Ab Al-'Aziz at Jalal AL-din Hakani main surveillance center. Then we were going to try to communicate with Turghar surveillance location. I wanted to include Abu Tamim's launcher in the bombing today. Abu Tamim was anxious to join in the bombing without joining us in the surveillance effort. In fact, dealing with him was difficult.

On the road we faced three air strikes, and one bomb fell behind us, but its fragment did not hit us because there was a small hill that shielded us.

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We arrived at the tenet at the surveillance center before sunset, so I started to wash up for prayer and writing in my diary about yesterday and today. We fixed our bed near the surveillance point. At ten the parade, as I called it, started. The red lights along the runway were lit. A transport helicopter arrived, and it was trying to land. Ibrahim contacted 'Abd Al-'Aziz at Hakani's surveillance center, and he asked us to start firing at the plane. We could not contact Abu Tamim and Abu Uthman was not ready to operate. Tamim started firing on his own and Abu Jindal, which was located to our right, answered with three rounds from their launcher. This earned the admiration from the mujahdin who shouted "God is Great" over the radios.

The fighter jets arrived later than their usual time, and they bombed our centers and other centers. Their bombing was sporadic but introducing the launcher BM.12 in the battle was the new event. The launcher fired a rocket that landed behind us and then it fired several rockets in the direction of Abu 'Abbas Camp. The bombing continued for two

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hours. I estimated that two planes succeeded in landing , but the surveillance point, which is on top Tur Ghar, said that most of planes could not land and only one succeeded in landing. I wrote this observation in my notes about the battle. The aerial effort was weak in comparison to the past. It consisted of one or two fighter jet, the "Buffalo". As far as the launcher it was stronger than usual.

This policy was not to their advantage, meaning the enemy, because it drained the city from its supplies and they needed more supply planes to come through the airport. Although Abu Tamim fired a few bombs, without joining our surveillance effort, I did not count this as engaging in a battle. The idea of our main project was to engage with a group of launchers at the same time under one command from the surveillance point where the command center is located.

However, the next day was the first day our project revealed itself on battle ground.

We were not completely ready when we dived to start the operation today Thursday August 16 1990.

For example, the number of rockets in our main storage (Abu Al-'Abbas) was less than a third of the needed rockets. Al-Qeada supplied us with five hundred rockets out of fifteen hundred needed. That is the number I estimated the operation will need during the airport closure which was supposed to last for full month.

The number of radios we had was less than needed by the leaders in the surveillance center that was under the Arabs' control. We had to cancel or postpone the "Special Operations" project or forsake of the Airport Project. This was the project which Abu al-Shahid was suppose to be in charge of, but due to the lack of radios we could not contact him and we also did not have men to work with him.

The lack of men was also the reason we were working with only two Arabs' launchers instead of three as it was planed originally. This caused the Arab launchers to be the minority in the project, but they fired the most during the operation in comparison with others in the area and since launchers were introduced in the battle.

Our old pickup truck was under repair during the operations which was risky because we did not have a way to supply the launchers with ammunition. Some problems were expected to be resolved such as the arrival of an extra radio and my vehicle came back from Mirna Shah after the repairs were finished.

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Or the arrival of some new volunteers in order to make up the shortage in man power. We specially needed men to help in building a site for the new launcher. Abu Harith took charge of that while we were in charge of the ammunition and other administrative matters.

The issue of ammunition was very important to me during the operation. The way the administrative people in Al-Qeada acted did not give me a reason to have any confidence in them. During the long period we spent preparing for the operation they only supplied us with a third of the weapons that were needed for the operation. Let's not forget the

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situation in general which lacked good management more than I expected. We did not receive the weapons we needed or the men we needed to run it. I had too many other sources in order to obtain the weapons and the men we need especially for Hakani and Al-Harith. Both of them were always willing to help. Had it not been for their help I would not have been able to complete the project.

What I was afraid of happened, and we ran out of ammunition in the middle of the operation. The irony is that one of al-Qaeda's military wings saved the day and not its management. They bought us one load which exceeded what the others had supplied in months.

Before we started the operation I borrowed ammunition (rockets) from some old friends who were commanders in the area and also from Hahani. We had about six hundred twenty rockets before starting. In spite of all that, we discovered that after the third engagement, meaning the third night, the usage of the ammunition was unusual. So, I was trying to hide my disgust because my estimates were incorrect and we might need many times the number we decided upon, meaning fifteen hundred rockets for the whole operation. However, Thank God we were able to close the airport permanently and we stopped the enemy from using it for ever by using only twelve hundred rockets. After only twenty six days of continuous closure of the airport and not a month as we previously planned, Hakani estimated that the enemy is not going to take one month of airport closure.

Hakani was correct, but the enemy did not fall flat because they used a new airport in the north eastern side of the valley. This area was safer for them because it was away from the firing range of the launchers. We will see how the enemy was able to trick Hakani and prevented him from interfering with the preparation of the airport by bombing the weapons he was working on. I was strongly pressuring him to finish, because I wanted the Arabs to accomplish the operations by themselves. All we needed was a few artillery weapons (120 mm caliber) or two tanks at minimum. Getting those weapons was not possible, which allowed the enemy to work on the airport runway in day light. Also, Al-Qeada was not able to supply us with the necessary staff to operate those weapons for many complicated reasons. It is always difficult for an organization to support an operation that is being run by someone from outside the organization. This is for fear that the person will become a new organization himself according to the foundation for the infectious organization or the out of control spread of the Islamic organization.

The operation took twenty six days of continuous closure of the airport. We did not engage with enemy each day, but the enemy stopped or was not able to use the airport, although the weather was suitable in some of those days. On other days the weather was the main obstacle. We stopped them by force from using the airport for eleven days. We called those nights the nights of engagement and the other nights we called them the nights of closure. We used those terms while we were telling the stories about the days of the airport project or Khost area.

I started the project on Thursday (8/16/90) and ended on Monday (9/10/90). Those were the blessed days during which fasting was desirable. The fighting in those days was blessed when the planes of the enemy burned down in the first and last day also. In that

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day the enemy lost fourteen military planes AN-32 which were modern planes at that time. Those planes were able to use a relatively short runway to land and they were equipped with night vision instruments as we were told by Air force General who was captured after the fall of Khost. The group of our launchers was the main reason behind his capture as we will see when we will talk about the conquest of Khost.

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The General told me that the planes were hit in Khost while we were working on the Airport Project but they were able to fly to Kabul. The planes had fragments of mortar rockets in their bodies and they were able to fix ten of them and the rest stayed in Kabul Airport. According to this eyewitness we can consider the enemy's losses to be twenty four military transport planes. We had several blessed signs from God during this project. More than I can count. We will try to mention some of them here. If it was not for God looking out for us, the whole working group would have been wiped out. That almost happened. Also the enemy planes were almost saved. That also almost happened. However, I think that we put in our best effort with what was available to us and circumstances surrounding the mujahdins; Arabs and Afghans. I think that we had good religious men, Arabs and Afghans, because God appreciated. If it was not for that we would have lost.

I was recording in my dairy the daily events in details as much as I could. I also kept most of the letters I exchanged during the battle and I also kept the surveillance reports that came from the centers. The most wonderful part was when I summarized at the conclusion of the operation in schedule format. The schedule showed what happened in the twenty six nights of airport closure and the eleven nights of engagement. I have decided now to put the summary before I state the detailed events of the day which might delay us from going into the operation. I will cover the situation from several angles; political, managerial and personal. We might tell the important points and the insignificant points. However, this was the life we lived. What is important here, in my opinion, is to show Jihad from its human and social side rather than jihad being just a military or political operation.

The prisoner of war General, Salah Amal, who was captured in Khost, summed up his experience in the Afghanistan war in one sentence when he said: This war has proven to me that the social element in wars has more impact than the military, economic or even the strategic element. So let's talk about ourselves as human beings. I do not think that there is anything to be embarrassed about since we are not angels and we do not claim to be devils, God forbid.

Thursday August 16, 1990: The summary:

- The first night of closure.
- The first night of engagement.
- Number of landing attempts: Two
- Landing Results: the planes could not unload their cargo.

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- The damages on the enemy side: one plane was hit and the other was able to escape.
- The damages on our side: no damages on our side.

Notes: Durwaji's launcher (Uthman's) was completely operational, but Al-'Abbas' launcher was partially operational because of the lack of wireless communication with the surveillance team and the command.

I was in the surveillance location when I heard Abu Zayd al-Tunsi coming with his two assistants Abu Hamid Al-Libi and Abu 'Ubida Al-jai'iry.

I shook their hands. They were out of breath after climbing the mountain. Their assignment for today was to retarget the launchers towards the planes on the runway. I had to pinpoint the targeted locations on the runway then Abu Zayd inputs the information into the designated launcher. After that, the launcher fires several shells while Abu Zayd does the corrections until the launcher reaches the desired target.

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Yesterday Abu al-'Abbas' launcher was to get a hold of the most important point on the runway. That was my belief and I was proven correct. It was the point at the first third section of the runway from the west side. I thought that it was facing the repair shop. The location was also being used as an unloading location sometimes and as a shelter for the planes if they were attacked unexpectedly. The planes were to move out of the runway to the south. All that was correct, except for the part about the repair shop. What we thought was a repair shop or a huge home was actually a defense and administrative center. Until now, I do not know where the repair shop is located because moving the equipment to the new airport did not leave a trace of anything. Also, the looting that followed our invasion of the city made everything disappear including the land of the runway. I am not exaggerating. Some of the Bedouins took over one third of the runway on the east side to plant wheat, and we had to pay them generous amounts of money to get them to leave the runway in order for us to repair it. We were also the ones who repaired it as a part of Taik Stan Project. We might tell the story as a part of this talk if we live long enough. Abu Jandil's launcher, which was in the east of the surveillance point, took the next section after Abu Al-'bas' launcher from the east side. We called the second unloading location.

Then, Muhammad Fadil's launcher was given a section between the sections for the other two launchers. The bombing locations of the three launchers covered the important sections of the runway and left small gaps in between them.

As far as the east side, we reserved a location two hundred meters from the edge of the east side for Durjzi launcher (the center of Uthman Al-Si'idi)

Abu Tamim was in charge of operating every launcher and adjusting them to register the new angles then he would leave it to original operating group. At first, the Afghani groups objected to this process, because they thought it implied a mistrust of their abilities, but Haji Ibrahim, the team translator, interfered to convince them with the fact that the process was necessary because it was easier to communicate between the surveillance team and the shooters with the same language.

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In Druzji Center, there was a complicated problem with the launcher which all attempts to adjust it failed for no apparent reason; although we had all the top experts of this weapon around it. Abu 'Abd Al-Rahman BM was leading the group and then he was joined by Abu Tamim, Abu Al-Shahid, and Abu Zayd. The launcher was not precise, it would hit the target one time and then it would miss it or draw an arch around it which could land before or after the runway sometimes.

We had several explanations for that, so we chose one of the positions of the several ones we tried which we determined it had the least problems. I felt depressed because of this situation. Uthman's launcher was one of the wonders of this operation or a symbol of its blessings, if you wanted to call it that. Away from what we planned for it and wanted for it to accomplish, it would turn in results we did not even expect. It became the most famous launcher with the enemy pilots, and stopped them completely from going to the west side of the runway. This location used to be a safe one because the Mujahdin did not pay attention to covering it and they focused on the middle section. As result of their inability to use this safe haven in the east the planes were forced to use the middle section, then they were faced with heavy fire in that location and the surrounding area. We would also like to point out that Abu Tamim's launcher (Abu Al-'Abbas Camp) focused on the west side, which was an area that is ignored by the Mujahdin. The launcher was able to cause many damaging hits against the airplanes and surprised the unsuspected enemy.

During the calibration of the launchers today we hit some sensitive administrative locations unintentionally. I had a backup plan in my mind to assign a single launcher (BM1) to hit these locations if we had enough ammunition and personnel. However, the news that was coming out of Miranshah did not support those rosy ideas. Our colleague Abu Al-Shahid arrived from there and he lost his enthusiasm for the airport project. He repeated his famous saying: This project is not going to liberate Afghanistan. This was a kind of belittling and degrading the operation. This would explain the reasons that he was not responsive enough to our administrative and financial demands. Also, he closed the door on supplying us with necessary personal to open the new center and to support the existing centers that were suffering from lack of personal. As far as our vehicle, he said that he sent someone to buy head lights for it from Peshawar.

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At this point, I could not take it anymore, and I told Abu Al-Shahid to make a phone call to the office in Miranshah to send the car as it was without delay. The program was going to start today, and without a vehicle to supply the centers with ammunition we would have to stop after a short period, or our program would have not been continuous. This would be against our plans of continuous closure of the airport for one full month.

Abu Al-Shahid, may God have mercy on his soul, was one of the unique characters among the Arabs. His personality had a strong imagination and great energy which qualified him to be placed in positions in the high command in any work he got involved with. I agreed with him on working program that consisted of three points.

First: make up the shortage in manpower through a venue other than Al-Qeada, and especially through Abu AL-Harth Group that is now cooperating with us.

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Second: Speeding the work on the new location for the launcher with the aid of Abu AL-Harth Group who promised to work on it.

Third: choosing a location for the Anti aircraft weapon, because we might really need it if we have a shortage in rockets especially after the last statement by Mubshir. He stated that he would not be obligated to deliver the ammunition al-Qeada promised.

Most important, Abu Al-Shahid borrowed a donkey from Karim's group and he brought us a full load of necessary supplies to the surveillance center that from now on will be backbone of the Airport Project.

We were approaching evening time, and the atmosphere of the battle started to be apparent. We started to smell fire and death, and so started to feel the tension and the enthusiasm.

Abu Zayd and his assistance left us to go to Abu Al-'Abbas Center in order to help Abu Tamim who loaned his communication devices to Abu Al-Shahid and he was hoping that he will return it to him before sunset. He was going to do a final attempt to fix Uthamn's launcher in Durzji but the battle started and Abu Tamim participated in it without his communication device which bothered him greatly. In any case, we did not have enough communication devices which we were waiting for over a month. However, Mubshir did not see the importance of getting what we needed because our project is not going to liberate Afghanistan.

I was supposed to run the operation from the top of the surveillance mountain with Ibrahim Haji helping me communicate with the other surveillance locations. Especially the wireless surveillance and eavesdropping devices which Hakani had and was commanded by our friend 'Abd AL-'Aziz or Fadl assistance.

Haji Ibrahim was supposed to communicate with the Afghani launchers that were participating in our project to relate to them the orders to engage. There were two launchers tonight, one with our neighbor near Majbur that was located to the right of our location and the other one was with Muhammad Fadil who was located behind the center and no more than half a kilometer away from our main center "Abu Al-'Abbas".

The role of Haji Ibrahim was very crucial for the operation, so when he was absent the work was affected. His way which was full of friendliness, energy and encouragement had a great effect on keeping the groups enthusiastic and with high morale. So, when his voice came across the radio, he sent new life to all locations who were responding to him with enthusiasm and humor. It was to the point that enemy came to the conclusion that Haji Ibrahim was the commander of the whole operation and called him "the Principal". One time, when he was absent from work, the command in Khost requested more military transport planes to come to Khost Airport because the circumstances became suitable due to the absence of 'The Principal.

In Fact, they had limited success at that time, but we used their belief on several occasions to ambush them. We let them think that Haji Ibrahim was absent and he kept quite until they asked for more planes. When the planes arrived, the ghost appeared, Haji Ibrahim's voice came across the radios and the planes started to burn on the runway.

It was really a night of a life time

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This was how I described that unforgettable night in my diary.

Before darkness arrived the four launchers were loaded with ammunition and we kept the radios on in preparation for engagement at anytime.

In the surveillance location, I was with Ibrahim and two of the young Arab men. Their assignment was to watch the airport runway for two hours each in the beginning of the night and then Ibrahim and I would take over in the second half of the night which was expected to be a crucial time for us because that was when the enemy preferred to use the airport. The majority of the Mujahdin did not engage with the enemy during that period of time. As a trial, Ibrahim communicated wirelessly with the people who were included in his network. On top of his list was 'Abd Al-'Aziz then Turghar surveillance location, Muhammad Fadil's launcher and Mhabub's launcher. Previously, the agreement with them was to communicate on a general wavelength, then a backup wavelength to be used in emergencies. This method was very useful to us. Both launchers were working on the same wavelength except for Tamiam's, because he did not have a radio.

I laid down near the surveillance location. Haji Ibrahim laid down next to me while the two young Arab men were talking quietly so they would not disturb us. They could not keep quiet and he could not sleep. Before ten O'clock one of them woke me up and told with enthusiasm: The enemy lighted up the airport runway.

I got up to look at the two red lines of small electric lights, which were three kilometer long which was the length of the run way, and they were lit. I woke up Haji Ibrahim to start his wireless communication with his Afghani group who were working in surveillance and behind the launcher. He started talking to them with a voice that indicated that he had just waked up. They replied to him with the same unenthusiastic voice. However, Abd- al-Aziz voice woke up everyone up when he picked up the wireless communication of the enemy which stated that military transport planes were about to land. The sound of the planes was apparent in the air, but we expected to be an attack helicopter the one we called the buffalo. It was rare for the enemy to land planes without first launching heavy firing from the air. This must be a trick they playing on us now.

'Abd -al-'Aziz screamed again and said that the planes were coming down and on their way to the beginning of the runway. So I told Ibrahim to tell the launchers (Durjat Stan) to start firing the total capacity of rockets and then repeat that until we tell them to stop. He related the order to them and they immediately started to work. I took the radio from him and called Uthman with (number nine) which was his code number. Our code number at the surveillance location was (seven) and the code number for Abu-al-'Abbas was(three). I asked him to start shooting using the same method, and he started immediately.

Abu Tamim, in Abu-al-'Abbas Center, understood immediately that we entered the battle but we could not tell him because he did not have a radio. Immediately, I correctly decided to shoot the same way from the hill that our Abu-al-'Abbas Center occupied. The heavy rockets shooting that was coming from the (Durjat Stan) Center, Uthman Center in Drujzi who entered the battle in a perfect time so we shook the whole area from Tuda Shini (where Abu Tamim's launcher is located) to Durjzi (where Uthman's launcher is located) and also the area in between them (Durjat

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Stan). The shelling was continuous and heavy, which had never happened before and made the Mujahdin to shout God the Great over the radios. The launchers emptied entire loads of ammunition. The explosions covered the runway with red and yellow lights in a wonderful sequence that lifted up our morale as well as the morale of the other centers without an exception. In little while , the voice of 'Abd-al-'Aziz announced that the plane took off immediately without unloading its cargo, and the air traffic controller in Khost asked the pilot to go the eastern edge to unload the cargo there but he told him that the bombing there had turned the area into hell so he should go back to Kabul .

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I sent my congratulations to Uthman, because his launcher was the first the enemy complained about that was repeated throughout the operation. This was the opposite of what we expected when we complained about that launcher targeting problem. The plane escaped after the runway turned into a lake of fire from the heavy bombing. State of happiness covered the Mujahdin's centers. They exchanged congratulations and they started to organize their targeting on the runway to assign an area for each of them that same way we did in our project. This made me very happy because one of the goals of our project was to convince the Mujahdin of the importance of organizing the bombing by experiencing it first hand.

We experienced calm and happiness for less than two hours then the planes of the enemy started to bomb our locations heavily and they used the artillery at the same time in order to increase the pressure. Our share of shelling at the surveillance location was more than usual even the heavy mortar rockets from the enemy's front line joined in the bombing.

The rocket launchers of the enemy -BM12- bombed our centers and our surveillance area, but unlike what the enemy expected our morale was high. We communicated among ourselves to launch the same attack if the enemy planes attempted to land. 'Abd-al-'Aziz warned for the second time against an attempt to land. We repeated the same wonderful and frightening seen by burning the airport runway with continuous waves of rockets. Unlike the first time, this time the enemy planes were flying over the launchers bombing it heavily with bombs and rockets. However, they failed to cause any damage to them, and we were able to hit a military transport plane that was sitting on the runway. 'Abd-al'Aziz related the news to us and he stated that the plane was unable to fly which made the Mujahdin shout God is Great and congratulate each others. While the bombs of the enemy tried to contain our launcher unsuccessfully until we stopped bombing. We stayed on alert with the launchers fully loaded waiting for any sudden enemy attempt to land.

Suddenly, everything calmed down, and no one tried to sleep. Everyone was around the radios congratulating each others and conducting humorous chats. The enemy has become incapable of doing anything. All of us felt that the airport has fallen in our hands and under the complete control of our launchers. The enemy succeeded in jamming the wavelength we used but the backup wavelength made its effort

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unsuccessful. This was happening in the middle of the battle. We succeeded in the electronic war although we knew little about its techniques. The star of the night was "Haji Ibrahim" whom the Afghani hailed as a hero who appeared from the darkness of the night to defeat the enemy with burning thunders. This was a night to crown Haji Ibrahim as the hero of the project to close the airport. The Mujahdin and the commanders of the enemy in Khost have attested to that as it was apparent in their conversion during the battle. Unexpectedly, we have gained a weapon for morale by the name of Haji Ibrahim as we and the Mujahdin knew him as "The Principal" which is what the enemy called him. It was enough for his voice to appear on the radios to spread confidence, joy, and unity among all the Mujahdin centers that were working or helping us, in one way or another, with the project. We stayed awake in this condition until three o'clock in the morning and we had less than one hour before dusk arrived. I came to the conclusion that the enemy was not going to attempt to land again, because the daylight would have made our work easier and more effective. Instead, they sent us the heavy bombers "the Buffalo". The strike hit us in the surveillance location in a dangerous manner due to the fact that it was very close to us. Then, it circulated in a big circle and it bombed a part of Turghar, the road leading to Abu Al-'Abbas Center and the areas around the launchers without causing any direct hits. The chats and the exchange of the news about the air strike were full of energy and high morale. When the sky brightened we got up to pray to thank God with our hearts full of joy more than any other time before. It was really a night of a life time.

Friday 17 August 17 1990- Summary:

- The closure night: the Second
- The night of engagement: the Second
- The number of landing attempts: Two
- Results of landing operation: planes were not able to unload their cargo.
- The damages at the enemy side: a second plane was hit and the first plane which tried to land had to take off without unloading.

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- The damages on our side: no damages on our side.
- Notes: the Arab launchers operated fully with some problems with the wireless communication and the electricity of the launchers.

The sun rays and the flies woke us up. We were all sleeping in any place or position we could master near the two surveillance telescopes that were sitting on tripods. All of us were in very uncomfortable positions. It would be hard to believe that human being can sleep like that; twisted limbs, a neck over the rocks and needles which only a lifeless martyr whose soul went to heaven and his body stayed on earth could endure.

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Haji Ibrahim moved with two young Arab men to our tent that was located two hundred meters away in the southern valley of the mountain under a pile of black rocks. I did not do the same thing they did. I was tempted by a big spot shaded by cactus to shake off the uncomfortable sleep until ten thirty in the morning.. I looked at the runway in the telescope and everything was calm. The white and bright runway did not show any traces of yesterday's battle. The whole area and the valley was carried a deceiving sense of peace which fills your heart with sadness and grief... it was as false as a mirage that would make a thirst anxiety even worse. I went down to the tent to check on what was going on in our camp. I was thinking about what the enemy was going to do in the morning to answer what we did last night. I expected them to launch violent air strikes in the morning against the launchers centers that participated last night. That is if they were able to pinpoint their precise location last night. They were flying over them and bombing them for a long period of time. I had my doubt in their ability to pinpoint the exact location at night, but I did not have full knowledge of the technological capability of the enemy planes that would allow them to accomplish that. I was just guessing that they would not show up today whether they accomplished that or not. I contacted our two centers number (3) and number (9) and warned them of the possibility of sudden air strike against them during the day. I asked them to empty the launcher from the ammunition and I told them not to leave any shells outside the caves. I also told them that the group prayers and eating food must be inside the caves also. They were also told not to gather in big groups in the areas in front of the caves for any reason and to walk in singles and so on. At noon Abu Tamim arrived at the tent of the surveillance center and he told me that five new young men have arrived at Abu-al-'Abbas Center and have been deployed between the launcher (Abu Tamim) and the camp administration (Abu -Al -nur) He discussed with me with persistence the heavy usage of the ammunition yesterday, and the danger of running out of ammunition quickly. So I repeated to him what I said before that we were using the launcher with a new plan which depended on three principles; heavy bombing, precise bombing, and good timing of the bombing. The heavy bombing had an economic reason, because this would increase the damages on the enemy, lower their pilots' morale and convince them to stop using the airport in a short amount of time. The result we did not expect yesterday was increasing the high morale of the Mujahdin. participation of many from outside the Airport Project. This would help us save the ammunition later. Abu Tamim was silent but he was not convinced, and opened the same subject several times in later occasions. At two o'clock in the afternoon, I climbed to the surveillance location, and organized the place. I wrote down my notes in my dairy. Abu Zayd and Abu-al-shahid went to help adjust the targeting system on Uthamn's launcher in Druajzy (number 9). I participated with them from the surveillance location in directing the shells. We faced the same difficulties, but it performed better than yesterday. It was sunset, and the enemy did not launch the air strikes I was expecting them to carry out on our launchers. I did not discount the fact that they would do that in the coming days. I have to watch carefully the enemy's behavior tonight. I have

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learned from our previous operation, five years ago, that the enemy changes his tactics with speed and intelligence. At that time we used to find joy in challenging him in its tactics although our capacity at that time was one or two rockets a day. We organized our work at the surveillance location the same way we did yesterday. I started the night with Haji Ibrahim by forcing ourselves to sleep in order to save our energy for the second half of the night. The three young men took turns watching the airport runway.

They woke us up at midnight. The sides of the runway were lit with small red light. They have repeated this several times in order to exhaust the Mujahdin, and to give them the impression that it was not an important event. This would let them not pay attention to the lighting of the runway and suddenly, a military transport plane would land without any warning. This is what exactly happened that night. 'Abd-al-'Aziz contacted me and said that there was a plane on its way to the runway. Just like that. To celebrate the happy occasion, the rocket launcher "BM-13" fired several rockets over our centers, as if trying to tell us go to hell!! I started the wireless communications among the centers. Ibrahim called 'Abd-al-'Aziz then the surveillance center in Turghar. Then, I contacted the two launchers that belonged to Majbur and Muhammad Fadal. Then, I contacted (number 9) and (number 3) to ask them to start shooting. All this took about a minute, and suddenly the earth started to shake. The shells from Abu Tamim (number 9) passed over our heads and then came shells from his nearby neighbor Muhammad Afdil. Then, our tent shook from the flow of rockets from Majbur, followed by Uthamn's launcher. Traces of red lines were generated from the rockets which were traveling to their targets in the west. Once again, the runway was full of the brightness from the flames that were generated from the rockets explosions. The plane did not attempt to empty its cargo and had to take off without accomplishing any thing. The noise of the plane increased as it was escaping to Kabul.

'Abd AL-'Aziz told us that the plane left the airport before it started emptying its cargo; so we stopped shooting. Our faces were full of joy and enthusiasm. Everyone congratulated the other because the enemy has become incapable of using the airport and stopping our fire power that was coming down over the runway without interruption.

The wireless communication with (number 3) was excellent both Abu Zayd and Abu Al-Shahid were working with Uthman. They were our best members.

- Abu Tamim's launcher had accomplished its role with force. Although Abu Tamim kept hinting about the big usage of ammunition I used to answer him by saying "Spend a lot and do not worry about God's generosity". Then, I used to follow that with the Egyptian countryside slang

"Let's go three ... Shoot three...one more time three...send them another load three"

He use to laugh and send his rockets passing over our heads and then I would answer him by saying:

"Another three...one more time three"

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Uthman got similar orders in this same manner, and all of them would laugh and shoot continuously with more enthusiasm.

Abu Tamim had borrowed a radio from one of the centers which allowed him to communicate with us throughout the night. He had to climb to a nearby higher location because his center was located in a very low point and a chain of mountains were blocking him from us.

The enemy failed in his attempt to accomplish a surprise landing in the middle of the night. They had to punish us, so they sent a rocket launcher helicopter that dumped tons of heavy bombs. The bombs were not precise and further from our center than before.

That is opposite to what I expected that morning.

Under the cover of the noise of the exploding shells and the engines of the heavy bombers a second plane landed on the runway. We took the usual steps after 'Abd Al-'Aziz warned us. The humongous shelling came from the four launchers without given any consideration of the roaring of the shells or the ear-deafening explosions from the one-thousand-shells dropping over our locations. All that happened in the middle of God is Great shouts coming from all of us over the radios. No one could stop the tears from coming down specially that darkness would continue just like this "human shelling" "The plane had sustained a substantial hit and it was incapable of flying again" This was the message that 'Abd Al-'Aziz related to us after he intercepted it from the wireless messages. So, we stopped shooting to congratulate each others. We asked the launchers

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to load the rockets and stay with us on the radios in case the message from the enemy was a trick and they would try to land a third plane.

The high morale stopped us from sleeping. Also, the launchers and the centers that participated with us sat together enjoying themselves and congratulating each other and Ibrahim on those amazing results.

We noticed the lights of a truck moving from the east side, so we asked Uthman to shoot. He attacked it with several rockets, so the lights were gone and we never saw it again. We did not know if we hit the truck or not. What happened was that the shelling from Uthman caused the destruction of the power line that lighted the red lights so the airport was dark for the rest of the night. So everyone one congratulated and blessed launcher "number 9" and Haji Uthman as we called him.

We stayed watching the runway carefully until daylight, and we did not see a trace of anything on the runway. It seemed as if the enemy left it permanently. In the sky a skinny trimmed crescent appeared with a bright star next to it. It was beautiful seen that reminded me of the old Ottoman flag the last state that united the Muslims.

I wrote the following sentence in my dairy commenting on that night: it was the second wonderful night in the Airport Project.

The third night that could not be forgotten!!

Saturday August 181990 the summary:

- The closure night: the third

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- The night of engagement: the third

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- The number of landing attempts: the first plane was able to unload its cargo which encourages the enemy to send two planes which were both hit.
- The damages at the enemy side: we destroyed planes that were carrying soldiers to enforce the enemy force which was engaged in "Dair Malik". Several soldiers were killed inside the two planes.
- The damages on our side: no damages on our side.
- Notes: we faced temporary problems with the wireless communication in the two centers (number 9) and (number 3)

We could not sleep last night, and we had to leave early morning to Abu Al-'Abbas Center to meet Abu 'Abd Al-Rahman who wanted to speak to me before he left to Peshawar. He participated in the previous two nights operation of the two launchers because he was considered the Godfather of this type of weapon among the Arab after the he became famous for working on it during the JiJi Battle in 1978. I went there with Haji Ibrahim and on the way we passed by Muhammad Afdil center because he agreed on our forced method. There, we were received with hugs, laughter and the shout of God is Great. They reminisced with Haji Ibrahim about the past two nights. They exchanged more details about the bombs that fell near them. Also Ibrahim explained to them the benefit from group shooting and dividing up the runway between the launchers and exchanging information among the surveillance locations. The group was very responsive and enthusiastic, and that wiped away from our eyes any traces of the exhaustion from staying up late and our desire to sleep.

We entered the camp and the first person we met in the front yard of our camp received us with hugs, smiles and the shouts of God is the Great. We entered the living cave and we found Abu 'Abd Al-Rahman who received us with hugs. He congratulated us and then we sat down with people from the camp around a meal to break our fast, which was prepared by Abu Al- Nur and under his close supervision, and it consisted as usual of boiled potatoes and red tea. We talked about the previous two nights. We talked about the enemy techniques and our techniques against them. We talked about the fact that we completely won the battle in the two previous nights, and we stopped the enemy from unloading a plane and left it with two planes which were incapable of flying again. Abu 'Abd Al-Rahman was very happy with what he heard, and the old and the new young men were very enthusiastic. I found that success was the best method to lift up the morale and generate energy. Success breeds success and failure breeds failure. (However, this rule is not always accurate so, we have to be careful so it does not backfire.)

A vehicle from Al-Qeada arrived from "Al-Btalun Center"; they knew that we did not have a vehicle, so the arrival of this vehicle was considered a sign of goodwill. We had it for a limited time, so we had to benefit from it by transporting the loads of ammunition to the three centers. Uthman Center (number 9) stock of ammunition went down to twenty shells only. The Arabs' vehicle was unable to carry more than fifty shells. We sent 30 shells to Uthman and 20 to Majbur. As for Muhammad Afdil we would try to find a vehicle from

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our neighbors to transport to him a suitable amount of ammunition. He was near our storage facility at Abu Al-'Abbas Center so supplying him was not a big problem. More important than that was the news the Arabs delivered to us. They told us a big attack by the Mujahdin would take place tonight in Dair Malik area west of the valley. We sat to discuss the situation, as we usually did before an operation like this one; most of the young men from the location were present. I presented to them my evaluation of the situation, and the steps needed for our project which was going on for two days. This is what I said:

As a result of the operation in Dair Malik the enemy will have a great need for the airport to replenish his ammunition and his military supplies. Thus he is going to a big pressure on us by mainly air strikes until we stop bombing the airport and then he will use it as he pleases

Then I added that we will take three steps this morning which is:

- restocking the ammunition supplies for the launchers, but we have to pay special attention to center number 9 (Uthman) which surprised us with its unexpected efficiency.

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- Attempting to bomb what we thought was (a radar center) for the airport, it was located in a huge building (fort) about two kilometers from the western edge of the runway. Abu Al-Shahid and Abu Zayd will accomplish that using Majbur's launcher.
- Rushing the shipment of rockets from Miranshah, because the quantity we received represented a third of the needed for the project.

Success and enthusiasm stirred the energy in the young men for this project. Our progress went as fast as our capabilities would allow us, but we were missing a dedicated vehicle to allow us to supply or centers with the number of rockets we needed.

As far as bombing the fort is concerned, which we thought was a radar center; it did not happen because the shells missed in spite of the efforts of Abu Zayd and Abu Al-Shahid with Abu Jandil and his launcher. The members of the camp felt uneasy about the fact that the Arabs were the ones who were going to bomb the radar. They thought that they were more than capable to do it and what we were doing was putting them down. I asked Haji Ibrahim to interfere to make understand that our goal was not to look down at them, but the instruction to adjust targeting would be in Arabic thus the operator of the launcher had to be an Arab. Majbur and his men were convinced with difficulty. However, the launchers failed and sunset came upon us, and we had to be ready for the surprises of the night.

As result of the enthusiasm of the young men they all wanted to be in the surveillance mountain in order to watch the details of the night battle in the airport. Some of them complained that they were there for two months and they have not climbed this mountain yet. So we organized visits for them in groups to come to the location every night, in order for them to have a full picture of what we do. They were very happy about that. As a result of this plan we had four of them with us that night at the surveillance location, and all of them insisted on being in the watch and wireless communication spot.

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Although this would mean sleeping was going to be hard and the possibility of injuries would increase if the planes drop their bombs which what happened from time to time. The tightness of the place forced Haji Ibrahim to leave it and he stayed in the tent. I did not notice it at that time, and by the time I noticed it was too late and the operation was disrupted at crucial moments. We lost the chance to accomplish our work at the right time.

An hour after sunset Abu Al-Shahid contacted me wirelessly, and he told us that he was coming to us from Majbur Center and he lost his way in the mountain. He added that he was in the nearby mountains, but he was unable to recognize the way. The area as we know was a mine field. We started to get nervous, because we had to give him a signal to identify the location. However this would have been easy for the enemy to detect as well and then our night would have been the darkest ever.

We had to do something. One of the young men went twenty meter down on the south side and he shot bullets periodically, and we lighted a small flashlight pointed to the bottom of the valley. We could not make more signals due to circumstances of the night battle.

Minutes passed by slowly and finally Abu Al-Shahid appeared from the eastern edge of the surveillance location. This was the more dangerous side in the mountains, because it was full of mines. We were worried when we watched him climb and with every step we expected an explosion to come from under his feet throwing him in the deep valley. He reached us while he was trying to catch his breath. We were looking at him with shock and anticipation. We heard an explosion but it was not a mine. It was something more powerful. Abu Hamid Al-Libi exploded with anger after he lost control. He lost his nerves under stress and directed his anger unto Abu al-Shahid who stood their in shock. I was able to contain the situation quickly. I was helped by the good nature of Abu Al-Shahid and his bashfulness, also the start of the battle in Dair Malik. From far we heard the sounds of the battles and we saw the smoke, and the brightness of the explosions. The fighter jets started to join in the battle.

Haji Ibrahim made several wireless communications in order to find out the news about what was happening there. 'Abd Al-'Aziz told him that the Mujahdin advanced a little, and they burned a tank that belonged to the enemy who retreated to his original defense line. As for the Mujahdin, they lost four martyrs and two of their tanks broke down.

There was no need to stay up and follow what was happening. I left two of the young men on watch and I asked the others to sleep between the large rocks. I was worried about the loss of life in case our location got direct hit.

I did not notice that Haji Ibrahim gave up his usual sleeping place next to me and close to the watch group.

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The planes started to bomb around us but we ignored them in order to get some sleep to help us face what we expected to be a long night.

I was not asleep, although my eyes were closed, when one of the young men called me and told me that the red lights of the runway were lit. It was ten O'clock.

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I stood up and called Haji Ibrahim, and I was told that he went down to the tent to sleep there. I screamed at him with anger from the top of my lungs, but it was no use. So I sent one of the young men to him while I was screaming with anger. I took the radio and I called center (3) and then (9) but there was no answer.

From the top of Turghar two rockets were fired towards the runway which indicated that a plane has landed. I stood with anger and in shock and in my hand I had a radio which did not connect me to anyone. The enemy plane landing on the runway without any interference from our side except for two lost shells, which were fired by Turghar more as a warning to us than a threat to the enemy planes.

Finally, Haji Ibrahim arrived running and trying to catch his breath and he tried to contact 'Abd Al-'Aziz and Turghar but the communication was cut off. Once again the enemy jammed the wavelength.

The plane left the runway and we heard the sound of it taking off. The communications with our centers came back, but after we missed our chance. The enemy succeeded to unload one of its planes for the first time since the beginning of our project. I felt that we have failed, but I asked all the centers to be prepared and we chose a new wavelength for communication. We also had a backup wavelength which we agreed on.

We did not joke among each others. We all felt that we had suddenly been and without a warning slapped by the enemy. I had no doubt that the enemy did not lack courage or intelligence, but we still had a long night ahead of us.

Haji Ibrahim felt that he was guilty and he was sad. I did not blame him, because that was not in my nature. So I contained my anger but he knew what I was thinking about and he kept quite and the time went by slowly.

This success tempted the enemy to repeat the attempt, because they thought that the wall of fire that was closing the airport had collapsed. Not a lot of time went by until a second plane landed without prior shelling as it happened in the last attempts. We received a warning from Turghar, but we could not contact 'Abd Al-'Aziz because he was extremely busy with the operations in Dair Malik. He was using his wireless services to help the Mujahideen there. The four launchers fired rockets over the runway, and the enemy attempted to cover its planes that were on the runway by bombing us from air and land. It was less intense than usual. Muhammad Afdil's launcher exhausted its ammunition, but we were only able to give him ten rockets because we did not have any means of transportation.

Majbur had double that number. We stopped the launcher to check on what was going on at the airport, but we could not do that. So we continued the bombing with seconds or minutes separating each shell until we stopped completely.

Uthman asked me in a call about the result of the shelling. I told him I did not know what happened and the results are unclear. After a silent period the shelling stopped. I could not contact 'Abd Al-'Aziz because he was still busy with the battles in Dair Malik which was still going on and the air force was joining in.

We still were an hour away from midnight, and the enemy did one successful landing and the results of the second attempt were unclear. Suddenly we were attacked by air strikes and bombing from the rocket launcher (BM13) which seemed to be targeted against us. Suddenly, our invisible friend, 'Abd Al-'Aziz, came with an important piece of information. He said that the planes moved to the western edge of the airport. It was

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really a deadly piece of information, because I asked Abu Tamim and Abu Zayd to work together with Abu Al-'Abbas' launcher to intermittently shell the section where the plane was located. I asked Majbur to attack his section with a signal shelling intermittently. I asked Uthman to stop shelling because we did not need his launcher.

Abu Al-'Abbas, launcher worked with more intensity. As soon as a load of shells was finished, it would start shelling the second load with a short time gap. The launcher only had eight shells but the speed of the shooting and the skill of the operating team

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turned the western side of the runway into hell. Indeed we saw a bright yellow light as there was a fire in the area of the bombing so we shouted God is Great. The teams of the launcher asked about the reason for the shouts. We told them that a light from a fire came from the western side and the planes may have caught fire, so they started to shout God is the Great too.

The voice of 'Abd Al-'Aziz was heard clearly as he shouted with enthusiasm that the enemy was talking about a burning plane with soldiers who were inside it and that a second plane was also hit. A big state of joy came over the center and the radios were full of the shouts of God is Great and congratulations. Many cried and knelt to thank God. The surveillance center at Turghar added some more details. They said that a third plane was moving to the eastern edge in preparation for takeoff and it was actually going up when it was hit by fragments of an exploding rocket. So, it crashed on the ground and caught fire.

If this was true, then those officers and soldiers were wounded in the battle. It cannot be that in the midst of battles these army troops could have gone on vacation especially when the landing planes were fully loaded with ammunitions.

This also means that the enemy won the cargo of two planes tonight. Those were the first and the second planes. It is also a given that the easy success with the first planes tempted him to send the second and the third plane within close intervals to take advantage of the absence of the new fire power that was attacking the airport. The enemy's bad evaluation caused it disastrous losses with the two planes. Probably, the enemy thought that we tricked him by letting the first plane go so we may strike the next plane which could have carried more precious cargo on board.. However we did not think in this manner. We were determined on not letting any plane pass. So tonight we have failed twice when the enemy was successful in unloading two planes consecutively. We have succeeded twice when we destroyed two planes (second and third).

The success we achieved was bigger than the failure we faced. In the next day, we have learned that a good number of officers were among those who were killed. Among them was "General 'Abd Al-Rahman" the head politician for the communist forces in Khost. This was an important position with authority over the military and the administrative command in the area. I contacted Abu Tamim, who was working on the launcher, and I congratulated him on his work. He thanked God with a voice that was choking with tears, and he said that he prayed to God and thanked him. He added that the brothers at the center also did that. I also tried not to show that I was crying in my voice at the surveillance location. The new young men were really affected and touched. They

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exchanged congratulations with me, and also Uthman and his group contacted us to send his congratulations while they were shouting and saying God is Great.

The good news reached the mujahdin who were fighting in Dair Malik and Miranshah. I learned later that what happened at Hakani Center also happened among the Mujahdin families, and that was not different from what happened at our place. Everyone knew that the Airport Project was behind that progress. My wife, who arrived that day at Miranshah, received congratulations from the Afghani families. Next, the children of immigrants told her the next day that "Mustafa" was working well at the front and he was bombing the airport hard. The secrets of our operations became public knowledge which caused many problems for me and my family and our safety was threatened by Arabs and Afghans.

Another service we accomplished for the mujahdin, who were fighting in the area of Dair Malik that night, was the shift of the enemy planes attack from shelling them to striking us with all its might. This continued until the beginning of dusk, and this was a reason to give us happiness because it showed how much pain the enemy felt from our work attacks on the airport.

At three o'clock in the morning, a military transport plane flew over the valley and we thought that it was trying to land, because it circulated many times. We were wishing that it would land because we would have been able to see it with our eyes on the runway due to daylight. Unfortunately, it went back, it could have been an easy catch for us. The bright star of the morning appeared, the fresh morning breeze passed, and the eastern horizon brightened.

Haji Ibrahim was sitting next to a huge rock quietly with his head over his knees. He was in deep sleep. I woke him up to pray the Morning Prayer. We prayed together, then we stretched over the rocks and we went in a deep sleep.

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In the morning I wrote in my papers describing that night as "that was the third unforgettable night"

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The planes disappeared, and we were puzzled.

During the next three days and three nights the enemy did not use the airport although the weather was suitable. Not just that but more importantly the battles were raging in the western side of the valley at the Deir Malik area which lasted from Saturday evening till Tuesday evening. The enemy would not have allowed any force to stop him from using the airport in such a situation.

The enemy had suffered great loses in the past three days. It consisted of four military transport planes (AN-32) and the killing of a number of officers and soldiers inside the planes. However, I could not imagine that the size of those loses would be enough to stop the enemy from using the airport which could lead to the fall of the city and the defeat of its forces there.

Without a doubt the enemy's loses were high for unloading one plane, maybe two. They lost four planes, and I would think that would ring the warning bells, but not to the point

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of abounding any attempt. I expected that there was additional reason that was not clear to us. Maybe we hit the airport radar during our attack. This possibility was too optimistic so I discounted it so immediately, because it meant that the enemy would be incapable to use the airport due to the fact that he could not get another radar.

I discounted or the rosy wishes as long as we did not have solid evidence as to why the enemy stopped using the air port during those three days. Without a doubt, we have done the Mujahdin who were involved in the battles in Dair Malik a great service. Also without a doubt, the enemy is plotting and planning a new way to defeat us. They might use new weapons or new methods.

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We had to get ourselves prepared for the new round which would be harder than the previous ones, because the affect of the element of surprise had been lost and the enemy would face us with a good knowledge of our methods and our capabilities.

Our biggest problem now was the fast consumption of the rockets, and supplies had stopped long time ago "almost two months". The past three nights we used what we had in storage. We had only four hundred rockets which were enough for six nights if we kept going at that rate. In another word, due to the high consumption of ammunition we would need two thousands rockets if we wanted to close the airport for one month. Then we had nightly confrontations, which caused me to wish that the enemy would stop using the airport for any other reason, such as bad weather and heavy rains which were common during that season; so I was watching the clouds in sky. This was an old tradition I learned since I came to Afghanistan for the first time. I learned that the clouds were our first line of defense against the enemy air force and the land was our last line of defense. Every night the enemy failed to use the airport gave me a feeling of happiness which I have not felt since I was a child when the school closed because of unrest or it would be opened but the math teacher was absent.

The next three nights which we will talk about now, were happy days because the math teacher did not come to school. I mean the planes did not land at the airport, so it saved us ammunition and it extended our siege of the airport without increasing our cost.

Sunday August 19, 1990

On top of the surveillance mountain we felt lazy until the Noon Prayer. After the morning tea most of us slept inside the tent in order to take shelter from the hot sun and the bites of the flies. Also, our guest from the back centers left us and another group will replace them tonight. This was according to the program that would show the young men our way of operating which cannot be shown unless they are here.

Haji Ibrahim was still asking me to go to Miranshah because of the situation with his family that did not allow him to be absent for a long period of time. I stopped him from going until I would find his replacement, which did not happen till now.

I thought that Abu Al-Shahid and Abu Zayd can run the operation from the surveillance location; a job which I was doing then. I did not want the operation to stop if I was absent for any reason. This was my way of operating. I did not want the work to depend on my presence. There was always someone who knew what to do from the beginning to the

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end. This method was criticized because it seemed that I was giving up my authority to the people around me.

It was noon and the temperature was hot and the air was full of the sound of flies. Everything was as calm as the silence of the graves. I was in a bad condition and I had frustrating thoughts. Normally, it was because the situation of the family and the unknown future that was waiting for us. If this war ended and I did not get killed, where am I going work? Where am I going to live? How are my boys and the girls going to be educated? And how will the governments and all the countries in the world will deal with us?

I commented on those ideas in my diary by saying (are those are the devil's thoughts? Or is it a hard problem a few years away. I seriously, faced all those questions and I met with my family all the possibility I was worried about. We lost the stability, the security and even our relationship with our family back home. Our children lost the chance to be educated. We all paid the price for the new world order which was born exactly at the time we were busy as a family with the airport project.

Abu Al-Nur contacted me from Abu Al-'Abbas Center to tell me that the stored ammunition was 400 shells out of 600 shells he had three day before the start of the operation.

- Abu Al-Shahid went to adjust the targeting for Majbur and Muhammad Fadil launchers.
- Before sunset I was surprised when Mubshir contacted me form Abu Al-'Abbas Center. He came walking with Abu Mus'ab Al-Suri from Jihad Wal Camp. They asked to come to the surveillance mountain, so they asked them to stay until I come in the morning because the place would have been too crowded if they all came.

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- After sunset the battle started again in Dair Malik area. This was the second night of battle without hearing any confirmed news, which tells me that the battles were not successful.

I asked all the centers to be ready because when the battles are tough in the valley that means will be tough here at the air port.

I sat down with Abu Zayd Al-Tunisi, Haji Ibrahim Al-Afghani and Abu Hamid Al-libi near the telescopes. The clouds gathered above us then they started to gradually clear up. I was watching the clouds movement with concern hoping they would increase. Abu Zayd asked me "are you expecting the planes to try to land tonight?" I answered him "You wished that the one unarmed should be yours".

- Which is a part of Al-Anfal chapter. So Abu Zayd laughed.

The weather cleared up and sky was bright which made me upset. However, the planes did not try to land, with the hard battles going in the valley. This surprised me. I thought about it for a long time and had Abu Zayd and the others join me in the discussion the one question: Why? We could not pinpoint a definite answer to what was happening.

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However, our 'project had a definite role in causing what was happening, but it was not the only reason.

Monday August 20, 1990:

In the early morning, I left the surveillance mountain going towards Abu Al-'Abbas Center where Abu Mus'ab's group which consisted of ten individuals who were working hard to repair the road to the center and reinforce the sand bags that protect the caves and around the launcher which was sitting like a waiting lion behind fences of bags formed in the shape of circle that was open at the side facing the door of the cave.

We greeted and congratulated each others, and we quickly exchanged the news. Then, I went to take a bath and wash my clothes which I have not done in two weeks, and after that I was ready for a meeting and for detailed discussions.

Suddenly the vehicle arrived from Miranshah after it was repaired so we received it with screams and God is the Great. An optimistic atmosphere of fun surrounded us.

Supplying the centers with ammunition and food was not a problem anymore. We left the surveillance center without food. Now, we have Mubshir the first one responsible for supplying the operation with ammunition and he was the first one responsible for obstructing the project. We will talk to him about this problem which represented our first obstacle even it came before the air strikes and the launchers that were shooting rockets at us from the valley.

After we performed the Afternoon Prayer we had a general meeting in the "living cave" and most of us attended it. Abu Mus'ab opened the subject of the Gulf events and bringing the American Forces and its allies into Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. He expressed his objection to Abu 'Abdullah calling the young men to fight in Saudi Arabia along side the American forces. I wished that would not have happened. He attacked the Saudi scholars to the point that he did not consider them Muslims that was a common practice among the Arab community here and it happened during disagreements that were less important.

I noticed that the talk was from one side and Al-Qeada group led by Mubshir refrained from commenting. So I made my statement very short and I said that what was happening in the Gulf now will be a distinctive mark in the history of Muslims and in the Islamic movement. I added that the official religious establishment is more important when it comes to protecting the regime, especially when the regime wants to cover itself with a religious appearance. In this case the establishment becomes more important than the military the police, intelligence services and the media collectively.

- At five thirty in the evening we stopped our meeting to go to the surveillance mountain, because I was expecting a landing at the airport. Mubshir and one of his Afghans workers came with me. Abu Mus'ab and his group stayed at the camp due to prevent the mountain from being crowded and they would follow the next day.

We gathered after sunset at the surveillance spot. We expected a night full of raging battles in Dair Malik. We expected the battles to continue in Dair Malik until the Mujahideen reached the center of the city. If they advanced ten kilometers more, they would be

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able to finish the battle to their advantage. They have a good chance because the airport is completely closed which was what they put down as condition in order for the city to fall or to be conquered.

At nine in the evening the Mujahdin were able to take over six military locations in Dair Malik and they planed to continue the offense until they take over a military location which was controlled by (Glim Gim) militia of Al-Rashid Dustum, who was the biggest agent for the communist militia in Afghanistan.

At three in the morning we declared a full alert because we heard the sound of “the Buffalo” so we thought that there was a surprise landing but that did not happen. I sat down with Abu Zayd to talk about the possible reasons behind the enemy not using the airport although the battles were still going on. We were ready for a long war because the enemy was not going to give the airport up and succumb to us that easily. But, what was the enemy planning for us now? That worried me a lot.

Tuesday, August 21 1990 - the first of Safar 1411 H.

The news form Dair Malik revealed that the mujahdin had accomplished more advancement on the ground during the night. They have planned mines before dusk to prevent the enemy from launching a counter attack to regain what he lost.

Due to the fact that the area was a farming and open territory it did not provide any protection for the Mujahdin during the day time, so they preferred to attack at night and defend inday time.

Abu Ibrahim was following the news with ‘Abd Al-‘Aziz .It was happy news for us to the point that we had our tea at the surveillance spot instead of the tent as was camp protocol. With the first light, the fighter jets flew over but it was foggy which prevented them from bombing us. We declared a full alert in anticipation for a surprise landing.

From seven thirty in the morning the air force was working hard against the Mujahdin in Dair Al-Malik but they completely ignored us. At noon time, Abu Mus’ab and his group went to the surveillance mountain. At the bottom of the mountain “Khalil” the Afghani, who was one of three from Karim Group stayed with us at the surveillance location, stopped them and ordered them to go back and not to climb the mountain. Due to the fact that they did not understand the language, they ignored him and continued to climb. So Khalil pulled his automatic rifle to threaten them, but they also ignored him. So, Khalil moved on his way. I asked Ibrahim to go to Karim to thank him for giving us the mountain and to ask him to pull the three remaining with their leader “Shiraz-al-hak”, whom we quarreled with yesterday because he was trying to use “Al-Dushka” after it was repaired. We were able to stop him with difficulty. He finally relented because our group outnumbered his.

Abu Mus’ab and his group took a quick look at our location and at that of the airport. We gave them a short explanation of the operation that we ran. We discussed what the Mujahdin do at Dair Malik and the clear connection between the two operations, because our launchers stopped the enemy from getting its supplies that were coming by air through the airport.

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I sat with the group at the bottom of the black peak of the mountain under two big trees with sharp thorns, on a ground full of sharp rocks and sharply slopping towards the deep end of the mountain. It was uncomfortable and the weather was hot. Our eyes were teary because of the sharp thorns that surrounded us from all sides.

We discussed the situation in the Arab area and in Syria and I was supposed to talk about the Afghani situation. I spoke without any enthusiasm because the talk was repeated. The group wanted to know who was closer to being right, Syaf or Hikmatyar, and they sided with the latter. However, my stand was to strongly condemn both men as I accused them of being a creation of the international game.

I knew that those statements would be rejected by the audience and that was the reason I was not very enthusiastic to express them. This would probably solidify their belief that they were correct but I did not care.

In the afternoon the weather was not as hot and the air was more refreshing. We sat again under the rocks and away from the cactus until the sunset Prayer, and then we prayed as a group. A group that represented the reality of the situation. The rocks and the thorns made every person stand alone and the Imam was isolated trying to raise his voice so that the young men behind him can hear him.

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Before the end of the prayer, a heavy bomb dropped by a fighter jet that passed over our head with a speed of lightning. The bomb exploded ten meter away from our blessed gathering. If it were not for God's mercy the bomb would have dropped on the other side of the black rocks where we were sitting, we would have become torn pieces of grilled meat. Finally they started to give us some attention. They could be planning to land a plane tonight. They might continue the air strike against our surveillance location, especially if they were sure about the function of the location. The young men scattered to all sides of the mountain and they slept between the rocks in anticipation of other air strikes.

We kept the wireless communication open with the other centers because it was always cut off. We continued to watch the airport.

The planes bombed our area continuously throughout the night, but we never got a hit like the one we got at sunset.

For the third consecutive time the night passed without a landing attempt at the airport. At dusk we did not have water so we cleaned up for the prayer with sand and we prayed. With the lights of the early morning Abu Mus'ab and his group went down to Abu Al-'Abbas Center to drink tea and eat breakfast.

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A night that surpassed all others  
Wednesday, August 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1190--- 2nd of Safar 1411 H

- The closure night: the seventh
- The night of engagement: the fourth
- The number of landing attempts: two.

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- Landing attempt results: the first plane was able to land because of the delayed wireless communication with Turghar.
- The damages at the enemy side: the first plane was hit during the takeoff attempt and the second plane burned during landing.
- The damages on our side: no damages on our side.

Notes: the enemy was able to unload the cargo of one plane but the damage to his planes was one hundred percent.

The battle stopped in Dair Malik and there were no engagements tonight.

Total loses for the enemy: six planes.

At the camp, I prepared some administrative matters to deal with the friction between Abu Nur and Abu Tamim. Abu Zayd suggested that Abu Tamim would become the leader of the camp as well as the launcher team because Abu Nur,

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the current leader of the camp, deals with the rest very aggressively and with a bureaucratic and complicated method that bothered everyone. Abu-al Nur accepted this like a good sportsman. I thought that this change is not going to solve the problems that resulted from the differences in nature and work ethics.

We received the good news that Shah Khan, our nearby neighbor, was ready to join us in bombing the airport. A number of the young men went to him to help him prepare the launcher and protect with sand bags, as we did here. They will also strengthen his bad cave by reinforcing it and protecting it.

Shah Khan was within a close distance from us, which is on the ravine facing us and our launcher. Other side the location of our launcher. Separating us was a sharp drop of land but we shared a water creek. We get flooded from the same seasonal rains, but our location was better than theirs because it had better protection and sand enforcement. Shah Khan will increase the project's firepower, and also increase our ammunition supply, which seems it will be resolved soon. However, all that we got from Mubshir was promises. Although, he showed some enthusiasm for our project, when he noticed its success in the past three days. That was attested to by both Arabs and Afghans. I complained to Abu Mus'ab about what I faced from Al-Qaeda from bureaucracy and slow response to the needs of the project. In any case my hopes were renewed that Mubshir will change his position. He stayed with us last night at the surveillance center and he will spend tonight with us also. I hope that will fill him with enthusiasm that will change his disinterested position.

During the day the enemy dropped eight parachutes, which were full of supplies and equipment, over the city but the wind carried six of them to the location of the Mujahdin. This spread joy and optimism.

In any case, the enemy would not have dropped the parachutes if it were able to use the airport.

We had to do practice experiment on the launchers to make sure that each of them was still aimed at its target, and to give Shah Khan a section of the runway. We assigned him the middle section.

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As usual, Uthamn's launching men refused to obey orders, and Majbur and his group were always sensitive about the Arabs adjusting their launcher. But the operation went on peacefully despite some argument and the effect of the strong wind on failing to adjust the launcher's aim. This forced us to agree with Majbur that his launcher was in the correct position.

The enemy started his attempts to land at nine thirty in the evening which was a very early time because he had giving up on landing in the first part of the night.

The enemy started preparing by heavy bombing from the jet fighters. We were at the surveillance location with a big number of people because of the guests. The fighter jets bombed our bottom tent with more than one bomb. Luckily it was empty because all of them were spread all over the mountain, at the surveillance spot to watch the anticipated battle between us and the enemy over the airport runway.

A thick black smoke and the rocks were spread around us. One of the young men shouted "save the tuna cans ...the tuna cans" So everyone started to laugh. After our camp almost got to the point of starvation, we received a shipment of tuna cans which had expired. We put them in the tent with extreme care and assigned tight security around them.

The enemy almost deprived us from the tuna. Several young men went running towards the tent to save the tuna when they found a small fire in the tent. So they put it out and saved the tuna which made them happy. We considered it a sign of good things to come. Actually, that night was one of the best nights.

The air strikes kept on coming on the mountain and around the launchers we had. The enemy launchers sent rockets to our area. The wireless communication between 'Abd Al-'Aziz and the surveillance location in Turghar was difficult. He was screaming "the plane has arrived. It is on the airport runway now. Bomb it quickly"

This is what we did. We fired heavily and quickly at the runway. It was the first time we used five launchers at the same time. Our firepower was impressive so it attracted the attention of all the Mujahdin. They were joyful and shouting God is the Great for the continuous hitting. I kept screaming on the radio so our group does not start "its economical mode" and reduce the shelling.

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The enemy covered us with fighter jets and started bombing us with rockets. The heavy bombers dropped cluster bombs and heavy bombs that weighed five hundred pound and one thousand pound.

The sounds of the planes started to be mixed, and I thought that the plane on the runway might have taken off. So I ordered the bombing to stop in order to clarify the situation. Ibrahim called 'Abd Al-'Aziz and tonight this was only possible through Turghar. 'Abd Al-'Aziz dropped a surprise on us when he said: the second plane has actually arrived on the runway and the first one did not take off. This was a chance that will not come again and time was very tight. There were planes on the runway. I grabbed the radio from Ibrahim and I shouted with a loud voice and sharp sentences "three, three ... nine...nine ... the planes are on the runway shoot quickly the full load. Do not stop shooting. Keep on firing"

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Then Ibrahim related the same orders to the three launchers which were working with us in “Dazjat Stan” including the new launcher with Shah Khan. I took the radio from him to follow up with our Arab centers, especially that the bombing of the launchers was heavy. Also the flashing coming out of the rockets showed clearly the location of the launcher which would make an easy target for the planes specially the fighter jets that might have guided missiles.

The battle was at its peak, and the bombs from the planes were dropping on top of the launchers. Our launchers were shelling the runway all at the same time. As for us at the surveillance location, we were jumping in between the rocks. A one thousand pound bomb fell on top of us. I could not use the nearest bunker without having three other people in there with me, and it was made for one person. So I stopped using it and I just used the rocks as a shield while I was shouting on the radio with the Egyptian countryside accent to urge our centers to continue shooting I said “Shoot three ...in the name of God.... God is Great...finish the load nine...I can see you nine... finish the load nine”... I was watching the red lines behind the rockets coming from our centers and if they stopped. I would shout at them to continue. They would laugh and continue. Abu Al-Shahid was working on Abu Al-‘Abbas Center launcher because Abu Tamim was sick with a cold or a light Malaria. He got up from his bed because of his respect for the battle, and the great explosion around the center. I went to help Abu Al-Shahid with the continuous shooting. The rest at the camp were busy preparing the new rockets for loading. The quantity we prepared in the morning was not enough and this launcher would be the most difficult tonight as we will see. The caves and the bunkers were like an ant farm carrying the rockets, cleaning them, and loading them. This was heavy work and relatively less dangerous. The more dangerous work was the wireless communication which required standing outside the cave and on a high spot. That is what Abu Tamim did when he called me to tell me to slow down the shelling speed because the ammunition consumption was very high. His voice was tired from his illness. So I answered him: “spend what you got and God will not keep anything away from you” he laughed and continued his work behind the launcher.

We saw a ball of fire a few meters above the runway then an explosion on top of it. A big fire lighted up the area. The plane had exploded and caught on fire.

The shouts of God is Great came across the radios. We reported the good news to our centers, so they shouted God is Great and prayed to God and thanked him. The plane was located in the section of Abu Al-‘Abbas launcher –number 3. We asked them to stop but the Turghar center had a different opinion. They asked us to fire some shells on the plane because a number of vehicles had gathered around it. So we asked –number 3- to fire a number of shells intermittently, so he fired his first rockets and he put out the fire!! Or most of it. He then sent a second rocket so the fire came back to its original size. So I asked him to stop so that he would not put it out again. Turghar shouted at us, instead of ‘Abd Al-‘Aziz, that a plane was about to take off quickly and we have to catch it before we lose it. We called on the rockets weapon in “Dizjat Stan” and he was completely ready. The five launchers were ready and they started shelling without mercy. I was following them while I was shouting God is Great and complementing them. Then, I ordered them to stop when ‘Abd Al-‘Aziz told me that the plane was hit and incapable of flying and it was in exactly

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the middle of the runway which was the section assigned to Shah Khan who was joining us for the first time tonight so we congratulated him and blessed him. He answered us with joy and bashfulness as if he was a young man at his wedding night. The enthusiastic calls over the radios joining in with the happiness which added a special feel for the battle. I asked the launchers to shoot intermittently and then we stopped and stayed on full alert and constant communication over the radios until three in the morning in anticipation of a landing at the airport.

We considered any landing after this time to be suicidal for the enemy because it is easy to destroy them due to the fact that visibility is relatively better so we can determine with difficulty what is happening on the runway.

At the Morning Prayer we cleaned up and prayed in our locations. The skies were bright as if the light was coming from heaven. We just said goodbye to the unforgettable fourth night. It surpassed the previous nights.

Thursday August 23 1990 (the third of Safar 1411 H.)

Summary:

Night of closure: the Eighth

Notes: the enemy did not try to use the airport although the weather was good. I was not there, so Abu Zayd took my place in commanding the operation from the surveillance location.

After the Morning Prayer Abu Mus'ab called me from Abu Al-'Abbas Center to congratulate me about the results of the previous night. We then got a wireless message from 'Abd Al-'Aziz to tell me that Sheikh Hakani is asking me to go to Miranshah, so I was sure that my family came back safely from Islamabad. I slept for about one hour before I went down the mountain going towards Abu Al-'Abbas Camp. Ibrahim came with me because he was going to Miranshah to spend his vacation with his family. We had to find a replacement for him while he was gone. We had two candidates and both of them were in the area.

We passed first by Muhammad Afdil's Center. He met us with his group with hugs and blessings as was the tradition in the morning after a full night.

Then we moved to Shah Khan and his group at the entrance of the valley where Abu Al-'Abbas Center is located and this time we were the ones who congratulated him for his big success in his first night with us in the "Airport Project". We found with him one of his team members by the name of Jul Muhammad and he volunteered to work in Ibrahim's place during his absence. He spoke Gulf Arabic so we welcomed him at Abu Al-'Abbas Center, where it seemed like it was a holiday because of the victories of the previous night.

We got our share of hugs and congratulations but Abu Tamim was ill with Malaria and he had a high fever. Abu Al-Nur was leaving as well to Miranshah to buy supplies for the camp and Abu Al-Shahid will stay to run the camp and the launcher.

I found my whole family who came from Islamabad. I was puzzled because the children did not go to school. My wife told me that she pulled all of them from the Saudi School

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after a big fight with the school administration because they were interrogating the children about their father. They would ask them; where is your father? What is he doing in Afghanistan? What are they doing in Miranshah? Who is visiting your father at home? So, my wife went to them and she was very angry because they exposed the children to police like interrogations and made them a source for information that could not have been useful to the school.

The discussion ended with a big crises and threats from the school administration and from the Saudi Consulate against my wife. They told her that she would face great punishment because she insulted the school administration. Um Walid did not hold back her verbal attack against the school the consulate and maybe the country. Then, she took the quarrel to the street in front of the school which put the men who did the interrogation and the consulate officials in a crisis, which was not resolved until the teachers and the residents of the district interfered. Um Walid came back dragging behind her, or in a car, her four children who were registered at the school. They all came back homeless to Miranshah.

It could be a coincidence or not, but our new security problems started after that date.

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In the afternoon Abu Hafs visited me in my house which was close to the Al-Qeada hospitality center. He told me that he will stay for a while in the frontlines. I was happy about that and I thought it was a good chance that Al-Qeada will participate in Khost battles. Before that they will support the airport project in more serious manner. At least in the category of buying rockets, because the success that we have accomplished in the project urged them to take those steps. We have destroyed six planes up to now. He promised to buy one thousand rockets for the project and he will order Mubshir and other to buy them quickly.

I laughed and I called it "Abu Hafs one thousand", and this became the code name for the project to buy the rockets.

We were exhausted so we decided to stay in Miranshah and the next day we will take our military supplies with us.

I was restless thinking about our brothers having to engage the enemy tonight and I am not with them. However the enemy did not use the airport that night and considered myself lucky.

Friday, August, 24, 1990. (5, Safar, 1411 H.)

Summary:

Closing night: The ninth.

Remarks: The weather was suitable for using the airport, but the enemy didn't try to use it.

Once more Abu-al-Nur returned to Miranshah devoting himself to the airport project. He was in charge of food, buying ammunitions because Mubshir and his team were focusing on running the camps. The number of people at those camps exceeded four hundred; while the number of people at our project was less than forty. The Arabs measure the importance of any project by numbers. That meant that those camps in their views are

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more important than the airport project because of the difference in the number of people. Walid would be working with Abu-al-Nur as his assistant. The culture office of Hakani's Group would be the center for this administration. The most important for Abu-al-Nur is to help in Abu-Hifis Project. I suggested that he get a written permission from Hakani to one of his deputies to work with us when buying the required missiles.

In order to get this permission, Abu-al-Nur, Walid, and Abu-Hifis rode with us in the car searching for Hakani inside the Afghani border. We moved at three o'clock in the afternoon to meet with Hakani's motorcade in Mubshir Center. At the motorcade, the guards were first, then Hakani's car, then some cars for the Mujahdin. The motorcade stopped, and Hakani got out of his car to see us. He took me aside to tell me some of the important news he had. The news he told me was as follows:

1. People in Khost are in touch with him, and they are also in touch with the rest of the leadership in order to prepare for an uprising. Therefore, the surrender of Khost City might be near.
2. The air traffic at the airport stopped completely.
3. The Pakistani government would send some ammunition, and Hakani would give us some of these ammunitions. There are some cluster bombs included in the new ammunitions, and we were told that they are very effective, if used at the airport. (They were American made).

Hakani was happy and optimistic. He told me that he knew I was at the guest house the night before, and he looked for me but did not find me. I said I was very tired from staying up all night by the airport. He laughed and said good-bye, because he was returning to Miranshah. He took with him Walid and Abu-al-Nur to help them with the ammunitions issue.

Abu-Hifis asked me about Hakani's news. I told him everything Hakani told me. Abu-Hifis asked me to comment on this news. I said I do not feel as optimistic as Hakani, especially when it comes to the surrender of the city. The civilians in the city are few, and they are followers of the current regime. Let us say they would prefer to jump off the ship before drowning. How can we overcome a military power with twelve thousand fully armed soldiers? Even if the enemy's morale was low, unless there were some

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influential officers on our side in this revolution, we would not stand a chance. Having those influential officers is unlikely because, "Shah Nawaz Tanay", failed in convincing the city officers to surrender.

In regard to the Pakistani ammunitions and the American cluster bombs, I feel it is like a very evil conspiracy from both sides – Pakistan and America together.

Even if a 'revolution' was unlikely inside Khost City, it was clear that the city was shaking under Hakani and his coalition's attacks. His coalition included Pakistan, America, and some Arabs. They all stopped helping the Mujahdin. If Pakistan managed to have a presence in Khost, this would be their chance to direct the current situation against the Muslims. It is too late to use the cluster bombs now, and those who sent them are looking for some medals on their chests. Those people are considered the revolution thieves and the enemies of Muslims. The stinger rocket was brought to the war after

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America knew that the Soviets decided to withdraw from Afghanistan. The Americans brought their rockets in order to take credit for the victory in the technology field. People would say that the American technology brought victory to us, not the Afghani Mujahdin or their Arab and Muslim coalitions.

Now after it became known to everybody that Khost Airport would not be in use anymore because of the airport project and the Mujahdin attacks, America has decided to intervene, so people once again say that the American technology brought the victory, and this prevents the Muslims from taking credit in the victory in Afghanistan.

The Americans used the Afghani war to try some of their weapons that were going to expire in their storage without any real chance to find out if they still worked. The Americans wanted to turn the Afghani victory into an American propaganda to promote their weapons. They were in competition at the international market for weapons with the Soviets. This market is considered the most profitable market after the oil market. It is better for the American political and economical interest to promote the victory in Afghanistan as if it were a victory for the American weapons.

They wanted to twist the facts and say it is not a victory for Islam, as they did in the Israeli war in 1967. They promoted the Israeli victory over the Arabs as a victory for the American weapons over the Soviet weapons. They denied the fact that the victory in this war was over the corrupt Arab regimes. The Arabs were going to be defeated whether the war was with Israel or not, because of the corruptions. We as Arabs are defeated whether in war or in peace. In regards to the air traffic at the airport, it does not mean that the enemy had surrendered and admitted defeat. If the enemy admitted defeat, it would mean that they lost the whole city, but they are still fighting on the ground. We managed to corner the enemy, but they still are fearlessly resisting. We have to keep our pressure on the enemy until they surrender.

At the valley entrance and before the car turned left in the narrow path toward Shah Khan Center and Abu-al-'Abbas Center, I stepped out of the car with Abu-Hifis. We continued on foot until we reached the observation center before sunset. I was afraid the enemy would use the airport tonight. We reached the observation point in the evening, and after awhile, Mubshir and Abu-al-Shahid caught up with us.

The sky was clear, and it meant that the enemy might try to land at the airport. The night passed peacefully, but it was filled with a lot of discussions. I still remember one of those discussions that took place between Abu-al-Shahid and me. The discussion was about the lack of the Arab Mujahdin in Afghanistan of having a scholar who could replace Sheikh Abdallah Azzam. Abu-al-Shahid suggested that we call one of the scholars who live in the gulf area. This scholar was deported from Saudi Arabia because he told the truth in one of the official occasions. Abu-al-Shahid said that if we called this a scholar and convinced him to come and stay here in Afghanistan, it would be a huge gain for us.

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I said that after all those years that were filled with fire and blood in Afghanistan, the scholars who did not come already would not come now. If I went to convince one of

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those scholars to come and participate in jihad, I would be the scholar, not him. Both of us laughed at this remark.

About the flourish of the 'Islamic Awakening' movements, I said that I am suspicious about these movements, and I hoped it would not be the end of the resistance. I did not feel confident about those new groups and new organizations that came after the wake-up call to Islam, especially the Jihadist part of it because of the absence scholars from their ranks. This was true, even in the Afghani groups. The Arabs went to the extreme about those organizations and about their capabilities. They believed that the organization had replaced the nation. This belief might lead those groups to destruction, if they were in disagreement with each other, or with the people of their country.

I said that the Salafi Movement is the banner under which the dispute would occur. The dispute between the Jihadi Movements and the rest of the Muslim nations could also fall under the Salafi banner. Those organizations living in complete ignorance regarding the circumstances of the world we live in; and whoever gets involved in a war without knowing the rules of a war, will suffer. The political ignorance in those organizations is known to everyone. Most of these organizations depended on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries. Some of the sympathizers in those countries, such as the king's scholars and the conformist youth, are the ones who support those movements. The financial support to those movements comes through the regimes of the Gulf area, particularly the Saudi regime, which is under American protection now. All of this can fall under the Salafi banner. The discussion ended peacefully, and so did the night, there were no explosions.

Saturday, August, 25, 1990. (6, Safar, 1411 H.)

Summary:

Closing night: The tenth.

Remarks: The weather was suitable for the planes to land.

In the morning, we went to Abu-al-'Abbas center to talk with Abu-Mus'ab. We talked about the necessity of publishing a magazine that can deal with some good and important ideas for the Arab Mujahdin in Afghanistan. I agreed with the idea, but I was not hoping for dealing with the Arabs –outside the camp boundaries- to avoid their countless problems. We then talked about the military role for the Arabs in Afghanistan. I criticized them a lot in this field, and said "until now, the Arabs were not a good example in military operations, and have not presented the Afghanis with anything new.

They have nothing to offer but courage, and this is an Afghani feature also. The Afghanis are better than us when it comes to military plans and discipline. The artillery was one aspect that can be used by the Arabs because they have a good level of education. The Arabs did not want to participate in the Artillery battalion, and preferred the infantry for the sake of martyrdom. They considered martyrdom as the quickest way to heaven, and they didn't use it in the right way from a military point of view. They did manage to use it brilliantly in the field of politics, to collect donations, so they can force the Mujahideen to use Jihad in an un-Islamic way to achieve some political goals.

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Shah Khan Center asked us to pay back our debt of one-hundred fifty missiles, which we had from their leader Mali Khan. After searching, we found out that we had received a note from him, but we didn't receive the actual missiles. The leadership of the camp believed us and managed to prevent the creation of a big problem.

We got a similar message from Muhammad Afdil, which was sent to us with Jul Muhammad our temporary translator. He said in the message that (Abu-al-Walid) was promised fifty missiles to make up for his loss in participating in the airport operation.

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I was disturbed by this message since they were asking me to fulfill an imaginary promise. I decided to try to ignore them, and the problem was over.

The enemy fired a lot of Mortars at "Majbur" center that night, but Majbur was calm and didn't respond back. I liked that. After the fall of few rain drops, the sky was clear, and the weather was suitable for the planes to land. Abu-Hafs spent one more night with us. We slept near to the observation point, while Abu-Zayd went to sleep next to the ruined 'Doshka'.

Sunday, August, 26, 1990. (Safar, 1411 H.)

Summary:

Closing night: the eleventh.

Confrontation Night: the fifth.

Number of landing attempts: Three attempts.

Results of landing attempts: The first one left before unloading. The second one unloaded its cargo, and then got hit. The third one got burned.

Enemy casualties: One plane got hit, and the second got burned.

Our casualties: None.

Remarks: The choice of our targets was very bad. 'Abd-al-'Aziz didn't do his job as was expected. He turned his phone off after midnight. Turghar changed his team members and replaced them with new inexperienced individuals. We fired about one-hundred missiles. "Dazjat Stan" participation was acceptable, and we didn't know the results of confrontation with the enemy until today from 'Abd-al-'Aziz.

I woke up at four o'clock in the morning, when Abu-Hamid al-Libi was screaming at the communication center asking center number (9) to strike the two trucks. I went to him and asked "what was the problem?" He said "There were two trucks coming to the northern side of the airport from the city's main road. Using the binoculars, I found that the two trucks were out of the launchers range, so I ordered to stop the firing before it started. I then told Abu-Hamid that we had a problem with the ammunitions. We can not strike any target except the planes on the tarmac. We prayed the Morning Prayer, and waited for Ibrahim, who was supposed to be back that day. The commander of Shah Khan's launcher came with two other men and started to watch the airport with the binoculars. Then they had breakfast with us. Abu-Zayd prepared the breakfast. He made some toast, Jam, yogurt, and tea with milk. This nice breakfast had its effect on our conversation, since it was amusing. We had our breakfast by the observation point. We heard Abu-al-Harith voice. He was so happy and told us that the enemy bombed the

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locations of its own soldiers by mistake and inflicted heavy casualties among them. We chanted Allah is great and asked him to come and visit with us. Abu-al-Harith promised to do so.

It was a short time before the enemy planes that were coming from Dair Malik bombed us, and one of its missiles exploded near our location. I had no doubt that we were the target of this bombing. One of the metal burning shrapnel hit the big rock that we were sitting behind.

I was thinking, what had attracted the pilot's eyes to us. I didn't come up with anything except the white flag that was near to us. The flag was at the top of some black stones near the road to the observation point. I was surprised when I knew that, this is the grave of the martyr Ghayath al-Din who was killed by a mortar. Some parts of the martyr's body were stuck to the rocks, so his colleagues gathered those rocks and placed a white flag on top of them in order to let others know that that was a martyr's grave.

The grave view at the top of the deserted mountain makes one feel sorry. I cannot deny that I wished my grave would be at the top of the mountain like that one, and I hoped it would be at the top of the Khost Mountain. Some of the dreams cannot turn into reality; even if those dreams were related to death. In the afternoon, Abu-al-Harith and three other people came to us at the observation mountain through Turghar Mountain. This surprise disturbed me because I knew that the area they used was full of mine fields especially the path between the two mountains. I blamed Abu-al-Harith for using this path. He answered me laughing and said, "Trust Allah". Then he congratulated me on the results of the airport project. He expressed his admiration about the way it was planned. His conversation was very encouraging to us. We then talked about the fighting news he said that there was a project being prepared to recapture the mountain lines, and that could be considered the first line of defense for the city. The valley starts after this mountain line and Julab al-Kutshi Group would be responsible for this project. I said this would be a huge step toward recapturing the city, and it would make it impossible for the enemy to use the airport because our automatic weapons would be a lot closer to the tarmac. This is considered the cheapest way to close the airport, and it would be better than using the launchers. Using the launchers is more expensive and the ammunitions are not enough. I asked Abu-Hafs to be more focused on what was going on in Khost. They must have better involvement there. The new Julab Project could be used as a start for that. Julab is Manan's brother, who is considered a close friend since we started the airport operations in 1985. Manan's group is still in contact with us. I explained to him that the latest operations for the Mujahdin on the locations in front of them resulted in failure for three reasons. The first and the most important one is that there was an old tank type, (T-34). This tank managed to close the road that has been used by the Mujahdin across the valley. The second reason is the presence of an automatic weapon, (Zicoyack), 14.5 mm. This automatic weapon is pointed at the same valley that has been used by the Mujahdin and resulted in slowing their movement. The third reason for the failure is the presence of the mine fields at the end of the same valley.

I told him that we can do Julab a huge favor if we managed to destroy that tank. I believe it was an easy task if we targeted that tank from the top of the mountains using our canons Type 82 Mm. Using the same canons, we could destroy the automatic weapons too. What was left were the mine fields, and Julab can deal with that based on his

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group's experience in dealing with that aspect. We can help them by using explosions to open different paths in those mine fields.

Abu-Hafs expressed his belief in the project and showed some enthusiasm. He said he is going to send someone to use our canon with new equipment to enable us to measure the distances. He also said that he is going to buy a new rocket launcher and get the necessary individuals to help in Julab Operation.

Abu-al-Shahid said that he was ready to strike the enemy's tank using canon Type 82 Mm. He also said that he can deal with any other tank in the area. Abu-al-Harith said that he is going to speed up the opening of the new center, number (5). He called this center (Abu-al-Ahwal). Abu-al-Harith added that he is going to bring the required individuals to operate the center with some rockets Type 710 Mm, and that is all what he can offer.

Abu-Hifis called his office in Miranshah and asked Mubshir about his opinion in buying the ammunitions. Mubshir met with Hajj Ibrahim and 'Abd-al-Rahman while they were coming to us. I was pleased to hear that Hajj Ibrahim was coming to us because we needed him at the observation point. He also was considered a key person at that point. Hajj Ibrahim arrived to the center with one of his friends from Miranshah to see the progress of our work.

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It was a wrong because it would make the secrets of our operation known in Miranshah. The Afghani hospitality made it difficult to object to Hajj Ibrahim's visit without making him mad, or abandoning the project. At the same time I was worried about the secrets of our project, but I decided to ignore the whole thing.

Walid came to our observation center with some supplies. He also delivered some supplies to Abu-al-'Abbas, and 'Uthman centers. He started to watch the tarmac. Both Americans, "Abu-Bakr, and 'Abd-al-Malik" were at the center, and Walid built a good friendly relationship with them. Walid asked to spend the night with us, and I agreed. The air bombing started at nine o'clock and it was concentrated on the observation mountain. Our position was known to the enemy. This night was the most we got bombed by the enemy. Once we stand on our feet, the bombs fall down around us, and so we had to throw our bodies back to the ground between the rocks, as we planned to do at the time of emergency. The bombs and the shrapnels made it difficult for us to think about any thing else except survival. Hajj Ibrahim was hiding in a big hole among the rocks and the antenna for his radio was sticking out of the rocks, so he could keep in touch with the rest of the observation points. Despite the need for using his radio, he managed to push himself deep inside the hole between the rocks to avoid shrapnels. We also were targeted by some rocket launchers.

Abu-Hifis attended with us the program the first unique program that we ever held. Unfortunately the program was shaky and I commented on the reasons for its shakiness at this night at my journals. The observations were bad at this night. No one had eavesdropped at the enemy's communications or their flights. It seemed that the number of people was less than expected at the main observation point. The same thing happened with Turghar observation point. They changed their personnel and replaced

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them with new inexperienced members. Those new members didn't help with any thing, they were useless. The fact was that for the first time we had to depend on ourselves to run the observation task. We took some irrational decisions, and some times we took decisive decisions. In general, we were not sure of our decisions. In both cases we had no way to find out the impact of our gun fire, without seeing any lights over the tarmac. Those lights were the results of burning of a plane. This happened once at that night. The next morning, we went to 'Abd-al-'Aziz, who is considered to be the beating heart for the observation units. We made sure to ask him about the enemy casualties last night, and his response was a surprise to us. 'Abd-al-'Aziz apologized for the interruptions in communications and said the reason was the change in the radio waves. We had no idea about this change, so we were not able to communicate with him in the morning. We worked most of the time without knowing the results of our decisions. We did not know what had taken place over the tarmac.

Tonight was the eighth night in the month of Safar and the moon was shedding its light on the tarmac. We were using our binoculars to watch the tarmac. We were listening to the sounds of explosions and the sounds of the jets trying to figure out if any planes had landed or not.

Ibrahim assured us that there was a plane trying to land. One of our youth confirmed the same story. Our observation points discredited the story. Turghar asked us to stop firing. I made a decision and asked all the rocket launchers to continue firing, and after a while, I asked them to stop the firing. The observation came to agree that the plane had already taken off and Turghar confirmed the news.

I was mad because of this confusion and because of the waste of our ammunitions. If I knew what 'Abd-al-'Aziz knew, I would not have been this angry. The plane had taken off before unloading its cargo, and this was good news for us.

At the middle of the night, the enemy returned to its air strike over our positions with the same strength. We assumed our positions and prepared to challenge any landing of any plane.

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All our senses and nerves were focused on the tarmac and the sounds of the planes. Hajj Ibrahim had a sharp vision, and he never used the binoculars. There were two people using two different binoculars, and I was depending on my hearing to figure out what kind of a plane was flying over us. I used to figure out whether it is a jet or a helicopter by its sound. I also used to know what kind of bomb they were going to drop on us from the sounds. The cluster bombs were unique; their sounds have special features, and their explosions always are accompanied with white smoke, so everyone was able to determine this kind of bomb day or night.

Most of the observers announced that the planes were landing, and Turghar confirmed the news. I asked the five rocket launchers to work to full capacity, and I repeated the same call to centers number three and number nine. Ibrahim was following the three Afghani rocket launchers. It was a fierce confrontation for the landing planes. The enemy planes were also violent in their bombing of our rocket launchers, and the whole mountain was

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lit by the explosions of the rockets. I am still wondering how those planes did not manage to hit any of our rocket launchers. I believe it was the mercy of God. When I saw that we covered the whole tarmac with our missiles, I requested all the rocket launchers to stop firing despite the lack of assurance of whether we hit any planes or not. Because of the lack of information, I was so mad that we might have wasted a lot of our valuable ammunitions. If 'Abd-al-'Aziz told me then, that the plane was hit, and it was not able to take off, my morale and the rest of the team's morale would have been better. At three ten, we were targeted by the planes one more time. For the first time the enemy used his tanks and canons in attacking our defense line. Our rocket launchers were silent until the moment we were sure that there was a plane landing on the tarmac. At that time, all of our rocket launchers opened fire at the airport, and there was smoke everywhere. This was the peak time for any confrontation, and it must have led to some casualties somewhere. With God's grace the casualties were on the enemy's side this time; there was smoke and light at the east side of the tarmac. The plane was burning, and we chanted, "Allah is great", and most of the observation units did the same. Once the fire had been put out, I doubted that the fire was a result of a burning plane. There was no use for our continuous calling to 'Abd-al-'Aziz. I was in a pessimistic moment, and I imagined that the plane was not damaged, but luckily I was mistaken. The next day, I was assured that the outcome of our operation of the previous night had frightened the first wave of planes, to the extent that they took off without unloading their cargo. We managed to damage the second plane and burned the third plane. This achieved good results of our operations.

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It has been five days, since our last confrontation with the enemy during which the enemy didn't try to use the airport. We were in bad need for this truce because we almost ran out of ammunitions. All we were left with were 148 missiles and these were enough for one battle. We had no way to get any more missiles as fast as we wanted.

The Mujahdeen used to fire about fifty missiles a month according to the Pakistani program. Their goal was to disturb the enemy with limited casualties. This goal also goes hand in hand with the American strategy. The American strategy was about preventing the Muslims from achieving decisive victory, and force them to negotiate with the communists. The Americans were planning also to replace the Afghani Muslims with (Americans Muslims) and they were numerous and could be found every where.

The number of missiles we used to fire in one night was double the number of missiles the Mujahdin used in a month. It was normal to destroy eight enemy military, cargo planes in five nights of confrontations. The enemy now is unable to keep up in this war despite the Soviet support. We were told about this support by a pilot, we captured in Khost. The project for the new airport was under way, as we are going to talk about in the next few pages.

My safety and that of my family were not guarantee in Miranshah. Abu-Hifis was the engine for al-Qaeda organization and the military leader for this organization. He promised to participate with us in the Julab project. This project aimed to capture the enemy's first line. This line was located between us and the airport. Capturing this line

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will give us a great victory, because we would be a lot closer to the airport and the Mujahdin could use their automatic weapons instead of the rocket launchers. Abu-Hifis gave his orders and began to personally follow them, but every thing stopped quickly and all the promises were vanished. We lost the Arabs' support.

Center number (5) had been opened, and we called this center Abu-al-Ahwal. Abu-al-Harith offered us the members of his group to help us in our battles, and it was a good offer that suited our needs. Abu-al-Harith group was trustworthy and disciplined.

Monday, August, 2, 1990.

Closing night: The twelfth night.

We were watching the tarmac to see if there were any changes after the battle of the night before. We saw a huge object that was covered but could not figure its features. There was a lot of fog, which prevented us from recognizing this object. We waited until the afternoon, but we still couldn't figure out the features of this unknown object. Finally, I came to a conclusion. I told the people around me that this unknown object was a spaceship. They all laughed and I knew that they didn't accept my theory. I left my post and went with Abu-Hifis and Ibrahim to Abu-al-'Abbas center to meet the new comers. I believed that the unknown figure was that of a damaged plane and the enemy was trying to deceive us. I believed that the enemy was trying to get this damaged plane out of the tarmac, may be during the following night. During our walk to the center, we saw new holes on the road. We also saw an exploded missile near one of our tents. On the way we met the commander of Majbur rocket launcher who told us that a plane got hit last night. This plane was hit by a missile coming from either his launcher or 'Uthman launcher.

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I was not willing to tell him that `Abd al-`Aziz did not confirm these news, but I liked the way he figured out the source of the rockets that hit the plane. I wanted to encourage him, so I said that the plane might have been hit by one of his rockets. He was pleased with what I said. When we came closer to Abu-al-'Abbas center, it was very crowded. The new comers at the center were Dr. Jamal and Dr. Abu-Bakr who came to establish a new medical center that could be the last hope for many of the injured people.

Eight individuals from Abu-al-Harith group came to our center with a new rocket launcher to occupy their position at the new center (Abu-al-Ahwal center) after it has been cleaned. We had to rearrange our priorities, and they were as follows:

1. Re-organizing the observation points, especially 'Abd-al-'Aziz point, and Turghar point. Their work was very bad and it might lead to our failure and the waste of our ammunitions.
2. Supply our main center with new ammunition, and as fast as possible.

The less pressing points were:

1. The opening of the new center, number (5), and supplying it with ammunitions. We had to find a way to move the supplies, either by cars or donkeys. I preferred donkeys, because using the cars can lead the enemy to our locations.

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2. Creating a plan to enable us to use the new Arab people that we were promised to have by Abu-Hifis to participate in the Julab project.

It was clear that our old car was not suitable for serving the project. We had three donkeys, and we called them "the braying weapon". We are still trying to improve this weapon by adding two mules to them. Using the donkeys were a problem for the Arabs because, they were not used to ride them. More often they used to carry the supplies on their shoulders, rather than placing them on the back of the donkeys or the mules. Some of those donkeys refused to climb the mountain, some of them refused to even budge. Today for example, I met Abu-'Ubaydah who is considered to be one of the important people at the observation point, carrying some of the supplies on his shoulder, after the donkey had stopped in the middle of the mountain refusing to climb any further. I tried to get the donkey to move but to no avail. So I had to carry some supplies and climb the mountain behind Abu-'Ubaydah, while the donkey remained in place watching us.

We reached the observation point in the evening, and I had to call 'Abd-al-'Aziz to find out the results of last night battle. He was happy because the enemy had lost two planes while they were on the tarmac.

The air attack and the bombarding of our rocket launchers fell behind the observation mountain and near Abu-al-'Abbas center. We thought that the enemy was trying to land some planes, because the weather was suitable for landing, but the fact was that the enemy didn't try to land. We had to fire some missiles because we heard the sounds of some helicopters, but they never landed. It was another night for the airport to be closed; so we thanked God for that.

Tuesday, August, 28, 1990. (9, Safar, 1411 H.)

Remarks:

Closing night: The thirteenth. The weather was suitable for planes landing.

The enemy attacked our locations early in the morning, but there were no casualties.

This made me believe that the enemy was not sure of our locations.

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Abu-Hifis left to Miranshah by our car to speed up the process on what we agreed upon. We sent Hajj Ibrahim to Ibrahim center in order to bring a team of contractors to dig some trenches in our center in anticipation for our next project. What was more important for him was bringing two hundred missiles with him. He was going to borrow the missiles from Julab group and bring them to Abu-al-'Abbas center. He was planning to bring the missiles by a rental car. We gave him one thousand Pakistani rupees. Abu-al-Shahid went to put some "magic lamps" at the top of the trees and the top of the hills. Those lamps work with Kerosene. Those lamps attracted the enemy attention last night, and made them fire at our locations.

Abu-Zaynab al-Suri came to video tape the city of Khost from the top of the observation mountain. He came with a recommendation letter from Abu-Mus'ab al-Suri. Abu-Zaynab spent the night with us, but it was a quiet night.

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Abu-al-Nur went to Hakani and took a letter from him to receive some rockets. He also took permission from Hakani to get one more mule from Jawir. Abu-al-Nur wanted to use the mule to deliver supplies to different locations.

Wednesday, August, 29, 1990. (10, Safar, 1411 H.)

Remarks:

Closing night: the fourteenth. The weather was suitable for planes landing. I had to get some ammunition as fast as I could. We couldn't hope that the enemy would stay out of the airport any longer, and the ammunition we had was enough for one night.

I decided to go to Miranshah to follow up with the ammunition issue. We either had to buy them or borrow them from Hakani. Our car was just back from a trip to Miranshah, but we had to use it for the same trip again. Abu-'Abd-al-Rahman, who fell sick that night, Abu-al-Nur and some other people came with me.

On the way, Abu-al-Nur expressed his pessimistic point of view. He said that the reason the enemy stopped using the airport was because they used a new airport in the area. The news that was coming from Khost said that the enemy started to use a new airport. I objected to Abu-al-Nur's views for a simple reason. The reason was that the new airport was still under construction. How can the enemy use an airport that was still under the construction? Moreover, building a new tarmac is not a simple easy job that can be hidden.

The idea of a new airport disturbed me because it meant the end for our current project. It meant that the enemy managed to escape from us and extend the length of the war indefinitely.

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We arrived to Hakani's guest house, and it was filled with the Mujahdin leaders. There were also a number of jurisprudence students. They were reciting the Qur'an in a loud voice, while wearing their white turbans. We were informed that Hakani's mother was dying. Hakani was preparing for the new project at the same time he was preparing for his mother funeral. We requested to meet with him at five o'clock. He requested the meeting to be held at nine o'clock. We could not arrive on time because of the floods, so we postponed our meeting until the next day.

Thursday, August, 30, 1990. (11, Safar, 1411 H.)

Remarks:

Closing night: The fifteenth. The weather was suitable for planes landing.

I spent the night in Miranshah, but I was worried that the enemy might try and use the airport that night. I was listening all the time trying to hear the sounds of the planes. The sounds of the planes in Khost were heard in Miranshah at night. In the early morning I went to use the radio at the Arabs' House. This radio was connected to Abu-al-'Abbas center. I wanted to ask them about last night news, but we couldn't connect with Abu-al-'Abbas, so we postponed our contact till eight o'clock of the next morning. Shortly before eight, Hakani's car arrived to our house. In the car there were two of Hakani's

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children who came to tell me that their grandmother had died. They asked for Um-Walid to go with them in order to help the women in preparing for the funeral.

I promised them that I would bring Um-Walid. I fulfilled my promise, and went to Afghanistan in the camp car. Some of the Arabs shared the car with me. They had two children with them aged eleven. The children were talking in a loud voice about some of the Arab Mujahdin like Babi, Sayaf, and the camp of Turghar and Jalal Abad...etc. The Arabs went to Khalil's center.

We arrived to Abu-al-'Abbas center before sun set, and I was told that the youths watched the enemy equipment working on the new airport. The news was a surprise to me, and it required the re-evaluation of the current situation. I was accompanied to the observation mountain by the new comer (Wali Muhammad) who was going to work as Hajj Ibrahim's assistant, and replace him during his absence. Wali Muhammad was from Khost but lived for a while in Dubai. On the road we found Abu-Zayd and his colleagues from the observation group having a trouble with the new mule. The mule had dropped all the cargo in the middle of the road many times and refused to move one more step. I had to leave them and move quickly to the observation point that was almost empty in anticipation of new landing attempt at the airport. At the observation point, I was told about the equipment that have been used at the east north part of the valley. The equipment have been working on the new tarmac. I couldn't see any thing because it was getting dark, but the youth's moral was very low, and some of them felt defeated. We spent the night at the observing point. There were some few clouds in the sky. The planes bombed the valley, but we had another night where the enemy couldn't use the airport.

Friday, August, 31, 1990 (12 Safar 1411 H.)

Remarks (the closing night is the sixteen) the enemy didn't try to use the airport despite the good weather.

After the Morning Prayers, we gathered near the observation point to discuss the new situation after the existence of the new airport. I offered an optimistic point of view to the youth. I told the same point of view to the members of Abu-al-'Abbas camp. This point of view consisted of three points:

First: The building of the new airport is a statement for our success. The new airport is an old project that was kept in the enemy drawers and was never brought to life, but now it is being built because the old airport, which was used intermittently has become ineffective as a result of our continued bombarding operations.

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Secondly: By building the new airport, the enemy has attracted the Mujahdin eyes to the eastern front. The eastern front is an important and sensitive area. The enemy will not be able to defend the new airport and will lose more land. Moreover, this step will lead to the end of the battle in favor of the Mujahideen.

Thirdly: By building the new airport, the importance of our plant to occupy enemy sites has escalated. This will bring an end to both, the new and old airports

The second and the third points were the core for our military operations to occupy the city and which started approximately six months after that date. At that time, we focused

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on the eastern front against the new airport. Our control over the mentioned mountains was the start of the city's collapse.

In the morning Abu-al-Shahid was busy moving the equipments of Abu-al-Ahwal camp by car through 'Uthman Center in the southern Druzaji.

I moved with Hajji Ibrahim on foot towards the Mujahdin Center in (Tudah Chini), where there were many centers for the Egyptians (Saqar) rockets. Our goal was to find some artillery force that can work with us or even work by itself according to their circumstances, and their desire to destroy the enemy equipment that were active all day in preparation for the new airport tarmac. I had no doubt, that the best way to strain this project is at its early stages. There is a limited number of heavy equipment that were used in building the tarmac, and if we manage to destroy them, the enemy will have some difficulty in replacing them under any circumstances.

We have reached the first Center, and it was empty, and deserted. The tunnel that led to the center was closed as well. There was another center twenty meters away that was carefully built, and equipped. This center was new, and there were two above ground caves attached to it. There was a road that led to that center and across of that road, there was a court that covered the traces of excavations. That court was planted with big red roses and some vegetables. The only launcher for Saqar missiles was standing in the middle of the court, surrounded by white stones as if it was a metal flower that was planted in the middle of a beautiful garden. The nature of this center was clear; it was a center for the important people to visit. There was no military presence at this center. The strange thing was the name of that center, since its name was (the center of the Martyr Muhammad Amin) who was an old friend, and a close friend to "Talib 'Abd-al-Rahman" who was martyred with him by a missile that destroyed their launcher in Buri Khayl short time back. We used to call him 'Abd-al-Rahman Jiriz and we talked about him a lot in the previous chapters.

The person who was in charge of the center told us that he was going to leave the area that day along with his neighbors from Jilani group. He was from Muhamadi group. He also said that according the Shura council decision, this center must be under the charge of Sayaf group and Jalab al-Din group.

He also provided us with some new information when he said that he tried to destroy those equipment yesterday but failed because they were out of reach by his missiles (Saqar-20), so we must use missile (Saqar-30).

I continued my walk with hajji Ibrahim through the narrow paths to reach Bari area few kilometers away, till I reached the center of the Martyr 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Misiri, where Abu-al-Shahid caught up with us in the center's car. Abu-al-Shahid was accompanied by Abu-Zaynab who had just finished filming. He also was accompanied by 'Abd-al-'Alim al-Misiri who used to come to us on short visits us that were unimportant and amusing. (He was recruited by the Egyptian intelligence at an unknown date which could be after the year 1990).

We didn't see any one at Khalil center that we could talk with. We asked about Dr.Nasratallah but we didn't find him. At Manan Center we asked about Julab, but we didn't find him either. All of them were in Miranshah offering their condolences to Hakani for the death of his mother.

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Since all the important people were offering Hakani their condolences, it was an opportunity to use those meetings to reach a successful resolution for the problem of the new airport.

In the after noon we went to offer our condolences to Hakani at the Muhajirin mosque that was located across of his house near the citadel (where the government of Miranshah). Hakani was accompanied by our friend Sheik Nasrallah Mansur who welcomed me. I told Hakani that we needed him in a very important matter, and he promised to meet with us after dinner.

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We performed the sunset prayer in Hakani's guest house that was filled with condolers, then dinner was offered to every one, and it was a generous meal that suited the status of the house owner and the status of his guests.

I sat next to Malawi Nasrallah Mansur and next to me was Abu-al-Harith. Abu-al-Shahid was sitting at the head of the long table that was filled with men on both sides. We just started to have our dinner when "Ali Jan" came calling me to meet with Hakani. I went with two of my colleagues to his private room where he usually met with his special guests. He met us with a smile on his face and said "Did you come here to eat or to talk?" I said, we have left the food behind despite its delicious taste.

We sat on the floor and I started to talk about the new airport and the necessity of confronting it as quickly as possible and destroying the equipment their either by tanks or artillery. Then I talked about the "Julab Project" as the final solution for the problems of the airports. I also suggested to him the participation of the Arabs with Julab and told him that they were going to take care of the enemy's two tanks and open new paths in the minefields.

Hakani (who had good connections on the inside, which means he had spies in the city) said that the equipment to level the tarmac was not available in Khost, so the airport will not be suitable for the cargo planes.

There were some secret communications to deliver the defense positions and the airport to us, and fifteen million Pakistani Rupees were paid to military people in Khost to seal the deal. Those who got the money are trustworthy and have been dealt with before.

With regards to the participation of the Arabs in the Julab Project, he agreed on that. He didn't agree on their participation to remove the mines because he was worried about their safety.

With regards to providing them with tanks, one or more, according to their needs, he agreed on giving them the five tanks he had, saying that the drivers he had were either killed or injured or ran away from the battles.

He was trying to buy more tanks; he had two in "Sarana". He also sent a bulldozer there to open the road for them. He's trying to buy new tanks since there were some in Qandahar – he did not know how many – and the price was between five hundred thousand and eight hundred thousand Pakistani Rupees. When I asked him if he agreed to sell a tank or two to the Arabs, he laughed and said, "I don't sell anything, but I buy". With regards to the eastern region, he said that he would Mujahideen, artillery guns and a tank to bombard the site of the new airport. These were Hakani's responses which need

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to be commented at. Regarding the new airport, I believe Hakani was the victim of a trick from a double agent; the information he got about the required equipment to level the tarmac was a lie. This information made Hakani and the Mujahdin relax and not express a strong reaction in their confrontation with the preparation of the new tarmac. This made the enemy gain a few days which were very crucial to them and were used by them in a very active way for more than fifteen hours a day, where their equipment with the yellow color were being used continuously. We were watching them with our field binoculars while they were working on building the new tarmac. The equipment used to be covered with heavy dust. Nobody had confronted the enemy because we were hoping that the tarmac would not be suitable for work!!

This mistake had cost Hakani and the Mujahdin more than six months of extra fighting until they were able to conquer the city. According to Hakani's calculations, the city would capitulate if the airport was closed for one month, and that is why we took over the airport project. Hakani's expectations were correct, but the enemy managed to deceive him, and that's why the period of fighting was extended for another six months.

Regarding buying the enemy's first line of defense, it was very serious, but the news had been leaked to the enemy, and they managed to foil the plan by using a military operation in which tanks and airplanes have been used.

About the participation of the Arabs, Julab Project was cancelled as a result of the new development; even if it had continued, the Arab behavior showed that they were not serious in their offer to participate in the project. Until the end of our project in September 11, the Arabs had never taken any practical step or final decision with regards to their participation in the Khost battles. I mean by the Arabs, Al-Qaeda Organization and other organization except Abu-al-Harith Group.

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Saturday, the first of September, 1990. (13, Safar, 1411 H.).

Summary: The closing night: The seventeenth.

The confrontation night: The sixth.

The number of the descent attempts: The enemy was not able to unload the planes.

The enemy injuries: none.

Our injuries: none.

Remarks: I was not there that night and Abu-Zayd had led the operation and was not able to communicate with Turghar or 'Abd-al-'Aziz and he worked with three launchers only. In the early morning I went with Abu-al-Harith to Hakani's guest house to use the radio there and communicate with the front to know what had happened in the airport the night before.

'Ali Jan went to inquire about the phone call, and then 'Al Jul had joined us, and a while later 'Ali Jan came with the news: the planes did not land yesterday in the airport, I was very happy because we had a free closing night, so I hugged 'Ali Jan. The news was correct.

Later that day we faced a problem of moving fifty missiles that we found with Ghulam Khan. We couldn't get permission from the government to move them and Abu-al-Nur had suggested that we make a deal with a smuggler to transport them for us. I turned

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down the idea fearing that the missiles might get confiscated, and that might lead to a long delay while we are in dire need for them. I recommended that we wait for another day since the enemy had given us a priceless opportunity by not using the airport in the past few days.

Mubshir was intending to travel to Peshawar, so I sat with him to discuss the new developments in the airport project, and that we had to move in order to face the new airport construction. We talked about the use of tanks, and artillery and that we needed more manpower. There was a possibility that we were going to have a ground operation, and that we might have needed more tanks and more individuals. Abu-Hifis had agreed before on raising the level of al-Qaeda participation in Khost operations. Mubshir had told me that we don't have to repeat what the Afghan are doing well, but we have to fill in the gaps in their work. I fully supported this idea. He also showed some enthusiasm and promised to provide us with 20 or 30 individuals for our next operation.

I preferred to spend the night at Miranshah saying that I wanted to make sure that moving the missiles in the morning was safe. To be honest that was not the real reason, I had the feeling that things were not moving as planned, and my wife was very sick as a result of her emotional, and physical participation in Hakani's mother funeral since she had a close relationship with her.

I was informed the following day that the enemy was trying to land in the airport twice, but Abu-Zayd managed to stop them from unloading their cargo. He used heavy fire against them in a short time, and he was in control of three launchers because our launcher ran out of ammunitions.

Sunday, September, 2, 1990. (14 Safar, 1411 H.)

Summary:

Closing night: the eighteenth

Confrontation night: the seventh

The number of landing attempts: two tries.

The results of the landing operations: the enemy didn't succeed in unloading his planes.

Number of the enemy casualty: One plane

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Our casualty: Abu-Tamim launcher was hit with some shrapnel from a huge bomb that fell next to it causing it to stop working for a while.

None of the men got hurt, but the launcher mouse was killed, and the camp's rooster got deaf, and one of the donkeys got injured.

Remarks: The people who worked at the observation tower in Turghar were very miserable and had no idea about the kind of work they were doing. Turghar had just fired three missiles during the whole battle, and 'Abd-al-'Aziz was out and we didn't try to communicate with him. The launcher of Jul Muhammad from Shah Khan was broken and the launcher of Majbur ran out of Ammunitions in the middle of the night. The moon was clear and had helped us to depend on our selves in observing the movement over the tarmac.

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The enemy had suffered the loss of nine planes in seven confrontations since we started our operations.

The car had moved from Miranshah to Bari area where Khalil Center was located. We stopped there for a while to get the news, especially to know if there were any steps that were taken to hit the enemy equipment being used in the preparation of the new tarmac. Unfortunately we didn't find any concern or any decision about that. We continued our trip to Abu-al-'Abbas Center in the area of (Tudah Chini), where I was glad to find Dr. Jamal who was sleeping and I didn't want to disturb him.

I was informed by Abu-al-Nur that our confrontation yesterday had put us in a very dangerous situation in regard to our ammunitions despite the light use of ammunitions in yesterday's operation. I told him that the missiles of Ghulam Khan might arrive today or tomorrow and they were not substantial.. The funny part was that a rumor had spread in Miranshah from some sources in Khost saying that the Arabs have bought thirty thousands Katyusha rockets to strike Khost airport.

The rumor was working for us and we didn't know the source of it. We didn't know the source of this rumor, if it was a friend or a foe. In any case we were threatened to stop our operations at any night because of the lack of missiles.

At Abu-al-'Abbas camp, and also at 'Uthman center we tried to solve the status of despair that had spread among the young men because of a rumor that went around claiming that the enemy is indeed using the new airport, and that our operation didn't achieve its goal which was surrounding the enemy.

At 'Uthman center, we stayed until the late afternoon prayer, and took with us some missiles that we transported to Majbur center to support him in his participation with us. I went to the observation mountain alone and it was almost the sunset time.

On the way I saw the same view, our group in the observation tower facing the same problem with the mule and the water plastic containers were on the ground while the mule was standing in pride. I gave Abu-Hamid the leader of the group my cover to tie the plastic containers together and asked him to hurry up since the program is going to start soon. I left him and headed to the observation point at the top of the mountain. An hour later Abu-Hamid caught up with me and gave me my cover back and it was torn into small pieces, so I considered it as a lost battle. We prepared ourselves quickly to participate in the confrontation since it was a clear night and the enemy will not let it go by. Indeed the enemy started his confrontation early; they started at around nine thirty. The air strike was heavy and despite that, our four launchers did their job as planned. One launcher was broken due technical problem, and it was (Shah Khan) launcher. Jul Muhammad had asked about this launcher few days earlier.

The launchers managed to stop many attempts by the enemy planes to land on the tarmac, and according to our count, there were four attempts, while Turghar was saying they were two attempts only. Every body was in a total agreement that no planes managed to land and unload its cargo. 'Abd-al-'Aziz didn't participate in the battle that night, but he attempted to contact us once or twice. The next day, he gave us a report about the enemy radio communications and what those communications were about. Turghar observance was very bad as its members were new recruits.

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Firing from the mountain did not exceed three missiles. I said angrily that the place doesn't deserve to have the name Turghar, and it's better to call it (al-Muqattam), the name of a hill in eastern Cairo.

As a result all the information we got from others was useless. For our good luck, the full moon and the clarity in the sky gave us the chance to watch and observe the tarmac, and the information we got out of our observation was sufficient.

At three o'clock in the morning the situation was full of excitement and violence. While we were attacked by the jets and attacked by the bombs and the missiles to the extent that those attacks covered all of our locations at the same time, one of the enemy cargo planes was trying to land on the tarmac, so I asked all the individuals on the working launchers to fire at the tarmac with full force. They did what I asked them to do except the launcher of Majbur was out of commission because it ran out of ammunitions.

We noticed a flare from the east side that was covered by 'Uthman launcher (number 9). It was a white flare which was an indication of burning the body of the plane that was made of aluminum. The fire didn't expand so I told all the observation centers that the enemy might have lost a plane, but we were not sure.

The next day, Turghar confirmed our news, and so did 'Abd-al-'Aziz.

I asked center (number 3) to fire but they were slow and said they had a small problem. After I insisted that it fires-and I knew that Abu-Tamim was the leader of this launcher at the time- and I knew he was trying to save his ammunitions and slow the firing process- he finally fired his first missile, and then fired the second, but I noticed that it was far of the target (the airport). I asked him to correct his firing range because it was away from the target. He said every thing was not working right because he had a sudden malfunction, and he was going to stop. I understood from his voice that something might have happened and that they might have got hit by a missile, so I asked him about the conditions of his men. He said they were all right. I was so worried until I visited the center the next morning and saw a five meters hole next to the launcher.

Most of the shrapnel were absorbed by the sand bags, except two out of eight metal pipes that supported the launcher were hit by small shrapnel, and the whole launcher was moved from its original place by few centimeters causing the calculations to change. Non of the young men on the was injured despite the fact that some were carrying ammunitions and others were carrying the radio and standing over the sand bags few meters away of the launcher. It was a miracle.

The only slain creature was the launcher mouse, and it was a very small mouse but very active. It used to be with the young men all the time and they got used to its presence so they didn't even try to kick it out of their area till the missile had fallen down .They found it dead from small shrapnel that pierced its neck.

One of the donkeys was injured as well in his thigh, but it healed few days later.

The third injury hit the camp rooster which was lovable because of its crowing nights and mornings. Abu-al-Nur examined his condition and said he became deaf; and I don't know what the relation between being deaf and not crowing is. Abu-al-Nur had to slaughter the rooster and cook him with some potatoes.

I forgot to mention that the bomb that hit the camp fell on loose ground. This ground consisted of dirt that came from digging holes in the caves and that is the reason the

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bomb was not as effective as it should have been. Despite all of that the bomb had made a whole as big as ten meters in diameter and two meters deep.

Monday, September, 3, 1990. (15 Safar, 1411 H.)

Summary:

Closing night: The nineteenth

Confrontation night: The eighth

The number of landing attempts: the attempt to unload one plane.

The enemy casualty: None

Our casualty: None.

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Remarks: Turghar observation center was unusually active, and the main observation at 'Abd-al-'Aziz was still out of business. Turghar firing attempts were rare. Our launchers were in a good condition.

According to our own observation, we believe that the enemy suffered a casualty, but Dr. 'Abd-al-'Aziz through his radio communication denied that in the following day. So we had to erase that casualty from our books. The enemy had suffered nine casualties in eight confrontations.

We were tired from staying up late last night, but we had to keep working in order to avoid some mistakes that could threaten our work. In the morning after sun rise, I went to Abu-al-'Abbas Center with "Wali Murjan" who was working with us instead of Ibrahim who was still in Miranshah. In the main center I saw the results of yesterday's bomb exposition (as previously described) and I asked Abu-al-Nur to call Miranshah and ask about Ghulam Khan Missiles and to push for a quick delivery.

Using the center's car, we went to the main observation center where 'Abd-al-'Aziz works. We were met by Fadal who usually is in charge of the center, in the absence of 'Abd-al-'Aziz. I blamed him for his carelessness and his lack of cooperation with us, and he tried to appease the situation and congratulated me on hitting that plane yesterday night.

He assured me that, they watched our work all the night, as well as listened to the enemy communications on the ground, and in the planes. He also said that, he tried to call us, but didn't succeed. He then took the Radio from "Wali Murjan" to make sure that he is dialing the right number. As a result he found that the radio was broken and storing the wrong number. He then started to explain the enemy's style at work. Among the things he said is "if one of the enemy plane gets hit, they never announce it in a known language to the Afghan but they announce it in English or Urdu."

We prayed the noon prayer at 'Abd-al-'Aziz Center and we had lentil for lunch. We liked the lentil to the extent that we used to visit them a lot at lunch time.

We then returned to 'Abu-al-'Abbas center and directly from there, I went to the observation mountain. Using the radio, we told all of our centers, that we hit a plane the night before. This piece of news raised everybody's morale. I assured them that the new airport is not working yet. I explained saying if the new airport was working, then why

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the enemy is suffering a lot of losses here at the old airport. We also are still watching them work at the new airport.

All the individuals were in a good spirits, and were ready to engage in more attacks. We were so happy while we were having our dinner at the observation mountain. We reached the fullest level of happiness, when we got a pot of coffee and milk made by Abu-Hamid al-Libi.

We talked about different topics, and the time we spent there was a nice time but passed quickly as any thing else in life. Now we have to face the next imminent battle.

I always was interested in getting some rest in advance before engaging in any battle, so I slept on the stones and thorns to get some rest before we start our program.

I was rescued from this comfortable nap by the sounds of the bombs. We got bombed heavily from eight-thirty till twelve o'clock mid night. All of our centers suffered the same fate, and we were constantly in touch with them to make sure that everyone is O.K. We got used to pray and thank God for our safety whenever we got bombed, because we couldn't defend ourselves, so we used to pray for our safety.

We used to repeat all the prayed we know and never stopped praying, and that is why, the time of engagement with the enemy has a certain flavor. This flavor is one of getting close to God. We felt like we were living in heaven and that our bodies only are on earth suffering from the huge stones. Jihad is the only worship that gives you this feeling despite its rough appearance.

The enemy had begun many attempts to land over the tarmac, and I had the feeling that they would fail. As usual, the enemy tried to use the second half of the night believing that the Mujahdeen were very exhausted especially after being faced with that heavy air attack. We tried to communicate with 'Abd-al-'Aziz Center but they didn't answer us, so we called Turghar observation center, and they told us that they lost their communication with 'Abd-al-'Aziz Center.

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I said with anger that Fadal had deceived us because he was the one who fixed our radio wave in the morning, but God's grace was with us. It was a full moon, and it was easy for us to watch the tarmac. We were not sure that a plane had landed, but we were told for sure that it had landed. We hesitated for a minute, and then we decided to attack the tarmac. The five launchers worked together in coordination and harmony which shook the Mujahideen's feelings and they chanted, "Allah is great", over their radio. I then ordered the attacks to stop to make sure that we hit our target, but we couldn't find out if we did. We started to fire individual missiles every once in awhile to make sure that we covered the whole tarmac. We stopped completely, and the whole area fell in a complete and scary silence. The sounds of the planes had disappeared completely.

Turghar has surprised us with a report saying two planes had landed at the airport, but our observation point insisted that they didn't see any planes despite the good visibility that night.

We asked Turghar observation point if they had seen these two planes take off, and they answered back saying they didn't. I hope then that his report was correct, because that

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meant we managed to surround the enemy and the two planes. The morning should come soon, and we will be able to find out the results.

During our shooting, we noticed a bright flare in the east of the tarmac, “‘Uthman launcher”. We told all the observation centers our news, and that we are not sure of the enemy’s losses.

The next morning the main observation center told us that they didn’t pick up any enemy communication that indicated casualties, so we had to delete the old report from our books.

At three o’clock in the morning, a helicopter was flying around the airport more than ten times, but it never landed and never fired at us. We considered that a proof of weakness and lack of ability from the enemy’s side. We were happy that night, and before dawn I called Abu-al-Shahid, and he was at Abu-al-‘Abbas Center. I asked him to go as soon as possible to Miranshah and not to come back unless he was able to get the missiles from Ghulam Khan. I believed we did not have enough ammunition for our next battle. Abu-Tamim and ‘Uthman comforted me and said that we had enough ammunition for our next battle, but they could not provide the other three centers with even a single missile. This meant that in our next battle we were going to use two launchers only, if we didn’t get the additional ammunition.

We used to exchange the numbers of the available ammunition after every battle. In order to deceive the enemy, we agreed amongst all centers to add an extra number from the right and an extra number from the left and keep the actual number in between. This was a very simple way, and I believe it was the reason the enemy believed that we had thousands of missiles. The rumor of the thirty thousand missiles was already spreading, and our heavy gun fire supported that rumor and every individual was thinking that we have a countless number of missiles.

Tuesday, September 4, (6, Safar, 1411 H.),

Summary: The closing night, the twentieth

Remarks: We didn’t engage with the enemy since they didn’t try to use the airport because of bad weather.

The missiles of “Ghulam Khan” arrived, and there were only seventy missiles.

The missiles had arrived at night during heavy rains, and I was informed the next day.

It was a fresh morning, and we spent the whole day at the top of the mountain near the observation point. Abu-al-Harith and his three guests who were with us last night, were so enthusiastic and full of vitality. Abu-al-Harith used to raise his voice saying, “Allah is great”, and they acknowledged the discipline of our work based on what they saw the night before. We had our breakfast, and it was a substantial one. It consisted of coffee with milk, jam, yogurt, and some cookies. We talked about the current situations and the immediate future.

Malizi neighborhood got bombed yesterday from the east, and it was facing the tarmac of the new airport. I didn’t know at the time that the enemy was trying to protect the equipment there.

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I called Abu-al-‘Abbas Center and ‘Uthman Center and asked them to equally share the missiles they had with the three other working launchers, so we could use the full five launchers in our position and give everyone fifteen missiles. This way we all have missiles, but we could not engage in a long battle.

I stayed at the observation mountain the evening. Dr. Jamal came to the mountain to spend the night with us. Dr. Jamal’s spiritual influence was as effective as his medical skills. I asked him to lead our evening prayer and ask Allah to stop the enemy this night, and we asked all the centers to do the same.

The response was quicker than we expected. The sky was full of black clouds, and it started to rain heavily while we were at the top of the mountain chanting, “Allah is great”. All the Arab centers chanted with us; then we began our dinner. While we were at the observation point, the moon was full, and at that time Khost was under complete darkness and under heavy rain and thunder, which sounded like the explosion of huge rockets.

After awhile the clouds moved to our area and it began to rain over the top of the mountain. We couldn’t stay there, so we descended to our tent. It was very dark to the extent it was impossible to see the road in front of us. I was holding hands with Dr. Jamal who was stronger and heavier than me. We reached our tent and our clothes were wet. Some of the rain managed to leak inside the tent, and as a result, some of the covers got wet.

Abu-Zayd and Abu-Usama were on the way to the observation mountain while they were faced with the rain. At the beginning I called them and asked them to return and not to climb to the mountain in the dark and the heavy rain, but they decided to complete their journey. It was a tough journey for sure, and they got lost many times. We used to fire flare bullets so they could correct their way and head to the mountain. Finally they arrived in a very bad condition. Once the rain stopped, I returned to the observation point fearing the enemy would make attempts to surprise us and land at the airport. I stayed there until dawn but nothing happened.

Wednesday, September 5, 1990 (7, Safar, 1411)

Summary: the closing night is the twenty first.

Remarks: the weather condition prevented the use of the airport.

The ammunitions car arrived at night, and I thanked God that the heavy rains didn’t affect its trip. We started to distribute the new ammunitions to all the centers. They were seventy missiles. This number was not enough to solve our problem, but it was enough to delay facing a problem for a while.

I left the observation mountain and headed to Abu-al-‘Abbas Center to evaluate the situation there. At the center Abu-Hifis and Abu-Usama were there and were happy about our work in general. Their opinion made me happy because I know that Abu-Usama is hard to please, and he never was pleased with the Arab activities in Afghanistan. He was pleased with the way the camp was protected and the positions of our launchers there. We then moved to talk about a specific subject. This subject was how to use the current Afghani situation to benefit the Arabic and Islamic front. When I used to talk about this topic, I was alone, and the rest were united on the other side. I

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always preached to engage in the military actions to reach a military conclusion for our case. At the same time we must follow with a political solution, and this way we could experience the benefits of military and political engagement together.

Abu-Usama and Abu-Hifis and most of the Arab leadership saw our case as a losing battle, and they also believed that the Afghani are not suitable for the establishment of an Islamic state.

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Jihad for the Afghani was an opportunity to steal and get rich fast, and there was no need to put our young men in danger. They believed the best way was to train the young men and let them engage in a short confrontation, and after that they would go back home. My response was harsh, and I used to describe their situation as a way to avoid getting involved in the Islamic cause in Afghanistan. We have to stand united in supporting the Muslims here, and that is the reason why we came. We came to Afghanistan to prevent the communists from occupying a Muslim country. We had to accomplish the goal of our mission, which was kicking the Soviets out of this country because they were the source of all problems. The creation of the Islamic state will be the result of getting rid of communism.

To accuse all the Afghani with being thieves and liars is an unfair accusation, because this description applies only to the leadership of the Jihadi Organizations in Peshawar. The Pakistani intelligence chose those people and provided them with money from Saudi Arabia. They also invited the Muslim Brotherhood members to participate in jihad under the supervision of the United States of America. The best of us moved from Sayaf Camp to Hikmatyar Camp despite the fact that both of them were just as bad.

Abu-Usama asked me about the Arab military contribution, and I told him what we are doing at the moment is considered the start of that contribution. Simply, we must undertake organizing the artillery operations using the simplest basis principles, then establish a nucleus for an armored division, to be followed by establishing a special and commando-type infantry division. If we manage to have those three elements, then we can offer to the Afghani Mujahdeen our support, and it will be effective.

This way we will not only be participating in the military operations, but we will be impacting the political process of the issue. America wants to freeze the military situation to force us to accept the engagement in a political discussion with the communists regarding ruling this country. The only way to foil the American plan is to participate with the Afghani Mujahdeen in defeating the communist forces in the battlefield.

Abu-Usama told me that they have a meeting in Peshawar with the Arab leadership to discuss this subject. He then invited me to travel with them to Peshawar to express my point of view at those meetings. I apologized because we had an agenda to follow, so he asked me to express my opinion in writing, and that way he can show it to them, and I agreed. We spent the night in Abu-al-'Abbas' caves and the rains were strong enough to prevent the enemy from using the airport that night.

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Thursday, September 6, 1990 (18 Safar, 1411)

Summary:

Closing night: The twenty-second.

The confrontation night: the ninth.

Number of landing attempts, seven

Results of the landing operations: Unloading, six airplanes.

The enemy casualties: Burning of a plane and striking another in a way that prevented it from returning to Kabul.

Our casualties: None

Remarks: I didn't attend this battle, but it was lead by Abu-Zayd. This battle ended in the worst results we've ever seen in all of our confrontations. We considered it to be our first defeat. Abu-Zayd said in his report about this battle, the lack of ammunition was the main reason for this defeat, the launchers ran out of ammunitions quickly, and the enemy succeeded in creating confusion in our private communications.

At eight-thirty in the morning, we moved to Miranshah and Abu-Hifis was driving our car, and next to him was Abu-Usama al-Misiri, and at the back seat, there were a number of the young men who were sick, and all the way in the back, I sat with Abu-Hamid and Uthman al-Sa'idi, who was going to leave us for good to participate in some training course in Jalal Abad. Uthman was waiting for this training course for a long time, and he was going to be replaced by Al-Miqdad, the Jordanian. Uthman's behavior was very strange; he attended many training courses for no specific reasons and no specific goals.

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The only goal for him was to attend these training courses.

The battle it self in Afghanistan had no meaning and no importance to the Arab Organizations, and that is exactly what I meant when I said "the Arab has a narrow understanding about the war in Afghanistan. They only seek to benefit from the Afghani battle ground with no interest to any results. They even believed that they have already been defeated."

In Miranshah, we tried to meet with Hakani in the afternoon, but he requested that the meeting takes place in the evening. I intended to go back to Afghanistan, but Abu-Hifis needed me to facilitate with Hakani and ask him to allow the Islamic relief Organization to be in charge of the big hospital that was sponsored by Hakani. This was a big problem. At the same time Abu-Usama al-Misiri asked me to write a report expressing the point of view we had discussed at Abu-al-'Abbas Center. This forced me to spend the night in Miranshah. I was very tired and I slept in the guest house shortly after sunset.

At our meeting with Hakani, we talked for a long time about the situation in the battle front. We also talked about the commandos meeting, that is going to be held the next day. Then we talked about the military program and we were told by Hakani that this program was going to be in the southern and eastern parts of Khost. Hakani told us that he was going to ask Julab to move to the east with his group, in order to strike the new airport. He didn't mention any thing about the enemy defense line, because he believed that they were going to surrender. I told him that we might be able to strike two enemy tanks at their defense line. He agreed and asked us to try and target Farim Bagh area. {This area is

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located behind the mountain line on the east side}. He told us that there were eleven new tanks in that area.

Hakani also talked about Kabul, and said that there were some rumors about planning for a new coup in Kabul under international supervision and Hikmatyar will participate in this coup by having his forces surround the capital. This coup will lead to the formation of a joint government between Jihad leaders and communist generals.

Regarding the field commanders he told us that their recommendations regarding security issues are being well implemented. He added that coordination over other aspects was going slow.

Hakani said that there is a committee overseeing the implementations of the commanders' recommendations. This committee had been meeting in different locations. Among the members of this committee are Malawi Arslan Rahman, and Akhtar Muhammad.

I didn't know the results of our confrontations with the enemy until the next day. I received part of the news by phone and the rest from Abu-Zayd and the others. We faced our first defeat since the start of the airport project. There were six planes that had landed at the airport, and had unloaded their cargo. One of those planes have been hit and burned according to the news I got through the radio. Another plane suffered light damage, and it was able to take off at eight o'clock in the morning. This was a very brilliant trick on the enemy's side because nobody had expected that the plane could take off in the morning. We all have been deceived, and saw that the enemy was trying to use the same trick with us in the Khost battles. The enemy's last plane landed in the city before the collapse of the regime, and we prevented it from taking off, and we managed to capture its pilot. He was a general. Fadl said that the launchers fire were not accurate and were not coordinated.

Anyway, I considered myself responsible for this defeat that night. I left the post and went to Miranshah for no particular reason. I expected the rain to continue falling and the weather to remain bad. Leaving my post was not my biggest mistake. The following year I made a bigger mistake.

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Friday, September 7, 1990, (19, Safar, 1411),

Summary:

Closing night: The twenty-third.

The confrontation night: There was no confrontation that night.

The enemy casualties: One plane that was completely destroyed while it was preparing to take off secretly. It was hit by an unknown missile. At the beginning of the night, the enemy ammunition depot was blown up.

At the house of Abu-al-Nur, which was used as the information office for Hakani Group, I sat at Abu-al-Nur's desk and started to write the report which Abu-Usama had asked me to write. I started by covering the current situation of the Afghani issue, then

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summarized the airport project and its connection to the general situation in Afghanistan. I added some suggestions to correct the path for the Arab military work in Afghanistan. Abu-Usama read the file that we kept in Miranshah and was very happy.

He approved of the project. His only concern was to find a way to keep enough ammunition before the start of any operation. He was right about everything he said. He talked about our problems in getting enough ammunition and the possibility of canceling or losing any operation if we did not have enough ammunition. "This almost happened last night, as we did not get any information about it in Miranshah."

I explained to him that we cannot wait any longer because the Mujahdeen's work is moving fast. It was necessary to support their work by closing the airport. We spent a long time preparing for this operation, and if we waited any longer, the operation would lose its credibility, and the people will start to lose concentration.

Abu-Hifis and Abu-Usama left in the afternoon to Peshawar. I received a message from Abu-al-Shahid in which he said, "Six planes had landed at night in the airport – all the brothers are O.K".

I was shocked. Hajj Ibrahim, who was on vacation in Miranshah called on me. I sent him immediately to call on 'Abd-al-'Aziz and find out all the details of what had happened the night before.

I asked Abu-al-Nur to focus on completing the project of (Abu-Hifis) within the next week. I promised him a big reward for spending two nights at the observation point. The observation point is the most attractive place for all the individuals who participate at this project and for all who follow the results of this project from Arab and Afghan Mujahdin. We reached Abu-al-'Abbas Center at five-thirty in the evening. I was informed that Abu-Tamim asked him for a missile that night. All the launchers were withdrawn because they ran out of ammunition. The unloading of the planes took place at the main area near the middle of the airport. This area was supposed to be covered by Abu-Tamim's launchers.

I asked to gather all the youth from the rest of the centers for a general meeting. They came slowly, and I admonished them for that. I spoke and explained the current situation and what had happened last night. I mentioned to them that we are still in a very crucial situation with regards to the quantity of ammunition we had, and that night we could not last for a long battle, so we needed to pray more.

I went to the observation mountain with Abu-Zayd, the Tunisian and Hajj Ibrahim, the Afghani. During our walk, I discussed with them the plan of our battle in light of the current circumstances.

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We were informed by all the centers of the Afghani launchers in (Dazjat Stan) that the enemy figured out the reason behind our weak battle last night. They figured out that Ibrahim's absence from the battle was the main reason for our weak and un-organized performance. The enemy requested that all the planes be send to Khost. I thought that we would neutralize Hajj Ibrahim at the beginning of the night, and let the first plane pass without any interference, because it will be their test plane and it wouldn't have any ammunition on it. It might be carrying food and some other goods. We can attack the

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second plane with all the power we had. If we had some luck one of those planes would explode with its ammunitions and then the enemy would think a thousand times before sending any other planes to the airport, despite the fact that, in the past, we managed to destroy an enemy plane before and they kept on sending their planes without any fear at the same night.

We had to use our prayers God as a weapon. It was close to sunset, and we were at the top of the observation mountain, getting ready for our prayers.

I was looking at the sky and it had few clouds, so I suggested that we start our prayers in the evening and ask all the centers to do the same thing. We called Abu-al-‘Abbas center and asked them to do the same thing. Dr. Jamal was leading their prayer, and he promised me to do the same thing.

We finished our prayer and stayed at our places waiting for the dinner. The valley was behind my back, and I saw one of the youths, who were in front of me looking at the sky in a very astonishing way. The sky was filled with red and yellow lines. I have not seen this image before. We went quickly to the observation point while we were trying to figure out what happened. Suddenly we saw more yellow lines every direction we look at. We had no doubt that those colored lines were the result of ammunitions explosions. We chanted Allah is great while the explosion got bigger and louder. I called all the brothers and told them the story, and they in turn chanted Allah is great. The explosions lasted for at least half an hour. The Mujahdeen fired their automatic weapons from the top of the mountain at the sky in celebration for this huge success. All this gun fire made the mountain and the valley look spectacular as if there were a night festival going on. The explosions were coming from the new airport. It was clear that they are coming from a huge storage buildings where there were heavy, and light ammunitions.

The enemy tried to hide its defeat by using the radio and telling the Mujahdeen “no need for you to get happy, we had no explosions, but we were celebrating and firing our guns because the Pakistani president (Ghulam Khan) died”. We were told by Abu-al-‘Abbas center that they were still praying behind Dr. Jamal when they got the news of the explosions.

I said that today’s explosions made up for our yesterday’s losses. This proves that the prayer weapons are more powerful and stronger than any other weapon, and this was a powerful lesson to all of us.

We were successful every time we used the prayer weapons. The following day, we were informed that the enemy had lost a plane the night before while it was preparing to take off. The story of this plane will come later. What is important is that the enemy didn’t try to use the airport that night because of the explosions. We saw the locations of those explosions after we captured the city back. They were like open trenches on the northern side of the airport.

Saturday, 8, September, 1990. (20, Safar, 1411)

Summary:

The closing night: The twenty-fourth.

Remarks: The weather conditions didn’t allow the use of the airport.

We managed to solve the ammunitions problem once and for all since we received 700 missiles.

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In the early morning, we had our breakfast at the observation point, and it was composed of tea, and cookies. I left the mountain with Hajj Ibrahim, and Abu-Zayd heading to Abu-al-'Abbas center. We were also planning to visit the communication center to find out what happened Thursday night, the sad night when we incurred the losses, and when six planes managed to land at the airport.

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At Abu-al-'Abbas center, we found a lot of nomad people there. One of them who got hurt in a mine explosion near the observation mountain was being treated by Dr. Jamal. Those people started to move to this area with the increase of the enemy air attacks. Those attacks left behind tons of metal debris. Those people used to look for the metal since it was their source of getting money. They were ready to sacrifice their life to get a piece of metal, and they didn't care which mine field they went to.

We used to hear their voices early in the morning when they managed to find a piece of metal. Some times those pieces needed two men or more to be able to lift it. In the last few days they were behind the observation mountain waiting for the bombs from the planes.

We took the injured person with Dr. Abu-Bakr in our car to Khalil's center. We let them continue to Miranshah, while we went to 'Abd-al-'Aziz observation point.

We found our friend Fadl there. He met us with a smile, and said he was trying to call us all the afternoon because there was a plane at the airport, and he believed it was damaged from our gunfire last night. He said one of the missiles we fired hit the plane in the middle and managed to split it into two. I exchanged some looks with Hajj Ibrahim, and said we didn't fire any missiles yesterday afternoon. I added none of the centers fired any missiles yesterday afternoon.

He replied saying "but the missile was fired from your direction, and I saw it my self. I saw the damage my self and followed its news on the radio". We took credit for damaging this plane and considered a point to our project because the missile was fired from "Dazjat Stan".

Fadl also told us that another plane had taken off at nine o'clock that morning. He said that he tried to call us but didn't manage to connect with any of us. Fadl said that the pilots' conversations confirmed the danger of using the eastern part of the airport because of the heavy gun fire taking place there.

Our car came back from Miranshah at five o'clock in the evening, so we went back to Abu-al-'Abbas center. We reached the observation point and it was very crowded and the fog surrounded the valley and the visibility was very low. As usual I slept near the observation point, and I went into deep sleep. I woke up many times and every time I looked at the sky and found it still filled with clouds. I thanked Allah and asked him to bless us this night and keep the weather condition the same all night long. The planes bombed many places, and I didn't bother to ask any of the youths about the bombing locations. I ignored every thing and went into deep sleep.

If I knew the good news from Abu-al-'Abbas center, I wouldn't have been able to sleep. I was told that two trucks filled with seven hundred missiles came yesterday, and this way we solved the ammunitions problem for good.

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It was good work from Abu-Islam who is considered one of the prominent leaders in al-Qaeda organization. He took responsibility two days ago and promised to solve the ammunition problem and he did. It was huge work and prevented us from failing in our next operation. I'm still thankful for his effort up till this moment. Abu-al-Nur also spent a lot of time and effort making sure that the trucks would be here on time and soonest.

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Sunday, September, 9, 1990. (21, Safar, 1411)

Summary:

Closing night: The twenty-fifth.

Confrontation night: The tenth.

Number of landing attempts: Two.

Results of landing attempts: The planes didn't manage to unload their cargo.

Enemy casualties: One plane

Our casualties: none.

Remarks: The first plane landed at around one thirty, and our gun fire forced it to leave the airport without unloading its cargo. The second attempt was at four o'clock in the morning, when the second plane landed and it was unable to take off because of the damage it sustained. The total of the enemy's plane loss up until now was twelve. I left the mountain with Ibrahim before six o'clock heading to Abu-al-'Abbas center, and from there we took our car to Durwaziji center number (9) to have a meeting with the members there. I explained to them the recent military development in Khost and the recent development in our operations.

I was faced with an administration problem. After 'Uthman had left his position and al-Qa`qa` replaced him, I tried to convince the latter to become commander of the site and lead the launcher's team. He vehemently refused. It was very difficult convincing him because he was one of those capable men who was afraid of taking responsibility on the Day of Judgment. I didn't understand what he meant by that. I did not know whether I convince him or embarrassed him when I told him that all the youths in the center were new recruits, and none of them could take that responsibility. Also the whole center could not be left without a responsible Emir to run it.

We then left to our new center number (5). This center was used by Abu-al-Harith group and we found a short way to the center. I repeated what I said at center number (9), and they told me their problems. I was surprised to see a lot of damage in the ceilings of the caves.

The launcher was not properly fortified with sand bags, and many bombs had landed close to it. I was surprised to see so much debris from recently fired bombs because the center was new and had been recently established.

They also complained about the difficulty of dealing with the management of Abu-al-'Abbas center, and said their requests have been ignored, and they were not treated right at the center. They also pointed out that there had been discrimination between members of al-Qaeda group and members of Abu-al-Harith group.. I denied any discrimination, and explained to them that discriminations were not allowed at any camp.

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I promised them that I will personally take care of their demands and requests.

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At Abu-al-‘Abbas center I sat with Abu-al-Nur and Abu-Islam and talked about the new missiles shipment. I expressed my gratitude to Abu-Islam for taking care of the matter. Once more we talked about the Military administration and how we would like to keep the launchers units as a separate unit.

I advised Abu-al-Nur to take care of Center number (5) and to avoid the rough treatment with its members. He offered some unnecessary explanations and excuses.

It was three o'clock in the after noon when I left Abu-al-‘Abbas center heading to the observation tower to start correcting the range of the launchers firing targets. We had to make sure that every launcher had a specific target and that all the measurements were accurate.

Abu-al-Shahid was in charge of the launchers at (Dazjat Stan) center, and Abu-‘Ubaydah al-Jaza’iri, and Abu-al-Ward al-Jaz’iri were in charge of correcting the launchers firing range. The night was very clear and it was a sign of an evil brutal night. Despite being quiet, and very tired, I couldn't sleep. At dinner time the quietness turned into hell falling from the sky. Never before have I seen that number of cluster bombs falling from the sky. The explosions started in the sky and continued on the ground. They were very loud and covered many kilometers of ground and top of mountains.

I took many pictures of these unseen images. We didn't have any way to protect ourselves against those attacks, but God blessed us and none of us got hurt, or injured. The first plane landed under the air cover and tried to stop in the middle of the runway, where we expected it to stop. We were ready for it and started firing a lot of rockets at the plane, but the plane was not at a complete stop so it managed to take off again. The helicopters attacked our positions and focused on our new center number (5). At four o'clock in the morning a second plane tried to land and we fired at it. This plane didn't take off and we stayed and kept on watching the tarmac to find out what happened to it. Finally in the early morning we got the news from all the observation points that this plane was hit and couldn't to take off.

Evening of the final battle

Monday, September 10<sup>th</sup>, 1990 (22 Safar, 1411 H)

Summary

Closing Night: Twenty Sixth

Confrontation Night: Eleventh (The last)

Landing Attempts: Three

Results of Landing Attempts: Unloading one plane

Enemy Casualties: One plane exploded and another was damaged.

Our Casualties: None

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Remarks: Landing started at one in the morning. The first plane went through because of poor wireless communications with `Abd al-`Aziz. The second plane received a direct hit and exploded. The third plane got damaged and was unable to take off again. The battle ended at four thirty in the morning, which was half an hour before the dusk prayers.

We remained at the control center all day in anticipation of any surprises, and working on re-adjusting the firing ranges of our launchers.

Abu al-Harith's group took the center's car to get a new base for the launcher so it can go around a full circle, and hit targets from all directions, as the need arises. Even the Torghar center became as enthusiastic as we were and kept in contact with us in order to target their launchers on the airport, the same way we did.

It rained in the morning and then stopped. After sunset, we had dinner as a group which consisted of tea with milk (our national drink) and bread.

I tried to catch some sleep but the planes started bombarding various sites located next to our center. We were fully prepared, both mentally and materially, for any anticipated attack.

The enemy intensified its attack, the same way it did the day before. They commenced the landing exercise at the same time of the day before. It became obvious that that night would become one of the best nights of our "airport project".

The enemy started the night by achieving a victory over us. They sent a military transporter amidst a squadron of helicopters so we did not hear the roaring sound of the transporter. The transporter landed swiftly among the runway lights which were quickly turned off after the landing. They were lit again while we were still under the heavy attack of the helicopters.

The transporter took off without our noticing, and during an attempt by our intelligence to warn us, but the enemy had jammed the wave length which impacted our operation.

I was disgruntled with this failure, and asked God to compensate us with another operation, which He did two hour later.

We were bombarded for two whole hours which excited the group that collected the metallic debris. We could hear them jumping for joy while collecting the debris throughout the night without fearing the risk of being killed.

The enemy tried to fool us by turning on and off the runway red lights intermittently, thinking that we would start firing and waste our ammunition needlessly; but we did not.

It was usually the case that in that particular Arabic month the moon would fully shine after midnight. At three in the morning, we discovered that a plane was landing without using any electronic surveillance equipment.

We fired all our launchers towards the airport and saw a flame flaring out. We hesitated to announce it was a hit, but later a huge fire followed by explosions took place. We all started shouting God is great, and started thanking the Lord for his blessings.

The hit was made by center (3) and assisted by (center 5). We congratulated them both for their great efforts.

The enemy believed that its earlier victory at one in the morning would deal them another victory at three in the morning, so it repeated its landing attempt. They did not realize that being close to dusk time would give us a better vision range.

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Moreover, the dusk light would not offer too much time to work under the cover of the darkness of the night.

The enemy repeated its mistake and its third plane landed at four fifteen in the morning, just half an hour before dusk.

I was elated to see that the enemy had committed another mistake, so I contacted all launching centers to fire heavily and continuously. This raised everyone's enthusiasm and made the mountains tremble from the explosions of the missiles, to the extent that all centers that had nothing to do with our program woke up. The plane quickly started taxiing towards the eastern part of the runway.

The pilots knew how dangerous the eastern part of the runway was. Despite the poor targeting record of center ((9), they were able this time to hit the plane and put it ablaze. There were no explosions to follow, and we were reluctant to announce a direct hit at first. But after we received confirmations from Torghar and Fadl about the direct hit, we announced the news to all the centers who shouted God is Great and started praying. It was truly a magnificent and blessed night which brought back the exalting memories of the victories we had achieved during the first night.

That was the last night of our "airport project" and the last battle. The enemy's casualties amounted to fourteen military transport planes type (AN-32). There were the wreckage of another similar planes on the northeastern edges of the airport which we had witnessed after the fall of Khost in 1991 G.

Tuesday 11 of September 1990 (the first day of the new airport)

Yesterday night was very violent to the extent that made me believe that the new air port was nothing but a trick and that it was impossible to put it in operation. Why would the enemy put all that huge effort and suffer all these big losses just to unload few planes? If the new air port was hard to build, then the enemy faced one of two solutions First, to destroy us by force and silence the source of our fire. I mean they have to destroy our cannons, and our weapons.

Second, to surrender and stop the fighting.

But the violence and the determination that were shown by the enemy the day before proved that it was going to fight and resist to the end. I had to prepare my group for a fierce confrontation that night, and the following night. The determination of the enemy to bear all this loss in planes (at least fourteen planes) in such a short period, less than a month, showed that the enemy did not intend to surrender or move to another airport. In the early morning I started an operation aiming at (the repairing workshop) and this was our project from the start but we had to delay it because of the lack of money and supplies. But now, especially after the arrival of Abu-Islam's cargo that delivered us some missiles, we could carry out our project. I believed that there was a good workshop with the necessary equipment to repair at least two planes, so we can leave that airport and head to Kabul.

After long observation, we found out that the location for this workshop is a room underground, in which number of the soldiers had been seen leaving in the afternoon passing the tarmac and heading towards some houses and government buildings located at the northern part of the airport.

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We started aiming our fire (Abu-al-‘Abbas missiles) towards this room, and after firing ten missiles, we found out that only three were good. I had to stop firing because our cannons were not suitable for this kind of operation.

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After achieving victory, and when I went to visit the airport, I found out that the workshop I had in mind was nothing but a well-fortified post. There was no evidence found to prove that this location has been ever used as a workshop. The Mujahideen and the looters took every thing, and didn't leave anything behind. They took the wooden windows, the wooden doors, and in some cases they even took the bricks and the supporting beams.

I postponed a visit that I intended to make to Hakani to arrange with him our "Arabic" program and how we can make it fit into our next agenda. I asked Abu-Zayd and Abu-Shahid to hurry and prepare the rocket launchers and to pick the intended positions as we were going to have a fierce battle that night. Abu-Zayd had to work on repairing some of the technical defects in our launchers, while Abu-al-Shahid was provided the posts with food and supplies, and tried to solve any problem that he encountered.

The enemy had confirmed my doubts, and started his attacks at the beginning of the night with an intense air attack, in which the cluster bombs were used again, and then we heard in the air the sound that resembled the sound of an airplane that was trying to land at the airport.

'Abd-al-'Aziz had told us that he heard two pilots through their radio talking about landing at the airport. We got ready for them and started firing from all the launchers we had and in all the directions at the same time, but the sound of the planes got further and further, and then they landed at the new airport.

It was an unpleasant surprise, and I felt like we were on vacation and had no value, and the morals of my men were down.

We asked every body to stop firing but we didn't answer their questions about our situation because they were listening to the sounds of the continuous landing planes. Later we told them that the enemy is now using the new airport, and that is why their voice was full of sadness. Ibrahim had spent the rest of the night having a conversation with our observation point at (Turghar) but the information he got had no value to us. The enemy had continued his violent air strike against us for no reason. We did not have the capability to strike its new tarmac at its new airport. Despite all of this, and may be because of all of this, I went into deep sleep which was my habit when I felt depressed.

Wednesday 12 of September 1990

This is the first day in which the name of the airport had changed to "the old airport" because of the existence of what is now called "the new airport", which had attracted the eyes and minds of everyone. I looked at the tarmacs of our old airport and as usual they were shining. The ruins were every where and that caused me to feel sick, the same feeling a fighter felt after killing his enemy and watched him laying down under his feet; but at the same time felt some kind of sorrow and respect towards simply because he was a strong and courageous enemy.

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Today, six years of animosity between me and that shining giant structure had ended; that giant that caused planes and soldiers to bleed, and tons of supplies to explode in their crates.

I haven't forgotten even for a second our first and simple operation against that airport. At the beginning we could only reach its eastern part where the launcher ('Uthman #9) was used and we couldn't fire more than two missiles in one day, but we managed to close the airport for many hours or even for a full day. In those days we used to laugh a lot like babies who are having fun. 'Abd-al-Rahman used to sing like the peddlers of Alexandria saying 'beautiful Abu-Ismael beautiful' while he was looking at the shining tarmac that was deserted because our one missile had frightened the soldiers and prevented the planes from landing into it.

What if 'Abd-al-Rahman was with us now? I repeated this question for a million times, what if he sees this giant after we destroyed it using at least one thousand and two hundred missiles at the same time!! That is the total of missiles we used in our operation (The airport project).

During that year, 1985 (Ramadan 1405), we used to return to our camp very tired but our spirits were very strong and vital. We used to sing the song of the big night {TN this is a famous song for an Egyptian writer by the name of Salah Jahin in which he talks about a crowded night and a young farmer man who came to a big city and doesn't know his way and asking all the people around him to give him direction}. We converted that song to suit the airport and we used to listen to the echoes of our songs repeated by the mountains "look at the lights on the dome of our sheik, what a missile that can destroy it".

'Abd-al-Rahman used to see the war as a childhood toy, a game that was filled with joy and fun mixed with optimistic religious lessons.

During that specific year, the Mujahideen's victories were greater and more comprehensive.

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Sadness had become the general mood. We won with sadness, cheered with sadness, laughed with sadness and cried while offering thanks. There was no specific reason for that change, but I think the core reason for that was the loss of many beloved ones, and the loss of our ability to feel happiness...and may be pain as well.

It's not hard for men at war to be brave, but it's hard for them to keep their feelings alive and humanly, and not feel cold like a piece of cold sheet of iron. I believe that the Qur'an is the only medicine that keeps the human spirit alive and protect it from evil thoughts. I sat behind the telescope looking at the tarmac, and cried out "sweet Abu-Ismael sweet". It was hard for me to have the same laughter I used to have in my early days, but I started to have some other thoughts or possibilities for what I can see in front of my eyes. Is it possible for the enemy to come back to this airport and use it tonight? Is it possible that the information that Hakani had about the lack of equipment to build the tarmac was true? If the planes that landed the previous night had caused some damage to the weak tarmac, then there is no doubt that the enemy will use the old airport for landing the next night.

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The idea I had was reasonable, so I took all the necessary steps to face the fierce confrontations we used to have.

Haji Ibrahim said that he counted twelve planes that landed yesterday night, while the rest of the observation points counted about seven to eight planes only.

Any way the tarmac is still questionable to me.

I went to the main center (Abu-al-‘Abbas) and had a meeting with the young men there, and then explained to them that the measurement of any success or failure at any military operation depends on achieving the goal of the operation. For us the purpose of the airport project is to close the airport, and that was what happened, which meant that we had a one hundred percent successful operation. What was more important was the safety of our groups, we didn’t lose any one, and we didn’t suffer any injuries, and that was unimaginable. The young men morals had improved a little. I talked with them about the possibility of some night confrontation with the enemy and that we had to get ready for that, then I left the main center heading to “Khalil Center” in an attempt to talk with Hakani about the procedures of the confrontation of “the new airport” and the other operations and the role of the Arab men in those operations. Hakani was in Miranshah, but we saw the Manan al-Kutshi’s car and inside it there was Hakani’s nephew “Batsha Dina” who stepped out of the car quickly to greet us, and the rest of his group did the same. Most the group used to work us at the time of ‘Abd-al-Rahman the martyr.

Batsha Dina was happy and very quick in his movement. I knew why he was happy when he took us to the trunk of his car and pointed at it, there was a stinger missile in its huge crate. He said he was going to fire that missile that evening on the landing planes at the new airport. I was happy for what I’ve heard and told him that I was going to cancel my travel that night to Miranshah and wait at one of the observation points to watch his work, and to communicate together via the radio. The radio communication with Manan group was very easy because friends and foes knew that all they had to do was to push number 4 many times and he was there waiting to answer. He had agreed with Haji Ibrahim on a way to communicate.

We went by our car to the radio communication center where we found “Fadal” and “Khalil” the brother of Hakani there. The car was full of the Mujahdin.

I asked Khalil many questions like:

Did you send any tanks or artillery to attack the new airport?

Do you have any tanks or artillery to attack the new airport?

Do you have artillery or a tank that is ready to be used?

Do you have (Saqr 30) missiles with their launcher?

Do you have any plans to attack the new airport tonight?

He answered all those questions saying (NO).

He didn’t say any other word, and this made me lose my mind so we left them.

Haji Ibrahim started to laugh at my anger and at Khalil’s careless answers.

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We returned to (al-‘Abbas Center) in the afternoon and I went straight with Ibrahim to the observation point. Abu-Zayd was the one of the men responsible for leading the observation point, and once I was there he asked me to move Abu-Hamid from his post at

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the observation point because he angered his colleagues by being rude. Abu-Hamid was hoping to get my support because of our good relations, but I supported Abu-Zayd with no hesitation because he was the direct leader of this post.

This made Abu-Hamid angry but he followed the orders and moved to the center (number 9). He went there on foot. Abu-Zayd went to Abu-al-'Abbas center and Abu-Tamim took his place with some other men from Abu-al-'Abbas center according to the exchange program over this observation point which I called the tourist observation. I was very tired so I slept at my usual place near the telescope while the young men kept on watching with no sleep in anticipation for what is going to happen that night. The program started a little before nine o'clock at night.

The Jet planes started to bomb but far away of our post. Most of the bombing was at some locations that were considered dangerous for the new airport, and we were not near that area any way. The way the enemy neglected us was very hurtful and humiliating. The planes started to land at the new airport, and we were looking at the sky over the airport waiting for the Bashta Dina missile. We asked Ibrahim to call him just to make sure everything is O.K with him. He answered saying that he has a technical problem with the missile that he is trying to solve it. We waited for long and then we left our places by the telescope except Haji Ibrahim, who said he saw a beam of light in the sky over the new airport, then Batsha Dina called us and said that he had struck a military plane. At that point all the young men started to say with joy Allah is great.

We got a call from Abu-al-'Abbas center informing us of the arrival of the two trucks that carried missiles for our operation. It was ironic news because our project was over and the defacto situation forced us to wait for new operations to be carried out.

Thursday 13 of September, 1990

I descended from the mountain alone heading to "Abu-al-'Abbas" and my chest was filled with contradicting feelings; some of them were unknown. I felt like I was out of work. I accomplished my mission but not to the extent I had hoped for. I was hoping to conquer the city, but Khost was still standing stubbornly in our faces, and the new airport which we knew very little about.

As I was slowly descending, I was met by a group of three men under the leadership of a very young healthy, active young man who asked me in a Gulf Arabic dialect: Is this the Arab observation tower? I felt at once that he is a spy and (I was not wrong), I asked him (who are you)? He replied laughing and full of confidence that he is from Mali Khan group, and that he was sent by him to the mountain to study the location of the new airport.

Abu-Zayd followed this story because he met the same group while he was climbing the mountain, and he also had some doubt about this group. This group had left the post after a while, and an hour later the post (The observation tower) was hit by a jet plane. The missile that struck our post was the worst since it led to the killing all the individuals on that post. Later, both Abu-Zayd and I connected the dots between that killing missile and that suspicious visit of those people. The funny part is that the exact same story had been repeated while we were conducting our operation against the new airport which resulted to the conquering of the city.

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At Abu-al-‘Abbas almost every one was fasting, and those who were awake were busy reading the Qur’an. I was not the right time to gather them for a conversation, so I left them and headed to “Uthman” center in (Druzaji). Abu-Imamah accompanied me in the center’s car. There I was able to talk about the following:

The airport project had fulfilled its goal which was a great success.

It was easy to strike the enemy and close the new airport (despite the fact that the Mujahdin themselves are responsible for not attacking the enemy earlier while they were building the new airport as we told them).

The building of the new airport at the north east angle of the valley had opened new and important fields that were neglected by the Mujahdin, and these fields were at the east and the north mountains where the Manjil tribes are located.

The enemy might use the two airports together in order to confuse the Mujahdin and weaken their efforts to confront its planes, so we had to keep enough fire power at the “old airport” to keep the enemy from using it and until we manage to close the new one.

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Because that operation was expensive, and it also required a huge effort day and night, we decided to use the Shalka cannon as an anti aircraft weapon to cover the old airport. This was an inexpensive way, but the problem was how to protect these cannons from the planes’ bombs, and from the tanks missiles. We had to protect our weapon and choose the right location to use them.

We were going to carry out some limited operations against the post office that was across from us in order to destroy two tanks, as well as attract the enemy to this area so the Mujahdin can have better chance in carrying out their operations at the western and the southern sides of the valley. The young men were not responding as we had hoped, may be because they were fasting, and they were looking for some sleep. May be because the area was new to them and they were new to military operations.

I asked Abu-Imamah to take the car back to Abual-‘Abbas, because I will go to (Abu-al-Ahwal) center through the mountains or through number 5.

Some colleagues wanted to join me on my trip but I turned them down. I went alone.

I had the same feeling I used to have on the first day of vacation at the end of the year. In an area as wonderful, and unknown like this area, it was impossible to walk in a straight path, there were a lot of things that attracted my attention and required a lot of detailed observation. There was some kind of a flower, some kind of a strange plant or a small hole for some kind of unknown animals, or a small stream under some hard rocks, and then there were big and small holes for some missiles that lost their targets, and found that wonderful location. Most of these holes had some green plants growing in them, as well as some colored flowers as way of laughing at the man and his foolishness. At this kind of nature one can go back to his childhood, but this experience was very short. I tried to make the journey takes longer, but in vain as I had reached the camp. I had to leave my beautiful dream behind since I had to speak with the young men at this camp about death and martyrdom because the war still going on.

At (Abu-al-Ahwal) center most of the young men were sleeping because of fasting. I had a meeting with those who were awake like Muhiballah, Abu-Anas, and I repeated the

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same thing I had to say at center number 9. The response was a lot better than the previous center, and because the whole group was attached to Abu-al-Harith, I asked them to make their choice freely, either to stay and carry out the new projects, or go back to Abu-al-Harith camp. Then I can discuss the situation with him at the first meeting between us. They promised to give me their decision in the evening.

I bade them farewell and headed to Abu-al-'Abbas center, and I refused to be accompanied by any one. Their offer was not good, but I enjoyed some extra minutes at my end of the year vacation. I continued my discovery at this forgotten nature.

At Abu-al-'Abbas I had a meeting with the young men in which I repeated for the third time the exact current situation from a military point of view. I talked about the airport project that became an old one now. I talked about the reasons that made it a success, and about the necessary steps that we needed to follow from now on. I also talked about the role the Arabs were supposed to play in all of this.

During our conversation Batsha Dina had arrived on an unexpected visit. I gave him a warm welcome and introduced him to the young men as the nephew of the martyr 'Adnan who was the world champion in striking the planes with Stinger rockets.

As far as I knew, that was a fact. This young man (Batsha Dina) was also holding a new record in that field. He had hit a military cargo plane the day before at the new airport, and that was the first strike at the new airport. The young men were so happy to see this unique guest.

Batsha Dina started to explain the situation near the new airport saying:

The Shalka or Zikoyak {TN: some type of missiles} will be very effective against the new airport because of the short distance.

The positions for the Mujahdin tanks are on a straight line with the airport so the target can't be missed.

They were not afraid of the enemy because they had enough forces to face the enemy.

They had a plan to dig new caves and new well, so I promised to help him with the costs thereof.

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The previous four points played an important role in our future program dealing with the new airport. We found the first point to be correct regarding the effectiveness of the Shalka. Few months later, we placed that weapon there.

The second point was correct but not all the way because we found a problem with it.

The third point which talks about not fearing the enemy, we will see in my next book that this was the expectation and advancing was possible. However, there was not enough power with the Mujahdin even their number was not enough to stop the enemy from occupying the northern area.

The fourth point which talks about digging, we helped a lot with that and it was very useful.

After lunch and the noon prayer, I left with Haji Ibrahim to Miranshah to meet with Hakani. Abu-Ibrahim al-Yemeni had left with us to prepare for the next operation with the help of al-Qaeda and its camps. Abu-Hamid had gone on vacation for an undetermined period (because he was angry since I moved him from the observation

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tower!!). Abu-al-Shahid was on vacation for two or three days to write some letters to his family and I believe they were the last letters he wrote as he was martyred after his return. He was telling me about his family and his latest visit to them, it was clear that he is from a loving family with close ties.

At Ghulam Khan Border point, we were stopped for inspection. Our driver Abu-Imamah al-Jaza`iri talked to them, and on the way we met a truck that was carrying our new supplies. The driver of the truck started talking to us and he was an Arab. He complained about Abu-al-Nur and said he would never work with him again.

In Miranshah, Abu-al-Nur had reached the point of explosion as he wanted to relinquish his responsibility and take a vacation for ten days. I arranged with Abu-al-Shahid to delegate Abu-al-Nur's responsibility to the nearby Arab house because the airport project was over. There was no agreement with al-Qaeda on any other projects. Abu-al-Nur left us after finishing his first and last Jihadi mission, and later found out that he was working for the Egyptian intelligence.

I tried to meet with Hakani but he was in Islamabad, so I was disappointed, then I was told that there were two Saudi men who were asking for me at Hakani's guest house. They had a picture of me and were asking Hakani's people: Did you know this man? Where is he? What is he doing? Etc.

I was astonished by this behavior because the entire Hakani group knew me personally and they knew my real name (Mustafa Hamid), but they had no idea about my nickname (Abu-al-Walid).

All of them were working with us in our operation against the airport. Getting astonished was enough at this point, but later I understood that it was message of threat because they knew I was going to know about their questions and their inquiry about me and this will make me frightened and that is what happened.

There were some strange incidents that took place later. The most important incident took place yesterday, when a young man who was addicted to Heroin attacked our house. He used to live in one the houses near us. I tried hard to look for him, but there was joint cooperation in the neighborhood to hide him. The group of the cultural office who were followers to Hakani was involved in this decision. This made me angry, but at the end I had to give up, and stopped searching for that young man because of Hakani and the general situation for the Arabs and because of what was going on the battle fields.

I didn't know then that Abu-al-Harith also had received some threats from the Saudi Intelligence. He was visited by some members of the Saudi Intelligence Department in Khost, and threatened him: if he didn't close his center and let the young men go back to their countries, they will deal with him.

Abu-al-Harith was under a lot of pressure from the service office which was controlled by the Muslim brotherhood. They spread some rumors and accusation about him to force him to leave Afghanistan.

This kind of pressure by the Saudi intelligence and the Muslim brotherhood proved the importance of Abu-al-Harith and his group and the importance of the Arab military work in Khost which was about to change the military and political balance in Afghanistan.

The Arab groups in Jalalabad or other locations did not face such pressures. On the contrary, lot of them was receiving direct and indirect support, despite their being in the wrong business at the wrong place.

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Friday 15 of September 1990

Hajji Ibrahim, the brother of Hakani, conveyed to me a phone message from Hakani in which he asked me to move the launchers and the men to the new airport area.

Ibrahim also told me that Majbur is going to move his launchers to the eastern area.

I was hesitant to vacate the old airport area from the launchers, because the enemy might come back quickly and use the old airport once again. I thought I would leave a permanent power, enough to protect the old airport, and then establish new power for the new airport.

Despite the difficulty and the expenses, this was the only solution in my mind to control the situation and stop running from a one place to another everyday.

I didn't find any benefit to explain my thoughts to anyone but Hakani himself. Julab had told us that he was going to take his launcher from our post and use it against the new airport.

This day I had spent long time searching for the suitable support to build the (Shalka shelter). That is the shelter I intended to put the new cannon in.

I imagined the shelter would be a hole with three sides of rocks and a roof supported by iron posts and topped with meters of sand and stones, with a firing hole that would be camouflaged.

The iron beams in Miranshah were not suitable for the job, so we had to weld the iron posts together in order to make them strong enough to hold the ceiling.

I was visited by Dr. Khalid and Dr. Rumil from Miranshah hospital. They were accompanied by Yussif Hamdan the director of the Islamic relief organization who came to supervise the negotiations with Hakani regarding the said hospital. They were looking for mediation.

Abu-Shaddad al-Misiri also asked for my mediation two months earlier in order to build a training center for making explosive devices and to train some of his special friends. He was hoping to build a small factory to produce explosive devices in Jawir Base.

Building such a factory was not possible, and he didn't work long enough in his training center. When he returned to Egypt, he was arrested, and then he declared his repentance and kept on appearing on the T.V to attack the leadership of the "Islamic Jihad" and reveal his friends' secrets.

Saturday 15 of September 1990

Mawlawi (Sayf al-Rahman) who is in charge of buying the military needs for Hakani had come to us in the morning to tell us that Hakani had returned to his home and that there was a huge quantity of munitions for sale at a very good price. The deal included Katyusha missiles and mortars as well as 82 mm artillery shells. I told him that I would discuss this with the Arabs in Peshawar.

Mawlawi Nizam al-Din had went that evening to meet with Hakani in his house who asked to postpone discussing the hospital project.

Nizam al-Din was in Saudi Arabia among a huge Afghani delegation where they attended an Islamic conference under the auspices of the Saudi government. The objective of the

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conference was to give legitimacy to the American Occupation of the Arab Peninsula in order to protect it from the threats of Saddam Hussein, who occupied Kuwait the month before.

Hakani agreed to give us the Shalka cannon, and requested us to redeploy the Mujahidine's firepower against the new airport. He said, "we should not be happy with taking over the old airport, and let the enemy use the new one." He then asked for Julab launchers and others to be under our control. This means that Hakani is going to provide us with the much needed munitions. He asked me to go to Bari to meet with Dr.Nasrallah and the rest of the leaders in order to discuss the required arrangements to carry out his orders.

At once we went to Khalil center in Bari; there we were informed that the meeting was not going to be held because out of 18 leaders, five only had come.

We decided to come back by taxi because our car remained at "Abu-al-'Abbas" center. Our surveillance was working. The enemy was using the new airport daily and ignoring the old airport.

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In the taxi which was a pickup model, Haji Ibrahim sat next to the driver to entertain himself by talking with the driver.

The conversation was about the details of what we did with the airport project! I was about to explode but I knew that this operation was over, and what Haji Ibrahim was doing was part of a local custom which could not be ignored by the locals.

Sunday 16 of September 1990

The hatred was hidden among us-the group of the Arabic magazine, the group of the airport project, and the group of the cultural office (the Farhanji) which we still were occupying part of its quarters.

Many indications proved that the person who attacked my house in Miranshah and was going to suffocate my youngest son 'Abdallah who stood up to him with courage. This person was seen many times at the cultural office, the office of (Farhanji).

Since yesterday and there were some European guests at the upper level-men and women-. They were watching some movies about the Mujahdin battles in the area. No body had told us any thing, but their appearance made me angry, at least because these white creatures became our clear enemies. They were working so hard to neutralize the Jihad movement in Afghanistan before reaching its intended goal.

Those white creatures were behaving freely as if they were at home.

Up until this morning, they were still in the top floor, and their women were occupying the small room that overlooked the house garden. No one had told us who they were. Or what was the purpose of their visit. On the contrary, they did their best to leave us in the dark.

I accompanied Haji Ibrahim to Hakani's House, and on the way we met Majbur, our neighbor at the air port operations. He said that he was going to move his 120mm mortar to the eastern (Shin Kai) area, with a small radio and a handset microphone. I promised to

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help him in his project of digging through the Arabs. I explained to him that we face shortage in the small radios.

Before reaching Hakani's house we saw the visitors coming to greet Sheik Nizam al-Din who had recently arrived from Saudi Arabia. I went with Haji Ibrahim to greet him as well. I was anxious to know his opinion on what took place in Saudi Arabia such as bringing the American forces to protect the Kingdom against the Iraqis, according to what they said at that time.

Nizam al-Din was well known with his strict views on religion, so I expected to hear some good news. The Sheik offered us some Zamzam water {this water is from Saudi Arabia, from an area in Mecca where Muslims conduct pilgrim} and some of al-Medina's dates.

The small room was filled with visitors. I sat next to him and I asked him about his opinion on what had happened in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf area. His answer came as unexpected shock to me. He said that the presence of the Americans and the Europeans in Saudi Arabia is permissible but with conditions. Since Saddam was working with Russia, the presence of the Americans becomes permissible, but they will have to leave. He then said that all the Muslim scholars from different Muslim countries gave their fatwa permitting the help of the American and the west Armies.

I tried to argue with him saying that America didn't come to Afghanistan to fight the Soviet Union which is stronger than Saddam Hussein, so why did they go to Saudi Arabia? Why didn't the Afghan people request the presence of America while the Saudis did?

He replied saying that the Saudi government is underachieving, but that is what happened and they will leave soon.

I said goodbye to him and left and I was still in shock and wondering about the capability of the Saudi government to reprogram a man like Nizam al-Din who had become delirious. No doubt the Saudi regime had the extra-ordinary ability to destroy the political and the religious aspects.

At Hakani's guest house I met with the well known leaders and they had bad news about the new airport. Yesterday there were eight planes landed in it, and most of those planes were carrying soldiers. Hakani said that the information he had was that the

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government was able to re-enforce its forces with one thousand new soldiers in the few days they have been able to use the air port, which meant that they might carry out an attack. The government had destroyed the tops of the mountains in Bari using the heavy artillery, and this didn't happen in the past four months. Despite all of this, the reaction towards the new airport was varied to the extent that I felt depressed. The circumstances for Hakani was very difficult, the death of his brother Isma'il was a huge disaster on the personal level, and on the operational level also since Isma'il was one among three people who represents Hakani in many battle fields. The three individuals were Hakani's three brothers; Ibrahim, Khalil and Isma'il. With the death of Isma'il, Hakani lost one third of his power. In addition, there was his mother, the person who controlled a different front which was as important as the battle field. This front was the internal field

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which consisted of the Mujahdin's and the martyrs' families. She also was the one who motivated people to perform jihad, as well as setting the right punishment for those who dropped out of Jihad. Her words and enthusiasm were effective weapons and always ready for the time of need.

This great woman died after Isma'il. This was not all; now Ibrahim is facing a serious health problem. He just left the hospital to attend his mother's funeral before he finished his medication. He never returned to the hospital, but he went to the battle field to supervise the supply operations. There at the battlefield he started to cough, so they transported him to the military hospital in Ru-al-Bindi by air.

All the above listed reasons were the product of Hakani's absent mindedness. He was always lost, he could not concentrate, and had lost his leadership magnetism.

I asked him about his upcoming military program. He answered saying, I don't know, they say it's coming soon, and it's supposed to be on all the fronts.

His responses and his lack of concentration lead to my loss, and I felt like I needed to take some rest and stay with my family for some time. I had hoped to find another person to give him all my duties.

What made this situation worse was the meeting of our group in Peshawar. They still were not able to take a decision, and they still haven't chosen a battlefield. In the evening my intervention in the hospital matter didn't work, and Mawlawi Nizam-al-Din had ordered that they should hold all administrative power. I sent a message to Abu-Hifis in Peshawar saying that the mission was accomplished, and I meant the old airport had been closed, so I requested the appointment of a new leader to Abu-al-'Abbas Center. I will be in Peshawar within a week to discuss the new development with you. I went to sleep early because I was very sad.

Monday, September 17, 1990

I copy the following paragraphs from my journals in which I wrote the most important incidents that took place in those days, and under this date I wrote the following: there is no communication between us and al-Qaeda leadership. This crucial separation between us and the leadership is proof of the lack of interest among the military leadership. The lack of ability to reach a final decision caused us to be depressed, and if the operation fails, everybody will blame only me. If I made the decision to expand without clear orders from them, this will be interpreted as bad intentions from our side, so I decided to limit our mission in the battlefield. I formed an observation group, a launching group, and a few numbers of reserves until I receive a final and clear decision. At this point I can use all the available sources. Militarily, what's needed now is:

1. To close the new airport required the following: a.) a coordination between (Shin-Kay) and (Khramtu) in the northern part where the majority of our artillery could be found, b) the coordination in our fire against the new airport. We have to keep in mind that the new supplies for the enemy will concentrate on the expansion of their defense areas by attacking the Mujahdin in the eastern area.

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2. To keep the old airport covered with our firepower, and that required the following:

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- a) the presence of at least one launcher with the Arabs,
- b) the presence of at least two launchers with the Afghani,
- c) the presence of Shalka cannon in a well-fortified location.

The lack of our quick response to the enemy attempts to open the new airport led to the bad situation we are facing right now. We needed many months in order to achieve victory over the enemy, which required the implementation of the two points listed above. In addition, a third point would be, the position of a reasonable power of the heavy weapons that consist of artilleries 122Mm, 85 mm, different types of mortars (120Mm, 82mm). It was possible to obtain that kind of weapons gradually after the success of our mission in closing the old airport and gaining the trust of the Mujahdin and proving our ability in coordination.

Sheik Jalal-al-Din had agreed to provide us with tanks. He requested that we be in charge of the launchers against the new airport. A fourth point would be to open a new front in the mountains north of the new airport.

That was the end of my brief report, which I wrote on the afternoon of that day. That report was still in need for some comments, which would, God-willing, be narrated when talking about our operations against the new air port.

The rest of the day's incidents as mentioned in the same journal said,

“At ten o'clock in the morning, 'Ali Jul came to me and asked me to meet with the sheik at his house. There at the house the sheik renewed his pledge to put the Julab launcher under our control if we agreed to coordinate with the others.

I have decided to take a vacation after a short visit to the battle field and find out what the situation was in (Shin Kay) area. I also decided not to use the air port any more unless I got the approval from al-Qaeda leaders.

I stated to the sheik that I had no control over those young men out side the airport operation, and that I'm still waiting for the leaders' decision.

He said “don't worry, just work with us and we will give you all what you need”

I don't know if he was just being nice or he was convinced by our abilities after we succeeded in the old air port operation. He then said that “'Ali Jul and Sabir Jan will be with you”.

I left sheik Hakani in a special meeting with Malawi Nizam al-Din. He told me before leaving that ('Ali Jul) will be in our camp the next morning.

In the afternoon, I was standing in front of the hospital court, while a small bus carrying a group of Arabs was heading to Peshawar; among this group were Dr. Jamal, and Dr. Abu-Bakr.

The bus has stopped near me and the two doctors, Jamal and Abu-Bakr stepped out of it, and came to shake my hand. They asked me to call them when the operations started.

They heard that it's going to start on Friday. I explained to them that I'll not be able to move the young men to another operation without getting the authority I needed from al-Qaeda leadership in Peshawar. I asked them to intervene in pushing this decision, and they welcomed that request. I then told them that the date of the start of the new operations would be the minute I got the authority I need. I also told them that the time for the new operations in Khost was unknown and that I did not think it was going to be any time soon.

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I got a letter from Hakani approving the training of Abu-Shaddad and six of his colleges in the camp of Salman al-Farisi (A course on how to prepare and make explosives). Shaddad then asked for an approval to build a big laboratory, and I told him the circumstances did not allow that at the time being because the pressure from the front prevented people from thinking about this topic.

At four thirty in the afternoon, I got a visit from Dr. Khalid, and Yussif Hamdan who is also known as ('Abd-al-Rahman), and that is how he was introduced to me. I told them that their intervention had failed. Khalid then said that he doubted the success from the very beginning because had told him "you spend a lot of money; hand the money over to us and we would act,"

I didn't agree with him because I believe the reason behind our differences is a fundamental one. Every one dislikes the other person's beliefs, and as a result there was a conflict between the Hakani group and the hospital administration.

(Document page 80)

Another reason was the presence of an Afghani gang that wanted to invest in the hospital as a private project and steal the medicine from the hospital and resell it on the black market.

We exchanged a lot of messages during the time we conducted the operation, and I kept all what I can put my hands on from those messages. Here I'm going to republish a message I had received on 10-09-1990 from Sayf al-'Adal who was considered an important military figure in al-Qaeda organization. He wrote this message after reading my memo in an anticipation of the air port project. I put a copy from that memo in Miranshah in the office of Abu-al-Nur to let the new participants have a look at it. By the time I received al-'Adal's message the project was almost over. The message still had its importance because Sayf al-'Adal was an paratrooper officer. He also was one of the people who had an open mind in al-Qaeda organization, and what is more he was my son in-law... and that is why I kept his message in my secret book.

In the name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Dear brother/ Abu-Walid

Peace and blessing be upon you.

I ask almighty Allah to make sure you are in a good health and prosperity, God willing. I also pray for you to achieve more victory that would benefit the Muslims and defeat the enemies.

I send my regards to all the brothers especially Abu-Tamim al-Misiri, Abu-'Ubaydah al-Lubnani, and Abu-Usama al-Libi. Allah has blessed me by reading the report you have written, and for the first time I found an organized work in this country. I pray to Allah it will be a good omen. I come to you with some questions about your report which I'd like to ask you about so we can understand the full picture of your work. These questions are:

1. What is the enemy's reaction to the closing of the airport, and also, what is his reaction toward the attempt to capture Khost?
2. What is the international reaction to the closing of the airport and to the attempt of capturing Khost?

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3. What do you anticipate will happen regarding the military operation that was mentioned in Chapter Two?
4. What is the role of the Pakistani intelligence toward Khost and the airport operations?
5. What is the real and honest situation of the Afghans in the battlefield?

I ask Allah to provide you with more success until we meet the next time, God willing.

Your brother,  
Sayf al-'Adal

The following document was the latest I had written in which I gave instructions to all the individuals who worked with us in the airport project. I wrote this document on September 15, 1990, which means it was written after the project was over. I wrote this document in anticipation of the continuation of our work to close the new airport and keep the old airport closed as well. At the same time, we did not want to give the enemy a chance to manipulate us and use the two airports together. We couldn't continue because al-Qaeda Organization was as silent as the sphinx. The young men I had would not act without any orders from al-Qaeda to avoid burning the bridges between them and my group; despite the good personal relationship I had with al-Qaeda leadership.

In the name of Allah, The Compassionate, the Merciful  
Thanks to Allah and peace be upon his messenger  
Dear brothers/ Abu-Tamim, Abu-Zayd and all the brothers.

(Document page 81)

I ask Allah that you all be in a good health and to have the support you need. The latest developments here; there are going to be a huge change in the positions of the Mujahdin tanks and launchers to enable them to face the enemy at the new air port. These changes will include some launchers here in our area in (Tazjatstan), and I'll try to make those changes without impacting our work capability at the old air port, and we pray to Allah to help us.

Sheik Jalal al-Din has agreed to give us the (Shalka) at the Observation Center to use in our new plan, and we are going to bring it in the near future.

Sheik Jalal al-Din has asked us to be in charge of the launchers that are going to be in use at the new air port and to co-ordinate the observation work and the firing work. He also is going to provide us directly with the supplies we need instead of distributing them on the operators of the launchers.

In order to co-ordinate the work between the new and the old air port, we are going to meet today, God willing, with Dr. Nasrallah and the rest of the commandos to organize the work. The meeting will take place in Bari. We have survey the new area, and this will be the responsibility of Abu-Tamim and I. This requires that Abu-Zayd take the responsibility of controlling the old airport and keeping a high level of readiness for the fighters in order to engage with the enemy at any time. We anticipate an enemy attack at any time and we don't want to face any surprises. So Abu-Zayd will lead all the current groups in the old air port starting from today.

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If Durwaziji group would give its launcher to Julab, they would have to return to the main center. Group number 5 has the freedom to choose between staying or going back. The most important point in the work at the old air port was to prepare the Shalka to engage the enemy, so I request to work hard and not to waste any time regarding this matter. You can initiate choosing the location for the new launcher, the way of protection, and then start the work. I recommend that you form three groups to work on the new air port. Each group should consist of two or three people who are able to operate the launchers, and at the same time have the ability to co-ordinate with the Mujahdin who use the same launchers in accordance to the current system.

I also want you to carefully choose those who are going to operate the (Zaycoyak), and make sure they use it well. You need to make a list with those names in case we need them in the new air port operation. The final decision will be taken after the completion of our observation mission.

I want you to authorize one of the brothers to oversee the necessary preparations for the engagement with the two tanks and also to prepare for the rest of our planned program. This person has to complete the observation mission and take the necessary measures to arm his group with the required and suitable weapons for the operation.

If you have extra individuals, I want you to make a list with their names to move them temporarily to Bari till you need them again. You also need to give some of the brothers who need a rest some vacation.

The current observation team has to prepare a daily report on the status of the old and the new air ports as well as the enemy power present there, and the daily enemy landings and their bombardments during daylight and night time, as of September, 13, 1990.

Your brother Abu-Imamah is recommending Haji Muhammad al-Kutshi to be used as a guide in your operations geared at finding mine fields, so please give him the respect he deserves and treat him well as if he is one of your own people. God bless all of you.

We request that you send one of the brothers to help us here in running our center in Miranshah at the near future.

We ask Allah to give us and the Mujahdin the victory over the enemies of Allah.

Peace be upon you.

Your brother,  
Abu-al-Walid.

I left to Peshawar and let Abu-Tamim and Abu-al-Shahid from al-Qaeda leadership to manage the project, so I can work on getting a decision to increase their participation in the new air port operation as well as some of the other operations if possible.

Of course I failed in my mission, and al-Qaeda had gradually withdrawn from (Darzjasatn) especially after the martyrdom of Abu-al-Shahid al-Qatari.

(Document page 82)

Here I'm going to mention a report that originated from the observation tower to Abu-Tamim who was in charge of the project at that time. This report was dated September, 23, 1990. I will summarize this report with the use of some quotations, which I will put between brackets.

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Here is what has happened on Saturday night; there were eight planes two of which landed in the old air port. The landing was successful, and they also manage to take off. The rest of the planes landed in the new air port. The third plane was the one that got hit, it even split into two, and then we saw the tank pulling it towards a building near the tarmac. Our mission became a little difficult because;

- A- Last night half of our power didn't participate with us (Shah Khan, Center number 5, and Majbur didn't fire one shot)
- B- The enemy is having two air ports and it is taking opportunities and changing its tactics from time to time, which makes our mission very difficult, as well as the withdrawal of two important elements from the old air port (Shah Khan, and Center number 9).

The second point is that we have noticed that the landing happens extremely fast and does not exceed eight minutes at the most. The plane just has to land then opens its bottom door (the back door) and unloads all the supplies on the tarmac while it's moving, and after finishing it takes off as fast as possible. What makes us sure of what we are saying is that we have seen some of the supplies on the ground of the new air port five days ago which proves that they unload their supplies while the plane is moving. If they unload their supplies while the plane was stationary, we would have seen those supplies stacked in one place. We also noticed that the unloading is quicker at the old air port than the new air port.

The third point is that the enemy uses his cargo planes at the same time with his jets planes to confuse the Mujahdin, they also light the two air ports at the same time and pretend they unload their cargo. We also noticed that the Mujahdin work hard at the beginning of the night but after one o'clock at night some of the artillery stop working. At the end of the report the writer, who is unknown, presents an idea to distribute the available fire power over the tarmac of the old air port through the use of three launchers BM12, and one individual launcher that belongs to Abu-al-Harith group.

This was a very good firepower any way, but the enemy's ability to maneuver made the information we have worthless. We couldn't even determine which air port is going to be used by the enemy.

The majority of the Mujahdin confirmed that the enemy had stopped using the old air port since our last operation there, which was on September tenth.

I tend to believe this assessment; and this way our observations would have fallen in the enemy's trap who, since Tuesday 9/11/1990, used only one airport, and that was the new one.

Thanks to Allah the God of the entire universe.

Thursday, March, 18, 1999.

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