The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qa‘ida
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INTRODUCTION

The targeted killing of Usama bin Ladin at a compound in the garrison city of Abbottabad, Pakistan has raised a number of important questions about the infamous global jihadist’s local connections. It has also highlighted how little is really known about the patrons and supporters that enabled al-Qa’ida’s charismatic leader to hide in plain sight, and communicate with his key lieutenants, for so many years. Al-Qa’ida’s successful integration into the complex local landscape of Islamist militancy in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region is not a recent phenomenon, and since the 1980s Bin Ladin’s organization has been dependent on a network of local supporters to conduct an increasingly global campaign of violence. Indeed, the inception, execution and continuity of al-Qa’ida’s global jihad cannot be meaningfully separated from this local dimension, which today remains one of the least studied aspects of the organization’s history. The present report aims to address this gap through an analysis of the history and organizational relationships of the Haqqani network, a single major constant that, for the entirety of al-Qa’ida’s existence, has shaped the latter’s local trajectory in the region.

A great deal of attention has been given to the activities of the Haqqani network in recent years, with the group having been described as the pivot issue between Pakistan and the United States.1 The Haqqani network, as it is commonly called, is an Afghan and Pakistani insurgent group that has its roots in the 1970s.2 The identity and evolution of the group is intimately tied to its patriarch and historic leader, Jalaluddin Haqqani. Over three decades of conflict the group has played a unique role in the region due to its interpersonal relations, geographic position and strategic approach. Today, the Haqqani network operates as a semi-autonomous component of the Taliban

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2 Outside of internal military usage, which was likely somewhat earlier, the appellation first appears in the 9 March 2006 Senate testimony of Rear Admiral Robert Moeller, in which he described the three main components of the Afghan insurgency as the Taliban, the “Haqqani Tribal Network,” and Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG). A week later, the U.S. State Department’s Washington File introduced the shortened appellation “Haqqani network” (David McKeeny, “Partnership Key to Progress in Afghanistan, U.S. General Says,” Washington File, 16 March 2006), though the phrase did not enter common usage in the Western press until late 2006, following Anthony Cordesman’s editorial “One War We Can Still Win,” New York Times, 13 December 2006.
with primacy in southeastern Afghanistan. Part of the network’s power also stems from its close ties to Pakistan’s Army and intelligence agencies, which have historically used the group as a proxy to exert influence in Afghanistan and to mediate disputes in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Throughout its history the Haqqani network has operated on and influenced militancy on the local, regional and global levels, the most underappreciated dimension of which is the global character of the Haqqani network and the central role it has played in the evolution of al-Qa’ida and the global jihadi movement. This is a gap of strategic proportions, insofar as the Haqqani network has been more important to the development and sustainment of al-Qa’ida and the global jihad than any other single actor or group.

Three main factors explain why a more developed understanding of the Haqqani network’s broad role in this history has remained elusive. First, although recognized as a distinct organization (i.e. a tanzim) by foreign jihadists as early as 1994, the historical evolution of the Haqqani network has received limited attention. Almost all historical treatments of the group are tangential in nature and rely heavily on secondary sources. Few studies offer unique or granular insights about the evolution of the Haqqani network, the pre-2001 actions of the group and its long-standing ties with key actors.

Second, the scholarly and counterterrorism communities have narrowly approached the history of al-Qa’ida through the lens of Peshawar and Arab precursor organizations, such as Maktab al-Khidamat (Afghan Services Bureau, hereinafter MAK). Less credence and attention has been given to areas like Loya Paktia and Miranshah, which functioned (and continue to function) as other centers of gravity for the mobilization and operational development of foreign war volunteers and future members of al-Qa’ida. These areas, and the Haqqani network’s role in them, were not only more central to the operational development of al-Qa’ida than Peshawar, but have also proved to be more enduring over time.

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3 Harmony document, AFGP-2002-800581, p. 5, in which the administrator of an al-Qa’ida training camp at the main Haqqani base in Khost writes to al-Qa’ida’s leadership in Sudan (1994) that “the governor of Khost is from the Haqqani organization” and is protecting al-Qa’ida from attacks by one of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s commanders.
Third, the history of al-Qa’ida has been narrowly approached through Arabic sources, as if the development of al-Qa’ida was solely an Arab phenomenon. Less attention has been paid to Pashto and Urdu language material produced by Afghan and Pakistani insurgent groups, much of which provides insights into the local context of al-Qa’ida’s trajectory and is ripe for study.

This report also provides insights into the strategic value of the Haqqani network. Specifically, it examines how, for the past three decades, the Haqqani network has functioned as an enabler for other groups and as the fountainhead (manba’) of local, regional and global militancy. Although this report explores all three of these militant levels, it emphasizes the Haqqani network’s impact on transnational militancy. While the Haqqani network is undoubtedly a sophisticated and dangerous organization in its own right, the group is best understood as a nexus player, tying together a diverse mix of actors central to various conflict networks. By detailing these ties and exploring how the group functions in this role, we will elucidate and contextualize the history of the Haqqani network.

The Haqqani network’s strategy is pragmatic and the organization is motivated by local concerns and a less visible but firmly held ideological commitment to the philosophy of expansive and global jihad. We will also illustrate how the Haqqani network and al-Qa’ida function as an interdependent system, and reveal that the seeds of global jihad were planted much earlier than previously thought and were nurtured just as much by the Haqqanis as by al-Qa’ida, its predecessor organizations and the Arab foreign fighter movement. Although not the main focus of this report, this history refines the arguments made by others about the al-Qa’ida and Taliban relationship and establishes that the threat to U.S. national interests that emerged most fully on 9/11 stemmed from both al-Qa’ida and the Haqqani network.

This introduction proceeds by offering an analytical framework to situate the Haqqani network’s role and influence across local, regional and global dimensions of jihad. This discussion is then followed by a review of our sources and methods and an acknowledgment of this report’s limitations. The first section then proceeds by discussing the Haqqani network in more detail, focusing on three key characteristics that have contributed to its endurance and effectiveness over time. The bulk of the
report starting in the second section explores the evolution of the Haqqani network and the nature of the group’s relations with key actors, especially al-Qa’ida. This is done through a chronological review, starting with the emergence and rise of Jalaluddin Haqqani to a trusted position of influence across local, regional and global plains in the late 1970s and 1980s, followed by an assessment of how the Haqqani network used its nexus position and resources to enable other forms of militancy during the 1990s and the post-2001 period. The conclusion examines the implications of our findings and the challenges they present to regional security, U.S./Pakistan ties and Taliban reconciliation efforts.

**Analytical Framework**

To situate the Haqqani network’s nexus position and role, it may be useful to refer to John Padgett’s and Paul McLean’s multiple-network ensemble, which uses separate plains and functions to explain the evolution of power in Renaissance Italy. Instead of transversing between the economic, kinship and political plains that Padgett and McLean outline, the Haqqani network can be understood as operating in a similar manner across local, regional and global dimensions of jihad (visually displayed in the Appendix). Moreover, while Padgett’s and McLean’s plains are segmented based on guild, neighborhood and social class, the Haqqani network’s actions within and across each plain can be organized into three functional categories: direct action (i.e., operations), diplomatic activity and support functions. Padgett’s and McLean’s conclusion — that the most successful families are those with networks that penetrate the key functional categories while also transversing across dimensions — can similarly

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5 For analytical clarity, the ‘local’ plain includes those militant groups that are indigenous to the tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and who are primarily active in one of these two countries and seek to create change there. The ‘regional’ plain is specifically devoted to the Pakistani state, given Islamabad’s interests in shaping South Asia’s security environment and historic use of proxies to counter Indian influence in the region. Groups such as al-Qa’ida and the Islamic Jihad Union who are primarily motivated by global jihad and directly engage in acts of international terrorism are included in the ‘global’ plain. The authors recognize that these categories — while analytically useful — are also at times partially blurred due to the fluidity of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, overlapping membership between groups and the fact that the activity of several militant actors is not limited to one specific plain. For example, even though the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) is a local, indigenous militant group that is primarily concerned with attacking the Pakistani state, the TTP is also motivated by global jihad and has proven its desire to attack the United States.
be used to explain the success of the Haqqani network, given the group’s ability to operate across local, regional and global plains and provide value within each functional category. For example, the Haqqani network functions as the primary conduit for many Pakistani Taliban (also known as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, or the TTP) fighters to access the jihad in Afghanistan and as a central diplomatic interface between the TTP and the Pakistani state when important issues need to be discussed. Playing such a role enhances the Haqqani network’s utility and credibility within, and across, multiple dimensions of jihad. This is not to suggest that the Haqqani network is the only actor operating in this capacity in the Afghanistan-Pakistan tribal areas, but rather that it has been the most influential.

Sources and Methods
To contextualize the Haqqani network and its relationships we conducted a review of primary and secondary source material in English, French, Arabic, Pashto, Dari and Urdu. This included the first known review of a near-complete set of over 1,000 pages of three jihadist magazines released by the Haqqani network from 1989-1993: Manba’ al-Jihad (one version in Pashto and another in Arabic) and Nusrat al-Jihad (Urdu); a series of digital videos produced by the group since 2001; and a number of Arabic-language memoirs written by current and former members of al-Qa’ida and other foreign fighters present in Afghanistan during the period under study (1973-2010). To corroborate this information and gain additional insights, we conducted interviews with prominent scholars, practitioners and journalists who either personally operated with or have had first-hand knowledge of the Haqqani network at specific points in history.

The authors also reviewed several thousand pages of letters written to and from Haqqani commanders during the 1980s and 1990s, which were captured in Afghanistan after the U.S. invasion and have since been stored in the Department of Defense’s Harmony database. While this material is extremely rich and illuminating, readers should be aware that analyzing such data is fraught with certain risks. Documents in the Harmony database were collected on the battlefield in an ad hoc manner. There is no way to know how representative the documents captured by U.S. forces are of the larger body of information produced by the Haqqani network, al-Qa’ida or other insurgents. The authors, however, made every attempt to corroborate material found in these documents with other sources.
Limitations and Caveats
This report is not a comprehensive history of the Haqqani network. Although it represents a serious attempt to present the contours of such a history, it does so through the lens of the Haqqani network’s support for al-Qa’ida and to a lesser extent its relations with the Pakistani state and Pakistani Taliban. A detailed exploration of Jalaluddin Haqqani’s relations with key Afghan insurgent / political factions during the anti-Soviet jihad, for example, or the commercial role of the Haqqani network, are beyond the scope of this report — although they are touched upon. We encourage others to expand upon our research by exploring (in greater detail) primary source material produced by individuals like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and ‘Abd al-Rabb Rasul Sayyaf — other actors who played a role in enabling the Arab foreign fighter movement and later al-Qa’ida. Finally, as a term of convenience, the authors occasionally refer to the Haqqani network simply as “the Haqqanis.”
INTRODUCING THE HAQQANI NETWORK

The Haqqani network is an Afghan and Pakistani insurgent group whose senior leadership structure is hierarchical and mostly familial in nature. Most of the operations conducted by the group over its three decade long history have been carried out by small, local, and semi-autonomous fighting units organized along tribal and sub-tribal lines, with Haqqani commanders often coordinating activity and providing logistics. The identity of the group, and its evolution from a collection of like-minded tribal fighters in the mid 1970s into a more structured network, with its own command and control and media, is intimately tied to the career of Jalaluddin Haqqani, the group’s historic leader. While Jalaluddin was organizationally affiliated with the faction of the Afghan mujahidin party Hizb-e-Islami led by Yonis Khalis during the 1980s and early 1990s, and since 1996 with the Taliban, Haqqani has always had a considerable amount of autonomy and been in charge of his own network of local fighters. It is difficult to pinpoint when the group led by Jalaluddin (and now nominally by his son Sirajuddin) became a cohesive entity, but the Haqqani network was recognized as a distinct organization (i.e. a tanzim) by foreign jihadists as early as 1994. Today, the group is believed to be comprised of several hundred core members and thousands of fighters with varying degrees of affiliation and loyalty. Assessments suggest that the Haqqani network draws from a pool of roughly 10,000-15,000 fighters.

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6 Major familial leaders include Jalaluddin and his brother Khalil, as well as Jalaluddin’s sons Badruddin, Nasiruddin and Sirajuddin. Leadership roles have also been filled by graduates of the Dar al-’Ulm Haqqaniyya madrassa and individuals like Jan Baz Zadrani, Darim Sedgai (deceased), Bakhita Jan and Mullah Sangeen have played important roles in the group, but are not known as nuclear family members.

7 For a historical perspective, see Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, Afghanistan – The Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower (Havertown, PA: Casemate, 2001), 167. As explained below, since the mid-1980s, these units have been augmented by foreign war volunteers who have either been integrated into Haqqani fighting columns or fought semi-independently alongside them. These dynamics are best laid out by Abu’l Walid al-Masri and his writing.

8 The name “Haqqani” is an honorific title that Jalaluddin earned after his studies at Dar al-’Ulm Haqqaniyya (see below).

9 For example interviews conducted by Jere Van Dyk in 1981 indicate that Jalaluddin was viewed at that time “as the leader for all of [Loya] Pakthia province and for all of Southeastern Afghanistan.” See Jere Van Dyk, In Afghanistan: An American Odyssey (New York: Coward-McCann, 1983), 126.


12 See, e.g., Jere Van Dyk, 128.
The Haqqani network has remained an effective militant actor while playing a broad role over three decades of conflict due to its ability to manage three important characteristics. It is the Haqqani network’s geographic position, organizational centrality and strategic approach that have set it apart from other groups. This section is organized according to these three characteristics and serves as a basis to help the reader situate the more detailed analysis that follows.

**Geographic Centrality**

The Haqqani network’s identity and endurance is intimately tied to the geographically central terrain from which it emerged and in which it has always been based. Since the mid-1970s the Haqqani network has increasingly wielded a tremendous amount of operational and diplomatic influence over the Southeastern Afghan provinces of Khost, Paktia and Paktika (together known as Loya Paktia) and Pakistan’s North Waziristan. This mountainous region, which straddles the Durand Line and has long been a center for political resistance against Afghan regimes, is host to a number of militant networks and has served as the group’s primary area of operation and its key region of refuge and political interest. Although less central to the group’s identity, since the early 1980s the Haqqani network has also had a presence in and operational ties to Kabul, Ghazni, Logar and Wardak.

The particular history and characteristics of this region have not only shaped the Haqqani network’s evolution and strategic behavior over time, they have also provided the group with the ability to carve out an enduring position of power over three and a half decades of regional conflict and globalized political violence. The magnitude of the resources that poured into Afghanistan to support the mujahidin during the anti-Soviet

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jihad in the 1980s are well known; the United States, Saudi Arabia, China and other partner states contributed upwards of $12 billion in direct aid to Pakistan to support the insurgency.\textsuperscript{15} According to the Brigadier General of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) responsible for directing this massive supply chain to the mujahidin, “up to 60 percent of our supplies” were routed through Khost and Paktia, a full third of this directly through Haqqani’s headquarters and supply base at Zhawara, just four kilometers across the Afghanistan border between Miranshah, North Waziristan and Khost.\textsuperscript{16} Jalaluddin Haqqani, the group’s patriarch, noted the importance and value of these resource mobilization networks after the Soviet withdrawal, remarking:

Khost is one of four strategic places in Afghanistan. It is very important because Khost has more than tens of routes to Pakistan, and more than eleven routes into other parts of Afghanistan. These routes are strategically important because we use them for shipping weapons and ammunition into the country, and taking our wounded and dead out.\textsuperscript{17}

It is therefore understandable that Khost — the city located at the distributing end of this international resource mobilization network — was the first city captured by the mujahidin after the departure of the Soviets, or that Jalaluddin led the operation.\textsuperscript{18} Furthermore, these resource networks have proven to be of consistent value to the Haqqani network — and other local actors — during successive conflicts, including that which the group is fighting today against Afghan and Coalition forces.\textsuperscript{19} Due to its history and ties with other actors, the Haqqani network remains the actor best positioned to capitalize and make use of them.

Of equal importance, as noted by Jalaluddin, is the connection between these networks and other parts of Afghanistan. Loya Paktia provides the shortest route from the

\textsuperscript{16} Yousaf and Adkin, 159, 164. See same source for background on other routes (at page 110) and distribution of materiel to other commanders (Sayyaf, Hekmatyar, etc.) via Khost routes and others.
\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Manba al-Jihad} (Pashto), 2:12, (June 1991).
\textsuperscript{18} For background see “Historic Battle, Great Victory,” Manba al-Jihad publishing, author and date not known; For perspectives on geographic centrality see: Harmony Document AFGP-2002-600093, 102; Steve Coll, \textit{Ghost Wars}, 157.
\textsuperscript{19} For a review of other actors in Loya Paktia see footnote 1.
sanctuaries of North and South Waziristan to Afghanistan’s capital, Kabul. This, and the nature of the Haqqani network’s relationships (explored further below), helps to explain why the group is usually responsible for suicide attacks conducted in Kabul.\footnote{Anand Gopal, “The Most Deadly US Foe in Afghanistan,” Christian Science Monitor, 1 June 2009.} The mountainous geography and the shelter provided by Pakistan’s close border have also historically allowed the Haqqani network — and, by extension, its operational partners — to maintain a rear supply base and limit their own rate of attrition.

**Organizational Centrality and Nexus Position**

The Haqqani network has long had intimate ties with a wide-range of actors due to its geographic position, history of inclusiveness and strategic approach. Indeed, one of the more remarkable and enduring aspects of the Haqqani network has been its ability and willingness to work with a wide variety of leaders, parties and foreign supporters, and to bring often fractious and rival groups into effective tactical alliances. This flexibility and ability to manage various interests has historically set the Haqqani network apart and allowed it to act as a central hub, tying together a diverse constituency of groups. This is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that the Haqqani network has long been an essential operational partner for both Pakistan and al-Qa’ida, and that both Islamabad and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, also known as the Pakistani Taliban) often rely upon the Haqqanis’ good offices to negotiate with one another.\footnote{These relationships are reviewed below. The use of the term “good office” refers to diplomatic services provided by the Haqqani network and not a physical office. See, e.g., Anand Gopal, Mansur Khan Mahsud and Brian Fishman, “The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in North Waziristan,” Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper, New America Foundation (April 2010).}

The Haqqani network’s organizational centrality is built upon the foundation and relations forged by Jalaluddin Haqqani and those close to him over the past forty years. The ideological roots and organizational basis for what would later become the Haqqani network were firmly fixed in the 1960s and 1970s, and they are just as much Pakistani in nature as they are Afghan.\footnote{For insight into the cross border nature of the Haqqani network see: “Interview with Taliban Commander Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani,” The News, 20 October 2001.} A major foundational component was the education that Jalaluddin and many of his chief lieutenants and battlefield commanders received at Pakistan’s prestigious Dar al-‘Ulam Haqqaniyya, a Deobandi madrassa near
the border city of Peshawar, during the 1960s. Indeed, Jalaluddin’s connections to Mawlavi ‘Abd al-Haq, founder of the Haqqaniyya madrassa, and his son Sami al-Haq would only deepen over the course of successive conflicts, and the latter ties still endure today. In the 1970s that Jalaluddin established early ties to the Persian Gulf and operational connections with key Afghan Islamist party leaders, such as Yunis Khalis, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, ‘Abd al-Rabb Rasul Sayyaf, Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massoud, all of whom had become involved in Islamist activism in Kabul in the 1960s and early 1970s. After declaring a jihad against Afghan President Muhammad Daoud from the village of Nika (Paktia Province) in 1973, Jalaluddin established centers of underground anti-government activities in Miranshah, Khost, and Kabul and he dispatched several of his supporters to Peshawar to liaise with the Kabuli Islamists. Although Jalaluddin’s relations with these Afghan leaders would at times be strained and in some cases hostile, they would remain important over the next several decades.

The Haqqani network’s centrality to the region’s conflict economy and the role it has played as a local conflict mediator over multiple decades have helped to solidify the Haqqani’s status in the tribal areas. At the local level in Pakistan, relations between the Haqqani network and local militant groups are deeply integrated and interdependent. They are guided by tribal solidarity, deep personal ties, and pragmatic considerations, such as the local alliances needed to facilitate the movement of fighters across different tribal territories in North Waziristan to battlefields in Khost. According to New York Times journalist Pir Zubair Shah, “when fighters under [Mullah] Nazir or [Hafiz] Gul Bahadur [the TTP commander in North Waziristan] go in [to Afghanistan], they operate under the Haqqani network and need them to allow access.” Other sources confirm

23 Jalaluddin’s chief lieutenants during the 1970s and 1980s included Nezamuddin Haqqani, Fatehullah Haqqani, Hanif Shah, and Mawlawi Aziz Khan; for background on these individuals see below.
26 Authors’ interview with Pir Zubair Shah, 13 September 2010; For background on Mullah Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur see Caroline Wadhams and Colin Cookman, “Faces of Pakistan’s Militant Leaders,” Center for American Progress (22 July 2009).
that Mullah Nazir is close to Sirajuddin Haqqani and that Gul Bahadur “coordinates closely with the Haqqani network on both strategy and operations in Afghanistan.”

There is also a qualitative dimension to which TTP fighters have fought with the Haqqani network in Afghanistan. Baitullah Mehsud was a close ally of key Haqqani commanders and fought with the Taliban (likely under Jalaluddin in the Shomali Plains north of Kabul), and both Baitullah and his successor Hakimullah Mehsud helped the Afghan Taliban to regroup after the U.S. invasion. In short biographical notes allegedly written by Hakimullah Mehsud, the TTP leader emphasized that he, Baitullah Mehsud and Abdullah Mehsud (killed in 2007) fought together with Mullah Sangeen, a key Haqqani commander, in Khost province. To facilitate the integration between the Haqqani network and the TTP integration, senior Haqqani leaders are known to vouch for Pakistanis who want to gain access to fronts in Khost and individuals like Qari Amil (deceased) coordinate this type of integration in the field.

Across the border in Afghanistan, the Haqqani network remains a central partner for the “Quetta Shura Taliban” — the primary insurgent group confronting Afghan, U.S. and NATO forces – for two main reasons. First, the Haqqani network has acted as an important regional platform for the Taliban to project power and influence in Southeastern Afghanistan. The relationship between the two parties is structured in

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27 Hakimullah Mehsud and Hafiz Gul Bahadur reportedly have close ties as well. See Imtiaz Gul, The Most Dangerous Place: Pakistan’s Lawless Frontier, (New York: Viking, 2010).
29 Ruttig, 76; Gul, 37; Abubakar Siddique, “Pakistani Taliban Chief’s Death would have Broad Implications,” RFE/RL (7 August 2009).
31 Authors’ interview with Pir Zubair Shah, 13 September 2010; For background on Qari Amil, who was recently killed, see “Rebel Commander Killed in Afghan East,” Pajhwok News, 2 November 2010; By using the term “fronts” the authors are referring to a line or zone of battle.
32 The authors use the term “Quetta Shura Taliban” due to its common usage. It is important to note that the “Quetta Shura” is one of the Taliban’s regional commands, but is not the overall leadership council. The Afghan Taliban movement prefers to call itself the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
33 The Haqqani network has a rich history with the Afghan Taliban and its precursor organizations, but as Thomas Ruttig points out, “Loya Paktia was never a stronghold of the Taliban movement, neither
this way out of necessity, as there are important differences between the lowland tribes of Loya Kandahar, where the majority of the Taliban’s leadership is from, and the mountain tribes of Loya Paktia.\textsuperscript{34} Due to its local tribal connections and its history in the region, the Haqqani network is more credible than the Taliban in these areas and thus is more capable of navigating local issues successfully.\textsuperscript{35} This leaves the Taliban reliant on the Haqqani network to function as the local, and more acceptable, face of its movement. By acting in this way, the Haqqani network helps the Taliban to extend its brand and project itself as a cohesive national (i.e., more than a Kandahari) movement.\textsuperscript{36} Second, given its military effectiveness, the Haqqani network acts as a force multiplier for the Taliban, strengthening the latter’s campaigns in Loya Paktia and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{37} Afghanistan’s capital is where the Haqqani network’s effectiveness and operational sophistication is most apparent, for the group is the entity tied to most, if not all, complex and strategic suicide attacks there. These attacks, which are almost always claimed by the Taliban, extend the perception of the Taliban’s reach and reinforce the view that the Karzai government is weak and cannot provide security.\textsuperscript{38}

At the regional level, the Pakistani state has long been a core sponsor and beneficiary of the Haqqani network. During the 1980s Jalaluddin quickly rose to be one of the ISI’s most favored field commanders and the support he provided would have a significant impact upon Pakistan’s security establishment and the jihad in Kashmir in the years to follow.\textsuperscript{39} The intimacy of Jalaluddin’s relations to various spheres of Pakistan’s establishment, and the operational assistance he provided Pakistan’s Army and intelligence service during this period, are key to the Haqqani network’s value to Pakistan, as well as to understanding the latter’s reluctance to move against the group. Since the anti-Soviet war, the Haqqani network has continued to function as a proxy through which elements of the Pakistani state could pursue their strategic interests and

\textsuperscript{34} For background see Ruttig.
\textsuperscript{35} For example, these tribal differences came to the fore on numerous occasions during Taliban rule when the “Loya Paktia tribes openly resisted what was perceived of Kandahari dominance.” See Ruttig, 73.
\textsuperscript{36} For background see Ruttig.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{38} Tajmeer Jawad reportedly heads Haqqani operations in Kabul. See Gopal, Khan and Fishman, 8.
\textsuperscript{39} This issue is explored in greater detail below.
seek military and political influence in the FATA. For example, today the group often serves as the primary conduit or good office through which Pakistan can manage local hostilities, gain access to TTP leaders, and try to shape the direction and priorities of militant groups in the FATA, especially those fighting against Islamabad.\footnote{For examples see, Anand Gopal, Mansur Khan Mahsud and Brian Fishman, “The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in North Waziristan”; “Interview with Pervez Musharraf,” Der Spiegel, 7 June 2009; Ismail Khan, “Forces, Militants Heading for Truce,” Dawn, 23 June 2006.} On the Afghan side of the border, the Haqqani network also functions as a kinetic strike force through which Pakistan can achieve important signaling effects vis-à-vis India and its regional posture. The Haqqani network playing such a role is best exemplified by the 2008 suicide attack it conducted against India’s embassy in Kabul, which killed fifty-three people including India’s Defense Attaché.\footnote{Jay Solomon, “US Ties Pakistani Intelligence to Attack in Kabul,” Wall Street Journal, 2 August 2008.} This attack, which was reportedly carried out with ISI assistance, was likely conducted to send a strong message to India to limit its role in Afghanistan given Pakistan’s concerns about New Delhi’s influence there.

At the global level, al-Qa’ida and other transnational terrorist actors — including the Islamic Jihad Union (Iju) and the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) — also rely on and leverage the Haqqani network.\footnote{TIP is usually referred to in the secondary literature as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), though the group changed its name to the TIP in the 1990s.} The internationalization of the anti-Soviet jihad brought Jalaluddin and his close cohort into partnership with a wide-range of foreign war volunteers and local fighters. Jalaluddin’s facilities in Peshawar, Miranshah and Loya Paktia were key meeting places where this mix of actors — Afghan fighters, Arab volunteers and Pakistanis from various backgrounds — could get weapons and food, as well as prepare for attacks.\footnote{Muhammad Amir Rana, jihad and jihadi, Mashal Books (Lahore), 2003; See also the writings of Abu Walid al-Masri cited below.} Throughout the 1990s, the relationship between al-Qa’ida and the Haqqani network only deepened, with the latter providing space for al-Qa’ida and other militant groups to develop and to initiate a campaign of attacks against the West. Today, this context endures as the Haqqani network remains the primary local partner for al-Qa’ida, the Iju and other global militants.
Pragmatism and Strategic Approach

The Haqqani network has maintained its nexus position over time by pursuing a strategy of extreme pragmatism. Due to the complexity of Afghanistan’s conflict environment most militant groups are pragmatic actors, but given its nexus position and the various interests it must consider the Haqqani network needs to be even more judicious in how it evaluates the practical consequences of its actions. The success of such an approach is predicated on the Haqqani network’s acute awareness of its position and the structural necessities, or internal and external constraints, which limit its public role and pursuit of power. As illustrated in this report, the Haqqani network has limited political goals and has a history of subordinating itself to other entities. Jalaluddin Haqqani’s relationship with Hizb-e-Islami (Khalis) and the Taliban prior to 9/11 are indicative of the group’s constrained approach, as is the Haqqani network’s public deference to the Afghan Taliban today. Unlike many other actors, the Haqqani network has little interest in governing Afghanistan nationally and seeks instead to maintain its autonomy and influence locally in Loya Paktia and North Waziristan, while also supporting efforts to spread jihad elsewhere. The Haqqani network appears confident in its capabilities and standing and is not overly concerned with receiving public recognition for its actions. Their constrained approach also helps to explain why the Haqqani network’s central role in the development of al-Qa’ida and the emergence of global jihad has until now been under appreciated.

To limit the perception of its broad role and impact since 9/11, the Haqqani network has consciously portrayed itself as a local actor preoccupied with local concerns. The group has been able to do so through a deceptive and segmented strategic communications campaign that masks the variety and depth of its relations with other actors. This has allowed the Haqqani network to tailor its messages to different audiences. Perhaps the best example of this is Jalaluddin’s treatment of the role of the Arabs in the siege and capture of Khost in 1991. In the Pashto and Urdu language versions of Manba` / Nusrat al-Jihad, the role of the Arabs is either ignored or specifically denied, while it is celebrated in the Arabic language versions of the same magazine.44 Segmentation

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44 See “Martyrs of the Conquest of Khost (Arab Martyrs),” Manba` al-Jihad (Arabic) 2:10 (June 1991). In one of the main Pashto versions of Manba` that recount the battle Jalaluddin states “Despite what the enemy claims, there are no foreign fighters in our fronts in Khost. We did not allow Pakistani, Arab or
proved useful to the Haqqani network in this case as it bolstered its credentials with Gulf supporters while also distancing the group from pointed criticism made by Afghan President Najibullah about the presence of foreign fighters, specifically Pakistanis and Arabs, in this battle.\textsuperscript{45} An anecdotal analysis of the Haqqani network’s communications post-2001 reveals that the group is engaged in similar activity and carefully avoids two primary red-lines: direct association with either anti-Pakistan militancy or global jihad, despite having close operational ties with the two primary actors — the TTP and al-Qa’ida — that are driving these jihads. This suggests that while the Haqqani network’s nexus position — and the nature of its various operational relationships — is a source of its strength, it is also a potential weakness, as its nexus position presents more ways to disrupt the group.

\textsuperscript{45} In a series of televised speeches to Pashtun and Tajik elders during this period President Najibullah criticized the role of foreigners fighting in Afghanistan, Khost and Jalalabad, \url{www.youtube.com/watch?v=pnvIr6819hk&NR=1}. He gives speeches to the gatherings of Pashtun and Tajik elders in the country, appealing to them to support the government because the foreigners are there, fighting to destroy Afghanistan. He mentions that every night he shows Arab and Pakistani captives on national television, pleading guilty of fighting in Afghanistan. He mentions Khost and Nangarhar.
EVOLUTION AND VALUE OF THE HAQQANI NEXUS

The Haqqani network maintains its nexus position by providing services or other items of value that suit the interests of its local, regional and global partners. The primary way that it does this is by functioning as a reliable and effective platform through which violence, driven by the specific interests of each actor, can be interjected into Afghanistan and/or launched abroad. This platform is of strategic value because it integrates military capabilities across networks to enhance effectiveness, while also creating a buffer between the Haqqani’s partners that masks the nature of each party’s inputs, thus minimizing their public association with operational incidents.46 The Haqqani network derives additional benefit from this position by leveraging its ties to this mix of actors to extract concessions or to improve its relative power.

Understanding the value that the Haqqani network provides to its local, regional and global partners also provides insights into the identity of the group and the strong enabling role it has long played. For instance, by facilitating battlefront access for local and global groups over multiple decades, the Haqqani network has created the space and context for al-Qa’ida and other fighters to inter-mingle and be influenced by one another. It thus should not be a surprise that today, TTP leaders like Hakimullah Mehsud — who at times operated in Loya Paktia with Haqqani commanders — describes his group’s fight in terms ideologically similar to those of al-Qa’ida. The ideological convergence of TTP and al-Qa’ida and the emergence of the Pakistan jihad is, at least in part, an outgrowth of the operational “glocalization” of conflict long facilitated by the Haqqani network.47 The paradoxical challenge for Pakistan is that the main group it relies upon to shape Afghanistan’s and the FATA’s political landscapes is the same actor that has incubated al-Qa’ida and served as an enabler for other forms of militancy, including that threatening Islamabad.

46 For example, the Haqqani network can conduct attacks against strategic targets (i.e., the Indian Embassy) in such a way that they are directed toward Pakistan’s objectives and are, or at least appear to be, distinct from and not integrated with the actions of al-Qa’ida or other global actors.
47 Other factors that have led to the creation of the TTP / Pakistan jihad include Pakistani operations and U.S. drone strikes, which have spurred the unification of militant entities. For background on the term “glocalization” see Roland Robertson, Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture, (London: Sage, 1992).
The section that follows explores the Haqqani network’s evolution and the value it has historically provided to other militant groups. It is organized via three time periods. The first – what we characterize as the ‘Birth of the Nexus’ – stretches from the mid 1970s to the end of the anti-Soviet jihad in 1989. The second covers the period from 1989 to 11 September 2001, a span of time during which the Haqqani network used its nexus position to enable other groups and spread jihad. The last period illustrates the continuity of the Haqqani network and its central role post 9/11.

**Birth of the Nexus: Early Outreach & the Haqqani Network in the Anti-Soviet Jihad**

The Haqqani network’s trajectory to a trusted position of influence across local, regional and global levels during the anti-Soviet jihad is the central narrative of this time period (mid 1970s to 1989). The birth of the Haqqani nexus is tied not just to Jalaluddin’s military achievements and operational partnering with a diverse set of actors, but also to the broader dynamic and ethos of jihad that he came to embody. Indeed, Jalaluddin’s direct regional control of what one of his Arab jihadi supporters called the “true base for the liberation of Afghanistan” set him apart from all of the mujahidin party leaders based in Peshawar and gave his network what was — and is today — a uniquely valuable asset: a geographically central platform for the delivery of violence.48 The Haqqani network capitalized on this asset early and consistently, opening up its fronts and its unparalleled military resources to an astonishing diversity of militant actors, from Arabs to Kashmiris, North Africans to Indonesians, and Pakistani madrassa students to ISI agents. In doing so, the Haqqani network was instrumental in the formation and operational maturation of al-Qa’ida and several other jihadi organizations over time.49 Such support was driven as much by pragmatism (i.e., a desire to diversify resources) as by an ideological commitment to what these groups aimed to achieve.

The transnational reach of the Haqqani network, and its broad influence, emerged early. Jalaluddin Haqqani first called for jihad (against the Daoud regime) in 1973 — a

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49 Al-Qa’ida was founded in Peshawar, Pakistan in 1988.
full six years before the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.\(^{50}\) From that point on — using Pakistan’s North Waziristan as his early resource base and sanctuary — Jalaluddin Haqqani began to develop an operational network of fighters and supporters that extended to the Arab Gulf states and likely drew on ISI support.\(^{51}\) More than a year before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Jalaluddin sent several of his followers to establish offices throughout the Gulf to raise money and awareness of the threat posed by the recent communist coup in Kabul.\(^{52}\) In 1978, Mawlawi Hanif Shah, a junior classmate of Jalaluddin’s at the Haqqaniyya madrassa and an early supporter in the mid-1970s uprisings in Paktia, was sent to Saudi Arabia for two years under such auspices.\(^{53}\) Mawlawi ‘Aziz Khan, later the director of the Haqqani network’s Manba’ al-‘Ulum madrassa in Miranshah, was also sent around this time “along with a few other brothers ... to the Gulf to promote the cause of the Afghan jihad there.”\(^{54}\) Years later he remarked, “Spending five years in the Gulf, I had many material and moral achievements for the jihad.”\(^{55}\) That their efforts to procure financial support were successful is evidenced by the existence of an assistance program for Gulf-based donors to aid the families of Afghans “martyred” on Haqqani fronts as early as 1980.\(^{56}\)

Unlike other Afghan commanders, Jalaluddin’s early outreach to the Gulf was not limited to seeking financial contributions. Haqqani fronts were especially unique in their early and consistent willingness to accept Arabs seeking battlefield participation, and Haqqani-dominated Loya Paktia was the single most common destination for the Arabs who went beyond Peshawar in the 1980s. Yet most accounts of the origins of the Afghan Arab phenomenon ignore Haqqani and emphasize the part played by the Palestinian scholar-activist ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam and his MAK in initiating the movement, and point to Hekmatyar and Sayyaf as the primary Afghan patrons of the foreign

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51 Jalaluddin’s early ties to the Gulf could have been facilitated by his father, Khwaja Muhammad Khan (a landowner/trader), or by his religious connections at Dar al-‘Ulum Haqqaniyya.
52 The Haqqanis attempted to establish offices in Iran; see Harmony Document AFGP-2002-008681, 24.
55 Ibid; For insight into these network’s in the 1990s see Harmony Document AFGP-2002-800775.
fighters.\textsuperscript{57} ‘Azzam was unquestionably the most successful promoter of the Afghan jihad to international Muslim audiences and his efforts did bring large numbers of would-be mujahidin to Peshawar in the latter half of the 1980s. ‘Azzam deferred to the Afghan party leaders, however, on how best to place these volunteers in service to the Afghan struggle, and Sayyaf and Hekmatyar, though happy to welcome the financial support that ‘Azzam’s organization attracted, were loath to involve untested and overeager foreigners in actual battles in Afghanistan. As the MAK’s guest houses in Peshawar and training camps in the Pakistani tribal areas swelled with recruits, a growing number of these men grew frustrated with the MAK’s limited capacity to facilitate battlefield access. This frustration ultimately led to the split between ‘Azzam and his wealthy patron, Usama bin Ladin, who established in Paktia the camps that would grow into al-Qa’ida. These camps were located along the Haqqanis’ supply lines and near the sites of the Haqqanis’ epic battles against communist forces.\textsuperscript{58} It was thus in Haqqani-controlled Paktia, and not Peshawar, that the international mobilization to which ‘Azzam had made his signal contributions was transformed into the global jihadi movement.

Much of ‘Azzam’s fame rests on what has long been regarded as his revolutionary innovation in the doctrine of jihad, declaring in a fatwa (Islamic legal opinion) in 1984 that supporting the Afghan jihad was an individual duty (\textit{fard ‘ayn}) borne by all able-bodied Muslims worldwide, and thus not contingent upon one’s parents’ or government’s permission to come and offer aid.\textsuperscript{59} Yet in a lengthy interview with the Abu Dhabi-based newspaper \textit{al-Ittihad} in 1980, Jalaluddin Haqqani, declared:

\textsuperscript{57} In a significant exception to this historiographic tendency a declassified 2001 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) assessment called Jalaluddin Haqqani “the Jadran [sic] tribal leader most exploited by ISI during the Soviet-Afghan war to facilitate the introduction of Arab mercenaries”; Defense Intelligence Agency, Cable, “IIR [Excised]/Veteran Afghanistan Traveler’s Analysis of Al Qaeda and Taliban Exploitable Weaknesses,” October 2, 2001, Secret, \url{www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/}.


Even though the revolutionary fighters are great in number, this does not mean that the revolution should close its doors to those who wish to participate in the jihad. Scores of volunteers from various parts of the world are coming to us to join the ranks of the mujahidin. They are doing so of their own volition. If the Islamic world truly wants to support and help us, let it permit its men and young men to join our ranks. There is a tendency in most of the Islamic countries which wish to help us to present aid and food as a kind of jihad. Some even think that this is the best kind of jihad. This, however, does not absolve the Muslim of the duty to offer himself for the jihad.60

This declaration was made years before ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam issued his purportedly revolutionary fatwa on the individually obligatory (fard ‘ayn) nature of supporting the Afghan jihad. Clearly Haqqani, and not ‘Azzam, was the innovator in this regard, and it is even possible that Jalaluddin’s views on this issue influenced those of ‘Azzam, as the two were very close – ‘Azzam wrote his own will and testament in Haqqani’s home.61 While Haqqani’s 1980 appeal did not take the same technical jurisprudential form as ‘Azzam’s 1984 fatwa, it was nevertheless innovative in all of the ways claimed for ‘Azzam’s ruling.62 The difference was that Haqqani had the means and wherewithal to directly facilitate that participation.

Many of those who heeded Jalaluddin’s call would later play leading roles in al-Qa’ida and other militant organizations. One of the first Arab volunteers to link up with

61 After his assassination, ‘Azzam’s will was published in al-Jihad 63 (January 1990), 58ff., and at page 58, it is headed with the inscription, “written April 20, 1986 in the home of the heroic Shaykh Jalaluddin Haqqani.”
62 Haqqani was not the only Afghan leader to precede ‘Azzam in declaring support for the Afghan jihad an individual duty. In December of 1980 several of the Peshawar-based party leaders visited Egypt to thank Sadat for his support and to seek further aid. Sayyid Ahmad Gilani, leader of one of the parties, was quoted in al-Ahram on 22 December as saying that “jihad is an individual jihad (jihad al-nafs) a financial jihad (jihad al-mal) and is obligatory (fard) upon all Muslims.” Muhammad Nabi Muhammedi, leader of the Harakat party, was quoted in the same paper on 27 December as saying that “it is the duty (wajib) of every Muslim to support Afghanistan.” See ‘Isam Diraz, al-‘A’idun min Afghanistan (Cairo: al-Dar al-Misriyya li’l-Nashr wa’l-‘Ilam, 1993), 56f. These appeals, however, all emphasized material support and did not go to the extent of inviting volunteer fighters to fight.
Jalaluddin was the Egyptian journalist Mustafa Hamid (better known by his nom de guerre, Abu’l-Walid al-Masri). After meeting with a group of Paktian ‘ulama that were sent by Jalaluddin to Abu Dhabi in the spring of 1979, he and two of his Egyptian friends decided to make their way to the Haqqani fronts. Abu’l-Walid al-Masri would spend the next eleven years fighting with Haqqani and in the early 1990s he began working closely with al-Qa’ida, becoming the amir of al-Qa’ida’s al-Faruq training camp, located at the Haqqani base at Zhawara. Another early arrival was ‘Abdullah ‘Abd al-Rahman, who arrived at Peshawar in July of 1981, stayed at the single guest house operated by Sayyaf, and then “left from there with Shaykh Jalaluddin Haqqani and Mawlawi Arsalan [Fatehullah Haqqani]... The Arabs at that time were very few, and some of the Syrian and Iraqi brothers went for jihad, participating in the battles with Shaykh Jalaluddin.” In late 1983 another Egyptian, ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Masri came to join Haqqani commanders, bought a home in Miranshah, and fought with Haqqani commanders until his death at Khost in 1988. Soon after his arrival, ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Masri would make a fateful introduction for another early Afghan Arab to the Haqqani scene: Abu Hafs al-Masri (Muhammad Atif), who later became the first lieutenant and then head of al-Qa’ida’s military committee. Abu Hafs was in Peshawar at the time, and later recounted:

‘Abd al-Rahman had preceded me [in coming to the jihad] by some months, and informed me about the fronts of Shaykh Jalaluddin Haqqani and his treatment of the Arabs, which I discovered was truly different than the treatment [in Peshawar]. Professor Sayyaf’s group made you feel like you were just a guest...[.] so when I heard from ‘Abd al-Rahman about Shaykh Jalaluddin and his relations with the Arabs, and the involvement of the latter in training and operations, I said “God willing I will return with you.”

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65 Muhammad, al-Ansar al-‘Arab fi Afghanistan, 80.
66 Ibid, 106 n. 8; Al-Jihad 44 (July 1988), 36. For Jalaluddin Haqqani’s praise of ‘Abd al-Rahman, see ‘Isam Diraz, Malhamat al-Mujahidin al-‘Arab fi Afghanistan (Cairo, 1989), 36f; Fatehullah Haqqani was the brother of Nezamuddin Haqqani. In 1980, Mawlawi Fatehullah was appointed head of Jalaluddin Haqqani’s fronts. He was killed in September 1985.
67 Ibid., 102. Abu Hafs was killed in the American bombing of Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks.
The openness of Haqqani’s fronts and the assistance and infrastructure that Jalaluddin would provide in the decades to follow was interwoven with the support the group received from Pakistan and — at least during the anti-Soviet jihad — other countries, including the United States. The confluence of these local, regional and global elements was perhaps nowhere more apparent than at Jalaluddin’s headquarters at Zhawara. This complex served as a central node and strategic outpost for Haqqani commanders and (at times) ISI agents to plan and coordinate their operations, including Jalaluddin’s epic 1991 capture of Khost.68 Pakistan’s role in directing the insurgency against the Soviets is revealed in numerous letters to and from Haqqani network leaders that were captured in Afghanistan after the U.S. invasion. For example, in a personal letter to Nezamuddin Haqqani in 1980 Fatehullah Haqqani explains why the group needed to temporarily halt its activity: “For a few days, the government of Pakistan has prohibited the mujahideen from carrying [out] logistical or combat operations. But we will, Inshallah, load up some weapons and equipments in three to four days [after the prohibition is lifted].”69 Communication logs between Haqqani commanders and the ISI from 1989 to 1992 are even more insightful. They show the ISI providing tactical level direction and shaping the activity of an inter-linked network of Afghan mujahidin.70 One message sent from “Star-II” at Zhawara to Commander Haqqani in December 1988 is typical: “Soviet [sic] have launched major defensive in Kandahar. Intensify your jihad and capture Gardez ASP. May Allah help you.”71 These communications also functioned as a way for Jalaluddin and other Haqqani commanders to request assistance, money and equipment and provide intelligence updates to the ISI.72

Zhawara was also an important meeting point for Afghan Arabs who were eager to fight. After Abu Hafs arrived at Haqqani’s headquarters in Zhawara — “far from the

69 Harmony Document AFGP-2002-008587; 23-24; Nezamuddin was a deputy to Jalaluddin, as well as a field commander on many fronts during the anti-Soviet jihad. His status is not known.
70 Harmony Documents AFGP-2002-008581 and AFGP-2002-008582.
71 Harmony Documents AFGP-2002-008581 and AFGP-2002-008582; Star II was potentially the Director of the Afghan unit within ISI; Don Rassler interview with Bill Murray (former CIA station chief at the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan), 29 June 2011.
72 Harmony Documents AFGP-2002-008581 and AFGP-2002-008582.
vortex of Peshawar and the problems of the Arabs there,” he met Abu’l-Walid al-Masri, Abu ‘Ubayda al-‘Iraqi and another important Arab Haqqani ally – Abu ‘Ubayda al-Banshiri, who would later become al-Qa’ida’s first military commander. Eyewitness accounts provided by Abu’l Walid and others document the participation of these fighters in a number of battles fought alongside Haqqani commanders and local fighters from 1984 on, including the 1986 battle against Soviet and Afghan forces in Zhawara.73

Nestled in the mountains, Zhawara was central to the resourcing and development of a rich network of al-Qa’ida, anti-Kashmir and other training camps. After the battle in 1986, Bin Ladin invested heavily in repairing and fortifying the damaged base at Zhawara, with Jalaluddin having given him “three caves at the side of the base near the Afghan kitchen.”74 In October 1986, Bin Ladin went on to use his construction equipment to build a fortified training area at Jaji (also referred to as Dzadzi) in Northern Paktia, on the supply line between Zhawara and Alikhel. Bin Ladin dubbed his camp “Ma’sadat al-Ansar,” “the Lion’s Den of the Supporters,” though it quickly became known among the Afghan Arab community as al-qa’ida al-‘askariyya, or the military base. It was from this appellation that the name of the al-Qa’ida organization was later taken, and indeed the training camp represented an early stage in al-Qa’ida’s development.75 According to the memoirs of Abu Ja’far al-Qandahari, an Egyptian Afghan Arab who arrived at Peshawar in 1987:

It was customary for new arrivals to go to the Sada training camp run by the Maktab al-Khidamat, but I preferred to go to a new training camp that had been announced at that time to any and all who sought to carry out jihad, a training camp in which the course of training would be of a higher and more strenuous

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73 See, e.g., Mustafa Hamid, Ma’arik al-bawwaba al-sakhriyya (al-Faruq Camp, Paktia: 1995), 40 (describing a battle fought in 1984 under the command of Fatehullah Haqqani at which Abu Hafs and ‘Abd al-Rahman “fought with a courage bordering on madness” and earned the epithets “the mad Arabs” [al-‘arab al-majanin] among the Haqqanis’ Afghan fighters).


75 See Peter Bergen, ed., The Usama bin Ladin I Know (New York: Free Press, 2006), 74.
level than that at Sada.\textsuperscript{76} It was a center which would winnow out those suitable to be admitted into “al-Qa’ida al-‘Askariyya,” an organization that had been advertised as forming the nucleus of an Islamic army capable of fighting jihad anywhere in the world.\textsuperscript{77}

Though the area in Jaji where the Ma’sada camp was built was under the supervision of Sayyaf’s party, Ma’sada was structurally integrated with Haqqani operations at Zhawara.\textsuperscript{78} Abu Ja’far relates that before proceeding to the advanced training at Bin Ladin’s “military base,” he and a group of other Arabs bound for Ma’sada had to proceed to Zhawara via Miranshah and there undergo ten days of preliminary training alongside the Haqqani-linked Afghan trainees.\textsuperscript{79} To join the nascent al-Qa’ida, in other words, meant first training with the Haqqani network. In that sense, Zhawara was a kind of military academy for those that would eventually fill al-Qa’ida’s ranks.\textsuperscript{80}

The early training and battlefield experiences that were being facilitated by Haqqani leaders, and to a lesser extent other Afghan commanders, in Loya Paktia were building to a major inflection point: the Ramadan battle at Jaji in 1987. This battle was a watershed moment for al-Qa’ida and for the Afghan Arab movement in general, leading to an exponential increase in the number of war volunteers pouring into Pakistan and Afghanistan from throughout the Muslim world. Touted as a major victory, it was the first of its kind for an independent Arab unit in Afghanistan, and it

\textsuperscript{76} Sada was a MAK/Sayyaf camp located near the town of Sada in the Kurram tribal agency of Pakistan. According to Muhammad, \textit{al-Ansar al-‘Arab}, 183f., Sada was established after the first battle at Zhawara in 1986. However, there is evidence that Southeast Asian trainees began to attend the Sada Camp as early as 1985. See International Crisis Group, “Jamaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous,” 26 August 2003, 4.

\textsuperscript{77} Ayman Sabri Faraj (Abu Ja’far al-Qandahari), \textit{Dhikriyyat ‘Arab Afghan Abu Ja’far al-Masri al-Qandahari} (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2002), 25.

\textsuperscript{78} The Haqqani correspondence in the Harmony database documents the logistical coordination between the Haqqanis and the various other parties operating in the southeast. For information on the supplying of Sayyaf’s \textit{Ittihad}, see Harmony Document AFGP-2002-008612, 49. Jaji was located somewhat closer to the Alikhel supply point over the Kurram-Paktia border than to Zhawara, but this base was under Hekmatyar’s control and the longstanding rivalry between Sayyaf and Hekmatyar left the former to rely on the Haqqanis for supplies.

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., p. 28. Abu Ja’far’s guide from Zhawara to Jaji was an ‘Iraqi Kurd, and he says that there were many such people in Afghanistan at the time, who came in overland from Iran.

\textsuperscript{80} Mustafa Hamid (Abu’l-Walid), \textit{Ma’arik al-bawwaba al-sakhriyya}, 133.
would propel Bin Ladin into a leadership position amongst the Arab community in Peshawar. Just as important, however, was the media impact of the battle and the subsequent increase in international attention. Following the example of Abu’-Walid, who had for years been filing regular reports from the front lines about Haqqani battles for the al-Itihad newspaper, Bin Ladin had invited Arab journalists from the Gulf to observe his men at Jaji.81 He even commissioned a film crew to record their exploits, again, an area in which Haqqani leaders had been earlier innovators.82 The resulting growth in volunteers was immediate and dramatic. As Thomas Hegghammer notes, “mid-1987 seems to have represented a tipping point of the mobilization, after which recruitment transcended personal social networks.”83

With the arrival of large numbers of new recruits after 1987, the areas under Haqqani control witnessed an explosion of training camps serving an extremely eclectic spectrum of ideological interests and militant causes, and these would continue to proliferate throughout the 1990s. In 1988, al-Qa’ida officially established itself as a clandestine, hierarchical organization, and it began to erect its first training camps: al-Faruq at Zhawara and the Jihadwal and Siddiq camps in Hekmatyar’s region at Zhawara’s southeastern approach.84 Until the late 1990s, these camps would remain the core elements of al-Qa’ida’s infrastructure, and agents of all of al-Qa’ida’s major attacks during the 1990s would be trained in these facilities.85 Other camps are attested in the sources as well, but the al-Qa’ida camps around Zhawara appear to have been the destination of choice for the majority of the new arrivals, and in the Afghan Arab memoir literature from this period al-Faruq stands out as the most frequently-attended camp.86

82 The British cameraman Peter Jouvenal, describing a visit to the Zhawara base in 1982, says that “They [the Haqqanis] shot videos of executions of Russians and sent them to Saudi Arabia for fund-raising purposes.” Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc. (New York: Touchstone, 2001), 57.
83 Hegghammer (2010), 45; Mustafa Hamid, Ma’tarika al-bawwaba al-sakhriyya, 229ff.
84 According to Abu’l-Walid, al-Qa’ida had to rent the land for these latter camps from Hekmatyar, though none of the sources mention any such remuneration required for the camps at Haqqani facilities. See Abu’l-Walid’s dialogue with Leah Farral, http://allthingscounterterrorism.com/.
85 See Bahri, Dans l’ombre de Ben Laden, pp. 104ff.
86 For example, see the work of Abdullah Muhammad Fazul, al-Qa’ida’s chief of operations in East Africa; Fazul, al-Harb ‘ala’l-Islam, vol. 1, p. 57f.
**Summary:** By the late 1980s the Haqqani fronts had already emerged as the center of the growing nexus of the diverse strands of transnational militancy then converging in Afghanistan. The emergence and growth of this nexus was predicated upon the local supply routes and terrain managed by Jalaluddin and his key lieutenants, as well as Haqqani’s battlefield achievements. Jalaluddin functioned,

[A]s the ISI’s main anti-communist battering ram in Khost. He operated fund-raising offices in the Persian Gulf and hosted young Arab jihad volunteers in his tribal territory. In part because of Haqqani’s patronage, the border regions nearest Pakistan became increasingly the province of interlocking networks of Pakistani intelligence officers, Arab volunteers, and Wahhabi madrassas.87

At the regional level, many of the Pakistanis who fought with Haqqani would later shift their attention and employ the fighting skills and training they had acquired in Loya Paktia against Indian forces in Kashmir. Some would even go on to create their own jihadist organizations and become legendary commanders, a dynamic perhaps best exemplified by Fazlur Rahman Khalil and Zakiur Rahman Lakhvi, who were respectively central to the formation of Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HuM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba.88 The makings of what would become the global jihadi movement were all also present: robust resource mobilization networks spanning the globe, training camps for foreign fighters of many nationalities, and open fronts for the transformation of international *muhajirin* — emigrants, or in Abu Hafs’ phrase, “guests” — into fighting *mujahidin*. Out of this mix, the self-proclaimed vanguard of that movement — al-Qa’ida — would be born, and in a form that was and remains to this day inextricably connected to the Haqqani network.

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88 Muhammad Amir Rana, *Jihad and Jihadi*, Mashal Books (Lahore), 2003; Zakiur Rahman Lakhvi is LeT’s current operations chief and is also believed to be the mastermind behind the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Sources linking Lakhvi to Jalaluddin Haqqani are extremely thin and should be treated with some skepticism. During the Soviet period Lakhvi also spent a considerable amount of time in Nuristan.
During the 1990s the Haqqani network would leverage its nexus position and look outward, playing an important role in enabling others to conduct and expand jihad. The period following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan witnessed a devastating civil war in Afghanistan; eruptions of militant violence in Kashmir, Northwestern China and the former Soviet Central Asian states; the rise of the Taliban; and the initiation by al-Qa’ida of a global campaign of political violence against the United States. The quadrangle of relations between the Haqqani network, the Taliban, Pakistan and al-Qa’ida lie at the heart of this story, a story that significantly challenges the prevailing conceptions in the American policy community.

On the global level, the Gulf War radically polarized the already conflict-prone Peshawar scene, dividing the Afghan party leaders and the Arab volunteer community between supporters and opponents of Saddam Hussein and, more significantly, over Saudi Arabia’s controversial invitation to the U.S. military to initiate Operation Desert Shield. Against the background of this acrimonious debate Bin Ladin and much of al-Qa’ida’s leadership left for Sudan, where the organization focused its early efforts on the Arabian Peninsula. Yet the Haqqani network and al-Qa’ida remained intertwined during this period, with the Haqqani network providing the space, context and ideological support for al-Qa’ida to operate training camps, conduct important media operations and conduct jihad elsewhere. On the regional level, Haqqani commanders would consolidate their operational capabilities and prove valuable to Pakistan by helping to foster its use of militant proxies in Kashmir. The Haqqani network would also enhance its credibility and power at the local level in the tribal areas through its mediation activity and by helping the Taliban to maintain its grip on Afghanistan.

A major operational turning point for Jalaluddin and the ISI was the capture of Khost in 1991. During this battle, followed soon by the capture of Gardez, Jalaluddin’s ability to manage and combine the resources (and spirit) of local, regional and global elements were in full display. This campaign would not just solidify Jalaluddin’s reputation with the Pakistani state, it would further endear him to the foreign fighter community and

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89 Brown (2011).
validate his desire to deepen this local and global partnership. The capture of these two cities was instrumental in the fall of the communist government of Najibullah in Kabul in 1992, a feat that only gave Pakistan more influence and power west of the Durand Line. These two battles (and the earlier battle in Jalalabad) saw the most extensive integration of foreign fighters into the order of battle of the entire anti-communist conflict in Afghanistan. Participation in the battle of Khost subsequently became a badge of honor for Afghan Arab veterans of the war, and the foreign fighter involvement was a veritable United Nations of transnational jihadism; by some estimates, these fighters hailed from more than forty countries. For the first time, Arabs fighting in this battle were led by Arab commanders, who were integrated into the Haqqanis’ chain of command; these included a Yemeni front led out of Camp Mubarak at Lajja (also known as Lizha or Lezhi), as well as a Jordanian front under the command of Abu’l-Harith al-Urduni. Al-Qa’ida’s military leadership also participated in the battle. Many of the leaders of the militant Islamist organizations established in the 1990s, from North Africa to Southeast Asia, got their first taste of jihad under Haqqani’s command in this fight. It was not just al-Qa’ida, then, that the Haqqani network had helped foster into being during the anti-Soviet jihad, but rather the broad spectrum of late-20th century transnational jihadist actors.

Bin Ladin was already in Sudan by this time, where he was coming to terms with the aftermath wrought by Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait and the presence of “infidel”

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90 This was noted by the DIA in 2001, see Defense Intelligence Agency, Cable, Secret. For accounts of these battles and the Afghan Arab involvement, see Mustafa Hamid, Tharthara fawq saqf al-’alam, vols. 4 (on the battle of Jalalabad), 8 (on Khost), and 9 (on Gardez). Lengthy accounts of these battles from can also be found in Hami, Fursan al-farida al-ghayba.


92 See Loretta Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq: Al Zarqawi and the New Generation (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005), 239, n. 2. On the Yemeni front, see Badi. For background on Abu’l-Harith al-Urduni, see the writings of Abu’l Walid.

93 On al-Qa’ida’s involvement, see Vahid Brown, Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in Al-Qa’ida 1989-2006 (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2007), 5f. The statement that Haqqani “operated under the aegis of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e Islami” is an error, and should read “Yunus Khalis’ Hizb-e Islami.”
troops in Saudi Arabia. During this transitional period Bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida were principally focused on repurposing the organization, continuing their training operations in Khost and establishing a presence in and around the Arabian Peninsula, especially in Yemen and Somalia. Although al-Qa’ida did not know it at the time, the organization was on the cusp of a new mission, and the ideological support and assistance provided by Jalaluddin would prove central to al-Qa’ida’s ability to train and deploy operatives, spread jihad and to define the United States as its primary enemy.

This is especially true with respect to al-Qa’ida’s early efforts in Africa. In July 1991, the same month that Bin Ladin and much of the senior leadership of al-Qa’ida were settling into Khartoum, Jalaluddin published a lengthy communiqué and request for assistance by the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM) in the Arabic-language Manba’ al-Jihad – the first time that any such communication by a non-Afghan organization was published in the Manba’ magazines.94 Leaders of the EIJM were also enjoying Sudan’s hospitality during this period, and al-Qa’ida reportedly extended financial aid and training to the group at this time.95 The EIJM liaison to al-Qa’ida was reportedly close to Haqqani associate Abu ‘Ubayda al-Banshiri, and the leader of the “militant Salafi faction” of the EIJM, Muhammad Ahmad Salih (Abu Suhayl), is said to have previously fought in Afghanistan.96 Given this information and the fact that the EIJM communiqué appeared in Manba’, there is a strong possibility that the EIJM veterans of the Afghan jihad had fought or trained at Haqqani fronts.

Jalaluddin Haqqani also issued declarations of support in 1991 for the “jihad” being waged by the revolutionary Islamist regime of Hassan al-Turabi against the Southern Sudanese forces of John Garang. In 2002 Bosnian authorities raided the offices of the Benevolence International Foundation (BIF) in Sarajevo being run by Enaam Arnaout (Abu Mahmud al-Suri), a co-founder of al-Qa’ida, associate of Guluddin Hekmatyar.

94 “Important Statement from the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement in regards to the recent developments in the Ethiopian and Eritrean arenas,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Arabic) 2:11 (July 1991). The statement is notable for its framing of the Eritrean Islamist struggle as nested within a global confrontation between Islam and an alliance of “Crusaders and Zionists” and their Arab and Muslim regime “agents.”
and a veteran of the Haqqani fronts during the 1980s, and discovered statements calling for support of the Sudanese jihad written by both Jalaluddin Haqqani and Yunis Khalis. The correspondence discovered on the BIF computers also documents the extensive al-Qa’ida infrastructure in and around Zhawara at this time, referring to “centers which belong to al-Qa’ida” at Zhawara, Bori, Jihadwal and Manikandaw, and noting that the Khost-area operations of al-Qa’ida are “in the hands of Abu Hafs [al-Masri].” The files also included numerous records of transactions between al-Qa’ida members, including Arnaout, and Hezb-e-Islami Khalis for vehicles and weapons, making frequent reference to al-Qa’ida infrastructure in Paktia.

These areas of cooperation demonstrate that the Haqqani-al-Qa’ida alliance did not cease with Bin Ladin’s move to Africa, but rather expanded and was considerably internationalized. But whereas Bin Ladin remained focused on the Arabian Peninsula, the rhetoric and activities of the Haqqani network became markedly global during this period. In a series of conferences in Pakistan convened by the Islamist political party Jamiat Ulema-e Islam (JUI) and its jihadist offshoots in 1991 and 1992, Jalaluddin spoke frequently about the need to expand jihad and the emergence of the United States as the next main enemy of the Muslim world following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This rhetoric was also reflected in a number of articles published by the Haqqani network in the first years of the 1990s. An article written by Nezamuddin Haqqani, Jalaluddin’s deputy, in January 1991 is characteristic: “Russia and America are both infidel forces, and our struggle continues against both. They are both against Muslims, and are united in their quest against Muslims. They have never done anything for the good of Islam, and will never do so.” The anti-American tone of these pronouncements was not limited to the perception of American “conspiratorial policies” in Afghanistan, but was also linked to the view that U.S. involvement in the Gulf since 1990 was part of a broader American-Israeli strategy to exercise an

98 United States v. Enaam Arnaout, Exhibit 53.
99 Ibid., Exhibits 84-98. This proffer also includes documents from Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin.
101 “Alhaj Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqqani in an Interview with Manba-al Jihad,” Manba al-Jihad (Pashto) 2:8 (Jan 1991); see also statement by Mawlama Abdullah Zakeri in the same issue.
oppressive and anti-Islamic hegemony throughout the Muslim world.\textsuperscript{102} Even more revealing is how Jalaluddin Haqqani’s peers viewed him and the great role he would play in spreading jihad and combating this new threat. This is perhaps best captured by Mawlana Fazlur Rahman, a leader of the Pakistani Islamist party Jamiat Ulema-e Islam, who said the following about Jalaluddin in 1992:

The Afghan jihad, which was spearheaded by Mawlawi Haqqani and other truthful leaders, defeated the Soviet empire. \textit{But now there is another enemy to this jihad. That is America} and its conspiratorial policies that are intended to bring Afghanistan, the center of jihad, under American attacks. But we are absolutely certain that people like Mawlawi Haqqani will give the Americans the same answer they gave to the Russians. \textit{And we are sure that people like Haqqani will fuel the flames of jihad worldwide}.\textsuperscript{103}

This statement, which Jalaluddin published in his Pashto language magazine, was an ideological harbinger of things to come. Even the title of Haqqani’s magazine — \textit{Manba’ al-Jihad}, or “fountainhead of jihad,” is reflective of his broader aspirations and transnational outlook before 9/11. It is telling that several years later, after having been expelled from Sudan, it was Jalaluddin Haqqani and Yunis Khalis who first embraced and hosted Usama bin Ladin when he returned to Afghanistan in 1996. From that point on, the partnership between Jalaluddin Haqqani, Usama bin Ladin and other members of al-Qa’ida would prove to be instrumental in helping to make Fazlur Rahman’s statement a reality.

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\textsuperscript{102} The view of U.S. involvement in the Gulf as part of a longstanding U.S. strategy was not unique to the Haqqani network. See Safar al-Hawali, \textit{kashf al-ghumma `an `ulama al-umma}, (Riyadh: Dar al-Hikma, 1991). The authors thank Thomas Hegghammer for this point and reference. For general references to the American conspiracy in Afghanistan see, “Text of Alhaj Jalaluddin Haqqani’s Interview with Bidar Digest in Afghanistan,” \textit{Manba-al Jihad} (Pashto), 1:12 (June 1990); “Alhaj Mawlawi Jalaluddin Haqqani in a General Gathering of the Jamiat-e-Ulama-e- Islam in Lahore,” \textit{Manba-al Jihad} (Pashto), 2:11 (May, 1991); Abu Abdullah, “Be Aware of the Intellectual Invasion,” \textit{Manba al-Jihad} (Arabic), 1:4 (November 1990). For references to this conspiracy and its ties to the Gulf see, e.g., \textit{Nusrat al-Jihad} 3:4 (February 1991), in which the first article argues: “America has been interfering in the internal affairs of the Muslim Gulf states in order to secure the stable flow of oil to the US. Now the opportunity has arisen to meet the objective. In this war, America has everything to gain and nothing to lose. Muslims die, their countries are destroyed, they pay for the costs of the war, while America gets control over the oil fields.” See also the article “The New World Order,” \textit{Nusrat al-Jihad} (Urdu) 3:5 (March 1991).
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Pronouncements by Haqqani commanders during this period were far from empty rhetoric, and were backed up by an intensive investment in training and mobilization of Islamist militants from Pakistan, Kashmir, Northwestern China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Southeast Asia and a variety of Arab countries. This assistance would prove pivotal to the development and military sophistication of al-Qa’ida and many anti-Kashmir groups. In the summer of 1991, several new training camps were established at Zhawara in partnership with the JUI-linked Kashmiri jihadi organizations HuM (also known as Harakat al-Ansar, or HuA) and HuJI. One of the Haqqani camps serving this population was the Salman al-Farsi Camp, established at Zhawara and described in Manba’ al-Jihad as serving as the main military training camp for students at the Haqqani’s Manba’ al-‘Ulum madrassa in North Waziristan.

Jalaluddin Haqqani was not bashful about his influence or impact upon the Kashmir jihad, and his assistance would pay dividends to the Pakistani state and its covert war against India. During a meeting in Karachi attended by some of Pakistan’s religious elite, including the General Secretary of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, Haqqani boasted, “We have trained thousands of Kashmiri mujahidin, and have made them ready for jihad.” Farooq Kashmiri, the Deputy Head of HuM, directed students at the madrassa where this gathering was held to spend their summer in Afghanistan so they could train under

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104 Some evidence suggests that Jalaluddin was connected to and tried to fundraise on behalf of the Islamic Jihad Movement of Bangladesh at this time, see Harmony Document AFGP-2002-800928, 5.
105 On the establishment of these camps in 1991, see Harmony Document AFGP-2002-000079; see also Harmony Document AFGP-2002-600088, 18. Mustafa Hamid calls them “jama’at al-mujahidin” and “jama’at al-jihad al-‘alami,” respectively, but it is clear that he is referring to Harakat-ul Jihad al-Islami and Harakat-ul Mujahidin.
107 Don Rassler interview with Robert Nickelsberg, 23 September 2010; In 1990 and 1991 Nickelsberg visited Zhawara and he was surprised by the number of Kashmiris engaging in training, and Jalaluddin boasted to him about their presence but declined Nickelsberg’s request to interview some of them.
Jalaluddin.109 These and other Pakistani madrassa students likely formed the rank and file at HuM/Harakat-ul-Ansar (HUA) training camps throughout the 1990s, all of which were based in Loya Paktia and supported by the ISI.110

Several of these camps would eventually become structurally integrated with al-Qaeda’s infrastructure in the years to follow, including those that were targeted by U.S. cruise missiles after the East African embassy bombings in 1998. The Haqqani network’s direct support for various Kashmiri training camps are revealed in a 1998 communication from the Pakistani government to the Taliban, contained in the Harmony database. This document includes a list in Pashto and English of nine wanted Pakistani “terrorists,” with photographs and names, aliases and last known sightings.111 The document reminds the Taliban that Pakistan was the first country in the world to recognize their regime and that it expects the Taliban’s cooperation in “disallowing any anti-Pakistan activity from Afghan soil.”112 Three of the four camps identified as harboring fugitives from Pakistan are indicated as being under Haqqani control.113

The Taliban had sought to dismantle many of these training camps several years earlier, after it rose to power in 1994, but these efforts yielded little results for reasons that remain poorly understood.114 Jalaluddin Haqqani initially wanted to confront the Taliban, and there were some skirmishes between the two groups, but his decision to join and assist the Taliban was critical to the Taliban’s consolidation of power inside Afghanistan.115 Haqqani brought a depth of military expertise to the Taliban, and it is likely that the Taliban’s capture of Kabul would not have been possible without securing an alliance with the man with the most military influence in Afghanistan’s

112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
114 One potential explanation is that the Taliban had limited influence in Loya Paktia and could not force these decisions upon Jalaluddin Haqqani.
Southeast. Jalaluddin’s membership in the Taliban functioned as another mechanism through which the ISI could diversify their influence over Mullah Omar and his movement, something that still holds true today. Shortly after joining the Taliban in 1995, Jalaluddin Haqqani helped the Taliban to recruit about 2,000 fighters from Paktia and neighboring Pakistan to reinforce its ranks.116 Jalaluddin also commanded Taliban troops in Kabul during this time and forces led by Haqqani are credited with repulsing a major assault on the capital carried out by Uzbek commander Abdul Rashid Dostum in 1996.117 The Haqqani network’s ability to train and raise fighters similarly proved critical to the Taliban in various battles in Afghanistan’s North against the Northern Alliance, a force backed by India and other countries.118

The early relations between al-Qa’ida and the Taliban were marked by mutual suspicion and conflict from the beginning, and remained turbulent throughout the period of the Taliban regime. The differences between the Haqqani network’s and Taliban’s support for Bin Ladin are deep-rooted and are best captured by the politics associated with Yunis KHALIS’ initial pledge to the Saudi after he first arrived from Sudan. According to a first-hand account told by al-Qa’ida strategist Abu Musab al-Suri, “He [Yunis KHALIS] said in his excellent Arabic and his thick foreign accent to Abu ‘Abdallah [Usama bin Ladin]: “you are our guests and no one will get to you. If anything comes from the Taliban, tell me. I may not be able to do much since they came, but I will try.””119 Bin Ladin’s former bodyguard Nasir al-Bahri (also known as Abu Jandal) has also described the mutual distrust between Bin Ladin and the Taliban during this period, recounting that when the Taliban sent representatives to find out where Bin Ladin stood, the latter refused to meet them personally. He says that Bin Ladin also initially refused to allow his followers, who were then actively engaged in training at the various al-Qa’ida camps around Zhawara, to fight for the Taliban, and alludes to the negative impression of the Taliban among many of the Arabs and the

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circulation of rumors about there being former communists among their ranks. It is also telling that when major al-Qa’ida figures such as Abu Hafs al-Masri did fight with the Taliban they did so with Jalaluddin Haqqani.

A major source of tension between the Taliban and al-Qa’ida was Bin Ladin’s media activity and provocative statements against the West, activities that Mullah Omar expressly forbade and viewed as a threat. About six months after issuing his 1996 communiqué that called on Muslims to boycott American-made goods and to wage jihad against “Zionist-Crusader” interests in Saudi Arabia, Bin Ladin invited CNN journalist Peter Bergen to visit him in Tora Bora and film an interview. His rhetoric in this interview went much further than that in his 1996 communiqué and came much closer to the language and ideological tone of the early-1990s statements found in Haqqani and other jihadist magazines. A CNN interview was a much more public pronouncement than the distribution of his 1996 *fatwa*, and drew the immediate ire of the Taliban. Not long after, Mullah Omar ordered Bin Ladin and his family to pack up and relocate to Kandahar, “where the situation is more secure.” With Kandahar being the birthplace of the Taliban such an order was likely issued so Mullah Omar could exert more control over Bin Ladin and keep a closer eye on his activities.

From that point on, al-Qa’ida came to increasingly rely on the Haqqani network’s autonomy from the Taliban in Loya Paktia as a launching pad for its declarations of war on the West. It was at the al-Siddiq Camp in the Zhawara valley — and not in

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121 See, e.g., Gutman, 110.
123 Al-Bahri, 82.
Kandahar — where Bin Ladin and several leaders from other jihadist organizations announced the formation of the “World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders” in February 1998.125 This was the most sweeping declaration of global jihad ever issued by al-Qa’ida, and called on Muslims worldwide to “kill the Americans wherever you find them.”126 Members of the international press were invited ahead of time to attend, and were escorted from North Waziristan by members of HuA, the Kashmir-focused jihadi organization whose training operations were integrated with Haqqani and al-Qa’ida camps at Zhawara.127

Carried out in direct contravention of Taliban restrictions, these media events enraged the Taliban leadership and further strained relations between the Taliban and the Arab jihadis residing in Afghanistan.128 After another press conference that same year, Mullah Omar angrily phoned Rahimullah Yusufzai, a Pakistani journalist present at that event, to ask how the latter had entered Afghanistan without a Taliban-approved visa. After Yusufzai explained his presence, Mullah Omar shouted “How dare he [Bin Ladin] give a press conference without my permission! There will be one ruler in Afghanistan, either I or Usama bin Ladin.... I will see to it.”129 According to the journalist Ahmad Zaydan, who was also present during these events, the Arabs in Afghanistan clearly understood that al-Qa’ida was using its alliance with Haqqani leaders to get around Taliban attempts to restrict their activities:

I learned later from Afghan Arab sources who were there that Usama had sought to sidestep the Taliban pressure on him by meeting the press in areas far away from the Taliban city of Kandahar, such as Jalalabad, where Hizb-i Islami leader Mawlawi Yunis Khalis enjoyed power and good relations with Usama since the days of the Afghan jihad, or in Paktia, where Shaykh Jalaluddin Haqqani, the Taliban Minister of Borders and Tribes, had strong ties with Bin Ladin as well. Haqqani was considered a king in his region.... He is also known to have established good relations with Pakistani Islamist groups and

125 For the text of the announcement of the Front, see Bruce Lawrence, ed., Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden (Verso, 2005), 58ff.
126 Ibid.
127 Bahri, 88.
128 On this issue, see Brown (2010a).
129 Gutman, 129.
the security agencies in Pakistan since the days of Afghan jihad. This might explain why the declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders in May of 1998 by Bin Ladin, Zawahiri, and Pakistani figures, was issued in Khost, not Kandahar, or other areas where the Taliban and Mullah Muhammad Omar enjoyed significant influence.130

Summary: Al-Qa’ida’s anti-American jihad, launched from Haqqani headquarters, had thus made operating outside of Haqqani-controlled territory in Afghanistan an increasingly prohibitive exercise for the foreign jihadis prior to 9/11. This, along with the deep history between the Haqqani network and the other regional and international militant groups operating in Afghanistan, helps to explain why it was to the Haqqani network’s refuge in Waziristan, and not the Taliban’s in Baluchistan, that these groups turned for safe haven after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks. Much more than personal ties, the nexus of local, regional and global jihadism that Jalaluddin Haqqani had fostered over the previous two decades enabled the Haqqanis' militant partners to deploy violence beyond the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region throughout the 1990s, fueling Islamist conflicts as far afield as Kashmir, Central Asia and Africa. The American-led invasion of Afghanistan forced this intertwined collection of militants to flee its Haqqani-dominated sanctuary of southeastern Afghanistan, but it did not have far to go to re-establish itself. In fact, the American-led invasion of Afghanistan that had succeeded in toppling the Taliban regime so quickly only managed to force this nexus of fighters a few dozen kilometers east, into North Waziristan, where it has remained ever since, with the Haqqanis' continuing to play a central role.

Post 9/11: Continuity and Consolidation of the Haqqani Nexus

During the decade following the 9/11 attacks, the Haqqani network would further consolidate its nexus position and act in a manner similar to prior decades, proving central to the Taliban, Afghanistan’s internal conflicts, and Pakistan’s efforts to hedge its position and cultivate influence on both sides of the Durand Line. Assisted by the

ISI, and leveraging its key characteristics and nexus position, the Haqqani network quickly emerged as a primary and lethal driver of anti-Coalition activity inside Afghanistan. Instead of disassociating itself from al-Qa’ida and its global jihad, 9/11, and the United States’ response to it, brought Haqqani and al-Qa’ida members even closer together. The Haqqani network has fostered this closeness by maintaining its open fronts and by providing protection and a base from which al-Qa’ida and others could conduct attacks inside Afghanistan and plan acts of international terrorism. The activities of the two groups remain deeply integrated across operational and functional (i.e., media) lines in Loya Paktia and North Waziristan today. The close bonds between al-Qa’ida and the Haqqani fighters have also survived the transition of Haqqani network leadership from Jalaluddin to his son Sirajuddin, indicating that these ties are not just historic, but are also now multi-generational, a fact that is likely to contribute to al-Qa’ida’s resiliency and further strain U.S./Pakistan relations.

Since the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan the Haqqani network has been essential to the rise — and geographic spread — of the Taliban insurgency inside Afghanistan. The value of Haqqani network contributions to the Taliban has been acknowledged by senior Taliban leaders, such as Mullah Dadullah, who — before his death in 2007 — confirmed the Haqqanis important role: “There is no doubt that Shaykh Haqqani and his son lead the battles and draw up military plans.” The Haqqani network’s leadership of the Miranshah Shura, and its representation on the Rahbari Shura — the Taliban’s central coordinating body, highlights the organization’s value to the Taliban as a trusted partner with primacy in Southeastern Afghanistan.

The Haqqani network’s embrace of foreign fighters and al-Qa’ida contrasts sharply with the Quetta Shura Taliban’s reluctance to open its ranks to outsiders and its efforts to publically distance itself from al-Qa’ida since 9/11. The continuity of the Haqqani’s open fronts and its operational integration with al-Qa’ida and the IJU is confirmed by material released by jihadist media outlets, as well as journalistic accounts, interviews with Taliban commanders, and Department of Defense communications. Collectively, these sources prove that a number of al-Qa’ida and IJU fighting units are still integrated

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with, and operating alongside, Haqqani network insurgents in Loya Paktia. Al-Qa’ida’s claim of responsibility for a multi-pronged suicide attack against Forward Operating Base (FOB) Salerno in Khost, the central resourcing base for Coalition troops in the region, in August 2008 illustrates this dynamic. During an interview in 2009, al-Qa’ida’s commander for Afghanistan, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (killed by a drone in North Waziristan in 2010), said that this attack was organized by al-Qa’ida and jointly executed with its local partners. While the Haqqani network does not have exclusive control over Loya Paktia, it is the strongest group in the region. On several occasions senior Haqqani network leaders have spoken about their close operational relationship with al-Qa’ida, revealing that there “is no distinction between us...[;] we are all one.” In fact, many security analysts believe that the Haqqani network participated in, and likely directed, the botched assault on FOB Salerno. The strongest indication of an al-Qa’ida role in the incident comes from Bryant Neal Vinas, an American al-Qa’ida operative, who was in North Waziristan at the time of the attack and met Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, Abu Yahya al-Libi, Rashid Rauf, Attiyat Allah and Baitullah Mehsud. In an interrogation conducted by Belgian authorities Vinas said that the attack had “been planned by al-Qa’ida leaders and that it went badly.” Vinas had such intimate


135 According to Thomas Ruttig, 95 percent of the commanders in Khost are linked to the Haqqani network. See Ruttig, 59.

136 “An Interview with the Director of Military Affairs in Paktika: Mawlwi Sangeen,” As-Sahab (English Translation provided by Dar al Murabiteen Publications, no date).


knowledge of the attack that he was even able to identify one of the suicide attackers, with whom he had trained.  

Even more convincing is the death of a Haqqani network family member alongside a veteran al-Qa’ida leader during an attack in Loya Paktia. It is not a coincidence that Muhammad Omar Haqqani, the son of Jalaluddin and brother of Sirajuddin, was killed in a firefight in July 2008 along with Abu-Hasan al-Sa’idi in the Seta Kandao area of Paktia. At the time, al-Sa’idi was believed to be al-Qa’ida’s top military commander in Southeastern Afghanistan. He also reportedly served as the head of al-Qa’ida’s training camps in Loya Paktia for a period after the anti-Soviet jihad. This incident speaks to the depth of Haqqani network and al-Qa’ida ties and illustrates how the intimacy of the personal relationships established during the 1980s and 1990s manifest operationally in Afghanistan and Pakistan today. Jalaluddin Haqqani would not let his eighteen year-old son fight with just anybody; Abu-Hasan al-Sa’idi was a trusted confidant. The deaths of other senior al-Qa’ida members in Loya Paktia also highlight these close ties. Take for instance, the deaths of Abu Dujanah al-Qahtani, and Abu Sulayman al-Utaybi – two important al-Qa’ida members killed together in May 2008 in Paktia province. Prior to his arrival in Afghanistan, Abu Sulayman al-Utaybi worked as a Sharia official for the Mujahidin Shura Council in Iraq and was a senior leader of al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI). It is unlikely that the presence of such a high-profile AQI figure in Loya Paktia would have escaped Haqqani attention.

140 Ibid.
144 “The ‘Martyrdom’ of Abu Sulaiman al-Otaibi.”
Counterterrorism pressures have brought al-Qa’ida and the Haqqani network into greater geographic proximity since 9/11, and the campaign of drone strikes has amplified their sense of shared suffering and ideological affinity for one another. This was perhaps most apparent to David Rohde, who, along with his translator and driver, was held hostage by the Haqqani network in North Waziristan. After spending seven months with his captors, Rohde realized that his Haqqani guards were “really committed to something far broader than simply driving American troops out of Afghanistan.”145 In addition to liberating Kabul, they also wanted to create a global Islamic caliphate that spanned the Muslim world.146 The Haqqani network’s appreciation for al-Qa’ida’s world-view became most clear when Rohde’s guards told him “how eager they were to carry out suicide attacks in the United States in revenge for the drone strikes.”147 These comments could be dismissed as frustration or mere posturing, but they also reveal important contradictions between how the Haqqani network publically portrays itself as a local actor and the broader jihadist interests it has long helped to facilitate.

The operational access and local partnering that the Haqqani network provides has a number of important derivative benefits for al-Qa’ida, the IJU and other foreign fighting units. On a practical level, access to Haqqani network fronts allows transnational jihadist groups to test new recruits, hone their capabilities and deepen their operational expertise.148 An invitation to join Haqqani fighters on the battlefield also provides al-Qa’ida and the IJU with an opportunity to deepen their ties to the Haqqani family, making it all the more unlikely that Sirajuddin will deny them safe haven. Jalaluddin was one of several key organizers of al-Qa’ida’s escape from Afghanistan after the toppling of the Taliban and “Ayman al-Zawahiri’s wife was taking refuge in a Haqqani-owned building on the Afghan side of the border when she was killed by a U.S. airstrike in late 2001.”149 The Haqqani network, along with other local partners, helped

146 David Rohde, “‘You Have Atomic Bombs, but We Have Suicide Bombers,’” New York Times, 19 October 2009.
147 “A Reporter’s Tale of Ambush and Captivity.”
148 For a discussion of how foreign fighter mobilizations empower transnational terrorist groups, see Hegghammer (2010-11).
al-Qa’ida to establish a safe-haven in Pakistan’s tribal areas after their escape from Tora Bora. Some have even identified Jalaluddin Haqqani as the key organizer. A document captured in Afghanistan in 2005 illustrates how the Haqqani network continued to shelter foreign fighters and local militants several years into the insurgency.

Mullah Abdullah is from Logar and has 30 fighters of different nationalities: Afghans; Uzbeks; Chinese; Chechens; and two Arabs. They’ve received military training from the training camp.... It is managed by Mullah Dawood from Logar, and an Arab is the head of this camp. Under the supervisions of Mullah Dawood, they arrived in Miran Shah after spending a night at a Madrassa in the headquarters of Haqqani.... After the battle only a limited number of people entered Afghanistan...[,] others returned to Miran Shah.

By facilitating access to the fight in Afghanistan (a classical jihad), the Haqqani network also helps to sustain al-Qa’ida’s relevance and branding as the leader of the global jihadist movement. Senior al-Qa’ida leaders have long recognized the importance of media to their cause and the Haqqani network’s area of operations remains central to al-Qa’ida’s media operations just like it was in the past. Norwegian scholar Anne Stenersen recently conducted a review of over ninety films released by al-Sahab from 2005 to 2009 as part of its “Pyre for the Americans in the Land of Khorasan” series. Since most of these videos detail the attack location she was able to establish, according to al-Qa’ida’s own reporting, that the highest concentration of operational films released by al-Sahab during this time period were filmed in Khost (thirty), followed by

151 Rashid, 268.
153 For a perspective on this see, Brown (2011).
154 For example, in a personal letter to Mullah Omar, Usama bin Ladin mentioned that “It is obvious that the media war in this century is one of the strongest methods; in fact, its ratio may reach 90% of the total preparation for the battles.” See Harmony Document AFGP-2002-600321.
155 A “pyre” is a heap of combustible material that is often used for cremating a corpse.
Paktika (fourteen) and Kunar (twelve) provinces.\textsuperscript{156} Put another way, footage of attacks in Khost and Paktika, territory where the Haqqani network is the “main executor of Taliban operations,” account for 50 percent of all operational videos released by al-Qa’ida as part of this seminal series over a four year period.\textsuperscript{157} These “films do not necessarily mean that Arab or other foreign fighters took part in the attacks, but they do imply a connection between the fighting group and al-Qaeda’s media operation[s].”\textsuperscript{158} They also reveal that Loya Paktia still functions as a central arena for al-Qa’ida’s operational and media activity inside Afghanistan. A similar analysis conducted by Intel Center corroborates Stenersen’s findings, as does an anecdotal dataset of raids compiled by the authors.\textsuperscript{159}

The network associated with the December 2009 suicide attack against FOB Chapman in Khost, which killed seven CIA officers, speaks to the broader nature of the Haqqani network’s media ties and the existence of an integrated media syndicate in Waziristan.\textsuperscript{160} It also solidifies the close personal and operational ties between the Haqqani network, al-Qa’ida and those who lead and continue to develop the TTP. The individual who conducted the attack, Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi (also known as Abu Dujanah al-Khorasani), was an influential writer on Arabic-language jihadist forums who was recruited and sent by Jordanian and U.S. intelligence agents to the FATA to collect intelligence on Ayman al-Zawahiri. Instead of cooperating with these authorities, Abu Dujanah joined forces with the TTP and al-Qa’ida and turned on his intelligence contacts. What was most revealing about the attack was which organization claimed responsibility for it, where it occurred and the media activity that transpired afterward. The first organization to publically celebrate the attack was al-Qa’ida, which noted in its media release that the “the appropriate media entity will

\textsuperscript{156} For a breakdown of all provinces, see Anne Stenersen, “Al-Qaeda’s Allies: Explaining the Relationship Between Al-Qaeda and Various Factions of the Taliban After 2001,” Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper, New America Foundation (April 2010).

\textsuperscript{157} For quote see Steinberg.

\textsuperscript{158} Stenersen.


\textsuperscript{160} FOB Chapman reportedly functions as a CIA outpost used to collect intelligence, see Mark Mazzetti, “CIA Takes on Bigger and Riskier Role on Front Lines,” New York Times, 31 December 2009.
publish his [the suicide bomber’s] story… in a proper production.”

This statement suggests that al-Qa’ida had prior knowledge of the attack and that the TTP was soon planning to release a video about the incident. Not long after, the TTP formally claimed responsibility for the attack through a series of videos that featured al-Balawi and TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud. The Haqqani network remained silent on this issue, but according to Michael Scheuer, “There is no way this operation would have occurred in Khost without the knowledge and active support of Jalaluddin Haqqani and/or his son.”

Direct Haqqani network ties to al-Balawi are hard to prove, but the Haqqani network is one person removed from a network of Arab foreign fighters and media operators linked to the Jordanian suicide bomber, suggesting that Sirajuddin’s group was tied to the attack. The centerpiece to this story involves an interview that Sirajuddin Haqqani conducted with al-Balagh media correspondent Abu-Dujanah al-San`ani (also known as Mohammed Naqaa al-Hamli) in April 2010. Less than one month after conducting the interview, that very same correspondent was killed in North Waziristan while making a suicide bomb for himself. Similar to the Jordanian suicide bomber, al-Hamali “was also a prolific contributor to web-based jihadist social networking forums, particularly the Falluja Islamic Network.” Even more revealing is the death and background of another jihadist writer from Yemen, Saddam Hussein al-Hussami (also known as Ghazwan al-Yemeni), who had ties to al-Balawi and al-Hamali and was also killed in North Waziristan, albeit several months earlier. An analysis of al-Hussami’s

163 For example, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RTZQTC6ucVI.
164 Alex Spillius, “CIA suicide bomber ‘worked with bin Laden allies’,” Telegraph, 7 January 2010.
165 “Interview with Sirajuddin Haqqani,” al-Balagh Media Center, 13 April 2010.
168 Ibid.
online activity and the jihadist community’s response to his death by Evan Kohlmann is worth quoting at length:

In early October 2009, al-Yemeni [al-Hussami] had posted a flurry of requests via the chat forum on behalf of “the Jalaluddin Haqqani Organization in the Shadow of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.” In one such message, he appealed, “we, your brothers from the Jalaluddin Haqqani Organization, have encountered some problems in regards to the subjects Tawheed and Aqeedah, and we want the email or website of the renowned shaykhs in this field….”

Other analysis by Kohlmann confirms that al-Balawi, al-Hamali and al-Hussami all knew one another and that al-Hussami had been trained by al-Qa’ida. This suggests that the Haqqani network was not only connected to this group, but that it is also learning from more experienced media hands. The slow but steady emergence of Manba al-Jihad as a digital production entity speaks to this trend as does Sirajuddin’s recent question and answer session with an Arabic-language jihadist forum, especially when one considers the connections that are required to facilitate such an event.

By serving as a platform for operational development and force projection, the Haqqani network functions as a military incubator for lethal segments of TTP. In fact, one can argue that the TTP and its jihad against the Pakistani state are an outgrowth, or at least a partial result of, the operational intermingling between local and global actors in Loya Paktia. Even though the Haqqani network does not actively, or publically, support attacks against the Pakistani state, it has helped to create and sustain the conditions and relationships that facilitate and drive the jihad against Islamabad. It is true that the Quetta Shura Taliban and the Haqqani network have tried to re-orient the TTP’s jihad

169 Ibid.
170 For example, as noted by Kohlmann, “Allah awarded them to spend Eid there in the highest levels of Paradise, with their beloved ones and brothers Ghazwan al-Yemeni, Abu Dujanah al-Sanaani, and Abu Dujanah al-Khorasani. Just as He gathered them in life, He has gathered them in the afterlife.” Ibid.
171 “Open Interview with Sirajuddin Haqqani, a member of the Shura Council of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and a commander in the southeastern provinces of Afghanistan.” Ansar al-Mujahidin Network, 27 April 2010.
172 As mentioned above, the U.S. drone campaign and Pakistani operations have also played central roles.
away from Islamabad towards Afghanistan.\footnote{For examples, see Khan; Mushtaq Yusufzai, “No Moderates in Taliban Ranks: Haqqani,” \textit{The News}, 17 April 2009.} The Haqqani network has also put systems in place to minimize its public association with and participation in the Pakistan jihad. According to a source with first-hand access, Haqqani fighters were ordered in one case in 2009 to not participate in an expected clash with Pakistani soldiers.\footnote{Authors’ interview with anonymous source, March 2010.} Haqqani fighters were told that Pakistani Taliban, not Afghan Taliban, would fight Pakistani military forces.\footnote{Ibid.} The need for such management and operational de-confliction illustrates the depth of Haqqani/TTP integration on both sides of the Durand Line.\footnote{For additional background, see Gretchen Peters, “Crime and Insurgency in the Tribal Areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Combating Terrorism Center (October 2010); Qandeel Siddique, “Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan,” \textit{DIIS Report} (December 2010).} It also demonstrates the Haqqani network’s cognizance of this issue and the group’s need to draw limits and manage where and how its fighters act.

But just as the Afghanistan and Pakistan jihads are distinct and the application of violence is segmented by separate chains of command, the infrastructure and economy of violence that they create are integrated and mutually reinforcing, ultimately enhancing the resiliency and longevity of each jihad. For example, the deployment of TTP manpower (i.e., suicide bombers and actual fighters) to Loya Paktia operationally benefits the Haqqani network, and thus also the Quetta Shura Taliban.\footnote{Since the spring of 2008…[,] Haqqanis’ fighters had been reinforced by a large number of Pakistani Taliban from the Wazir, Dawar and Mehsud tribes. Some sources speak of up to 4,000 of them…..” See Ruttig, 71.} Yet, the benefits of this integration are not unidirectional and limited to the jihad in Afghanistan only. They are bi-directional and the TTP can also leverage Haqqani network expertise and resources — either through training or personal contacts — and incorporate the knowledge and combat experience gained in Afghanistan to strengthen its campaign against Pakistan.

The Haqqani network partners with and provides al-Qa’ida, the TTP and other local and foreign fighting entities operational access to fronts in Afghanistan’s Southeast for a number of reasons. The most important and collective benefit is that the Haqqani network is able to diversify the resource mobilization networks to which it has access.
This helps to reduce the group’s dependence upon a single actor, such as the ISI, and reinforces its nexus position. The Haqqani network also uses such access and its relationships to hedge its position and gain leverage over other actors. For example, Haqqani commanders leverage their close ties with the TTP to gain influence with the Pakistani state because maintaining such close ties ensures that the Haqqani network is more familiar with the needs and vulnerabilities of its various partners. Being located at the operational point of convergence for various networks provides practical benefits as well, such as human (i.e., ideologically committed fighters), financial and technological inputs, which the Haqqani network aggregates and employs to enhance its operational effectiveness and sustain its campaign.

**Summary:** The most striking element of the Haqqani network’s evolution post 9/11 is the persistence of its cross-dimensional nexus. During this decade, surprisingly little changed in terms of the Haqqani network’s relations, strategy and outlook. The war in Afghanistan has reinforced and strengthened the Haqqani network’s central role, with the group still being located at the nexus between local, regional and global forms of militancy. Similar to the 1990s, areas in which the Haqqani network exerts the most influence continue to be used as a platform to enable other actors, most notably al-Qa’ida and more recently elements of the TTP. The Haqqani network has been able to maintain close ties with these actors while also remaining a key proxy for Islamabad, highlighting the paradox underlying Pakistan’s security policy. Perhaps most importantly, this nexus has also survived a generational change in leadership from father Jalaluddin to son Sirajuddin, as well as a ten year campaign against al-Qa’ida conducted the United States and its partner Pakistan.

**CONCLUSION, IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS**

Several important conclusions can be drawn from this study and they inform current policy debates about the Haqqani network, al-Qa’ida, U.S./Pakistan relations, U.S. interests in Afghanistan and efforts to reconcile with the Taliban.

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178 Authors’ interview with Pir Zubair Shah, 13 September 2010.
Context, History and Evolution of al-Qa’ida and the Global Jihad: This report challenges conventional narratives of al-Qa’ida’s early history and development by placing al-Qa’ida’s trajectory within the local context of the Haqqani network. The actions and outlook of Haqqani network leaders are not confined to the Afghan theater today, and they have not been since the late 1970s. In addition to operating as a distinct organization, the Haqqani network has historically functioned as a nexus and key enabler for local, regional and global groups. Al-Qa’ida’s global jihad and elements of Kashmir’s regional jihad have been shaped by the safe-haven, training, combat experience, propaganda support, resource mobilization, and networking opportunities facilitated by the Haqqani network. By serving as the local to al-Qa’ida’s global over multiple decades, the Haqqani network has directly contributed to the development and endurance of global jihad.

The Haqqani network has carefully avoided any direct association with international terrorism or the targeting of Westerners outside of Afghanistan. The nature of Haqqani support for international jihadism, however, is best evaluated through the context of the group’s consistent support for al-Qa’ida and the Haqqani network’s unwillingness to meaningfully disengage from the group since it formally declared war on the United States in 1998. This makes the Haqqani network a willing ideological partner and an active participant in al-Qa’ida’s global jihad, as Haqqani network leaders have consistently provided the local context and space for al-Qa’ida to sustain itself and continue its fight. By shedding new light on the history of al-Qa’ida, this report also tells us that al-Qa’ida and the Haqqani network, and not the Quetta Shura Taliban, became the United States’ primary enemies on 11 September 2001.

The death of Usama bin Ladin will challenge al-Qa’ida and its long-term survival, and his demise has renewed debates about U.S. interests in Afghanistan and al-Qa’ida’s presence there. While it is too early to know what the full ramifications of Bin Ladin’s death will be, the ties between the Haqqani network and al-Qa’ida have remained just as close since 9/11 under Sirajuddin’s command. Barring any significant change, the Haqqani network will likely remain central to the future evolution of al-Qa’ida and its attempts to attack the United States and its allies. Poorly sourced accounts suggest that Sirajuddin Haqqani acted as the intermediary between Iran and al-Qa’ida to secure the release of a top Iranian diplomat in exchange for several al-Qa’ida commanders,
including Saif al-Adel.\footnote{Syed Salaam Shahzad, “How Iran and al-Qaeda made a deal,” \textit{Asia Times}, 30 April, 2010; Yassin Musharbash, “Saif al-Adel Back in Waziristan: A Top Terrorist Returns to al-Qaida Fold,” \textit{Der Spiegel}, 25 October 2010.} If this account is true, it would again place the Haqqani network at the center of al-Qa’ida and its global jihad. U.S. efforts to disrupt and degrade al-Qa’ida today, therefore, are just as much about dismantling al-Qa’ida as they are about degrading the Haqqani network.

\section*{U.S./Pakistan Relations:} The Haqqani network, and the ISI’s ties to and support for the group, lies at the core of the troubled U.S./Pakistan relationship.\footnote{During his April 2011 trip to Pakistan, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen noted: “It is fairly well known that ISI had a relationship with the Haqqani network and addressing the Haqqani network from my perspective is critical to the solution set in Afghanistan. So that’s at the core – its [sic] not the only thing – but that’s at the core that I think is the most difficult part of the [U.S./Pakistan] relationship.” See, “Mullen launches diatribe against ISI,” \textit{Dawn}, 21 April 2011. Members of Congress have also linked Pakistan’s support for the group as a major problem “for continuing any kind of financial support” to Islamabad. See Josh Rogen, “Dems: Pakistan must go after Haqqani network if they want our money,” \textit{Cable}, 17 May 2011.} Since the rise of the neo-Taliban insurgency Pakistan has distanced itself from openly expressing its support for the Haqqani network. This is for good reason, given the lethal role the group plays in Afghanistan. Statements made by senior Pakistani officials, as well as recent actions taken by the Pakistani government, demonstrate, however, that the Haqqani network remains a strategic asset.\footnote{For example, “In a transcript passed to Mike McConnell, the Director of National Intelligence in May 2008, Pakistan’s army chief General Ashfaq Kayani was heard referring to Haqqani as “a strategic asset.” See Catherine Philp, “Pervez Musharraf was playing ‘double game’ with US,” \textit{Times}, 17 February 2009. For debates about Pakistan’s policy, see Jayshree Bajoria, “The ISI and Terrorism: Behind the Accusations,” \textit{CFR Backgrounder}, 28 May 2009.} For example, in June 2010, Pakistan claimed that it could “deliver” the Haqqani network and reconcile it with President Karzai’s Afghan government.\footnote{See Alex Rodriguez and Laura King, “Reconciliation efforts with Afghan militants face major obstacle,” \textit{Los Angeles Times}, 29 June 2010. On more recent efforts by Pakistan to get the Haqqani network to negotiate, see Matthew Rosenberg, “Pakistan Woes Insurgent Group,” \textit{Wall Street Journal}, 18 May 2011.} The fact that Pakistan offered up the Haqqani network as a solution to the Afghan conflict at a time when the United States was evaluating its commitment in Afghanistan and was pressuring Pakistan to take action against the group in North Waziristan indicates that the network remains a central asset. The timing of Pakistan’s offer seems all too convenient, and it reveals that Pakistan has continually refused to
move against the Haqqani network because the group is viewed as a part of its solution for Afghanistan.

The findings of this report add further clarity to this picture and the challenges involved. Since 9/11 the United States has provided billions of dollars in military aid to Pakistan to help degrade al-Qa’ida. Pakistan’s assistance has led to the capture and/or death of a number of senior al-Qa’ida operatives, and it has come at a significant human cost to Islamabad.\(^{183}\) Yet, Pakistan’s favored Afghan proxy is also the very same actor that has served as al-Qa’ida’s primary local enabler for over two decades. Given the ISI’s historical sponsorship of the Haqqani network, it is highly unlikely that Pakistan has not been aware of this history. Although less clear, there is also some evidence that the ISI helped, and continues to a lesser degree, to facilitate these ties, suggesting that Pakistan could have played a more influential role in the development of al-Qa’ida than has thus far been recognized. More tangible is Pakistan’s reluctance to conduct a military operation against the Haqqani network and the milieu of jihadist actors sheltered in North Waziristan.\(^{184}\) Pakistan’s inaction is fueling the Afghan insurgency and it is also providing space for the Haqqani network to sustain itself and for anti-Pakistan militants and global jihadists to further coalesce. Left unchecked, North Waziristan will continue to function as the epicenter of international terrorism.\(^{185}\) Such a dynamic is likely to further strain the U.S./Pakistan relationship.

**Taliban Reconciliation**: The history and continuity of Haqqani and al-Qa’ida ties also poses challenges for reconciliation efforts, indicating that it is unlikely that the Haqqani network will meaningfully disengage from al-Qa’ida and other global jihadist actors. The fact that Pakistan has offered up the Haqqani network as a way to end the conflict in Afghanistan is reflective of the group’s importance and central role, but it also makes clear that U.S. and Pakistani goals for Afghanistan are in tension. While no options should be taken off of the table, any U.S. or Afghan effort to reconcile with the Haqqani

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\(^{183}\)For example, between 2004 and May 2010, Pakistan lost 2,421 of its personnel in the tribal areas fighting against militant entities that threaten the state. See “Pakistan Army pays heavy price in Taliban war,” *Dawn,* 20 May 2010.

\(^{184}\)In June 2011, Pakistan publically announced that it will conduct an operation in North Waziristan. According to initial reports, the target of these operations will be the most violent aspects of the TTP. See Muhammad Saleh Zaafr, “Pakistan to launch operation in North Waziristan,” *The News,* 1 June 2011.

\(^{185}\)For background on these plots see Cruickshank (2010).
network must be undertaken from a position that understands the richness of the Haqqani/al-Qa’ida relationship, and must be informed by an acute awareness of the risks that any future negotiated settlement with the Haqqani network presents. The likelihood of the Haqqani option bringing peace to Afghanistan should be assessed in relation to the failure of prior negotiated settlements orchestrated by Pakistan between it and tribal militants based in the FATA, such as the 2006 Miranshah Peace Accord.186 Reconciliation efforts with the Quetta Shura Taliban come with less risk as the group is less closely tied to al-Qa’ida.

In conclusion, the threat of international terrorism is not and has never been represented by al-Qa’ida alone, nor did the latter emerge in a vacuum. The scholarly and policy communities have misapprehended the precise local context for the development of global jihadism – a context to be found in the Haqqanis’ Paktia and not ‘Azzam’s Peshawar – and have underestimated the Haqqani network’s critical role in sustaining cycles of violence far beyond its region of overt influence. In the wake of Usama bin Ladin’s death, the al-Qa’ida organization may face an uncertain future, but the nexus of resources and relationships that the Haqqani network carefully assembled over the course of three decades and which helped to foster al-Qa’ida’s rise remains firmly in place. Positioned between two unstable states, and operating beyond their effective sovereignty, the Haqqani network has long been mistaken for a local actor with largely local concerns. It is vital that the policy community correct the course that has taken this erroneous assessment for granted and recognize the Haqqani network’s region of refuge for what it has always been – the fountainhead of jihad.

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APPENDIX: THE HAQQANI NETWORK’S CROSS-DIMENSIONAL NEXUS

Dimensions of Jihad

Local

Afghan Taliban
Pakistani Taliban

Regional

Inter-Services Intelligence
Directorate

Global

al-Qa’ida
Islamic Jihad Union

Note/Explanation: The social networks shown in this graphic were generated for illustrative purposes only and not based on empirical data, but such networks could be constructed with sufficiently accurate data.187 Within each plain the dots represent individual actors and the lines capture relationships between them. Each plain also consists of three functional categories: direct action (i.e. operations), diplomatic activity, and support functions (i.e. media, financing, etc.). The lines that cross dimensions highlight those individuals that cross between these different plains of jihad.

187 This graphic is a modified version of that found in Padgett’s and McLean’s work cited above.