Islamic Groups’ Social Service Provision and Attitudinal Change in Egypt

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ABSTRACT

Islamic organizations’ educational, medical, financial and charitable services benefit millions of Egyptians each year. Scholars and policymakers alike argue that, in the process of meeting Egyptians’ basic needs, this social service provision Islamizes the population, acclimates them to the use of religiously justified violence, and aggravates sectarian attitudes. Yet authors rarely provide concrete data concerning these facilities, their history, the scope of the services provided, and the audiences they serve. Further, the attitudinal change supposedly under way is neither clearly observed nor easily measured. These twin deficits have limited the progress of research on an area of growing scholarly and practitioner interest. This paper improves on both of these areas. It uses a variety of primary and secondary sources to sketch the history and organizational capacity of three Islamic organizations’ social service networks: those of the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Gam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya, and Ansar al-Sunna al-Mohammediyaa. It also reports the results of an original survey experiment of over 3,700 Egyptians, testing how exposure to information about these organizations’ service provision shapes individual attitudes on religiosity, violence, and sectarianism. While in many cases these primes fail to produce statistically significant shifts, results in both the religion battery and that regarding violence are notable. First, exposure to information about the Muslim Brotherhood’s social service provision produces a significant and conservative shift in personal and social dimensions of religion. However, receiving information about the Brotherhood’s social service provision makes respondents less likely to support a political role for religion. Second, receiving information about al-Gam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya’s service provision shifts an individual’s propensity to tolerate violence in retribution for perceived provocations from non-Muslims.
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Introduction

Among a trove of documents recovered from an al-Qa’ida safe house in Mali was a letter from Nasir al-Wuhayshi, the leader of al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), to his counterpart in Mali. In it, al-Wuhayshi advised his comrade about the importance of social service provisioning:

Try to win them [the population] over through the conveniences of life and by taking care of their daily needs like food, electricity and water. Providing these necessities will have a great effect on people, and will make them sympathize with us and feel that their fate is tied to ours. This is what we’ve observed during our short experience [in Yemen].¹

The logic underpinning al-Wuhayshi’s statement is not limited to terrorist groups; in fact, it motivates the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), as well as the more recent iteration of the U.S. military’s counterinsurgency doctrine (FM 3-24).² Social service provision is particularly relevant in the developing world, where the state often lacks either the capacity or the will to provide for its citizens.³ In conflict settings, such as in Syria and Libya, the breakdown of basic services and the emergence of multiple nonstate groups competing for popular support can magnify the effect of this provision. While practitioners and academics have increasingly noted these potential relationships, research into when and how a nonstate actor’s provision of social services shifts individuals’ attitudes has only recently emerged.⁴

This report relies on an original survey experiment of over 3,700 Egyptians to test how exposure to information about Islamic organizations’ health care provision affects individuals’ attitudes toward religiosity, violence and sectarianism. In particular, this report examines three conservative yet nonviolent Egyptian Islamic groups, al-Gam’iiyya al-Shar’iiyya, Ansar al-Sunna al-Mohammediyya, and the Muslim Brotherhood. Combined, these organizations operate a wide array of medical services serving millions of Egyptians per year.⁵ These networks are also long-standing. Al-Gam’iiyya al-Shar’iiyya, for instance, predates the Muslim Brotherhood’s 1928 founding and is now entering its second century of existence. Although these organizations are nonviolent, a number of authors and commentators claim that their provision “Islamizes” the population, and in the process exacerbates sectarian strife and encourages sympathy for violence and terrorism.⁶
Medical services provide a useful basis of comparison for a number of reasons. First, they offer a firm basis for assessing the contrast among providers—in this case, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Ministry of Health, al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya and Ansar al-Sunna. Other charitable efforts such as education are not so widely comparable. Until late 2013, the Brotherhood operated a number of primary schools across Egypt that were broadly comparable with public (government) schools; they have now been placed under the Egyptian Ministry of Education’s control. Al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya, on the other hand, operates specific religious schools that are not comparable with the Brotherhood’s facilities or with those provided by the government. As discussed later in this report, Islamic providers manage a diverse assortment of comparable brick-and-mortar medical facilities, including hospitals (mustashfiyat), specialized centers and smaller clinics (‘iyadat or mustowsafat). Finally, authors in Egypt and elsewhere have focused in their own work on Islamic medical service provision. This eases comparisons among in-country and out-of-country cases and facilitates theory testing and building.7

Two mutually reinforcing problems have frustrated prior attempts to explore the relationship between social service provision and attitudinal change. First, most studies on the subject lack basic empirical information. There has been extremely little English-language research into al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya and Ansar al-Sunna, for instance. Because of this deficit, many studies tend to jump directly to discussing the effect of these services without specifying their basic parameters: who and how many individuals are served, why they are served and how this provision compares with other groups’ efforts or the available public-sector provision.8 We do not know, for instance, if the quality of Islamic providers exceeds or falls below that of their competitors. Nor do there exist basic, reliable data about the size of these organizations’ provision.

Second, most researchers tend to impute dramatic consequences to this provision: it supposedly changes individuals’ beliefs, radicalizes the population or fosters ethnic and confessional strife. Yet the process of attitudinal change is difficult to measure through snapshot observational methods. Take, for instance, the claim that the Islamist provision of social services—or Islamist civil-society activism in general—Islamizes a population.9 Without longitudinal data on the relationship between individual attitudes and social service provision, the occurrence of this process is difficult to substantiate.10 Determining causality raises a different but no less severe set of issues: Is the growing
visibility of Islam in Egyptian life an effect of the proliferation of these services or a cause of them? While these authors’ claims are potentially plausible, there have been only limited attempts to test and quantify whether—and if so, how—nonstate groups’ service provision affects the beliefs and behaviors of populations they serve.¹¹

This paper is an attempt to improve in each of these areas. The first part of the paper traces the evolution of Islamic social service provision through the history of three prominent Egyptian Islamic organizations: the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya, and Ansar al-Sunna al-Mohammediyya.¹² All three of these organizations emerged in the early 20th century, in a context where private organizations and religious charities, both Christian and Muslim, were responsible for significant social service provision to Egyptians.¹³ Today, al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya, for its part, has become the largest nonstate provider of social services in Egypt. While Ansar al-Sunna is a relative newcomer to social service provision, it has embarked on a series of impressive projects around the country. Finally, the Brotherhood’s social service networks have not escaped repression after the 3 July 2013 military coup.

The second part of the paper relies on an innovative survey experiment to test a series of hypotheses about social service provision and attitudinal change. Briefly, a survey experiment samples a population (in this case, over 3,700 Egyptians) and randomly assigns them to treatment and control groups. After exposing the treatment group to some stimuli (in this case, basic factual information about specific groups’ medical provision in Egypt), each groups’ attitudes on questions of interest can be compared. Because the only difference between the treatment and control groups is the exposure to the treatment, that is the logical source of any observed attitudinal variation.

The next section presents hypotheses about social service provision and attitudinal change derived from the academic literature and public commentary. The section following these arguments offers an extended discussion of the history of the three groups’ provision of social services in modern Egypt. The point of this history is twofold: First, it provides context for the following statistical tests. Second, it allows an assessment of the posited hypotheses against qualitative evidence. The third section summarizes the contemporary character of these three organizations’ social service networks and their interaction with the current Egyptian regime. The fourth section introduces the research design and discusses the experimental method. The final section
presents the results of the experimental manipulation as well as auxiliary quantitative evidence of the spread of these services across Egypt.

**Section 1: Deriving Hypotheses**

Both academic literature and public commentary offer specific predictions about whether, and in what direction, social service provision affects a recipient’s attitudes and beliefs. This survey experiment tests six specific hypotheses derived from these works. Briefly, these hypotheses are that receiving social services from Islamic groups (1) increases religious conservatism; (2) increases tolerance for religiously justified violence; (3) decreases tolerance for the presence of Christian religious minorities; (4) decreases tolerance for the presence of Shi’a religious minorities; (5) increases tolerance for religious minorities; (6) has no effect on personal attitudes. These hypotheses and the expected results were preregistered with Experiments in Government and Politics (EGAP) prior to conducting the survey.\textsuperscript{14}

As an aside, it is important to note that only an indirect test of these hypotheses is possible. These authors’ theorized mechanism depends on personal and extended exposure to these provisioning facilities, which is resistant to experimental manipulation. This report approximates the general relationship through priming with information, on the assumption that if this mild intervention reveals a relationship, the “real-life” process is even more likely to occur.

**H1: Exposure to Religious Service Providers Increases Personal Religiosity**

Over the past generation, a number of observers have pointed out that public expressions of religious faith have become increasingly overt in Egyptian life. This “triumph of Islam” is manifest along a spectrum from dress and personal grooming to political activism.\textsuperscript{15} For many, the social activities of the Islamic movement are the engine of this transition. Carrie Wickham hypothesizes that in the 1970s and 1980s, Islamic organizations inaugurated a massive ideological outreach project grounded in a “parallel Islamic sector” of associations, institutions, businesses and informal groups. Embedded in these institutions, Islamic activists used interactions built around daily life to gradually change the mind-set of individuals. This, over time, acclimated ordinary Egyptians to a more activist reading of Islam.\textsuperscript{16} Asef Bayat finds a similar dynamic at work in the operation of charitable networks. “Beyond improving material
conditions,” we are told, “the Islamist movement in Egypt also offered alienated constituencies with an alternative social, cultural, and moral community within which the rival secular and western culture seemed less threatening.”

Other authors have offered insights into the dynamics of this change at the micro level. In her work on everyday life in Cairo, Salwa Ismail discusses the “moral subject,” essentially an ideologically coercive element underlying how religious organizations distribute charity. As she explains, “to qualify for assistance, the subject must produce herself not only as supplicant but as a deserving one in both material and moral senses.”

Nachman Tal goes further in his account of Egypt when he claims that “acceptance into the Brotherhood’s institutions required the pupil’s mother to wear a veil and recite certain chapters from the Qu’ran by heart.”

These accounts suggest that individuals exposed to information about Islamic social services are more likely to report higher levels of Islamic conservatism than those not exposed to this information. In order to cover the personal, political and social dimensions of religious beliefs, all Muslim respondents in this survey were asked to separately rate the doctrinal importance of (1) requiring women in the family to wear the niqab (full face veil); (2) giving religious authorities the power to review legislation; and (3) inviting one’s friends and neighbors to Islam (da’wa).

H2: Exposure to Religious Service Providers Increases Tolerance for Violence

A number of scholars, policymakers and jihadists themselves have suggested that service provision produces specific effects on a population’s tolerance for and support of violence. In the academic literature, Pierre-Emmanuel Ly uses formal modeling to show that the prime reason terrorist groups use charitable activities is “to advertise their ideals amongst potential sympathizers.” “People benefit from (consume) the services provided by charities,” he writes, “while at the same time being exposed to the terrorist group’s values. For example, a school might be named after a martyr, or strong ideological bias can be introduced in teaching some subjects. More generally, the charities’ staff can promote the cause that the terrorist group claims to fight for.”

Authors draw nearly all of the qualitative evidence backing this claim from case studies of Hamas in the Palestinian Territories and Hezbollah in Lebanon. In his study of Hamas, Matthew Levitt argues:
Inside the Palestinian territories, the battery of mosques, schools, orphanages, summer camps, and sports leagues sponsored by Hamas are integral parts of an overarching apparatus of terror. These Hamas entities engage in incitement and radicalize society, and undertake recruitment efforts to socialize even the youngest children to aspire to die as martyrs.23

Shawn Teresa Flanigan and Mounah Abdel-Samad arrive at similar conclusions in their study of Hezbollah in Lebanon:

Hezbollah’s NGOs perceive their mission as complementary and essential to Hezbollah’s military resistance and display pictures of martyrs and leaders of the party on their walls . . . Hezbollah considers that those involved in the provision of social services are part of the jihad. Social service provision thus opens the door to be part of the military or political units of the party.24

American policymakers have echoed these sentiments. As Stuart Levey, the undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence at the U.S. Department of the Treasury under George W. Bush, argued, “Terrorist groups such as Hamas continue to exploit charities to radicalize vulnerable communities and cultivate support for their violent activities.”25

This proposition can be tested only indirectly in Egypt. The groups under consideration here are not violent. Violent groups currently active in Egypt, such as Ansar Beit al-Maqdis/Wilayat Sinai, do not provide social services.26 However, the asserted link between social service provision and violence spans both active recruiting and the passive conditioning of populations to accept violence. Considering that authors indict the Muslim Brotherhood, Ansar al-Sunna al-Mohammediyya, and al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya as “conveyor belts” to violent activism, these organizations offer an important sample on which to test the above hypotheses.27

In light of potential preference falsification and social desirability biases, this question was repeatedly pretested and modified to capture sufficient variation and to avoid floor/ceiling effects. The questions that eventually satisfied these criteria relied on asking respondents the extent to which they thought attacks on Western diplomatic facilities in response to perceived slights against Islam such as the Mohammed cartoons
were justified. A second question captured attitudes on the extent to which violence against fellow Egyptians was necessary “to defend Islam.”

**H3: Exposure to Religious Service Providers Decreases Tolerance for Christian Religious Minorities**

**H4: Exposure to Religious Service Providers Decreases Tolerance for Shi’a Religious Minorities**

Both interview subjects and academic research articulate a particular concern that service provision in Egypt has assumed a sectarian dynamic, fueling conflict between Muslims and Christians. A number of Islamic religious organizations were created, either totally or partially, in response to fears of Christian missionary activity in Egypt. One recent study directly connects the rise of the Brotherhood to Christian missionary activism in Egypt. Another account suggests that al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya established “Islamic Clinics” (‘iyadat Islamiyya) “as part of their objective to snatch the Muslim from the claws of atheism and Christian proselytization (tabshir).” In December 2013, an Egyptian court froze the funds of Islamic nongovernmental organizations (including al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya and Ansar al-Sunna) suspected of links to the Brotherhood. In response, the Brotherhood issued a statement decrying the asset freeze and lamenting that the ensuing vacuum would allow Christian missionaries to convert poor Muslims. Similarly, after the regime began to assume control over their schools, the Brotherhood complained of being unfairly targeted while the regime ignored the “Christian schools…and the English, French, and Canadian schools which freely marginalize our Arab culture.”

Anecdotally, a number of interview subjects, both Muslim and Coptic, told me that the Coptic Church began to increase its own social service provision in order to lessen the need for Coptic Christians to visit Islamic clinics. The dynamic of Christian-Muslim competition and segregation also appears in the literature. According to Janine A. Clark, “the highest concentration of Islamic clinics can be found in areas with large numbers of Christians and Christian clinics.” If Muslim and Christian communities increasingly segregate themselves and systematically reduce daily interactions in this fashion, the potential for confessional strife increases.

A second facet of this hypothesis extends to relationships between the Sunni and Shi’a Muslim populations in Egypt. While Muslim-Christian relations in Egypt have been the subject of considerable debate and study, until very recently the relationship between
Egypt’s Sunni majority and the tiny Shi’a minority was almost completely ignored. Yet the escalation of violence in Syria, and Mohammed Morsi’s passive reaction to increasing anti-Shi’a incitement by some of his supporters that resulted in the horrific June 2013 lynching of four Shi’a men in Cairo, suggests the relevance of this hypothesis.

**H5: Exposure to Religious Service Providers Decreases Sectarian Attitudes**

Yet there is also the possibility that Islamic medical facilities—which bring together Muslim and Christian patients—may actually be “tranquilizers to sectarian agitations.” Ashutosh Varshney studied ethnic conflict in India and found that those neighborhoods with crosscutting civil-society institutions (in his case, institutions where Muslims and Hindus interacted) were less likely to experience ethnic strife. These institutions, Varshney theorized, serve a number of palliative functions, including quashing rumors, providing venues for conflict resolution and communication, and policing neighborhoods. A 1990 investigative report in Al-Ahram offered anecdotal support to Varshney’s thesis. The article detailed confessional overlap at religious medical clinics under the headline “Stronger than Discord, Stronger than Sectarianism: Hundreds of Muslim Patients Visit the Virgin Mary Clinic, Christian Women Visit Specialists in Women’s Health in the Mosque.” More anecdotally, hospital interview subjects would almost always emphasize how they did not discriminate among patients on the basis of religion, and were happy to hire Christian doctors and nurses.

In order to test hypotheses three, four and five, respondents were asked about their level of comfort with “a Christian family moving into a majority-Muslim neighborhood” and “a Shi’a family moving into a majority-Sunni neighborhood.”

**H6: Exposure to Religious Service Providers Has No Measureable Effect on Personal Attitudes**

Other scholars have questioned the narrative connecting social service provision and ideological change. In particular, they argue that individuals simply do not care enough for the identity of a service provider for it to influence their ideological orientation. Simpler concerns such as price, proximity or personal ties matter much more. Summarizing her findings from a lower-class Cairene neighborhood, Mariz Tadros suggests:
A woman from Bulaq el Dakrour might have her blood pressure taken in the nearby pharmacy; her glasses done at the Wafd (political) Party Health Centre, her blood tests taken at a private clinic, dental care sought at a government teaching hospital while sending her daughter to the female doctor at a Muslim association (a registered service-providing NGO) for gynecological treatment.42

In her book on Islamic civic associations in Gaza, Sara Roy argues that Hamas’s social activities are, by and large, dedicated to creating and developing civic communities, and that their potential to change religious outlooks, let alone radicalize populations, are often overstated.43 Tarek Masoud focuses more on the potential of these facilities for political, and not ideological, mobilization. “Mosques, charities, and religious associations may create Islamist voters,” he tells us, “but they do not create Islamists.”

Another important point is that the doctors who work in these clinics, be they operated by the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya or Ansar al-Sunna, often juggle other jobs, including a “day job” in a government facility. For instance, one doctor I spoke with at a medical clinic affiliated with Hizb al-Asala (“Authenticity”), a small Salafi political party, worked during the day at a private hospital, had his own successful private practice where he worked a few days a week, and volunteered infrequently at the ramshackle party clinic.45 Others, particularly the younger doctors with whom I spoke, viewed their work as just “a way to get experience.”46 At one al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya clinic, the nurse who gave me the tour did not even wear a hijab (head scarf). This, naturally, raises the question of how much ideological pressure an unideological provider can apply to a patient, even in a nominally “ideological” setting.

In the next section, I sketch out the history and organizational capacities of three Egyptian Islamic organizations: the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya and Ansar al-Sunna al-Mohammediyaa. This serves two purposes. First, these organizations (especially al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya and Ansar al-Sunna) have received only very limited attention in the English-language literature; their social service networks have received even less. Second, the information in the following section contextualizes what then follows. Without precise information on the actual extent and character of the services these organizations provide, a full evaluation of the results of the experimental manipulation that follows is impossible.
Section 2: Organized Islamic Social Activism in Modern Egypt

For decades, scholars have focused on Egypt’s long history of confronting jihadist groups. Similarly, after Hosni Mubarak’s February 2011 resignation and the subsequent electoral success of Salafist political parties such as Hizb al-Nour, researchers shifted their examination to politicized Salafist groups. Since the 3 July 2013 military coup, attention has swung back to violent groups such as Ansar Beit al-Maqdis/Wilayat Sinai. Yet there have been only limited studies of those Salafist groups that eschew both politics and violence, preferring instead a long-term and below-the-radar focus on religious and social reform. Researchers seeking to examine these organizations have confronted serious practical difficulties in addition to their lower profile. Although nonviolent, these organizations have for much of their existence been tightly monitored by the regime, subject to often arbitrary closures, detention and harassment of staff, and invasive reporting requirements. Although these strictures briefly receded after 2011, they returned following the July 2013 military coup.

The challenge of practically researching this aspect of Islamic activism has caused contradictory claims to proliferate. Even basic information about the size, history and scope of these movements is often contested. For instance, in the introduction to his edited volume about global Salafism, Roel Meijer claims that Salafism is “not very strong” in Egypt. Yet Will McCants estimates that there are approximately 3 to 5 million Salafis in that country, far outstripping the estimated 200,000 Muslim Brothers. The 3 to 5 million claim is, more or less, in line with an estimate from Abdul Moneim Abu El Foutouh, a former presidential candidate and erstwhile Muslim Brother. In an interview prior to the 2012 presidential elections, he claimed that Salafis outnumber Brotherhood members twenty to one.

More confusion exists over the basic date that Salafism, as a phenomenon, emerged in Egypt. Although some authors date it to the 1970s, the phenomenon has deeper roots in Egypt, stretching back to the beginning of the 20th century. In 1912, Sheikh Mahmoud Khattab El-Sobki, a graduate of al-Azhar, established al-Gam‘iyya al-Shariyya to train preachers, to build mosques and to combat the intrusion of what he saw as bid‘a (innovation, heresy) and khirafat (superstitions) into religious practice. El-Sobki attributed these theological deviations to foreign and domestic causes—European influence on one hand, and the proliferation of Sufi orders on the other. Importantly,
al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya provided social services from its outset, including hospitals and clinics offering reduced prices, as part of its mission to bring “practical Islam” to the people.\textsuperscript{58} By demonstrating the applicability of (its interpretation of) Islam to solving everyday problems, al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya hoped to attract Muslims to apply these religious principles in other aspects of their life.

A founding principle of al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya was accommodation with the government and the avoidance of “foolish politics” (al-siyasa al-khurqa’a). Yet the group was not completely politically quietist.\textsuperscript{59} El-Sobki was politically active from the outset, boycotting European goods and preaching against the British occupation (for which he was arrested in 1914 and imprisoned for three months), advocating for trade unions and being active against the early stages of “the Zionist colonialist attack.”\textsuperscript{60} In conjunction with the boycott, al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya also launched its own “homespun” movement, opening its own factory to produce clothes so its members would not have to buy and wear foreign garments.\textsuperscript{61} In 1952, following the Free Officers’ revolt, al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya sent the leaders a telegram requesting that they implement the sharia as a way to combat social ills.\textsuperscript{62} When I brought up this episode with al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya members, they noted that they have continued to do this to the present day. As an example of this, they pointed to messages sent to Egypt’s erstwhile first lady Suzanne Mubarak offering the group’s advice on certain social and development programs.\textsuperscript{63}

Fourteen years after the founding of al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya, in 1926, Sheikh Mohammed Hamid al-Fiqqi founded Ansar al-Sunna al-Mohammediyah with a circle of acquaintances, most of them fellow graduates of al-Azhar.\textsuperscript{64} Al-Fiqqi himself was a student of Rashid Rida, an early proponent of Salafism in Egypt who grappled with the relationship between Islam and the West.\textsuperscript{65} Like al-Sobki, al-Fiqqi reportedly established his organization after witnessing the intrusion and influence of what he saw as both Sufi and European norms into traditional Islamic practices and culture.\textsuperscript{66}

From its origins, Ansar al-Sunna boasted strong intellectual, personal and financial links to Saudi Arabia.\textsuperscript{67} Certainly there is an ideological affinity between Ansar al-Sunna and the dominant strands of Islam as official Saudi religious institutions interpret it. Gilles Kepel, for instance, describes Ansar al-Sunna as Saudi Arabia’s “religious embassy” in Egypt.\textsuperscript{68} Yet as Richard Gauvain notes, whether these relationships ran from Egypt to Saudi Arabia or the reverse is an open question. Al-Fiqqi’s successor at Ansar al-Sunna,
for instance, occupied a senior place on Saudi Arabia’s fatwa council and helped shape educational curricula in the kingdom. The group’s own semiofficial history repeatedly mentions Saudi Arabia’s intellectual influence on the organization, including trips of Ansar al-Sunna figures to Saudi Arabia and their roles in official Saudi institutions, and, vice-versa, the time that Saudi Arabia’s religious scholars have spent with Ansar al-Sunna figures. King AbdelAziz Ibn Saud himself reportedly played in important role in opening Ansar al-Sunna’s headquarters in the Abdeen neighborhood of Cairo.

Charitable provision or other types of organized social work was not part of Ansar al-Sunna’s early activities. In contrast to al-Gam’iiyya al-Shar’iiyya’s more holistic focus on reform, Ansar al-Sunna’s approach to combating what its members saw as corrupting innovations was highly textual and academic, based on the Qur’an and hadith scholarship. This tended to create a cloistered, relatively elitist environment conducive to debating Islamic legal issues with fellow scholars and theologians. A second factor restricting the group’s social role is the lack of a space for women’s activism within Ansar al-Sunna. Both the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Gam’iiyya al-Shar’iiyya created a space for women to participate in their respective movements, particularly in administering and working in medical facilities, schools, and day care centers (dawr hidana).

As a result, Ansar al-Sunna’s conduits to the broader population have, until relatively recently, been limited to intellectual enterprises such as training preachers, giving lectures, printing literature, and distributing books. It was only in 1946 that the group began to provide medical charity, and even then such charity was a minor part of the group’s overall mission. In interviews, Ansar al-Sunna figures would openly acknowledge that they lacked the experience or professionalism in service delivery that marked the Brotherhood or al-Gam’iiyya al-Shar’iiyya.

Two years after al-Fiqqi established Ansar al-Sunna, Hasan al-Banna established the Muslim Brotherhood in Ismailiya, on the Suez Canal. Although the Brotherhood shared with the other two organizations a focus on religious reform, al-Banna also included a social dimension directed, at least initially, toward reforming village and rural life. Although the group began mainly through individual, small-scale projects (such as refurbishing or building mosques and schools), it soon expanded to larger projects, many centered on medicine. These allowed the group to increase its opportunities for contact with the population and to spread its message. Some
observers have claimed that the purpose of such projects was not so much to change the beliefs of society in general, but rather to open avenues for recruitment among Egypt’s burgeoning professional class.79

**Social Service Provision under Nasser**

Around the time of the Free Officers’ 1952 coup, all three of these organizations were involved in social service provision. In 1956, Ansar al-Sunna had forty-six branches nationwide mostly offering “religious services and lectures” (5,750 people served), but also providing limited distributions (162 packages) of “monthly and seasonal aid in cash.”80 That same year, al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya operated fifty-eight branches in Cairo alone, with most of its efforts focused on “religious talks and services,” “monthly and seasonal aid in cash” and “burial facilities” and the construction of graves. The group also operated two hundred dispensaries or small medical clinics around Egypt.81 The Brotherhood, for its part, was also a sizeable organization; one account suggests that in 1949 the group had roughly five hundred branches and close to one million members.82

In terms of specific social services, the Brotherhood inaugurated a formal “Medical Section” in November 1944, although individual branches had been providing medical services for years by that point.83 Toward the end of the 1940s, the group’s facilities in and around Cairo alone were treating over 100,000 patients a year.84

The emergence of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s regime would set in motion a dramatic shift in the structure of Egyptian nonstate service provision. At the core was an implicit bargain with the population: in exchange for political quiescence, Egyptian citizens would reap government-provided economic and social benefits, including education, health care and the promise of full employment in national industries. Specifically among the new regime’s promises to the citizens was a nationwide health care system theoretically able to place a medical unit within 3 kilometers of each village in Egypt.85

In parallel with his expansion of the government’s provision of social services, Nasser also expanded the web of administrative and bureaucratic controls over the nongovernmental sector. The chief bureaucratic instrument for this effort was the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA). Egypt’s rulers had established the organization in August 1939 to prevent “instability” and to ensure that the monitored organizations would not use their initiatives for political and partisan purposes.86 Mainly through Law 49 of 1945 and Law 384 of 1956, the ministry supervised organized charitable and
social activities by requiring groups to seek the ministry’s permission and certification before appointing personnel and engaging in formal operations.87 The passage of Law 32 of 1964 considerably strengthened these monitoring mechanisms.88 In particular, the law endowed the Ministry of Social Solidarity with extraordinary powers to catalog, monitor, interfere with, merge and even shutter charitable organizations.89

In the late 1960s, Nasser relied on this law to forcefully join Ansar al-Sunna with the much larger al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya.90 He acted amid rising criticism over Israel’s decisive defeat of Egypt’s in 1967, the risk of renewed Islamic mobilization and protest (Sayyid Qutb had been executed in 196691) and a deteriorating relationship with Saudi Arabia. Nasser then assigned an army officer, Abdelrahman Amin, to head the combined organizations. Despite his affiliation with the military, in histories of Ansar al-Sunna, Amin is generally appreciated for being a good man who helped, as much as he could, to preserve the religious character of the organization. He was, according to one Ansar al-Sunna sheikh, “a devout man, but without knowledge of Sharia.”92

Yet Ansar al-Sunna resented Nasser for his decision “to still their pens and silence their tongues.”93 They also chafed at having to sit under al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya’s leadership, a resentment that provides an instructive illustration of the theological differences between the two ostensibly similar groups. Particularly, Ansar al-Sunna felt that al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya was “contrary” to Salafism because of its “complete Ash’ari-ism” (Ash’ariyya bil-tamam). This, Ansar al-Sunna believed, was a back door to allowing innovation in religious practice.94 So immediately upon Nasser’s 1970 death and Anwar el-Sadat’s assumption of power, Ansar al-Sunna’s leaders began to lobby the new president to let the organization reestablish itself independently. In 1972 Sadat relented, giving the organization independent legal status under its “second founder” and fourth president, Rashad al-Shafa’ie.95

The Brotherhood, on the other hand, emerged from the Nasser era in a state of disarray. The regime had closed or taken over many of the group’s social service institutions.96 Still riven by internal ideological debates over the legitimacy of violence, and administratively shattered, the Brotherhood tentatively began to reorganize and rebuild.97 As Anwar el-Sadat loosened restrictions on Islamic activism, Ansar al-Sunna and al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya played an important role in the Brotherhood’s reestablishment. In his memoirs, Abdel Moneim Abu El Fotouh, a former member of the Brotherhood’s guidance council, discusses how sheikhs affiliated with these
organizations helped correct the image of the Brotherhood he had received from Nasser’s propaganda.98 Mohammed Habib, another former member of the guidance council, calls Ansar al-Sunna a “refuge and sanctuary” during Nasser’s persecution of the Brotherhood in the fifties and sixties. He goes on to recount how he initially connected with the Muslim Brotherhood through Ansar al-Sunna. As he describes, a teacher from the Brotherhood was traveling among Ansar al-Sunna branches, looking for youth to help rebuild the Brotherhood.99 A senior member of the Brotherhood would later say that in times of mihna (inquisition) al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya and Ansar al-Sunna served as “a good incubator” for Brotherhood youth.100

A key point in the Brotherhood’s reintegration into Egyptian politics and society came in 1977. In that year Dr. Ahmed al-Malt (who died in 1995), the deputy to three leaders of the Brotherhood (Umar Telmessani, Hamid Abu Nasr and Mustapha Mashour) and a crucial figure in the group’s post-Nasser reorganization, founded the Islamic Medical Association (IMA).101 This organization would grow to become the most significant aspect of the Muslim Brotherhood’s medical service provision, eventually operating dozens of hospitals, medical clinics and specialized centers across Egypt.102

**Mutual Interests: Service Provision under Sadat and Mubarak**

In addition to helping to construct a bulwark against leftist mobilization, Anwar el-Sadat’s outreach to Islamists also complemented his embrace of free-market reforms, the *infitah*. Specifically, liberalizing Egypt’s economy meant dismantling the bargain Nasser had struck decades earlier: political quiescence for economic development and an extensive state-provided welfare network.103 Driving home the danger, riots followed an initial attempt to cut back on state social spending in early 1977. By allowing civil associations, including Islamic ones, to proliferate, Sadat hoped to cushion the blow from market-based reforms and prevent a repeat performance.104

Subtly investing Islamic civil and social associations in the task of regime maintenance opened up a schism between the Brotherhood, in particular, and Egypt’s jihadist groups. Egypt’s jihadists charged that, by accepting the regime’s terms and submitting itself to state regulation (under Law 32 of 1964, for instance), the Muslim Brotherhood was supplementing and maintaining the regime it supposedly opposed. Abdelsalam Faraj, the ideological architect of Anwar el-Sadat’s assassination, wrote in his famous pamphlet *The Neglected Duty* (*Al-Farida al-Gha’iba*) that:
There are those who say that we should establish societies that are subject to the state and that urge people to perform their prayers and to pay their zakat tax and to do [other] good works . . . However when we ask ourselves: “Do these works, and acts of devotion, bring about the establishment of an Islamic State?” then the immediate answer without any further consideration must be “No.” Moreover, these societies would in principle be subject to the State, be registered in its files, and they would have to follow [the State’s] instructions.  

Despite Sadat’s 1981 assassination at the hands of Islamist militants, his successor, Hosni Mubarak, continued to use ostensibly independent civil associations to maintain and support the regime. So long as these newly emerged civil-society groups submitted to the web of bureaucratic and security control that had grown since the 1960s, they had a relatively free hand to pursue social, ostensibly nonpolitical activities. In practice, this meant that the Islamic associations such as al-Gam’iiyya al-Shar’iiyya, Ansar al-Sunna and the Muslim Brotherhood operated legally and in the open, registered with and inspected by multiple overlapping state and local bureaucracies. In some cases, they would come close to actually merging with the regime. Sarah Ben Nefissa describes al-Gam’iiyya al-Shar’iiyya as a “parapublic” organization, owing to its close relationship with the regime during this time. Manal Abdel Salam Badawy studied a Cairene neighborhood clinic in the late 1990s and found that Ansar al-Sunna’s neighborhood welfare network was entwined with the state’s safety net. Even a local social worker drew two salaries, one from the Ministry of Social Affairs and one from Ansar al-Sunna.

This evidence complicates the narrative that these social service institutions are radicalizing the population and turning people against the state. First, the regime heavily regulated and surveilled these facilities, making it likely that any clandestine activity would be quickly discovered. On its face, this suggests that these facilities were not engaged in any type of overt radicalization or recruiting. Second, with some exceptions (such as Imbaba in the early 1990s), Egypt’s jihadist groups eschewed social service provision in favor of attacking both regime and civilian targets. Their focus remained on targeted, cadre-based violence (such as assassinations) rather than broad revolutionary activism or popular engagement.
The strategy of relying more and more on a web of nonstate actors to supplement rickety public services also constrained the regime’s options. Especially as the threat from jihadist groups declined toward the end of the 1990s, the Brotherhood’s political activism became a key area of concern for the Mubarak regime. But the importance of the group’s social activism to Egypt’s stability limited the extent to which the regime could crack down on these initiatives. As an official from state security told an administrator of a Brotherhood hospital during a raid in the mid-1990s, “If you weren’t helping us carry the load, you all would be in prison right now.”

In the 2000s the Mubarak government began sporadically targeting the Brotherhood’s network of social services. In 2007, Fathi Surour, the powerful National Democratic Party parliamentarian from the Sayyida Zeinab neighborhood in Cairo, appropriated the Islamic Medical Association’s clinic in the district. The regime also picked on other IMA hospitals by seizing on small infractions such as uniforms on the floor, a dripping faucet or missing smoke alarms, and then forcing those hospitals to close for extended periods of time. In 2010, the regime used jackhammers and heavy machinery in an attempt to destroy parts of the group’s high-profile Central Charity Hospital in Nasr City. The demolition continued for weeks and set back the completion of the hospital nearly four years.

In addition to its fraying relations with the Brotherhood, relations between the regime and al-Gam’iyya al-Shariyya began to deteriorate in the 1990s. In particular, as elections emerged as sites of contestation between the regime and the opposition, both sides began to covet al-Gam’iyya al-Shariyya’s wide and deep social service networks. And although the religious character of both the Brotherhood and al-Gam’iyya al-Shariyya eased their cooperation, especially at the local, day-to-day levels, it did not always unite the organizations. National Democratic Party (NDP) officials also used al-Gam’iyya al-Shariyya’s reputation and networks to influence voters.

This increasing politicization caused problems with the regime. According to Sarah Ben Nefissa, the government dissolved al-Gam’iyya al-Shariyya’s board in 1990 (again under the authority of Law 32 of 1964) after a local branch came under the control of pro-Muslim Brotherhood individuals. Apparently an “old guard” in al-Gam’iyya al-Shariyya who opposed the group’s politicization seized the opportunity to remake the group’s leadership. In late 1999, a similar skirmish between an al-Gam’iyya al-Shariyya branch in Tanta and the Ministry of Social Affairs over candidates for the al-
Gamʿiyya al-Sharʿiyya board led to a lawsuit. This conflict eventually led the Supreme Constitutional Court to overturn the new law on charitable organizations, Law 153 of 1999, which was designed to update Law 32 of 1964.\textsuperscript{116} Law 32 went back into effect until 2002, when a new charities law was passed, Law 84 of 2002.\textsuperscript{117}

As it did with the Brotherhood, the regime also began to harass specific al-Gamʿiyya al-Sharʿiyya facilities. While I found no evidence that the type of harassment included closures and destruction, as faced by the Brotherhood’s facilities, al-Gamʿiyya al-Sharʿiyya did face numerous delays and bureaucratic harassment while building an X-ray center in the outskirts of downtown Cairo. According to one of the board members of the project, Mubarak became angry that the group had chosen to erect the facility in a prominent spot on Salah Selim Street, a major thoroughfare connecting downtown Cairo to Nasr City.\textsuperscript{118}

Following the February 2011 departure of Hosni Mubarak, the three organizations began to cooperate more openly. During Egypt’s brief political opening, candidates from both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafist Hizb al-Nour touted their affiliations with Ansar al-Sunna in their biographies.\textsuperscript{119} In the presidential and parliamentary elections, the press recorded incidents of collaboration between Islamist candidates and al-Gamʿiyya al-Sharʿiyya’s and Ansar al-Sunna’s charitable networks. In one instance, al-Gamʿiyya al-Sharʿiyya allegedly used its vehicles to transport “fully veiled [female] voters” (al-nakhibat al-munaqibat) to polling stations, allegedly to support the Brotherhood.\textsuperscript{120} In other cases, the Brotherhood’s political party (the Freedom and Justice Party, FJP) cooperated with local branches of both Ansar al-Sunna and al-Gamʿiyya al-Sharʿiyya to provide medical services.\textsuperscript{121} In July 2012 in Aswan, the local branch of Ansar al-Sunna hosted a Freedom and Justice party medical caravan.\textsuperscript{122} It appears that, at least for al-Gamʿiyya al-Sharʿiyya and Ansar al-Sunna, the ostensibly “nonpolitical” nature of charitable events (even if they were organized with a political party) eased cooperation with the sharply politicized Muslim Brotherhood.

**Section 3: A Snapshot of Organized Islamic Social Service Provision**
The Muslim Brotherhood

As mentioned previously, the Islamic Medical Association carries out the majority of the Muslim Brotherhood’s organized medical efforts. The association is nominally an independent entity from the Brotherhood, having its own board of directors and management structure. In practice, however, it is closely tied to the group through the participation of prominent members of the Brotherhood on its board and in managerial positions throughout the organization. The Islamic Medical Association has been registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs since its inception in the late 1970s and currently operates dozens of medical facilities across Egypt. The group’s flagship operation is the advanced Central Charity Hospital in Nasr City, which is located beside the upscale City Stars mall and hotel complex.

In contrast to the facilities that al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya and Ansar al-Sunna operate, the Islamic Medical Association’s centers benefit from tighter, more centralized and more professional organization. Financial matters, including paychecks, are handled locally but reviewed by the central administration. The central administration also monitors the individual hospitals and internally rates them according to the status and professionalism of the facilities. If a hospital falls below the organization’s own standards (which are different from the minimum standards set by the Ministry of Health), the central office can step in to shift staff around and bring in more experienced or qualified managers to improve the situation. Not surprisingly, this gives the organization a reputation for providing high-quality services and general professionalism. In some cases, other organizations will inaugurate medical initiatives and later, after struggling to manage them or losing money, will ask the Islamic Medical Association to assume control of the endeavor.

The centralization creates a type of standardization across IMA facilities that is absent from the medical facilities the other groups operate. They generally have the same types of procedures available, a regular schedule specifying which high-quality doctors and specialists will be in at what time, and the same level of equipment and technology. Ansar al-Sunna’s flagship “Kuwaiti Hospital” and the Islamic Medical Association’s Central Hospital, for instance, are comparable facilities, both with very high quality equipment and a large staff of specialists. Yet there can be large differences between other, non-flagship facilities. This is due, in part, to the funding of these facilities. Because of Ansar al-Sunna and al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya’s decentralization, their
facilities tend to more closely assume the characteristics of the neighborhoods in which they are located: wealthy areas tend to boast better equipped, higher quality and larger facilities, while poorer locales make do with less-experienced (cheaper) doctors and specialists.

Like al-Gamʿiyya al-Sharʿiyya’s and Ansar al-Sunna’s facilities, the Islamic Medical Association’s facilities do not make a profit. Any surplus is funneled back into the facility, often to expand it physically or to upgrade equipment. According to the IMA’s own balance sheets, from 2005 to 2011 the number of “poor” patients never exceeded 5 percent of the total number of treated patients. When an individual is too poor to pay for treatment (and the organization can identify if this person truly needs the help through local contacts), he or she is directly subsidized with profits. In other cases, the doctors will waive a portion of their fees (particularly for a surgery) to reduce the costs.

The July 2013 military coup hit the Brotherhood’s social sector hard. The regime froze the Islamic Medical Association’s funds, forcing a number of hospitals to curtail operations, especially dialysis and neonatal care. Shortly after the freeze, the IMA published a letter on the front page of the national daily Al-Ahram. In it, the group petitioned the prime minister, as well as the ministers of social solidarity, justice and health, to unfreeze the funds, “in the name of 2 million sick and tens of thousands of those who receive kidney dialysis on a continuing basis, and premature infants, and those unable to pay for their treatment, as well as those who visit the hospitals.” The facilities remain in operation as of early 2015, although they have seemingly been placed in a type of receivership, in which the government has taken over the management of their assets.

The regime also seized or closed other types of social services connected to the Brotherhood, and an administrative court in Cairo also recommended dissolving the Brotherhood. While the ruling has wound its way through Egypt’s judicial system, early in 2015 the regime began to dissolve swathes of these NGOs: in late February the Ministry shuttered 169 institutions, and on March 1st they dissolved 112 more. The regime dissolved a further 99 in mid-March. The regime also singled out the group’s schools for seizure or closure. As of the publication of this paper, the schools are operating under the custody of the Ministry of Education.
Al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya

Al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya’s footprint includes around 3,000 branches nationwide. Sarah Ben Nefissa refers to it as “the most important Islamic charity organization in terms of social and political power, and in geographic spread. It has come to win the largest ‘market share’ of Islamic social services in Egypt.” Mohamed Fahmy Menza characterizes the group as “Egypt’s largest and most powerful Islamic Social Institution.” Official statistics on the group’s reach, however, are more difficult to come by. For instance, the official handbook (dalil) of the organization lists 332 mosques. But in a 2005 interview, the organization’s leader claimed that the group controlled twenty times that, over 6,000 mosques. The association also claims to own 43 institutes to train preachers and 1,154 Qur’an memorization centers nationwide, serving approximately 70,000 boys and girls. The group also provides corpse preparation and burial services, for which it is particularly well known in the rural, poorer areas of Egypt.

It is in the medical field where al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya truly makes its weight felt. Across Egypt, the group operates specialized eye, GI/endoscopy, dialysis, burn center and cancer care hospitals, including a dedicated chemotherapy center. It also provides a number of specialized centers for premature infants in the Beheira, Cairo, Giza, Menufiyya, Qalubiyya, Fayum, Kafr al-Sheikh, Sohag, and Suez governorates. The Almaza Hospital near Cairo, the “jewel” of al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya’s network of premature birth centers, boasts 150 incubators. In addition to these specific advanced medical facilities there are likely hundreds of smaller al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya clinics that exist throughout Egypt (usually just one- or two-room clinics with a few, usually part-time, staff).

Al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya relies extensively on donations to fund its operations. According to officials in al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya, many of its donations come from wealthy Egyptians who want to donate money but are unsure of how to maximize their contributions. Because they have either heard of al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya or encountered its work in passing, they trust the organization to handle their donation professionally and see it disbursed correctly.

In terms of staffing, while support personnel (nurses, technicians, administrative assistants) may have full-time jobs at the facility, doctors and specialists juggle multiple
jobs and move in and out of the individual facilities frequently. This caused consternation among the managers of some clinics. The manager of one al-Gamʿiyya al-Sharʿiyya clinic lamented how many of the doctors at the clinic took quite a utilitarian perspective on their work, and they would leave the clinic once they had amassed enough of a following to support a private practice. He felt compelled to offer higher and higher salaries to keep doctors at his clinic, because he felt that bringing in new doctors would compromise the trust that the neighborhood residents had placed in his clinic, and more broadly in al-Gamʿiyya al-Sharʿiyya. Further, he had worked with these doctors in his clinic for over two decades as they had grown from young doctors to prominent specialists, and so they were quite familiar with the maladies and medical histories of patients of the area. Bringing in new doctors would, essentially, have meant starting from scratch.\(^{143}\)

In addition to the brick-and-mortar facilities, al-Gamʿiyya al-Sharʿiyya operates “medical convoys” (Qawafel Tibiyya) to underserved areas, which began in January 2004.\(^{144}\) According to statistics that al-Gamʿiyya al-Sharʿiyya published, the group dispatches roughly two caravans a week and averages roughly 43,000 cases per year. Difficult cases are sent to more specialized facilities, including the group’s Mustapha hospital in Nasr City, for surgery or more in-depth care.\(^{145}\)

Post-coup, al-Gamʿiyya al-Sharʿiyya came under pressure for suspected links to the Brotherhood.\(^{146}\) The regime closed some al-Gamʿiyya al-Sharʿiyya institutes because of links (either real or suspected) to the Brotherhood.\(^{147}\) In response, both al-Gamʿiyya al-Sharʿiyya and Ansar al-Sunna have kept a low public profile and pursued accommodation with Egypt’s military government.\(^{148}\) For al-Gamʿiyya al-Sharʿiyya, the strategy has seemingly paid off, and in June 2014 the group was apparently cleared of all charges of collaboration with the Brotherhood and was allowed to resume its operations.\(^{149}\)

Yet the government has erected a sturdy regulatory apparatus to monitor and maintain control over charitable organizations. Over the summer of 2014, the government tightened its control over mosques, forcing all preachers to reapply for licenses from the state. Around 12,000 applications were reportedly rejected, including Mokhtar al-Mahdi’s, the head of al-Gamʿiyya al-Sharʿiyya. As one government figure put it, “The aim is to prevent mosques from serving agendas of political parties or being used as propaganda machine for any ideology either those with the government or not.”\(^{150}\)
In a similar strategy, the regime has also taken steps to implement a new monitoring law for civil-society groups. The new law would, according to Human Rights Watch, “give the government and security agencies veto power over all activities of associations in Egypt and would sound the death knell for the independence these groups have fought to maintain.” The most recent step came on 18 July 2014, when the Ministry of Social Solidarity published an announcement in the state-owned daily Al-Ahram directing all NGOs to dissolve and reapply to the ministry within 45 days. The deadline was extended, and it expired on 10 November. The following day, however, the minister of social solidarity reportedly told the press that she was delaying enforcement of the decision pending further investigations.

**Ansar al-Sunna**

For its part, Ansar al-Sunna generally kept a much lower profile during the Mubarak years as the views of the Saudi quietist figure Rabi al-Madkhali rose to prominence in the group. Occasionally the state security services would arrest members and implicate them in militant activities, but generally the group’s leaders refused to countenance anti-regime activism. The group’s president, Abdullah Shakir, had even gone on the record in 2010 supporting the hereditary secession of Gamal Mubarak to the presidency (tawreeth).

As the protest movement gained steam throughout 2010, Ansar al-Sunna’s sheikhs issued fatwas (legal opinions) opposing participation in the demonstrations against Hosni Mubarak. Some figures affiliated with Ansar al-Sunna attacked the opposition directly. In December, Mahmud Amir, an Ansar al-Sunna figure in Damanhour, issued a fatwa authorizing the killing of Mohammed el-Baradei, then the head of the National Front For Change, for advocating protests against Mubarak. Ansar al-Sunna officially rejected the statement and promised to discipline Amir.

Somewhat surprisingly, given their support for the prior regime and refusal to join the anti-Mubarak protests, Ansar al-Sunna found themselves in the midst of a controversy with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which led Egypt following Mubarak’s ouster. A leaked judiciary report soon after Mubarak’s resignation indicated that Qatar has given EGP 181 million (approximately USD $28 million) to Ansar al-Sunna. A spokesman for Ansar al-Sunna challenged the allegations in Al-Ahram. In another statement, which the group posted on its website, Ansar al-Sunna’s president
stated that the group received “only” $800,000 in foreign contributions, the largest portion of which came from Kuwait.\(^{160}\) Reportedly, members of Ansar al-Sunna are still awaiting trial in the case.\(^{161}\)

On the eve of the 3 July 2013 military coup, Ansar al-Sunna had 152 branches and controlled around 2,000 mosques in 15 governorates.\(^{162}\) Most of the group’s emphasis remains on intellectual and scholastic outreach; the group has twenty-five two-year training institutes, three three-year institutes, and two four-year training institutes for preachers. In addition, Ansar al-Sunna boasts 203 Qur’an memorization centers and freely distributes multiple books and pamphlets, many of which are printed by the Kuwait-based Islamic Heritage Society.\(^{163}\) The group’s website claims that Ansar al-Sunna runs 27 hospitals across Egypt.\(^{164}\)

The group’s largest and newest hospital, the al-mustashfa al-Kuwaiti al-takhassus (Kuwaiti specialized hospital) is located in Banha, north of Cairo in Qalubiyya governorate.\(^{165}\) The fourteen-story, eighty-bed hospital is so named because the majority of its financing came from donations collected in Kuwait. The hospital, which took five years to complete, is Ansar al-Sunna’s first health initiative in Banha. Like the other Ansar al-Sunna facilities, the Kuwaiti hospital is financially self-contained, receiving no financial assistance from the organization’s Cairo headquarters. The hospital is able to fund itself because only a minority of its patients are poor—in the estimate of one of the board members, around 20 percent of them. “This is a charity hospital,” he explained, “but it is run according to investment principles.” In practice, this means that the hospital charges fees and pays its personnel as a private hospital would, but funnels its profits back into the hospital to either fund expansion or, more frequently, to subsidize the minority of its patients who qualify for either lower prices or free care.\(^{166}\)

According to Ansar al-Sunna officials, the group hires doctors and medical staff through a competitive process. There are no attempts to actively discriminate against those outside the movement, although they conceded that preexisting social ties between individuals in the Ansar al-Sunna network likely increase the probability of hiring someone intellectually predisposed to the organization. More anecdotally, however, my interview with a board member at an Ansar al-Sunna hospital was interrupted when two Christian doctors arrived to interview for jobs at the facility.\(^{167}\)
Section 4: Service Provision and Attitudinal Change: An Empirical Test

The next section describes and justifies the use of a survey experiment that allows statistical tests of the hypotheses described earlier. To briefly review, various authors have suggested six distinct effects of Islamic social service provision on sociopolitical attitudes. They argue that exposure to Islamic social services either (1) increases personal religiosity; (2) increases tolerance for violence; (3) decreases tolerance for the presence of Christian religious minorities; (4) decreases tolerance for the presence of Shi’a religious minorities; (5) increases tolerance for religious minorities; and (6) has no effect on personal attitudes.

I tested these six hypotheses through a telephone-based survey of 3,707 adult Egyptians conducted in May 2014. The survey also included a randomized experimental component, modulating a specific informational prime across the control and two treatment groups. The size of each subgroup (~1,200) has the added benefit of furnishing basic information on how Egyptians use and think about different types of social services. The English- and Arabic-language survey forms, as well as a methodological appendix on the sampling strategy, are available online.

Despite their frequent use in American politics, survey experiments remain quite rare in Middle Eastern contexts. However, three recent examples stand out. In their survey experiment, Daniel Corstange and Nikolay Marinov varied information about Iranian and American interest in Lebanese elections to explore how foreign actors did, and did not, polarize Middle Eastern electorates. Amaney Jamal, Tarek Masoud and Elizabeth Nugent explored how modulating information about Western hegemony in the Muslim world influences support for Islamism. And Jason Lyall, Graeme Blair and Kosuke Imai studied how wartime violence affects civilian attitudes toward combatants.

Briefly, a survey experiment randomly assigns respondents into control and treatment groups, exposes the treatment group to some stimuli and then infers causality through comparing the results of the treatment group with the control control. This technique improves on both traditional survey research and lab-based experimental methodologies. The random, representative sample of the population under consideration improves applicability (external validity) over laboratory experiments, where the tested population may differ significantly from the population of interest.
Secondly, random assignment and manipulation of the independent variable increases internal validity by controlling for potentially confounding and hidden variables. Because exposure to the treatment condition is the only factor that distinguishes the two groups, any difference in outcomes must logically be the result of the experimental manipulation.

In contrast to traditional surveys, the survey experiment’s ability to uncover causality—and not just correlation—is particularly important for understanding the relationship between social service provision and attitudinal change. Consider if a traditional survey uncovered a strong correlation between intensity of religious belief and use of an Islamic medical facility. While interesting, the direction of this relationship would actually remain unclear. We would not know if someone’s use of an Islamic medical facility intensified his or her Islamic belief, or if one’s intense Islamic beliefs caused him or her to seek out Islamic facilities in the first place.

This survey uses a “mere mention” design, as Paul M. Sniderman and Thomas Piazza crafted in their study of race and affirmative action in American politics. This approach is designed, as the authors put it:

> To simulate the kinds of conversations that ordinary people undoubtedly have about affirmative action and the characteristics of blacks. The basic idea is . . . to determine whether references to affirmative action can, in and of themselves, excite negative reactions to blacks.

In my version of the survey, enumerators read all survey respondents a short paragraph about medical provision in Egypt. However, the content of the information the respondents heard subtly differed according to the survey form to which the respondent had been randomly assigned. Specifically, the control version contained information about the Ministry of Health’s medical services. In one treatment group this was changed to the Muslim Brotherhood’s medical services, and in the other treatment group this was changed to al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya’s medical services. The prompt, with the modulated text appearing in italics, is as follows:

> Now I would like to ask you some questions about organization and their activities in the field of medical provision in Egypt. Organization operates many hospitals and clinics in all parts of the country, and these facilities provide a wide
range of medical services to millions of Egyptians every year, among them the poor and destitute. Have you heard about these facilities before?

In order to gather additional information, the respondent received further questions about their experience with these brick-and-mortar facilities. Then, following the treatment battery, all respondents received the same series of questions assessing their attitudes about various facets of religious belief, the legitimacy of various forms of violence, and relationships toward religious minorities.¹⁷⁵

The relationship under consideration here approximates, but does not directly test, the relationship between social service provision and behavioral change. Most obviously, this survey experiment is based on a fleeting “mere mention,” while the “real-life” relationship it is designed to simulate is more concentrated or prolonged (consider visiting the same hospital multiple times, or being saved from a potentially life-threatening malady).

On the one hand, this cautions against overinterpretation of the results. On the other, any short-term attitudinal response to the survey hints at the capacity of social service provision to permanently shift attitudes and behaviors. If—as Sniderman and Piazza note in their own context—a “mere mention” is enough to excite a strong negative (or positive) reaction, then it seems reasonable to assume that a more intense, extended exposure to that service provision may indeed produce stronger versions of the effects measured here.

The survey experiment is also somewhat unusual in that it assesses effects across two treatment groups rather than utilizing a traditional treatment-control setup. One benefit of this design is that it helps isolate the effect of the specific organization, to determine whether the response prompted by the Muslim Brotherhood prime is less than, equal to or greater than the al-Gam’iyya al-Shar‘iyya prime, or vice-versa. For instance, while the first part of this paper demonstrated the on-the-ground ways that the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Gam’iyya al-Shar‘iyya differ, the two organizations may be essentially indistinguishable for Egyptian citizens. Yet it is also possible that the relatively more political Muslim Brotherhood and the relatively less political al-Gam’iyya al-Shar‘iyya would generate differential reactions in survey respondents.

Further, the varied audiences of these groups suggest the utility of testing for differential effects. A number of authors have made the point that Islamists, and the
Muslim Brotherhood in particular, generate the bulk of their support among middle-class audiences. Further, Jannie Clark studied Islamic clinics in Cairo and found a distinct middle-class bias in this provision. On the other hand, authors who have examined al-Gamʿiyya al-Sharʿiyya have noted that organization’s emphasis on the poor. For this reason, I also consider differential effects of provision based on socioeconomic class, which I divide into poor and nonpoor groups.

A number of assumptions must also be kept in mind when interpreting the results of the experimental manipulation, and when comparing the organizations’ effects against one another specifically. One is that respondents are as knowledgeable about one group as they are about the other. This experiment, for instance, is designed to prompt respondents to think not just generally about the Islamic organizations (the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Gamʿiyya al-Sharʿiyya, respectively) but specifically about these organizations’ activism in the realm of social service provision. If respondents do not make this association upon hearing the prompt, then the causal mechanism becomes difficult to test.

In fact, the results of a manipulation check at the end of the survey form show that respondents may not have reacted to both prompts in the same fashion: Priming respondents with information about the Muslim Brotherhood’s social services does provoke respondents to think about these efforts more positively. The al-Gamʿiyya al-Sharʿiyya prime, however, does not produce a statistically significant difference in how respondents view that organization. Although the al-Gamʿiyya al-Sharʿiyya prime does produce measurable effects in how respondents respond to substantive questions, particularly on the legitimacy of religiously justified violence, the fact that the manipulation check failed to detect a result suggests caution must be used in interpreting these results.

Before presenting the results of tests of these hypotheses, this paper will first discusses the possibility that respondents are intentionally altering their answers to avoid official sanction and retaliation.
Uncovering Response Bias

Both the descriptive statistics and the results of the survey experiment require a caveat. As noted previously, since the July 2013 military coup the Egyptian government and Islamic organizations, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, have been engaged in an often-violent confrontation, resulting in hundreds, if not thousands of Muslim Brothers killed and imprisoned. In the background, both state and private media have engaged in an extensive campaign of demonization against the group. This, naturally, raises the possibility that respondents underreport both their knowledge of and interaction with Islamic organizations to avoid an expected sanction from the regime. And this effect is likely not distributed evenly across both Islamic groups; people are potentially more circumspect about revealing their interaction with the Muslim Brotherhood than their interaction with al-Gam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya, which is a lower-profile and a less overtly political group. If respondents modulate their answers based on fears of security service retribution, they may strategically deflate responses to certain questions while inflating responses to others.

A list experiment allows a test for this possibility. These instruments are particularly valuable for their ability to ascertain potentially hidden biases or attitudes. Because of this, they appear frequently (as the mere mention construction discussed earlier) in the study of racial attitudes. In a list experiment, individual respondents are granted anonymity to more freely express their opinions and ostensibly escape either social opprobrium or official sanction. Yet while the individuals retain anonymity, the aggregate results reveal whether, when granted anonymity, the population is more likely to express hidden attitudes. James H. Kuklinski et al. describe the technique, which they used in a study of affirmative action:

Imagine a representative sample of the general population divided randomly into two. One half is presented with a list of three items, and asked to say how many of the three make them angry—not which items, just how many. The other half is presented with the same list with one item added—a race item—and is also asked to say how many of the items make them angry—not which ones, just how many. Suppose, for the sake of argument, some respondents in the second half take exception to two of the items, and one of the two that angers them is the race item. Asked how many items make them angry, they respond “two.” It will seem to these respondents quite impossible for the interviewer to figure out that
one of the items upsetting them is racial in content. . . . Although the interviewer cannot tell in the course of the interview if the race item has angered a particular respondent, the analyst can determine afterwards the level of anger in the population as a whole and in strategic subsets of it.\textsuperscript{182}

Recently, scholars have begun to adopt Kuklinski et al.’s technique in countries where the fear of government retaliation potentially causes respondents to modify their answers.\textsuperscript{183} The same possibility motivates the use of a list experiment in the Egyptian context. Rather than race-related, the fourth item that may have potentially angered respondents was “the military alone controlling the government.” While it is not feasible to completely protect respondents from their fear of reprisal, this offers some way to test for the possibility that respondents’ fears are severe enough to cause them to falsify their preferences. Specifically, if the prospect of security service retribution was indeed frightening Egyptians, we should expect that when granted anonymity, the percentage of respondents whom this item “bothered or upset” would rise significantly. If, on the other hand, respondents were unconcerned with the role of the security services in Egyptian life, the mean number of items that “bothered or upset” individuals would not change when the fourth item was added to the list.

The table below presents the difference-in-means tests across all groups. The “four-item list” includes “the military alone controlling the government” whereas the “three-item list” does not.

The results reveal that adding a fourth item to the list (an item concerning the military’s control over the government) significantly increases the mean number of total items on the list that anger respondents. Put differently, “the military controlling the government” apparently angered 34.9 percent (which is the four-item mean minus three-item mean, multiplied by 100) of all respondents.\textsuperscript{184} The effect is quite noticeable across all four groups, although it decreases in strength (while retaining significance) when limited to the respondents who received the forms asking about the Muslim Brotherhood (29.8 percent) and al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya (23.3 percent), respectively.
Figure 1: Average Number of Items per List that “Bother or Upset” Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Full Sample N=1417</th>
<th>Control Only N= 473</th>
<th>Muslim Brotherhood Treatment Only N= 477</th>
<th>Al-Gam’iiyya al-Shar’iiyya Treatment Only N= 467</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 item list</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=711</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 item list</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=706</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean number of</td>
<td>1.973</td>
<td>1.879</td>
<td>1.979</td>
<td>2.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>items on each</td>
<td>2.322 ****</td>
<td>2.391 ****</td>
<td>2.277 **</td>
<td>2.298 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>which make</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>people angry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**** = p ≤ .0000 *** = p ≤ .001; ** = p ≤ .01; * = p ≤ .05. Std. Error in parenthesis.

This provides a fairly solid indication that, when granted anonymity, respondents were more likely to criticize the military’s control of the government than when asked directly. One implication of these results is that respondents do take into account potential regime sanctions when answering sensitive questions, and thus they may be expected to modify their response to some or all of the questions considered here. This provides important context for interpreting the following results.

The next section presents findings from the survey experiment in two parts. First are simple descriptive statistics charting respondents’ knowledge of and experience with facilities from the Ministry of Health, the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Gam’iiyya al-Shar’iiyya, as well as their familiarity with those entities’ medical caravans. The second section presents the results of t-tests comparing responses across control and treatment groups. The conclusion offers an interpretation of the results and specifies extensions and future directions of study.

**Descriptive Statistics**

As mentioned previously, one difficulty in the study of Islamic groups’ provision of social services is the lack of basic empirical data about the extent of these groups’ networks across the Egyptian population. To highlight this question, figure 2 presents responses to the questions assessing familiarity with and usage of medical facilities...
operated by the Ministry of Health, the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Gam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya, respectively.

**Figure 2: Familiarity with and Usage of Medical Services**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ministry of Health</th>
<th>Muslim Brotherhood</th>
<th>Al-Gam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Answered</strong></td>
<td>Total “yes”</td>
<td>Total “yes”</td>
<td>Total “yes”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(yes + no)</strong></td>
<td>Response</td>
<td>Response</td>
<td>Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Have you heard of this organization’s brick and mortar facilities?</strong></td>
<td>1226</td>
<td>638 (%52)</td>
<td>1220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Have you used this organization’s brick and mortar facilities?</strong></td>
<td>1240</td>
<td>780 (%62.9)</td>
<td>1215</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With the earlier caveat about preference falsification kept in mind, the most notable finding concerns the scope of each group’s provision. Specifically, a higher percentage of Egyptians are familiar with al-Gam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya’s medical provision than the Muslim Brotherhood’s. Notably, this includes those both having heard about the organization and those having used it. This finding offers some support to the earlier anecdotal and historical evidence that al-Gam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya’s provision of medical services is more widespread than the Brotherhood’s own efforts.

With this data in mind, I present the results of the experimental manipulation in the next section. I first discuss the hypotheses connecting social service provision to religiosity. I then examine the two questions concerning violence. The last section presents the results of questions designed to test sectarian attitudes. Finally, recall that the null hypothesis is that service provision simply does not affect personal attitudes on these issues in a meaningful way.
Results: Religiosity

The battery measuring religiosity contained three questions. All Muslim respondents were presented with three behaviors that “some people believe it is important for Muslims to do” and were asked their opinion of these behaviors’ importance on a four-point scale, from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (4). To measure personal dimensions of religiosity, respondents were queried about women in their family wearing the niqab (the full face veil). To measure a social dimension, respondents were asked about discussing Islam with their friends and neighbors (da`wa). To capture political dimensions, respondents were asked about giving religious authorities the power to review legislation. The results are presented separately as a principal component factor analysis revealed a low \( \alpha \) (.3881).

Figure 3: Religion Battery, Aggregate Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personal (Women should wear the niqab)</th>
<th>Muslim Brotherhood</th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0= strongly disagree, 3= strongly agree</td>
<td>1.396 (.034)**</td>
<td>1.266 (.035)</td>
<td>1.321 (.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n= 1077</td>
<td>n= 1069</td>
<td>n= 1061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social (One should speak to friends and neighbors about Islam)</td>
<td>1.84 (.037)**</td>
<td>1.668 (.039)</td>
<td>1.73 (.038)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0= strongly disagree, 3= strongly agree</td>
<td>n=1092</td>
<td>n=1089</td>
<td>n=1086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political (Religious authorities should have a role in reviewing legislation)</td>
<td>2.119 (.034)**</td>
<td>2.254 (.031)</td>
<td>2.177 (.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0= strongly disagree, 3= strongly agree</td>
<td>n=1059</td>
<td>n=1028</td>
<td>n=1051</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** = \( p \leq .001 \); ** = \( p \leq .01 \); * = \( p \leq .05 \). Std. Error in parenthesis.
Figure 3 displays the results of the experimental manipulation across the three religion questions, including the results of t-tests comparing the group means. Note that in all the following tables the answer scales have been zeroed (they read 0–3 rather than 1–4). Figure 4 reproduces these results disaggregated by economic class of the respondents.

Figure 4: Religion Battery, Disaggregated by Economic Class

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslim Brotherhood</th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(Women should wear</strong></td>
<td><strong>Non-Poor</strong></td>
<td><strong>Control</strong></td>
<td><strong>Al-Gam’iyya al-</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>the niqab)</strong></td>
<td>1.36 (.042)</td>
<td>1.24 (.044)</td>
<td>1.28 (.043)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>0= strongly disagree, 3= strongly agree</strong></td>
<td>n=622</td>
<td>n=636</td>
<td>n=643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poor</strong></td>
<td>1.45 (.055)</td>
<td>1.30 (.056)</td>
<td>1.38 (.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n=455</td>
<td>n=433</td>
<td>n=418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(One should speak</strong></td>
<td><strong>Non-Poor</strong></td>
<td><strong>Control</strong></td>
<td><strong>Al-Gam’iyya al-</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>to friends and</strong></td>
<td>1.74 (.048)</td>
<td>1.60 (.05)</td>
<td>1.61 (.048)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>neighbors about</strong></td>
<td>1.74 (.048)</td>
<td>1.60 (.05)</td>
<td>1.61 (.048)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Islam)</strong></td>
<td>n=641</td>
<td>n=653</td>
<td>n=667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.98 (.056)</td>
<td>1.76 (.061)</td>
<td>1.93 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poor</strong></td>
<td>n=451</td>
<td>n=436</td>
<td>n=419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.08 (.044)**</td>
<td>2.26 (.04)</td>
<td>2.19 (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political</strong></td>
<td><strong>Non-Poor</strong></td>
<td><strong>Control</strong></td>
<td><strong>Al-Gam’iyya al-</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(Religious</strong></td>
<td>2.08 (.044)**</td>
<td>2.26 (.04)</td>
<td>2.19 (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>authorities should</strong></td>
<td><strong>n=643</strong></td>
<td><strong>n=633</strong></td>
<td><strong>n=663</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>have a role in</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>reviewing legislation)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>0= strongly disagree, 3= strongly agree</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poor</strong></td>
<td>2.17 (.052)</td>
<td>2.24 (.051)</td>
<td>2.16 (.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n=416</td>
<td>n=395</td>
<td>n=388</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** = p ≤ .001; ** = p ≤ .01; * = p ≤ .05. Std. Error in parenthesis.

**Discussion**

These results provide some support for H1: exposure to information about Islamist social services increases personal religiosity. The strongest evidence for this is that
receiving the Muslim Brotherhood treatment did shift respondents’ attitudes about the personal and social aspects of religion in a conservative direction. As a baseline, the control groups registered mild agreement with the statements that “it is important for women in your family to wear the niqab” and “it is important to call your friends and neighbors to Islam.” In comparison, the treatment group receiving information about the Muslim Brotherhood’s provision of health services registered a higher level of support for both propositions. While slight in absolute terms, the shifts on both the personal and social questions were statistically significant at the .01 level.

However, the shift disappeared when disaggregating by socioeconomic class. While both the poor and middle-classes experienced a shift when measured independently, the shift was only very weakly significant at p ≤ .10.

The aggregate effect did not appear in the results for the al-Gam’iiyya al-Shar’iiyya group. While those respondents who received information about al-Gam’iiyya al-Shar’iiyya’s social service provision seemingly evinced more religiously conservative attitudes than the control group, the effect was not strong enough to reject the null hypothesis (p ≤ .05). The null finding remained when disaggregating on the basis of social class, as neither the poor nor the nonpoor respondents demonstrated a detectable shift in attitudes.

The question assessing attitudes toward a political role for religion revealed a significant but unexpected shift in attitudes. Egyptian Muslims’ baseline attitude is in fairly strong agreement with the proposition that religious figures should have a role in reviewing legislation. Yet those who received information about the Muslim Brotherhood’s health care provision were less likely than the control group to support a political role for religious figures. Further, this shift appears to be driven disproportionately by the middle-class respondents. When eliminating the middle-class respondents from both the treatment and control, the effect was not statistically detectable. Taken together, these results are not supportive for H1. In fact, they directly contradict it; mentioning the Brotherhood’s social service provision does not attract respondents to the group’s ideology, it repels them from it.

Again, those in the al-Gam’iiyya al-Shar’iiyya group seemed to display a similar reaction, although the shift did not approach statistical significance. This remained constant even when disaggregated into social class.
The earlier findings regarding preference falsification, coupled with the ongoing conflict between the government and Egyptian Islamic movements discussed in the qualitative section earlier, may better contextualize the results. It may be that those individuals queried directly about religious groups purposefully deflate their support in order to avoid appearance of siding with the government’s opponents in questions of political authority. In the personal and social realms, seemingly more divorced from political conflicts, respondents may feel freer to express their opinions without filtering them. It could also be the case that these facilities do increase an individual’s religiosity in the personal and social sphere, but this increase simply does not carry over into the political sphere. Perhaps one consequence of the Muslim Brotherhood’s two-plus-year domination of Egyptian politics was to heighten the importance of the segregation of religion and politics.

The results of this intervention complicate broader theories about the interplay of social service provision and personal attitudes. In isolation, the attitudinal change of those exposed to the Muslim Brotherhood treatment should provide evidence that social service provision can potentially shift religious attitudes. However, were this true more broadly, those individuals exposed to the al-Gam’iyya al-Shar‘iyya treatment would also register a shift in religiosity.

As to why the Muslim Brotherhood would provoke this shift but al-Gam’iyya al-Shar‘iyya would not, it is possible only to speculate. On the one hand, this result may simply be a reflection of the Muslim Brotherhood’s being more well-known generally. On the other hand, as noted in figure 2, more Egyptians are familiar with al-Gam’iyya al-Shar‘iyya’s medical provision than the Muslim Brotherhood’s efforts in this realm. At any rate, the inability of the al-Gam’iyya al-Shar‘iyya prompt to shift respondents compared with the Muslim Brotherhood prompt strongly suggests that the identity of the provider matters. The precise reasons why this is the case appear to be a ripe area for future research, yet even at this stage the differential reactions, or, rather, the ability of one group to provoke a reaction and the inability of another, suggests the importance of disaggregation.

**Results: Violence**

Before I present the questions designed to chart Egyptians’ attitudes toward violence, it is important to note at the outset that this battery required extensive pretesting and
modification because of pervasive floor/ceiling effects: Egyptian respondents were nearly unanimous in refusing to countenance religiously motivated violence no matter how the question was phrased.

In order to measure tolerance for violence against Western targets, respondents were told: “A few years ago some privately owned European newspapers published cartoons of the Prophet Muhammed. Some people said that this was insulting and some demonstrators attacked Western embassies in response.” On a five-point scale, respondents were asked their opinion as to whether such attacks were justified, from “never justified” (1) to “always justified” (5).\textsuperscript{185}

To measure violence directed internally (that is, against Egyptian targets), respondents were then asked the extent to which they agreed with the statement that “sometimes, it is legitimate to target Egyptian citizens in order to defend Islam.” Again, they were asked their response on a five-point scale, stretching from “never justified” (1) to “always justified” (5).\textsuperscript{186}

**Figure 5: Violence Battery, Aggregate Statistics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attacks on Western Embassies</th>
<th>Muslim Brotherhood</th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never Justified = 1</td>
<td>1.53 (.05)</td>
<td>1.408 (.05)</td>
<td>1.61 (.052) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always Justified = 5</td>
<td>n=1089</td>
<td>n=1091</td>
<td>n=1089</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attacks on Fellow Egyptians</th>
<th>Muslim Brotherhood</th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never Justified = 1</td>
<td>.283 (.025)</td>
<td>.223 (.022)</td>
<td>.217 (.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always Justified = 5</td>
<td>n=1105</td>
<td>n=1110</td>
<td>n=1111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** = \( p \leq .001 \); ** = \( p \leq .01 \); * = \( p \leq .05 \). Std. Error in parenthesis.

Figure 5 displays the results of the experimental manipulation across the question, including the result of t-tests. Responses here are zeroed (they read 0–4 rather than 1–5). Figure 6 displays the results disaggregated by economic class.

**Figure 6: Violence Battery, Disaggregated by Economic Class**
Discussion

Egyptian Muslims in the control group were generally reluctant to justify either externally or internally directed violence. As a baseline condition, however, respondents were generally more likely to justify attacks on Western embassies in response to private papers publishing cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed than attacks against their fellow Egyptians “in order to defend Islam.”

The mean response of those receiving the Brotherhood treatment seemingly shifted toward this violence being justified, although the difference was not enough to rule out the null hypothesis. In other words, it is possible that this was the shift was the product of random chance rather than the experimental manipulation. Disaggregating the respondents based on socioeconomic class also fails to produce a statistically significant result.

Those who received treatment at al-Gam‘iyaa al-Shari‘yya facilities, however, were more likely to see attacks against Western embassies as justified, and this was statistically significant. On the one hand, this is counterintuitive and puzzling, given the Brotherhood’s more politically activist interpretation of Islam. On the other hand, it may be that al-Gam‘iyaa al-Shari‘yya’s more conservative (although less activist) conception exercises an effect on individual’s predilections to defend the religion against perceived provocations like the Mohammed cartoons. However, it seems unlikely that this more violent interpretation of Islam would manifest its effects in such a roundabout way here yet not appear in the explicitly religious questions discussed in the previous section.
It may also potentially be the case that the finding is an outlier, based on some stochastic factor rather than the manipulation. Notably, this finding seems entirely driven by the nonpoor respondents. The poor moved in the same direction, yet not enough to generate a statistical effect. Further, the inability of the al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya treatment to budge respondents’ opinions on internally directed violence looms particularly large, for if this manipulation caused respondents to become more supportive of violence, we might expect it to be consistent across type. In fact, receiving the al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya treatment made individuals *more resistant* to using violence against their fellow Egyptians.

In line with the earlier findings related to religiosity, respondents to this battery reacted dissimilarly based on the specific identity of the provider. Again, the findings suggest analytical disaggregation.

It is also difficult to extrapolate this finding in terms of social service provision and radicalization. First, the particular context likely matters a great deal; in Egypt there exists a potentially comparable public alternative, the Ministry of Health’s network. Yet in situations of extreme conflict or poorly institutionalized states, the proper comparison may be between the nonstate provider and no provider at all.

Secondly, the attitudes toward violence may be a subset of broader attitudes of general support for the provider organization. This survey experiment did not test how social service provision affects general attitudes of support for the provider organization. For instance, a future iteration of the experiment might refine the attitudinal question by not asking about support for violence in general, but about specific acts of violence in which the provider organization engaged, or about a specific organization known for engaging in violent acts.

**Results: Sectarianism**

The sectarianism battery included two questions. The first asked respondents on a four-point scale the extent to which they “strongly supported” (1) or “strongly opposed” (4) a Christian family buying a house in a majority-Muslim neighborhood. The second question substituted “Shi’a family” for “Christian family” and “majority–Sunni Muslim neighborhood” for “majority-Muslim neighborhood.”
Figure 7: Sectarianism Battery, Aggregate Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslim Brotherhood</th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Al-Gam’iyya al-Shariyya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To what extent do you agree with a Christian family buying a home in a majority-Muslim neighborhood?</td>
<td>0= Strongly Agree</td>
<td>n= 466</td>
<td>0= Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4= Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>n=446</td>
<td>4= Strongly Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0= Strongly Agree</td>
<td>.991 (.042)</td>
<td>.908 (.039)</td>
<td>.931 (.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4= Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>n=446</td>
<td>n=446</td>
<td>n=433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent do you agree with a Shia Muslim family buying a home in a majority-Sunni Muslim neighborhood?</td>
<td>0= Strongly Agree</td>
<td>n=416</td>
<td>0= Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4= Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>n=415</td>
<td>4= Strongly Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0= Strongly Agree</td>
<td>2.368 (.044)</td>
<td>2.443 (.041)</td>
<td>2.408 (.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4= Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>n=416</td>
<td>n=415</td>
<td>n=402</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** = p ≤ .001; ** = p ≤ .01; * = p ≤ .05. Std. Error in parenthesis.

Figure 7 displays the results of the experimental manipulation across the two questions, including the results of t-tests. The relatively lower response rates are due to isolating a portion of the respondents to this question for a separate study. Figure 8 presents the disaggregated statistics. Note that the scales here are zeroed (they read 0–3 rather than 1–4).
Figure 8: Sectarianism Battery, Disaggregated by Economic Class

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To what extent do you agree with a Christian family buying a home in a majority-Muslim neighborhood?</th>
<th>Muslim Brotherhood</th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Al-Gam’iiyya al-Shar’iiyya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0= Strongly Agree</td>
<td>4= Strongly Disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Poor</td>
<td>.894 (.052) n=254</td>
<td>.778 (.045) n=257</td>
<td>.838 (.043) n=259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>1.11 (.068) n=212</td>
<td>1.08 (.066) n=189</td>
<td>1.07 (.07) n=174</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To what extent do you agree with a Shia Muslim family buying a home in a majority-Sunni Muslim neighborhood?</th>
<th>Muslim Brotherhood</th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Al-Gam’iiyya al-Shar’iiyya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0= Strongly Agree</td>
<td>4= Strongly Disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Poor</td>
<td>2.27 (.062) n=219</td>
<td>2.42 (.055) n=243</td>
<td>2.4 (.054) n=240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>2.47 (.061) n=197</td>
<td>2.48 (.063) n=172</td>
<td>2.42 (.064) n=162</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** = p ≤ .001; ** = p ≤ .01; * = p ≤ .05. Std. Error in parenthesis.

Discussion

Neither the Brotherhood nor the al-Gam’iiyya al-Shar’iiyya treatments produced a statistically significant shift in attitudes on either question. Disaggregating based on social class likewise reveals no significant effects. Yet the baseline results (the results of the control group) are instructive in and of themselves. Muslim Egyptians are significantly more likely to accept a Christian moving into a majority-Muslim neighborhood than a Shi’a Muslim moving into a majority Sunni Muslim neighborhood. As to the dynamic behind the animosity, the extremely small number of Shi’a in Egypt suggests the possibility that the polarization is a reflection of broader regional trends and geopolitical rivalries.

Especially in the context of the qualitative evidence introduced earlier, these results provide no evidence for theories linking social service provision to increasing sectarian conflict.
Null Hypothesis

As discussed in the review of the literature, a number of authors have taken exception to the general assumption that motivates this study: that the use of social service provision can, over time, shift the beliefs and behaviors of recipients on questions of religiosity, violence and sectarianism. Many of the results from this experiment support these authors’ skepticism.

The results of the religion battery were most notable for their ability to produce a shift, but this shift was apparent only in the case of the Brotherhood and disappeared when the results were disaggregated based on economic class. The other clusters tested here (violence and sectarianism) seemed relatively unaffected by either treatment group. One conclusion is that the ability of social services to stimulate attitudinal change on these questions is not as large as many have suspected, although again these tests are also relatively (and necessarily) weak approximations of any “real-world” effect. Nonetheless, these results provide the most extensive test of these hypotheses to date, and they should be taken seriously when crafting and assessing theories linking social service provision to these specific attitudinal outcomes.

Also, as mentioned earlier, the manipulation check showed that the ability of the al-Gam’iiyya al-Shar’iiyya treatment to move respondents was potentially limited. While there was evidence that the Muslim Brotherhood prime increased respondents’ opinion of the group’s social service efforts, the ability of the al-Gam’iiyya al-Shar’iiyya prime to prompt a shift in underlying knowledge was not detected in the manipulation check. In light of this, it is somewhat unsurprising that the al-Gam’iiyya al-Shar’iiyya prime did not produce an effect on many of the questions (save the question of religiously motivated violence against Western targets). At least according to the manipulation check, receiving the informational prime about al-Gam’iiyya al-Shar’iiyya neither increased respondents’ knowledge about the organization nor changed their opinion of it.\(^{187}\) Yet this conclusion, that the Brotherhood’s provision of social services is somehow unique vis-à-vis other Islamic groups’ provision of these services, is still instructive and points a direction for future research.
Conclusion

Although authors have advanced a number of intriguing theories about Islamic social service provision, the production of historical and empirical information to contextualize and fully evaluate these theories has lagged. This paper attempts to improve on these deficiencies. It first provides a case study of the evolution and spread of organized Islamic health care provision in Egypt, based on the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya and Ansar al-Sunna al-Mohammediyaa. The second section uses an original survey experiment to test theories linking service provision to changes in individual religiosity, tolerance for violence and sectarian attitudes.

A number of findings are notable. First, these three organizations oversee largely distinct social service networks, although there are episodes of cooperation between all three. These episodes accelerated after 2011, although episodes of earlier collaboration and overlap also exist. In part, the differentiation stems from each organization’s conceptualization of how charitable provision supports—or does not support—its broader strategies of religious and social transformation. While the Brotherhood and al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya integrated charitable provision into their outreach strategies from their founding, Ansar al-Sunna is a relative latecomer. Although its general provision lags behind the Brotherhood’s and al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya’s networks, ambitious new projects such as the Kuwaiti hospital in Qaloubiyya speak to the Ansar al-Sunna’s potential to mobilize resources in this arena.

The first particularly relevant conclusion that emerges from the qualitative sections of this study is that these social service networks seem to be facing different fates after the 3 July military coup. Whereas the Muslim Brotherhood’s network has seen schools and medical facilities confiscated and community associations shuttered, al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya seems to have escaped the post-Morsi crackdown with much of its network intact. All organizations, however, are finding their conduct increasingly subject to aggressive efforts by the regime to police civil-society activism.

Second, the expanding Islamic social service provision helped successive Egyptian governments manage biting economic reforms while maintaining their hold on power. By shifting social service provision to nonstate groups, including Islamic organizations, the state alleviated some of privatization’s most pernicious effects. When this strategy began to backfire as Islamic groups became more and more politically assertive, the
regime responded by passing more and more management responsibilities to the security services. The evidence accumulating during the post-Morsi period suggests that President Abdelfattah el-Sisi may be changing this logic. Despite an increasingly severe fiscal crisis, the Egyptian government has acted to aggressively shutter Islamic social service providers, especially those linked to the Brotherhood. One notable recent development is the decision to simply expropriate the group’s facilities and run them as arms of the government, rather than allow them to continue to operate under much tighter surveillance. At this stage the regime seems willing to tolerate the risk of general social instability so long as they are able to uproot the Brotherhood’s network of support. The longer this confrontation drags out, however, the more precarious the balancing act becomes.

Third, the survey experiment provides only limited support for theories linking social service provision to attitudinal change on questions of religiosity, tolerance for violence and sectarianism. Evidence for an attitudinal effect was strongest in the religious battery among the group receiving the Muslim Brotherhood treatment. In these cases, individuals receiving information about the Muslim Brotherhood’s social service provision reported more religiously conservative attitudes along personal and social dimensions, but more liberal attitudes regarding the role of religion in politics. Other hypotheses tested reveal no statistically significant shifts. While the survey method here uses only a “mere mention” to approximate a much more complex real-world interaction, this survey goes further than any prior effort to test theories linking Islamic social service provision and attitudinal change.

At the same time, the possibility that preference falsification is significantly distorting the results cannot be ruled out. Indeed, the list experiment showed that a notable portion of respondents apparently modulated their responses to questions about the security services based on a fear of reprisal. While this does not prove that respondents modulated their responses to other questions in the survey for fear of reprisal or sanction, these results suggest that some portion indeed did so.188

Examining the degree of preference falsification triggered by the respective treatments (Muslim Brotherhood versus al-Gam’iiyya al-Shariyya) is instructive. Comparing those in the Muslim Brotherhood group who answered the four-item list, with those in the control group who answered the three-item list, revealed that 39.8 percent of those queried potentially modulated their responses. Comparing those in the al-Gam’iiyya al-
Shar’iyya group who answered the four-item list with those in the control group who answered the three-item list showed that 41.9 percent of that group potentially modified their response. Curiously, however, Egyptian’s baseline condition was an even higher degree of preference falsification—comparing the three- and four-item means inside the control group suggested that 51.3 percent of the sample modulated their concerns. In other words, asking Egyptians about Islamic groups seems to have decreased the degree to which they modulated their answers.

For policymakers struggling with broad theoretical approaches to Islamic groups, one important implication of this paper is the way that it shows, with both qualitative and quantitative information, precisely how superficially similar “Islamic” organizations produce different on-the-ground effects. In light of this, it seems unwise to speak of “Islamic” social service provision when, in fact, different Islamic groups produce varied outcomes. This, in turn, is relevant to understanding broader approaches to the analysis of Islamic groups. As Marc Lynch summarizes:

> In trying to understand Islamism, two approaches are possible. The first sees Islamism as essentially a single project with multiple variants, in which the similarities are more important than the differences. . . . The second approach sees consequential distinctions in the ideology and behavior of various Islamist strands.\(^{189}\)

While both the Muslim Brotherhood and the al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya treatment groups seem to move in the same direction on most of the questions studied here, they do so with different statistical strengths. This suggests that there is something unique about the Brotherhood’s social services able to shift individual attitudes in a way that mention of al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya’s services cannot. While more investigation is necessary to theorize the underlying dynamics, the finding that provider identity “matters” is notable both for theories of social service provision and an overall understanding of the varieties of Islamic sociopolitical activism.

Finally, it is important to note what this study does not examine. While this article explores the relation of Islamic groups’ provision to religiosity, attitudes toward violence and sectarian attitudes, it does not study the counterfactual. A full appraisal would also consider the effects of visiting an Islamic organization’s hospital versus the
potentially far more radicalizing effects not being able to receive health care at all. In other words, the types of provision under examination here may, in practice, render the population less susceptible to radicalization than the alternative.

1 The letter comes from a file that the Associated Press found in Timbuktu, and later translated and released as “The al-Qaida Papers.” It is available online at www.longwarjournal.org/images/al-qaida-papers-how-to-run-a-state.pdf.
3 *Studies in Comparative International Development* 46, no. 1 (special issue, Spring 2011), Melani Cammett and Lauren Morris MacLean, eds.
4 Berman, Shapiro and Felter’s aforementioned study approaches this issue by correlating behavioral outcomes (incidents) with the distribution of aid spending. They formally model the behavior at the individual level, but they do not test it.
5 Notably, I exclude other Salafist groups that are involved in service provision from the analysis simply because they lack the reach and the diversity of services that the Brotherhood, al-Gam‘iyya al-Shari‘iyya and Ansar al-Sunna can boast. The Da‘wa Salafiyya, for instance, are active in service provision, but they are closely identified with Alexandria, and during the bulk of their existence the security services hemmed them in there. Similarly, during the 1980s and 1990s, al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya provided social services in the Upper Egyptian governorates and in certain Cairene neighborhoods such as Imbaba. However, all these are essentially limited initiatives, in both geographic scope and the array of services provided. The Christian community in Egypt, as well as ostensibly secular organizations, also run similar social service networks, although they are much more limited than the Islamic organizations considered in this paper.
11 A number of works on the broad phenomenon exist. See Cammett, *Compassionate Communalism*. There are a few studies that examine the groups from the perspective considered here. Sarah Ben Nefissa, a longtime observer of the Egyptian NGO scene, has published valuable work (in French) on al-Gam‘iyya al-Shari‘iyya. Her 2002 chapter is particularly informative: Ben Nefissa, “Citoyenneté morale en Egypte: une association entre Etat et Frères Musulmans [Moral Citizenship in Egypt: An Association Between the State and the Muslim Brothers],” in *Pouvoirs et Associations Dans Le Monde Arabe*, Sarah Ben Nefissa, ed. (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2002). The Arabic-language literature on these organizations is quite spotty, but there are a few works that stand out. Abdelgaffar Shukr’s edited volume, *Al-Gami‘yyat al-Ahiliyya al-Islamiyya fi Misr* [Islamic Civic

There are numerous difficulties inherent in attempting to classify and categorize these organizations, given the fluidity and social nature of Islamic activism. But I also believe it is worthwhile to separate them, because they do differ organizationally, ideologically and in terms of their relationship with the state. For a broader discussion of Salafi ideology/ideologies and their usefulness as a concept in research, see, Roel Meijer, ed., Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement (New York: Columbia, 2009) and Bernard Rougier, ed., Qu’est-ce que le Salafisme? (Paris: Proche Orient, 2008).


This is increasingly considered a best practice in social science. See the discussion in Michael Findley, Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein, “Draft Proposal for a Pilot Registry for Political Science (PREPS)” (working paper, 3 October 2012). Available online at: http://cega.berkeley.edu/assets/cega_events/45/Weinstein_Draft_Proposal_for_a_PREPS.pdf.


Nachman Tal, Radical Islam in Egypt and Jordan (Brighton, UK: Sussex Academic Press/Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 2005), 47.

Importantly, all of the organizations deprioritize violence, preferring instead some blend of political, social or intellectual activism. Yet some regard their conservative religious ideology as a “conveyor belt” toward violent activism. See the summary in Marc Lynch, “Islam Divided between Salafi-jihad and the Ikhwan,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33, no. 6 (June 2010).


Ibid., 183.


See, for instance, Baran, “Roots of Violent Extremism.” See also Rewriting the Narrative, Washington Institute for Near East Policy.


Dawoud, Al-Jama’iyat al-Islamiyya fi Misr wa Dawruha fi Nashr al-Da’wa al-Islamiyya, 152.


“Ba’d al-Tahafuz ‘ala Madaris al-Ikhwan...Khibraa’: ‘al-Qarar Siyasi wa Laysa Ta’leemi’ (After Seizure of the Brotherhood’s Schools...Experts: This is a Political Decision, not an Educational One),” al-Rasad, April 21, 2014. Available online at: http://goo.gl/g2wHL1.

Clark, Islam, Charity, and Activism, 46.


Varshney, “Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society.”


I attempted to conduct interviews in a clinic affiliated (physically and ideologically) to the Coptic Church, but the staff refused to speak to me. There were, however, many Muslims in the waiting rooms.

Clark, Islam, Charity, and Activism, 39.


Tarek Masoud, “What’s the Matter with Cairo? Religion, Class, and Elections after the Arab Spring,” (working paper), January 24, 2013, pg. 3.

Author interview, Hizb al-Asala party activist, Cairo, May 2013.

Clark, Islam, Charity, and Activism.

50 The best is Richard Gauvain’s rich Salafi Ritual Purity: In the Presence of God (Abington, UK: Routledge, 2013), an ethno-hagiography focusing on the theological side of Ansar al-Sunna that also includes relevant information on al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya.
51 I conducted the bulk of the fieldwork for this project in the fall of 2012 and the spring of 2013, but even then I was turned away from some facilities and stonewalled by staff. However, individuals at most sites very graciously accepted me.
56 For those who date it to the 1970s, see Amani Maged, “Salafism: The Unknown Quantity,” Al-Ahram Online, 12 May 2011. See also Brian Wright, "A Legal Methodology of the Salafi Movement in Egypt" (master’s thesis, American University in Cairo, June 2012).
59 Al-Tahir, Jamaa’t Ansar al-Sunna al-Mohammadiyya, 36.
61 Dawoud, Al-Jama’iyat al-Islamiyya fi Misr wa Dawruha fi Nashr al-Da’wa al-Islamiyya, 87.
62 Ibid., 144.
63 Author interviews, al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya members, Giza, December, 2012.
66 For the emphasis on combating Sufi and European influences, see Al-Tahir, Jamaa‘at Ansar al-Sunna al-Mohammadiyya, 41–48.
67 For some interpretations of the group’s relationship to Saudi Arabia, see Hussam Tammam, Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun: Sanawat ma Qabla al-Thawra [The Muslim Brothers: The Pre-Revolutionary Years] (Cairo: Dar al-


89 Ibid., 91.

90 Even today, the discussion of charity sits only uneasily in Ansar al-Sunna’s broader conception of social reform. See, for instance, the discussion ibid., 422.


93 Author interviews with Ansar al-Sunna members, Cairo, January 2012. See the comparison of the three organizations’ goals, methods and ideologies Dawoud, *Al-Jama’iyat al-Islamiyya fi Misr wa Dawruha fi Nashr al-Da’wa al-Islamiyya*.

94 Author interviews with Ansar al-Sunna members, Cairo, January 2012.


97 Notably, they also worked closely with the national government and foreign powers in the field of public health, particularly sanitation and disease prevention. See Nancy Gallagher, *Egypt’s Other Wars: Epidemics and the Politics of Public Health* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990), 110–11, 124–25.

98 Munson, “Islamic Mobilization.”


100 Ibid., 186.


106 Both laws are translated in Istiphan, *Directory of Social Agencies in Cairo*.


Section 1 art. 4 (p. 257) allows the MSO to dissolve an organization, while Section 1, art. 29 (p. 259) allows the MOSA to forcefully merge organizations. There is a surprising amount of confusion over the exact dates when the organizations were merged and when they separated. Dawoud places the merger in 1965, Ben Nefissa and al-Tahir both say the merger occurred in 1967, Naseera says 1968 and Gauvain (citing Yunus) says 1969. Al-Tahir is also imprecise about the dates, mentioning only that the merger lasted "four or five years" (148).

Sayyid Qutb is perhaps the Brotherhood's most prominent theoretician, mostly known in the West for his legitimization of certain forms of violence. Despite exercising influence among contemporary jihadist groups, the Muslim Brotherhood struggled with and ultimately revised those aspects of his thought in the 1970s. See Barbara Zollner, "Prison Talk: The Muslim Brotherhood's Internal Struggle During Gamal Abdel Nasser's Persecution, 1954–1971," International Journal of Middle East Studies 39, no. 3 (August 2007).

Al-Tahir, Jama'a'at Ansar al-Sunna al-Mohammadiyya, 148 and Dawoud, Al-Jama'iyat al-Islamiyya fi Misr wa Dawruha fi Nashr al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya, 177, 180.


Al-Tahir, Jama'a'at Ansar al-Sunna al-Mohammadiyya, 149. For more on this charge and the differences between the organizations in this respect, see also Auda, "Al-Salafiyoon fi Misr," 10. The president of the Gam'iyya al-Shar'iyya does not dispute this, telling an interviewer, "We are Ash'ari in our doctrine." Quoted in Gauvain, Salafi Ritual Purity, 38. Ansar al-Sunna rejects Ash'arism as an overly rationalist approach to religious texts, which some Salafist groups see as dangerous because it relies on human intellect and logic as an intermediary between text and praxis, leading to deviations.

Khaled Mohammed Yunus, "Al-Qarn al-'Ashreen wa Juhud al-Harakat al-Da'wiyyya fi Misr;" 43. Al-Shafaei's nickname comes from his efforts to help the group re-establish their independence. Al-Tahir, Jama'a'at Ansar al-Sunna al-Mohammadiyya, 43–44.

See Gallagher, Egypt's Other Wars.

The best account of this critical period is Abdullah al-Arian, Answering the Call: Popular Islamic Activism in Sadat's Egypt (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). See also Zollner, "Prison Talk."


Abduh Mustapha Dessouki, "Dr. Ahmed al-Malt: Khidmat al-Deen wa al-Mujtama' [Dr. Ahmed al-Malt: Serving Religion and Society]," Ikhwanonline, 8 May 2008. The actual date of the Islamic Medical Association's founding is disputed. I use 1977 because that is the year the association formally registered with the Ministry of Social Solidarity (Wazirat al-Shu'un al-ljitma'iyya), as required by Law 32 of 1964. The announcement, and the ministry's note confirming the registration, is reprinted in the Brotherhood's magazine Al-Da'wa, December 1977, p. 65.

See Steven Brooke, "Brothers and Doctors," Middle East Report, no. 269 (January 2014).


It is also likely not a coincidence that the Islamic social sector took off thanks to financial flows from Gulf states and networks enriched by post-1973 energy markets; however, reliable, specific evidence of this is difficult to come by.

According to the Brotherhood, during the “Together We Build Egypt” campaign between 25 January 2013 and organized medical caravans to underserved areas. Since the deposition of Mubarak, the Brotherhood organized such caravans by (Freedom and) Justice Party in Matrouh, http://ikhwanonline.com/new/print.aspx?ArtID=92087&SecID=250.

There is still the possibility that radicalization was occurring elsewhere, however.


Author interview, Islamic Medical Association Hospital Assistant Manager, Cairo, May 2013.

For instance, in 1979, when residents of Mirs al-Qadima in Cairo elected Hassan Gamal, a Muslim Brotherhood personality, to parliament, he reportedly repaid the favor by bolstering the al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya institutions in the area. See Mohamed Fahmy Menza, “Neoliberal Reform and Socio-Structural Reconfiguration in Cairo’s Popular Quarters: The Rise of the Lesser Notables in Misr al-Qadima,” Mediterranean Politics 17, no. 3 (2012): 331.

Momen Masr’i and Naseera argue that Muslim Brotherhood infiltration was the true reason for the al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya “dissolution” in 1968. Naseera, “Al-Jama’iyyat al-Khairiyya wa al-Insaniyya al-Islamiyya fi Misr.”


Ben Nefissa, “Citoyenneté morale en Egypte.”

Ibid. See also Abdelrahman, Civil Society Exposed, 114. Hani Naseera argues that Muslim Brotherhood infiltration was the true reason for the al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya “dissolution” in 1968. Naseera, “Al-Jama’iyyat al-Khairiyya wa al-Insaniyya al-Islamiyya fi Misr.”


Author interview, member of al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya medical committee, Cairo, April 2013.


In addition, individual members provide charity under their own auspices, and the group has for years organized medical caravans to underserved areas. Since the deposition of Mubarak in February 2011, the Freedom and Justice Party generally organizes these caravans in cooperation with the Muslim Brotherhood. According to the Brotherhood, during the “Together We Build Egypt” campaign between 25 January 2013 and...

124 Masoud, Counting Islam, 76–79.

125 The hospital’s website is http://ima-hospital.com/.

126 Islamic Medical Association balance sheets, 2005–2011, author’s copy. Although some data are missing, the percentage of poor patients is remarkably stable over the six-year period.

127 Al-Ahram, 28 December 2013, p. 1. See also Brooke, “Brothers and Doctors.”


132 I discuss these efforts more fully in a forthcoming paper.

133 Al-Gamiyya al-Shari’yya al-Ra’iyya, al-Da’wa, al-Amal al-Salih, al-Ighatha, al-Tanmiyya [Protheslytizing, Welfare Work, Relief, Development], n.d., p. 10. This is significantly more that the 882 that Radha Allam cites; see “Engaging with Traditional and Modern NGOs in Egypt,” IRP Cairo Policy Brief (Cairo: Netherlands-Flemish Institute, May 2012), 3.


136 Humam Abdel Ma’boud, “Rais al-Gamiyya al-Shari’yya bi-Misr: Nushrīf ‘alā 6000 Masjid [President of al-Gama’iyya Shar’iyya in Egypt: We Supervise 600 Mosques],” almoslim.net, 4 April 2005, www.almoslim.net/node/86714. The difference, most likely, rests on whether or not one includes zawiya, the smaller, often informal and undercounted mosques (often simply prayer rooms) that populate many neighborhoods. In 1990, according to Sarah Ben Nefissa, the organization counted more than 450 branches and offices with between 2.5 and 5 million members in addition to 6,000 mosques. Ben Nefissa, “Citoyenneté morale en Egypte,” 148.


138 Many of the group’s ambulances are actually used to transport bodies for burial.

139 Mohammed Rashad, “Al-Afat al-Mubtasireen [Premature Babies],” Al-Tibyan, no. 74 (August 2010). The article claims that this is the largest number of incubators in one facility in the world.

140 One of my standard interview questions was “Are there any other associations in this neighborhood who provide medical services?” Invariably the respondent would mention al-Gamiyya al-Shari’yya, often gesturing in multiple directions, indicating numerous small facilities.
141 See the chart in Naseera, “Al-Jama’iyat al-Khairiyya al-Khairiyya wa al-Insaniyya al-Islamiyya fi Misr.”
142 See Atia, Building a House in Heaven, 62–63.
143 Author interviews, al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya clinic, Giza, December 2012.
154 Gauvain, “Salafism in Modern Egypt,” 815, n.16.
155 Ansar al-Sunna board members told me that the regime occasionally forbade them from traveling outside Cairo and hassled them. One prominent arrest occurred in 2001 when Fawzi Said, a reported member of the organization and sheikh at the al-Tawhid mosque in Cairo, was sentenced for membership in a terrorist group. It is incredibly difficult to independently judge the veracity of these accusations, but it was a high-profile incident that generated significant coverage. See Auda, “Al-Salafiyoon fi Misr.” See also “Al-Shaykh al-Saeed: Min Mowazzaf bi-Sharika Diwa’iyya ila Qiyadat Tanzim ‘al-Wa’d’ al-Usuli bi-Misr [Shaykh Saeed (Fawzi): From an Employee in a Pharmaceutical Company to Leadership of the ‘al-Wa’ed’ Fundamentalist Organization in Egypt],” Al-Shaqr al-Awsat, 20 November 2001, www.aawsat.com/details.asp?article=67260&issueno=8393#.Um1OAaR4a4ac and “Ahad Qiyadat Tanzim al-Wa’d al-Misri Sharaka fi Harb Uktubir [One of the Leaders of the Egyptian Wa’ed Organization Participated in the October (1973) War],” Al-Shaqr al-Awsat, 16 December 2001, www.aawsat.com/details.asp?issueno=8070&article=77835#.Um1QCR4a4ac. See also Gauvain, Salafi Ritual Purity, 287, n.45. I appreciate Gabriel Koehler-Derrick bringing this source to my attention.
156 Shakir tried to skirt the question; he answered rhetorically by asking, if Gamal Mubarak was nominated and elected, “Is it possible to say that this would be hereditary succession?” Tayseer Qawaid, “Dr. Abdullah Shakir, Ra’is Jama’at Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya: Lasna Didda Tarshih Gamal Mubarak… Wa la Notalib bi-Taghbeer al-Maadda ’76… wa al-Sha’ab sayakhtar man yumathilu [Dr. Abdullah Shakir, President of Ansar al-Sunna: We Do Not Oppose the Nomination of Gamal Mubarak… We Don’t Seek to Change Article 76…”


158 The fatwa, and the reaction to it, are summarized here: www.arabwestreport.info/organizations/ansar-al-sunnah-al-muhammadiyyah-group-egypt.

159 Mohammed 'Anz, "Wa Ansar al-Sunna: Talqina 3 Milayeen Guinea Faqat Taht Ishraf al-Tadamun al-ljitima'i [We Received Only EGP 3 Million, (All) under the Supervision of (the Ministry of) Social Solidarity]," Al-Ahram, 13 September 2011.

160 "Ra'is Jam'iyyat Ansar al-Sunna: Qatar Aqal al-Duwal Da'man Lana...Wa al-Sa'oudiya Lam Tad'amna bi-Mileem [President of the Ansar al-Sunna Association: Qatar Is the Least of the Countries Supporting Us...And Saudi Arabia Never Gave Us a Dime]," 14 September 2011, www.elsonna.com/play.php?catsmktnba=14005. This seems to be an edited version of an article from Al-Tahrir newspaper the same day. See also "Jam'iyyat Ansar al-Sunna Takashif: Talqina Ta'baran 338 Alf Dolar fi 5 Sanawat wa Lasya 181 Milyonan [Ansar al-Sunna Reveals: We Received Only 338 Thousand Dollars in Donations over Five Years, not 181 Million (Dollars)]," 22 January 2012, www.elsonna.com/play.php?catsmktnba=14405.


162 From the "about" page on the Ansar al-Sunna Facebook page: www.facebook.com/52164609707 (accessed 12 November 2013). And www.ansaralsonna.com/web/catsmktnba-1152.html. The practical importance of al-Gam'iyya al-Shar'iyya's or Ansar al-Sunna's owning a mosque is unclear, as individuals formally affiliated with one trend will teach at mosques affiliated to the other. See, for instance, Gauvain, Salafi Ritual Purity, 120.

163 http://elsonna.com/play.php?catsmktnba=13113. Abdelrahman Abdel Khaliq, an Egyptian and former Muslim Brother who assumed a more Salafist interpretation of Islam but retained the Brotherhood's openness to political competition, founded the Islamic Heritage Society. See Will McCants, “The Lesser of Two Evils: The Salafi Turn to Party Politics in Egypt,” Saban Center Middle East Memo no. 23 (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, May 2012), 2–3. When I asked the leadership of Ansar al-Sunna for recommendations of books to read to understand their organization and thought, they gave me literally too many books to carry, including a multivolume (hardcover) boxed set of hadith literature from the Islamic Heritage Society.


165 The hospital is so named because the majority of the EGP 20 million cost of building the hospital came from Kuwaiti donors, the top three being "the Kuwaiti people’s committee" (al-Lajna al-Sha’biyya al-Kuwaitiyya), the "Kuwait Society for the Revival of the Islamic Heritage" (Jam’iyya Ihya’ al-Turath al-Islami bi-Dawlat al-Kuwait; see note 157), and "The Kuwait Finance House" (Bayt al-Tamweel al-Kuwaiti).

166 Author interviews at the Kuwaiti Hospital, Banha, Egypt, May 2013.

167 Their cross tattoos on the inside of their wrists revealed that they were Christians.

168 Cairo-based survey firm Baseera (The Egyptian Center for Public Opinion Research, http://baseera.com.eg/baseera/home_en.aspx) constructed the sample and executed the survey over both landlines and mobile telephones.

169 It is available on my website, www.steventbrooke.com.

175 Prior to comparison of means tests, distributions were checked for unequal variance and, if appropriate, Welch’s approximation was applied.
176 See, for instance, Masoud, Counting Islam and Wickham, Mobilizing Islam.
177 Clark, Islam, Charity, and Activism.
178 See, for example, Moustapha Khalil, “Islamic-based Civil Society Organizations between Myth and Reality,” in Islamist Social Services, Marc Lynch, ed. (Washington, DC: Project on Middle East Political Science, POMEPS papers no. 9, 15 October 2014) and Khaled Dawoud, “Poor Chances for the Nour Party,” Al-Ahram Weekly, 10 July 2014; and Amr Nasr El-Din, “Unholy Dissention: The Political Future of Egypt’s Salafis,” Fikra Forum, 23 May 2014.
179 The appendix discusses the manipulation check in more detail.
180 The fact that only the Muslim Brotherhood triggered the manipulation check is a notable finding in and of itself.
183 Eric Kramon and Keith R. Weghorst, “Measuring Sensitive Attitudes in Developing Countries: Lessons from Implementing the List Experiment,” The Experimental Political Scientist/Newsletter of the APSA Experimental Section 3, no. 2 (2012).
184 By way of illustration, consider a case in which no items on the control list bothered any of the respondents; all the items were completely banal (mean = 0). Yet the item added to the treatment was so provocative that it bothered every single member who answered the question (mean = 1). In that case, subtracting the mean of the control (0) from the mean of the treatment (1) and multiplying by 100 yields the percentage of people bothered by the sensitive item (1 * 100 = 100%).
185 A five-point scale provided greater variation and allowed people to answer “neither agree nor disagree” in addition to refusing to answer or selecting “don’t know.”
186 A five point scale provided greater variation and allowed people to answer “neither agree nor disagree” in addition to refusing to answer or selecting “don’t know.”
187 One curiosity is that as a baseline condition, Egyptians were more knowledgeable about al-Gamʿiyya al-Sharʿiyya’s medical networks than the Brotherhood’s (or at least less reticent to admit they did). This suggests that the inability of the al-Gamʿiyya al-Sharʿiyya prime to move respondents was less the result of a lack of knowledge as some other factor. For instance, respondents simply do not connect al-Gamʿiyya al-Sharʿiyya’s medical provision with anything more than basic “no strings attached” charity.
188 It is not clear the extent to which the survey form (telephone versus face-to-face) would alter these results; the scholarly literature is contradictory. See the findings and review in Allyson L. Holbrook et al., “Telephone Versus Face-To-Face Interviewing of National Probability Samples with Long Questionnaires,” Public Opinion Quarterly 67, no. 1 (Spring 2003).
Al Qaeda’s Organizational, Strategic, and Ideological Fissures, Assaf Moghadam and Brian Fishman, eds. (West Point: Combatting Terrorism Center and Routledge Press, 2010) and Meijer, “Introduction,” 21–22.
