Pakistan’s Jamaat-ud Dawa (JuD) is often compared with Lebanon’s Hezbollah thanks to its efforts at blending charitable works and Islamic proselytization with overt political activism. The JuD is consciously attempting to improve its image, taking advantage of Pakistan’s religiously charged socio-political environment. It appears that it is being aided by government policy, notwithstanding international sanctions imposed on the group. The JuD’s influence has now extended to even the most remote corner of the country through its exploitation of the media, the expansion of its social services that range from health care to education, and its ability to assist affected populations during natural calamities outside its epicenter of power in the province of Punjab.
The JuD has been banned by many countries and international groupings, including the United States, India, and the European Union, for its association with terrorist violence. As a sister organization to Lashkar-i-Tayyiba (LeT), JuD, along with all its associated entities, has been designated as a terror organization under UN Security Council Resolution 1267. Many of its top commanders have been designated as terrorists, including Hafiz Muhammed Saeed and Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, the two founding fathers of JuD and LeT, who were listed in December 2008.
More recently, in June 2014 the U.S. Department of the Treasury named Nazir Ahmad Chaudhry and Muhammad Hussein Gill of LeT as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs), taking the number of designated terrorists associated with LeT and JuD to more than 20. Treasury also listed six entities associated with LeT, including Jamaat-ud-Daawa, Al-Anfal Trust, Tehrik-e-Hurmat-e-Rasool, Tehrik-e-Tahafuz Qibla Awwal, Falah-i Insaniat Foundation (FIF), and Idara Khidmat- e Khalaq (IKK).  Despite these efforts, JuD has flourished.
This article explores JuD’s shifting narrative and its efforts to secure socio-political legitimacy both by supporting the government and the military and by conducting humanitarian works intended to improve its reputation in civil society. The article also examines JuD’s efforts to strike a balance between its roles as a jihadi proxy for Pakistan, a political pressure group, a social welfare group, and its efforts to remain domestically relevant under direct state patronage.
The Historical Context
Pakistan arguably provides a unique environment for terror groups. Internationally designated terrorist leaders and operatives, sometimes claiming a cover as religious scholars or social workers, appear to travel and work with little legal restraint. This situation has its roots dating back more than 20 years to the early days of the mujahidin revival in the 1980s. Pakistan’s then-government served as a willing partner in efforts to fund and supply Afghan rebels in their fight against Soviet troops. As part of that process, it allowed the creation and operation of many activist groups. After the USSR withdrew from Afghanistan, elements within Pakistan’s government moved to use the mujahidin groups in their efforts to secure gains against long-time rival India. Some of the individuals and organizations that flourished, or their descendants, continue to operate today.
JuD, its sister group LeT, and Hafiz Muhammed Saeed are examples of this dynamic. JuD was originally created in 1985 in Muridke, Lahore, as a small preaching group. A year later it merged with Lakhvi’s group of anti-Soviet jihadists to form the Markaz Ad-Da’awa Wal Irshad (MDI) or the Center for Proselytization and Preaching. One of MDI’s early online releases clearly mentions Saeed’s original role and how the organization raised funds for jihad in the name of Mujahidin-e- Lashkar-i-Tayyiba. The group’s ostensible role was to implement humanitarian missions and preaching according to the Islamic tenets. Below the surface though, the group’s links to jihadi philosophies and aims were readily apparent. One MDI document details how “the brothers [Lakhvi, Saeed, and others] gathered and in 1989, Markaz Ad-Da’awa Wal Irshad was established. This caravan of Da’wah and Jihad, started its journey towards its destination under the guidance of Professor Mohammad Saeed.” Another document states: “We declare that Lashkar-e-Taiba is not a terrorist organization […] but is fighting for freedom and liberty of Kashmiris.”
After the Soviets left Afghanistan, the MDI and LeT shifted their attention to Kashmir as part of Pakistan’s Operation Tupac. The LeT established a number of training camps in Pakistan’s Kashmir and engaged in terror attacks across the border in India’s Jammu and Kashmir, along with other Islamist terror groups nurtured by Pakistani agencies. There is evidence suggesting that MDI and LeT were jointly operated by the same group of leaders, even after the Pakistani government banned MDI’s operations in 2002 and despite some frictions between the two groups in 2004, which was reportedly resolved with help from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
There is significant evidence linking LeT to attacks on Indian targets and installations throughout the 1990s and beyond as the tensions in Jammu and Kashmir escalated. LeT was involved in skirmishes during 1999, fighting alongside Pakistan army regulars. LeT organized numerous terrorist attacks in India, including the December 2000 Red Fort (Delhi) attack, the May 2002 Kaluchak (J&K) massacre, and the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, among other deadly strikes. Even Pakistan’s government has admitted LeT’s role in the late November 2008 Mumbai attacks in its July 2009 report, and underscored the roles of Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi and Zarar Shah, another LeT operative, in the tragic event.
The September 11, 2001, terror attacks in the United States and the December 13 attack on the Indian Parliament in the same year changed the security dynamics in the region and forced a response from Pakistan. Under significant U.S. and Indian pressure, the Pakistani government, led at the time by President Pervez Musharraf, on January 12, 2002, ordered a crack-down on militant groups active in the Kashmir region and in Pakistan, including LeT and Jaish-e Muhammad, another terror group active in Jammu and Kashmir. The order, however, did not affect Pakistan-Administered Kashmir (PAK), the Northern Areas (Gilgit and Baltistan), or the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
In an attempt to ensure continuity, the MDI’s senior leaders decided to split the organization into two distinct units as laid out in an internal MDI document from October 2002. The document describes the planned division in light of the fast-changing security scenario in the region and how JuD was reconstituted. “A general council of Lashkar-i-Tayyiba has been established which will work under the chairmanship of Maulana Abdul Wahid Kashmiri who belongs to Poonch [Jammu and Kashmir]. The Lashkar-i-Tayyiba will continue its jihadi activities in occupied Kashmir…rather it will further intensify them. On the other hand, to continue the mission of Markaz al-Dawa Wal Irshad in the country [Pakistan], JuD has been established. All the organizational, political, and reformatory work will be accomplished under the Jamaat.” This shift also marked the beginning of JuD’s move to the mainstream.
As part of the reorganization, Hafiz Saeed took control of JuD while Lakhvi became the supreme commander of LeT. Notwithstanding the internal arrangements, JuD maintained its financial and logistic support, especially for LeT operations in Jammu and Kashmir, via various existing charity fronts and other channels such as Idara Khidmat-e Khalaq (IKK) and Falah-i-Insaniyat Foundation (FiF).
There is, however, much evidence to indicate that Saeed’s aggressive language directed at India going back nearly 20 years more accurately describes his ideological leanings and intent. On February 18, 1996, while addressing the Lahore Press Club, he stated that “jihad in Kashmir would soon spread to all of India and the mujahidin would create three Pakistans in India.” More recently in mid-April 2015, he stated in an interview with Channel-4 Pakistan that JuD would support action by the Pakistani army in Jammu and Kashmir. “We support the Pakistani government and Pakistan army in their efforts to help the people of Kashmir…we call it jihad.”  He also admitted that Lakhvi has been a senior member of JuD, negating earlier claims by the JuD’s leadership, who in the months after the 2008 Mumbai attack had denied Lakhvi and Zarar Shah’s role within the organization. Six months earlier, the newspaper Dawn quoted Saeed saying that “if India can send its troops to Afghanistan, it can’t stop mujahidin from entering Kashmir to win freedom for the oppressed Muslim brothers.”
Hafiz Saeed and other senior JuD leaders have pursued several strategies to maintain JuD’s continued relevance in the face of growing international scrutiny and sanctions. JuD carried out humanitarian relief activities in the aftermath of the 2005 Kashmir earthquake and the 2010 floods in Pakistan via the IKK and FiF respectively. JuD had several motives. Not only was it able to heighten its public support, but by assisting in this way it was also able to gain favor with senior government officials. The JuD was careful to work in tandem with the Pakistani Army and other agencies during rescue and relief operations and use these opportunities to win the hearts and minds of the refugees. The JuD’s ability to reach inhospitable regions such as North Waziristan or Balochistan before government help arrives during natural calamities and other humanitarian relief operations has not surprisingly made the JuD quite popular.
Such activities also helps generate further charitable contributions, some of which it can funnel to LeT, and also refreshes the flow of recruits to the cause of Kashmiri reunification. JuD also used its humanitarian efforts, such as during relief operations, to spread Islamic teachings, along with a dose of Kashmiri or Afghan jihad.
The central government has been hesitant to take action against the JuD. On at least three occasions the government has cracked down on the JuD, and all three occasions were the result of India raising its concerns with Pakistan about the involvement of Lashkar-i-Tayyiba militants in attacks against India.
In January 2002, as a result of the September 11 terror events in the United States and the December 2001 Indian Parliament attacks, the Pakistan government did take action against militant groups including LeT. The government intervened in JuD facilities and placed its top leaders under house arrest following the July 2006 Mumbai commuter train bombings. Saeed was detained until mid-October that year and subsequently released by the Lahore High Court for lack of concrete evidence against the JuD leader.
Then, in early December 2008, in the wake of the LeT’s Mumbai attacks and under pressure from the United States and India, Pakistan launched a brief police operation against LeT hideouts and training camps. Top leaders including Hafiz Saeed, Lakhvi, and Zarar Shah were arrested and security forces again took control of JuD establishments across the country.
Despite these actions, there are many signals that the JuD enjoys a privileged status with various levels of government. This kind of protection has helped the group fuel its move into the mainstream of Pakistani society and politics. Despite the UN ban, the central government has not shut down JuD’s or FIF’s establishments completely, claiming that the groups were primarily charities. Following the June 2009 verdict from the Lahore High Court that quashed all terrorism charges against Hafiz Saeed, JuD was able to continue its move into the mainstream.
In many regards, the government intervention in the wake of Mumbai attacks can be best seen as an effort to avoid international criticism. Additionally, it is no secret that the provincial government of Punjab has provided and continues to provide significant financial and physical security for JuD’s properties and establishments. In fact, the government approach could be interpreted as protecting the JuD in an effort to use it to further policy goals with an apparent degree of deniability. On January 24, 2015, for example, Pakistan’s High Commissioner to India, Abdul Basit, clarified that there is no ban on JuD’s activities, only that its accounts have been frozen and a travel ban has been implemented restricting foreign travel by its leaders, in accordance with the UN Security Council resolution.
Pakistani agencies, such as the ISI, have systematically used Islamist ideologues such as Saeed to raise issues like Jammu and Kashmir, but at a distance. This analysis is supported by the fact that most of the Kashmir-focused terror groups, including LeT, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and Hizbul Mujahidin have never targeted Pakistan or its interests abroad. In contrast, the government has occasionally used these groups to counter other anti-Pakistan militant extremist groups such as the Pakistani Taliban. The government has even deployed ideologues such as Saeed in government-run militant rehabilitation or reform programs.
Most recently, JuD has heightened its profile by supporting Saudi Arabia. It spearheaded a campaign along with other religious groupings such as Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ), pressing the government to send troops to Saudi Arabia to protect Muslim holy sites against possible aggression by the rebels in Yemen. Issues like these are another way that JuD can garner public and government support while pleasing multiple stakeholders, including the people.
The Mainstreaming of JuD
Over the years, JuD has grown into a socio-religious behemoth with its Islamic education and health service units spread across Punjab and other parts of Pakistan. Free education and free medical treatments comprising five hospitals, 200 dispensaries, ambulance services, and 250 schools fuels growing support for JuD’s presence and facilitate its legitimacy substantially within the Pakistan.
Despite international pressure, it appears that at least some elements of the Pakistani government consider actors such as Saeed to be assets. There are clear signals that this is so, to include, for example, his participation in the de-radicalization and rehabilitation of former militants, as mentioned above. Other evidence is seen in the group’s own conclaves and rallies, such as “Revival of Pakistan Ideology” and the Takbeer Conventions that focus attention on its pro-Pakistan agenda. These conventions are usually well attended by political and religious leaders and the general populace.
JuD is also engaged in transforming its self-image. It aggressively uses social media outlets such as Twitter and Facebook, as well as the Internet, and a variety of Urdu- and English-language publications to showcase its socio-religious works, including health and education programs. There are also reports about JuD’s political ambitions and possible participation in Assembly elections in Punjab province, its traditional stronghold. The JuD itself, however, claimed that the group or leadership do not believe in power politics, but are engaged in educating people on various political and security issues and in constructive criticism of political actions. This could be loosely termed as political activism, and may be prelude to large-scale political action in the future, something that would complete the JuD’s move from the shadows into the light and cement its legitimacy.
The shift from an entity that supported violence in Kashmir and India in general into a ubiquitous pro-State entity hints at JuD’s likely new trajectory of Islamic nationalism, fueled by the legitimacy of its jihadi roots. With highly motivated, trained, and committed cadres, JuD could find success in national politics or as a significant lobby. These many developments underscore JuD’s apparent move into the mainstream, but also raise concerns about the direction of politics in Pakistan.
Animesh Roul is the executive director (research) of the Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict, a think tank based in New Delhi that focuses on security issues. He studies militant Islamist groups active in South Asia and has published widely on the subject. He has been awarded a M. Phil from the School of International Studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, India.
 For UN listing of JuD, See, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/AQList.pdf.
 United States Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Two Senior Lashkar-E-Taiba Network Leaders,” June 25, 2014
 United States Department of State added Jamaat-Ud-Dawa and Idara Khidmat-E-Khalq to the Specially Designated Global Terrorist Designation of LeT on April 27, 2006 and added Falah-i-Insaniat Foundation (FIF) as an alias of LeT on November 24, 2010, along with FIF cheif Hafiz Abdur Rauf as Specially Designated Global Terrorist. See, United States Department of State, “Addition of Aliases Jamaat-Ud-Dawa and Idara Khidmat-E-Khalq to the Specially Designated Global Terrorist Designation of Lashkhar-E-Taiba,” April 28, 2006.
 “Introduction: Da’awah and Jihad Movement,” https://web.archive.org/web/20020109200440/http://www.markazdawa.org/english/organization/introduction.htm, October 30, 2001. For the fund raising activities in the name of LeT, See, https://web.archive.org/web/20010128024900/http://markazdawa.org/English/organization/contribution.htm.
 “Introduction: Da’awah and Jihad Movement,” https://web.archive.org/web/20011217234502/http://www.markazdawa.org/English/organization/introduction.htm.
 Official Site for Markaz Ad-Da’awa Wal Irshad and Mujahidin- e- Lashkar- e Taiba, URL, https://web.archive.org/web/20001017212716/http://www.markazdawa.org/English/radio/news.
 Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Columbia University Press, 2008, pp. 55-59, Also See, K Santhanam (ed.) Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir: A Portrait Gallery, Sage (New Delhi), 2003, pp. 22–24.
 Evidently, in 2004 Saeed and Lakhvi increasingly disagreed over financial irregularities and nepotism, which eventually led to the creation of a breakaway faction of JuD/LeT, Khair-un Naas (KuN or People’s Welfare). It was able to forcibly control JuD’s headquarters in Muridke and other assets before ISI intervened to find a truce between two factions. See, for example, Amir Mir, The True Face of Jehadis, Mashal books, 2004, pp. 95–113.
 In June 1999, Hafiz Saeed reportedly claimed that his organization led the war against Indian troops in Kargil. See, Praveen Swami, “The Other Wars,” Frontline, June 19—2 July 2, 1999.
 “After admission, Pak files 26/11 charge sheet”, Times Now TV, 18 July, 2009; Also See, “Part of 26/11 plot hatched on our soil, admits Pak,” Mid Day, February 13, 2009.
 “Musharraf bans Lashkar, Jaish; says no terrorism on name of Kashmir,” Daily Excelsior, January 12, 2002.
 “Strategy to Foil Nefarious Designs of India”, Voice of Islam, January 2002.
 For instance, See, “Extremists given ‘free hand’ to collect funds for flood victims,” Daily Times, August 27, 2010; Also, “Secretary of State’s Terrorist Designation of Falah-i-Insaniat Foundation.”
U.S. Department of State Press Release, November 24, 2010, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/11/151931.htm; Khalid Khattak,
“Government takes over 10 JD schools,” December 27, 2008.
 For example Navnita Chadha Behera, “Demystifying Kashmir,” Brookings Institution Press, 2007, p, 162.
 See, Hafiz Saeed’s Interview with Mujahid Barelvi on Channel 24, April 16, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H_Hyl4_cFCE.
“JuD supports Pak Army’s jihad in Kashmir,” Kashmir Monitor, April 19, 2015,
 Amir Mir, “LeT commander furious at JuD chief,” The News, January 15, 2009.
 “JuD call to arms to help Kashmiris,” Dawn, December 6, 2014,
 “Footprints: Extremist bodies run IDP relief efforts”, Dawn, July 4, 2014,
 JuD includes religious lessons with flood relief,” Express Tribune, October 26, 2011.
 “Hafiz Saeed set free,” Dawn, August 29, 2006
 “Pakistan cracks down on Lashkar, JuD,” Reuters, December 13, 2008.
 Khalid Khattak, “Government takes over 10 JD schools,” The News, December 27, 2008.
 For example, in the fiscal 2009-2010 the Punjab government allocated Pakistan Rupees 79.7 million (US$936,240) to JuD’s Al-Dawa School System, a mosque, hospital, and other health facilities built on the JuD Markaz-e-Taiba campus at Muridke. An additional Rs. 3 million (US$35,207) was given to schools run by Jamaat-ud-Dawa. Again in the budget for fiscal 2013-14 the Punjab provincial government allocated more than Rs. 6.1 crore for Markaz-e-Taiba and allocated a further Rs. 35 crore for setting up a Knowledge Park at the centre along with other developmental activities. See, “Punjab Govt. funded outfits on UN terror blacklist: report, Express Tribune/ AFP, June 17, 2010; Also, “Pakistan’s Punjab Government allocates funds for JuD centre,” Hindu/Press Trust of India, June 18, 2013.
 “JuD not banned, only accounts frozen: envoy,” Daily Times, January 24, 2015.
 Pakistan’s ISI has nurtured LeT and other Kashmir centric Islamic extremist groups (e.g. Jaish-e-Mohammed) financially and with other logistics since their inception. The latest piece of evidence comes from 26/11 accused David Coleman Headley during interrogation by India’s National Investigation Agency (NIA). According to Headley, every important member of LeT is handled by one of more ISI officials. For example he named Maj. Sameer Ali and Maj. Iqbal who took care of him, Brig. Riaz handled Zaki ur Rahman Lakhvi (Chief military commander of LeT). Headley also revealed how Maj. Iqbal gave him US$25,000 in cash for his India trip prior to Mumbai attacks. See, “Interrogation Report of David Coleman Headley,” National Investigation Agency, India.
 “Hafiz Saeed helping de-radicalize militants, says official,” Dawn/Reuters, April 6 2012.
 “JuD, ASWJ activists ask govt. to send troops to Saudi Arabia,” The News, April 4, 2015.
 According to JuD’s own website, there are 146 Ad Dawa model schools with an estimated 2,050 teachers and nearly 35,000 students enrolled throughout the country. See, http://jamatdawa.org/en/education/. Also for a rough estimation of overall strength, See, “Banned’ Jamaat-ud-Dawa group thrives in Pakistan,” Dawn/AFP, February 10 2015
 ‘Hafiz Saeed helping de-radicalise militants,’ The Nation, April 7, 2012.
 “JuD calls for reviving Pakistan ideology,” The News, March 24, 2014. For Takbeer Convention, See for example, “Takbeer Convention” held in solidarity with Pak Army attracts Karachi public,” June 18, 2014.
 Hafiz Saeed once reiterated that it was a misconception to consider JuD as apolitical. As a political platform, JuD brings together different religious and political entities and raising awareness on issues, like the Difa-e-Pakistan Council. For details on this, See, “Difa-e-Pakistan Council: Ahead of 40-party rally, JuD chief parries questions on electoral ambitions,” Express Tribune, February 1, 2012.