Al-Qa'ida's (mis)Adventures
in the Horn of Africa

back to report home

Case Study: Kenya

For a PDF version of this chapter, click here

I. Introduction

Of all the countries in the Horn of Africa, Kenya boasts the most stable, most effective, and most democratic government. Kenya has also experienced the most terrorist attacks against Western targets and has been the most useful operational base for al-Qa'ida.[1] This "Kenyan Paradox" is driven by the convergence of four factors. First, Kenya provides a target-rich environment for terrorists because of its relatively advanced economy and its long-standing ties with the United Kingdom, United States, and Israel. Second, Kenya maintains a functioning sovereign government, one increasingly subject to public opinion. The former limits the operational freedom of Western intelligence and counterterrorism units, and the latter heightens the cost of being seen to be doing others' bidding in the "War on Terror." Third, Kenya suffers from weak governance in a number of critical areas, including security and the criminal justice system. This discourages those Kenyans who might have relevant information from providing it to the authorities. Fourth, the presence of a disaffected minority Muslim population,[2] especially along the Kenyan coast, provides al-Qa'ida operatives an environment in which they can operate with less security pressure than elsewhere in the region.[3] Simply put, Kenya is an attractive place for al-Qa'ida to operate.[4] The level of development and stability have increased the density of targets and logistical convenience of conducting operations in Kenya while the combination of a more responsive political leadership and weak governance reduce the security costs of doing so.[5]

Some of these factors can be ameliorated by adjusting existing policies to account for the complex forces at work in Kenya. Others are background conditions that cannot be changed but must be understood. Section II begins our analysis by reviewing Kenya's history as a target for terrorist activity. Section III examines structural factors that make Kenya an attractive place for terrorists. We focus mainly on the governance challenge in Kenya, drawing on theoretical insights developed in the last section of Chapter 2. The next two sections draw on a series of recent interviews along with other sources. Section IV looks at the historical and current status of Kenyan Muslims. Section V briefly reviews how current counterterrorism initiatives are perceived by both the incumbent government and its citizens. Section VI attempts to explain the complex set of policy games played in Kenya. Section VII concludes by discussing the future prospects for terrorism in Kenya.

II. Terrorism in Kenya: A Brief History

Until very recently, terrorism in Kenya was mostly a foreign affair.[6] Operatives from elsewhere saw Kenya as a permissive, target-rich environment. The first major attack of the modern era was the Norfolk Hotel bombing in December, 1980, which killed sixteen people and injured more than one hundred. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) claimed responsibility. Most believe the attack served as retaliation for Kenya's decision to allow the launch of the 1972 Israeli military raid on Entebbe, Uganda from Kenyan soil.[7]

Nearly two decades later, on August 7, 1998, al-Qa'ida attacked the American Embassy in Nairobi with a truck-bomb. This attack killed some 220 people and injured roughly 5,000 Embassy staff, passers-by and people in neighboring buildings.[8]Al-Qa'ida simultaneously attacked the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing 11 and injuring another 70. An attempt to destroy the American Embassy in Kampala, Uganda, was reportedly foiled on this same date.[9] All three embassies were accessible and relatively unprotected, making them particularly attractive targets. The Kenyan attack also produced the first known al-Qa'ida operative from Kenya, Sheikh Ahmad Salem Swedan, from Mombasa, as well as Abdullah Muhammad Fazul (henceforth 'Fazul'), a Comorian who reportedly holds a Kenyan passport, though his legal citizenship remains unclear.[10]

Al-Qa'ida executed Kenya's third major terrorist attack on November 28, 2002. Two SAM-7 missiles were fired at, but narrowly missed, an Israeli passenger jet taking off from Moi International Airport in Mombasa. Five minutes later, a truck-bomb detonated just outside the lobby of the Israeli-owned and frequented Paradise Hotel in Kikambala along the beach north of Mombasa. Fifteen people were killed and another 35 injured in that attack.[11] Clearly, in this case al-Qa'ida's attention shifted from the U.S. to Israel with the perceived vulnerability of both targets a clear incentive for their selection.[12]

Shortly thereafter, in June 2003, Kenyan authorities foiled a plot to attack the temporary U.S. Embassy in Nairobi using a truck-bomb and an explosive-laden plane. The plane was to be taken from Nairobi's Wilson Airport. This same airport acted as the staging base for al-Qa'ida operatives' entry flights to Somalia in the early 1990s.[13] One of the suspects arrested by Kenyan police indicated a number of the same individuals involved in the November 2002 attacks on the Paradise Hotel planned this failed attack.[14]

A final incident, not associated with al-Qa'ida, occurred on May 12, 2006, when three assailants fire-bombed the Nairobi offices of the Christian radio station Hope-FM after gaining entry to the station's premises by killing a private security guard. An inner security door prevented the attackers from reaching the upper floor where several staff members were hiding. Little is known about their identity, but their motives appear less opaque. The station's weekly program, "Jesus is the Way," which many believe was explicitly designed to win converts to Christianity from the Muslim community, had just been aired.[15] Although minor in scale, this attack marked Kenya's first entirely domestic case of Muslim-based terrorism.[16]

Despite two major al-Qa'ida attacks on Western targets in 1998 and 2002, the group's operatives continued to move about the country freely, establish businesses in Mombasa, Nairobi and Lamu, operate Islamic charities, find local brides, rent light aircraft to come and go from Somalia, hold meetings, communicate with al-Qa'ida figures outside the country, transfer money, stockpile weapons and engage in years of undetected reconnoitering of possible targets.[17] The next two sections explore the factors which make Kenya a relatively safe haven for al-Qa'ida.

III. Why Foreign Terrorists Like Kenya

Though few in number, the above attacks demonstrate Kenya's significance in terms of recent global terrorism. Moreover, the scale and complexity of attacks in Kenya strongly suggests a permissive environment exists for terror group operations. Understanding what it is about democratic, economically successful Kenya that makes it a relatively frequent target of jihadi terrorism is of paramount importance. A combination of international and domestic factors result in Kenya's targeting. Two specific international factors enhance Kenya's attractiveness. First, the country's foreign policy reflects a long history of close relations with the United States and Israel, as well as the United Kingdom-the former colonial power. Both the United States and Israel maintain a significant official and private-sector presence in Kenya.[18] In addition to current foreign policy issues, these historical relationships provide both an ideological justification for attacks in Kenya and a range of targets. The use of Mombasa as a supply-station for Western military operations and patrols in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf brought increased attention from al-Qa'ida beginning in the early 1990s.[19] During his infiltration into Somalia, Saif al-Adel illustrates his interests in a trip report along the Kenyan coast. Here he describes Mombasa as, "an island that teems with foreigners who stroll all over the place. It is said that the American army soldiers take their R&R there. Mombasa's security situation is terrible."[20]

Second, the country's geography puts it in close proximity to long-running conflicts in northern Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Rwanda. Kenya's porous borders permitted al-Qa'ida operatives to enter and leave the country clandestinely. However, the expense of doing so may explain why most al-Qa'ida operatives traveled to and from Kenya using normal channels.[21]The exception was travel to Somalia. Throughout the early to mid-1990s, members of al-Qa'ida traveled to Somalia from Kenya by sea and land through the coastal route of Mombasa-Witu-Kiunga in Kenya to Ras Kamboni, Somalia.[22]

Turning to domestic factors, Kenya appears, at first glance, to be an unattractive environment for terrorists. In contrast to neighboring Somalia, Kenya boasts a relatively robust state equipped with a national police force, capable intelligence services, and a pervasive system of provincial administration.[23]Its overwhelmingly Christian population would also seem to bolster its capacity to deter terrorist activity.

Yet a number of domestic factors appear to trump such disincentives, making Kenya a more positive environment for al-Qa'ida. One is the presence of small but significant Arab, Arab-Swahili and Somali minorities concentrated in coastal Kenya, Nairobi and several other urban centers.[24] Some of these, especially those with Arab lines of descent, maintain closer ties with their home countries. Indeed, many residents of Mombasa, Malindi and Lamu hold stronger ties with the Arabian Peninsula than with Kenya's own interior.[25] These historical connections and the cover provided by a diverse population significantly reduce the visibility of foreign operatives.

Deep-rooted and continuing shared economic interests strengthen the coastal Kenya-Arab relationship still further.[26] The centuries-old maritime culture along the East African coast has given rise to many interlocking networks of kinship and commerce that the "modern" national borders of the Comoros, Zanzibar, mainland Tanzania, Kenya, Somalia, Oman and Yemen have not obliterated.[27] Further, modern transportation and communication that fosters rapid and detailed transmission of both political and religious information and messages significantly bolster this situation.[28]The net effect of all the above is that al-Qa'ida operatives have been able to employ a mixture of "mosque, madrasah, marriage"[29]and money to move about relatively freely while establishing more permanent local roots.[30]

Beyond these regional, historical and demographic factors, Kenya's weak governance climate makes a considerable contribution to the country's terrorist threat. Central here is its lack of effectiveness in investigating, arresting and convicting terrorists as well as more ordinary criminals. While mundane bureaucratic ineptitude no doubt accounts for some of this, the general "culture of impunity" that has been said to reign in Kenya may be equally responsible.[31] For example, not a single (credible) conviction has been obtained with regard to the several assassinations and mysterious deaths of leading political figures.[32] The same applies to the "mass" killings of the 1990s that killed 1,500 and displaced several hundred thousand, as well as to the countless victims of torture in various detention centers and police cells, beginning after the failed Air Force coup attempt of 1982 and continuing well into the 1990s.[33] The current government shelved recommendations from a recent Presidential Commission for a "transitional-justice" process of exposure, confession and national healing.[34] In addition, despite local and diplomatic demands, the Kenyan government provided no explanation for either the March 2006 police raid on the offices of The Standard newspaper and its sister company Kenya Television Network, or for the breach of security at Nairobi's international airport several months later. At the airport, the same pair of mysterious "Armenian brothers" who led The Standard raid-allegedly business partners of Kibaki family members-stormed the Customs area to insure that associates arriving from abroad would not have their luggage searched.[35]

This history of impunity extends in particular to those involved in large-scale corruption. Kenya repeatedly finds itself among the most corrupt countries in the world. According to Transparency International, bribery "costs Kenyans about US $1 billion each year, yet more than half live on less than US $2 per day."[36]No senior public figure in either politics or the civil service has ever been convicted, let alone gone to prison, for abuse of office.[37] The current government's own former anti-corruption "czar" now resides in self-imposed exile in the UK, having feared for his life as he attempted to investigate corruption among the very government he was serving[38] Corruption also makes it easier for terrorists to use airports and other official border points and to obtain identity papers and travel documents.[39] Testimony in the 1998 Embassy bombing trial revealed that Mohamed Sadeek Odeh used fake travel documents obtained at a government Immigration office to leave Kenya the night before the attack.[40] Omar Said Omar, one of those allegedly involved in the 2002 coast attacks, also claimed he used a fake Ethiopian passport to get back into Kenya in December 2001 after completing his al-Qa'ida weapons training in Mogadishu.[41]

Corruption may also have played a part in the failure to arrest and/or prosecute non-al-Qa'ida terrorists and other international criminals. Two examples stand out. The first is Abdallah Ocalan, for many years the leader of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), the main Kurdish rebel group. According to reports, a foreign security team arrested him while he was being escorted to Nairobi's airport to board a "safe flight" out of the country. Reports alleged that two senior figures in the Moi government received $40 million from the Turkish government for allowing this.[42] The second example is Felicien Kabuga, previously Rwanda's wealthiest private businessman and today its most wanted genocide fugitive.[43] Despite a large U.S. government bounty of $5 million for his arrest, Kabuga reportedly made his home in Kenya for many years with the knowledge and support of senior figures in first the Moi government, and now that of his successor Kibaki.[44]

The examples above, taken together with Kenya's weak record in apprehending, holding and prosecuting high-profile terrorism suspects,[45] apparently serves as a serious disincentive for Kenyans contemplating going to the authorities, whether with regard to issues of general "public safety"[46] or indeed, their own problems.[47] A final governance issue that also seems to contribute to the government's inadequacies in this area, is, ironically, a reflection of the recent expansion of the country's "democratic space." Kenya returned to competitive, multi-party politics in 1992 after more than three decades of either de facto or de jure one-party rule. Over the last three national elections, intense competition for votes in both parliamentary and presidential contests reflects in part the country's highly fluid partisan political landscape. According to Kenyan election law, victory in presidential contests requires a candidate obtain both an overall plurality and a minimum of 25 percent of the vote in at least five of Kenya's eight provinces. Muslims currently hold a great deal of collective political "clout" as they constitute at least 90 percent of inhabitants in North Eastern Province and over a quarter of the population in Coast Province. Because any incumbent or would-be government can ill-afford to ignore Muslim voters, counterterrorism policies that antagonize this section of the population are unlikely to be pursued with anything but considerable reluctance.

This issue of political sensitivity may well have influenced the government's response to one of the attacks described above: that on the HOPE-FM station in May 2006. Notwithstanding its clearly religious overtones, the official government spokesman, Dr. Alfred Mutua, called the attack "normal thuggery," going on to claim the attackers were the "same gang" that had been "molesting motorists" in the area, a view immediately disputed by the Minister for Information.[48] Although Mutua simultaneously promised "a thorough investigation," nothing more has been heard of the matter.[49] In this context, one Western diplomat may be justified in his view that, "even if the Kenyan government were seriously committed to apprehending and convicting these terrorists, whether they are foreigners or locals, it fears antagonizing the entire Muslim community."[50]

One particular element of the reform program with which the current Kibaki government came to power appears particularly relevant to terrorism. In July 2003, new rules of evidence were established for criminal trials setting stricter requirements for the admission of confessions as evidence in court. Specifically, the rules require that these confessions be made before judges and magistrates (and only before the former, in the case of murder), rather than before police officers, who were said to commonly use torture. This new requirement resulted in the prosecution's main evidence in the 2002 Coast attacks case, a confession made to the police by one of the suspects during the first week of August, being thrown out after it was challenged by the defense attorneys.[51]

IV. The Wider Context: The Muslim Situation in Kenya

Previously, we noted that foreign jihadis can move relatively unnoticed and may receive at least some sympathy for their objectives from certain parts of the Kenyan population.[52] This section takes a more focused look at the political character of Kenya's Muslims, especially at the coast. Much of this population nurses a profound sense of grievance against the Kenyan state. While most assert that terrorists tend not to be especially disadvantaged, there is some connection between such grievances and support for terrorism in cross-national studies.[53] At the very least, such disaffection increases the probability that foreign jihadis will be tolerated.

The poverty affecting so many Kenyans combined with the history of the coast in relation to the rest of Kenya comprises the root of this disaffection.[54] Its foundation lies in the "status inversion" that an important section of the coastal community experienced following the transition from colonial rule to independence.[55] To simplify a very complex reality, its Arab and Arab-Swahili leadership went from being highly privileged under the British, to being subjects of a largely alien, up-country, and non-Muslim political elite.[56] A critical aspect of this reversal of relative status was the aversion to Christian mission-dominated education, so that Muslims became, in retrospect, "the first to read (i.e., the Koran), but the last to go to school." This placed Muslims at a distinct disadvantage in the post-independence competition for formal employment in both the public and private sectors.[57]

More recently, the opening up of the political space since the return to multi-party politics in 1992 has had an ambiguous effect on Kenya's Muslims. On the one hand, it led to increased participation in public life through attendance at public meetings and demonstrations, the initiation of civic education programs, and contributions to the effort to revise or replace the country's constitution.[58] Such opportunities give Muslims greater influence in national political life, and thus should reduce the frustrations of exclusion and marginalization. However, given the community's inferior competitive power, especially in the economic sphere, it is unclear whether increased "voice" will lead to more radicalism as a consequence of the frustration of popular demands, or more support for the current system.[59]

That some Kenyan Muslim leaders, such as Mombasa Imam Sheikh Ali Shee, call bin Laden "a hero" should not be taken as a sign that a radicalization process that legitimizes violence is winning out.[60] In the view of one Western scholar who has spent considerable time among the coast's Muslim community:

Bin Laden may have garnered admiration in Tanzania and Kenya, but he has not won the sympathy of Muslims.. [H]e symbolizes for East African Muslims the resistance against the global political and economic hegemony of the United States. Bin Laden is known as someone who has dared to stand up on his own against the world's No. 1 superpower. The people praise his courage, but not his actions. They admire him as a pop icon, but not as a "holy warrior." How strongly Bin Laden's Islamic legitimization for terror is rejected in the East African region is reflected in the fact that Kenyan and Tanzanian Muslims continue to argue that the true perpetrators of the World Trade Center attack could never be Muslims, as Islam prohibits such violence.[61]

Few Kenyan Muslim leaders or their followers appear willing to condone violence.[62]Indeed, they see it as inimical to their individual and collective purposes, if not simply morally wrong. Yet the perceived lack of integrity in the country's security and judicial apparatus, combined with an antipathy to being seen as a partner with "the enemies of Islam" makes a true partnership with the government on the terrorism issue even more problematic.

Despite the basically pacifistic inclinations of most of the population, the Kenyan coastal Islamic "sea" is certainly one that a few stealthy al-Qa'ida zealots used to good advantage. Taking this portrait into account with the inciting impact of external issues,[63] one might ask why so few attacks have occurred in Kenya and why so few Kenyans have been involved; rather than why they have occurred at all.[64]

V. The US-Kenya Anti-Terror Partnership: Protecting Kenyans, or Targeting Kenya's Muslims?

United States counterterrorism efforts in Kenya expanded significantly after the 1998 Embassy bombing.[65] In addition to joint military training exercises in North Eastern Province and in the Coast Province's Lamu District, U.S.-Kenyan counterterrorism efforts include: the establishment of the National Security Intelligence Service with support from the U.S. Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program; creation of the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) in 1998, a Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and the National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) in 2003;[66] and the National Security Advisory Committee (NSAC) in 2004. Altogether, these measures aimed to improve Kenyan capacity to investigate incidents, identify operatives and coordinate relevant work across agencies involved in counterterrorism.[67] Additional measures include participation in the U.S. Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP), which provides technology to screen travelers arriving at airports and border crossings. With support from the Federal Aviation Administration, Kenya has improved airport security and worked with Uganda and Tanzania to harmonize regional aviation security regulations. Kenya also ratified or acceded to all twelve United Nations conventions on terrorism and continues to submit regular reports to the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee. Finally, beyond its bilateral cooperation with the United States, Kenya continues as an active member of the African Union. In this endeavor, Kenya reaffirmed its commitment to the 1999 Organization of African Unity Convention on Preventing and Combating Terrorism and established the African Centre for Studies and Research on Terrorism.

However impressive this list may appear, it is not clear how deep the Kenyan government's participation in the "War on Terror" can actually be. Kenyan leaders must take into account a key issue that goes beyond 'security': their political standing among their own citizens, both Muslim and non-Muslim.[68] Close cooperation with America creates serious political liabilities stemming from a number of grievances.[69] First, the periodic and visible presence of FBI agents and U.S. Marines along the coast has left many Muslims feeling targeted by U.S. policy. Recent U.S. military actions just over the Kenyan border in Somalia, combined with the Kenyan government's unsympathetic response to Somalis seeking refuge in Kenya, reinforce this sentiment.[70]

Second, there is lingering bitterness about the level of compensation for the Kenyan victims of the 1998 Embassy bombing. This relates to the more general conviction among Kenyans that their country has become a terrorist target specifically because of its close relationship with the United States. Reflecting this belief, 5,000 Kenyans filed a class action lawsuit in a U.S. district court in 2002 seeking compensation for their losses.[71]

Third, the focus on terrorism angers Kenyans who see their country suffering from a variety of ills. Of these ills, terrorism places low on their list of concerns.[72] The U.S. State Department's frequent travel advisories reinforce this grievance. Many Kenyans see them as economic punishment to their tourist industry, now the country's leading foreign-exchange earner, while serving to divide Kenyans on a sectarian basis.[73]

Fourth, the perceived hand of the U.S. in the Kenyan government's efforts to steer unpopular anti-terrorism legislation through the National Assembly has not made open cooperation easier. Many Kenyans viewed the initial version of the bill as an effort to roll back vital human rights gains of recent years. Even after heated protests from both Muslim and non-Muslim human rights organizations led to the removal of its most abrasive provisions, resistance to the bill remains sufficient to deter the government from backing it with any real commitment.[74] Nevertheless, the association of such legislation with U.S. policy damages the credibility of both the American and Kenyan governments.

The final issue concerns just how much information about the two countries' anti-terrorist efforts should be made public. American officials seem inclined towards more disclosure than their Kenyan counterparts. Given that any successes achieved constitute clear political gains for Washington, this is not surprising. However, when Kenya is seen to be "caving-in" to pressure by violating Kenyan law, the cost is considerable. The recent capture of M.A. Malik, a participant in the 2002 Paradise Hotel attack, provides an illustrative example of this phenomenon. Reportedly, Malik's transfer to American custody for relocation to Guantanamo Bay came with an understanding that the transfer would not be made public. Malik's arrival in Cuba became headline news triggering considerable outrage in Kenya.[75] Likewise, Malik's arrest reportedly led to the discovery of plans to stage an attack in Mombasa during the international cross-country championships to be held there a few days later.[76]The U.S. Embassy felt obliged to announce the possibility of "a serious terrorist threat" during the forthcoming event. However, Kenya's Internal Security Minister, with his eyes clearly on the international gallery associated with the event, rejected the warning as without justification.[77]

Altogether, such issues underscore the divergence of interests between Kenya and the U.S.[78] As Whitaker points out, the U.S., in deed if not in word, "has made clear that its top priority in Kenya is counter-terrorism."[79] However, most Kenyans seek a combination of improved security regarding "normal" criminal activity, economic development, and further consolidation of their fledgling democracy.[80] Even when U.S. support for these other goals is forthcoming, the American focus on counterterrorism encourages cynical Kenyans to see any investment in these areas as diplomatic-donor "bribery."[81]

VI. Different Games in the War on Terror

One way to think about the War on Terrorism in Kenya is as a set of three related games. In one game, the players are the U.S. and Kenyan governments. For the U.S., the game is about undermining al-Qa'ida and its local adjuncts. In Kenya, this entails convincing the Kenyan authorities and ordinary people of the importance of American anti-terrorism objectives. For Kenya, this game is more problematic. On the one hand, Kenya seeks to maximize the material benefits derived from its partnership with the United States which they employ for well-established neo-patrimonial purposes.[82] At the same time, however, Kenya seeks to minimize three accompanying costs: (1) the loss of political support from its citizens in an increasingly competitive electoral environment;[83] (2) their higher profile as a legitimate target which accompanies close association with the U.S.; and (3) the concern that too much of a "buy-in" to terrorism concerns will hurt the vital tourism industry.[84]

Less visibly, reducing cooperation with American anti-terrorism efforts may also be a card to be played with regard to other distant issues. The Commissioner of Police in 2005 pulled the Anti-Terrorist Police Unit out of the Joint Terrorism Task Force. Some saw this as a jab at the U.S. and its allies who were pressuring the Kibaki government to move firmly against corruption involving some of his closest associates.[85] Kenya successfully parlayed its centrality in the War on Terror into other diplomatic advantages. In mid-2005, Kenya refused to ratify a bilateral immunity agreement promising not to turn American citizens over to the International Criminal Court in The Hague. In response, the Bush administration initially mandated substantial cuts to military and governance programs in Kenya. Later, the U.S. restored much of the money in late 2006[86]As these examples show, the Global War on Terror provides a most welcome resource-pool. However, Kenya's incentives in that war are not fully aligned with those of the U.S.

The second game occurs between the Kenyan government and the Muslim community.[87] For its part, the Government would prefer to avoid antagonizing its Muslim citizens. Beyond the obvious electoral disadvantages, officials fear that doing so will make Kenyan Muslims more sympathetic to the terrorists' agenda(s). For their part, significant sections of the Muslim leadership see the often-clumsy efforts of the Government's security apparatus and its partnership with the U.S. more generally as a useful means of bolstering their own status as defenders of Islam and Muslims' human rights. That no Kenyan has yet been convicted on any charge directly related to the terrorist attacks that have occurred makes such posturing much more credible.[88]At the same time, playing the role of sectarian defender attracts applause and valuable resources from certain philanthropic individuals, organizations and even governments in the wider Islamic world.[89] Taken together, this implies that Kenya's Muslim terrorism threat-level is not without some benefit to its Muslim leaders (whether or not this is consciously recognized as such). That is, the Government's propensity to engage in or allow periodic provocative actions provides various opportunities for them to mobilize their followers.[90]

The U.S. and Kenyan Muslims play a third game. American intelligence forces are presumably trying to penetrate certain sections of the country's Muslim communities so as to discover and apprehend terrorists and their sympathizers. Meanwhile other American agencies seek to mollify the Muslim population at the coast and elsewhere, through a combination of community aid projects, meetings with local leaders and more general public pronouncements.[91] Such efforts appear to be generally appreciated. Most Muslims are not averse to receiving material assistance from the U.S.[92] At the same time, as with the Kenya government, Muslim leaders know they can gain extra points among their followers and foreign benefactors by "standing up" to U.S. actions when provided with opportunities that encourage them to do so.

In each game, there are strong reasons why the best outcome from a counterterrorism perspective is unlikely to occur. However, some repackaging of desirable policies can reduce the incentives for Kenyan leaders, both in the government and in Muslim communities, to behave differently than the U.S. would like. In Chapter 5, we will outline some recommendations the U.S. might consider when designing policy with regard to Kenya.

VII: Conclusion: A Fragile Present and an Uncertain Future

Kenya's location on the map of international terrorism is not likely to change in the foreseeable future. Kenya remains only peripheral in al-Qa'ida's grand scheme, seen more as a battlefield than a future stronghold. The goal in Kenya seems limited to attacking symbols of "enemy" power and conducting logistical operations. Notwithstanding such modest aims, their capacity for attacks remains considerable, especially when compared with other Horn of Africa settings. Kenya provides attractive and numerous Western targets in a vulnerable security and governance environment. With rampant corruption, porous borders, weak investigative and prosecutorial systems, and a population within which foreign jihadis can move with a fair degree of anonymity while finding some sympathy for their causes, Kenya hosts all the necessary elements for a terrorist safe haven.

While investment by the United States can increase the Kenyan government's counterterrorism capacity, its commitment to this agenda remains somewhat equivocal. The central dilemma is that the incentives of the two governments are not aligned. As described in Chapter 2, efforts to combat terrorism generate a considerable supply of resources for the Kenyan government. Because aid appears to have been pegged to the perceived terrorism risk rather than to the level of counterterrorism effort, Kenyan officials have incentives to tolerate a low level of terrorism. Moreover, close cooperation with the U.S. entails significant costs for the Kenyan government.[93] Terrorism is simply a much higher priority for the U.S. and certain other Western diplomatic missions in Kenya than it is for Kenyans themselves.[94] For them, insecurity, disease, and above all, poverty are the most ominous threats. Addressing these threats more aggressively may pay great counterterrorism dividends by reducing the political costs of supporting U.S. policy and thereby aligning the preferences of the Kenyan and American governments which would also be most welcomed by the Kenyan people.

Even if few Kenyans have joined the jihadi cause (some have), others are likely to continue to do so. But this seems to depend much more upon issues and contacts elsewhere than inside Kenya itself. To this extent, efforts to ameliorate the conditions in which Kenyan Muslims find themselves may bear little fruit in terms of direct deterrence. Similarly, it is not clear whether socio-economic improvement per se would eliminate the kind of religious motivation that prompted the HOPE-FM attack, the only entirely indigenous attack to date.

One final issue bears consideration. In the previous Harmony report, we stressed the importance of efforts that would help alienate terrorists from the local population. The lack of consideration given to local Muslims by the perpetrators of the attacks in Kenya and Tanzania suggests the willingness of jihadis to exploit African Muslims. Any terrorist could have predicted that there would be some fellow Muslims among the casualties, and there were. That the attacks went ahead suggests the perpetrators held the local Muslim population in low regard given the primacy of the wider, global goals. Alternatively, they may have expected that either: (1) since the vast majority of those killed would be non-Muslims, the attacks would create exploitable rifts between the local Christian and Muslim populations; or (2) a clumsy, heavy-handed response would further alienate Muslims, thus increasing the pool of local recruits. Our analysis suggests both, which bodes poorly for future efforts to deter jihadis from exploiting Kenya as an operational base on account of any such "sympathetic consideration" to their local co-religionists.

Painting Kenya as a stronghold for al-Qa'ida and other terrorist activity is an overstatement. In many ways, it remains East Africa's leader in both political and economic terms. Yet it is Kenya's very stature that makes it such a decisive battleground between al-Qa'ida and the West in the Horn of Africa as a whole. Its track record as a target for terrorists, combined with the underlying conditions of weak governance and religious-ideological influence on the Coast, suggest that future terrorist attacks are likely. Efforts to defeat al-Qa'ida will require the U.S. and its allies to wade through a complicated set of actors and issues. Without the predictable operating environment offered by Kenya, it is unlikely that al-Qa'ida would have been able to mount effective operations in the Horn in the past. We therefore believe Kenya is the decisive point in the Horn of Africa.

REFERENCES-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

CONTINUE REPORT
back to report home