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Al-Qa'ida's (mis)Adventures Part II: Al-Qa'ida "In Their Own Words" The Harmony Documents For a PDF version of this chapter, click here The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has the responsibility to plan and synchronize efforts across the Department of Defense for the war on terrorism. In conducting their operations over the past several years-particularly Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)-representatives of USSOCOM have uncovered scores of documents authored by members of al-Qa'ida. These documents, which currently reside in a classified database called "Harmony," shed important new light onto the inner workings of the organization as well as the personalities and preferences of their authors. The database houses thousands of items with a wide range of content, including loose papers, multimedia, and personal letters. In the latter half of 2005, the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point was given access to a small subset of recently declassified Harmony documents and asked to provide an analysis of potential network vulnerabilities and conflicts of interests within the organization. The CTC was chosen to conduct this study based partly upon its expertise in analyzing al-Qa'ida's strategic texts, jihadi images, video clips, and other materials distributed on the Internet. The documents used in this study were initially identified, processed and translated based upon criteria established to support military planning efforts, including:
The initial 28 documents extracted from the Harmony database that met combinations of the search criteria described above range from single page letters to 70+ page excerpts from larger jihadi texts, and were authored both before and after September 11, 2001. Every document released to the CTC from the Harmony database is posted on the CTC website at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony_docs.asp. Harmony: Al-Qa`ida's (mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa In late 2006 and early 2007, USSOCOM released another 24 documents to the CTC. This iteration of Harmony focuses on al-Qa'ida's continuing organizational, operational, personnel and pecuniary challenges in the Horn of Africa (HOA). Although most terrorist groups seek out and thrive in ungovernable spaces, the HOA countries pose greater challenges to al-Qa'ida than one might expect. The HOA is a surprisingly difficult area in which to operate, especially for an organization that relies on secrecy, deception, and the loyalty of its operators and affiliates. The area is ripe with political turmoil, corruption, and poverty and these local concerns sometimes trump or hamper al-Qa'ida's efforts to wage their global jihad. As in the first Harmony study, these newly released documents reveal a different side of al Qa`ida that is often not shown in traditional media reporting and literature. Harmony HOA continues to show that oftentimes so-called al-Qa'ida allies and sympathizers do not necessarily want automatic subjugation to the group, do not share the same religious fervor, and often desire some kind of compensation before providing operational security or support. These documents demonstrate that although al-Qa'ida did have some success in terms of planning and executing attacks, raising funds for operations, and establishing contacts throughout the region, they also expose their failures and frustrations. Though Harmony illustrates that al-Qa'ida faced significant challenges in the HOA, it is not the intent to discount its ability to adapt to its operational environment. On the contrary, these documents reflect how the organization overcame obstacles and remained steadfast in its efforts. Moreover, they are testimony that some senior operational leaders of al-Qa'ida in the HOA (most notably Abu Hafs al-Masri, Saif al-Adl, and Abdullah Muhammad Fazul) were extremely talented and resourceful. Unlike some 'adventurers' from the Middle East and elsewhere who went to Pakistan and Afghanistan for vacation during the Soviet occupation to claim jihadi credentials, there is no question the senior members of al-Qa'ida were deadly serious about their mission in the HOA, and that their jihadi status was unfortunately well-earned. Thankfully, al-Qa'ida has not been successful in generating wide-ranging support of local populations or securing wide swaths of territory even though they have maintained a continuous presence in the HOA for almost 15 years. Recent alleged al-Qa'ida activity in Somalia and US counterterrorism actions throughout the HOA further reinforce this point. Indeed, the HOA will indeed be a place of interest for both al-Qa'ida and the United States for many years to come. Document Summaries
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