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Harmony and Disharmony:
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600080 Synopsis: A lengthy document of 20,000 words that examines the jihad waged against the Syrian regime of Hafez el Assad from 1976-1982. The document begins with a Chapter 2 entitled “Basics” followed by a Chapter 1 “Observations on the experience as a whole. This is followed by another Chaper 2 entitled “Lessons learned from the obstacles facing military jihad.” The Syrian militants belong to one group called the Attalieaa-the Vanguard and their erstwhile allies in the Muslim Brotherhood fought secretly and openly against the Alawite regime in Damascus. Although brutally repressed, this campaign taught Islamic militants many valuable lessons. Key Themes: Drawing on Islamic tradition and Twentieth Century examples of guerilla and information warfare, the study takes a critical look at the many failings of this campaign, and develops a strategy for waging jihad successfully. Lessons learned can be grouped in these major categories: Islamic Tradition: 18 Lessons Learned, of which the most important are: Leadership Battles. The leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood were more concerned about their leadership battles than the struggle. They are accused by the author of treason and criminal behavior against jihad. They betrayed the faith and devotion of the young followers. The Vanguard while strong in faith and dedication, were weak in leadership and training. Their Islamic devotion was blessed by Allah who saved them from deviant thought and deterioration. Insufficient religious instruction. Fighters were either not properly taught or not sufficiently instructed in Islam. This problem became more acute as the original fighters were killed off and replaced by members who lacked proper understanding of Islam. Insufficient number of committed Mujahadeen to fill all important positions. Lack of study in the Islamic tradition. A myriad of rich experiences were readilyavailable for those seeking knowledge, but nobody bothered to study these traditions. Failure to develop a public relations campaign to communicate Mujahid Revolutionary Theory, The most important element of any revolutionary struggle is to communicate the right message. This was not done and the people therefore did not support the struggle. Untrustworthy Arab Regimes. While reluctantly willing to support jihad against Syria, the Arab neighbors were at best temporary allies. The leaders of the neighboring countries in reality feared Islam and imprisoned the faithful. Excessive Dependence on Outside sources of support. Mujahideen must be self-sufficient, otherwise they become dependent on unreliable external benefactors. It is better to depend on stealing from the hostile regime, than to develop a dependency on external supporters Failure to deter allies of Syria. The lack of a means to strike at the allies of Syria meant that Arab regimes suffered no penalty for assisting Damascus. Lack of Scholarly Contribution. Islamic scholars in the region failed to contribute their knowledge, and the Mujahideen likewise did not make sufficient effort to seek out and develop religious scholars. Unprepared Islamic Missionary Groups. These groups did not understand the requirements for jihad and failed to prepare their followers both spiritually and militarily for the struggle. Pan-Arabism Undermining the Islamic Message. When secular, pan-Arab nationalist thinkers became involved in the movement, the message of jihad was distorted by an Iraqi Baath message. Lack of Operational Security. Groups used open lines of communication which made it easy for intelligence services to collect information and control the movement. While all of these lessons do not appear directly related to the Islamic tradition, the conclusion to this section states that despite the failings of the religious leaders, the Muslim masses demonstrated the power of jihad, and Allah honored their sacrifice. “A giving Muslim nation willing to sacrifice is the ultimate capital.” Lesson Learned in Jihad Operations and Guerrilla Warfare: (Text refers to “gang warfare” but the clear sense corresponds to the sense of guerrilla war) No comprehensive Plan and strategy. The movement lacked a strategic vision, had no understanding of the importance of terrain, and failed to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the Syrian regime. This led to events, not plans, controlling the course of the battle. Insufficient screening of recruits. Mujahideen failed to vet carefully recruits. This allowed many government informers and moles to join, and betray the movement. Improper Command Structure. The movement was too dependent on outside sources and field commanders were not given sufficient authority. The organization must be provided with sufficient resources instead of depending on raiding the resources of the opponents. Field commanders, however, must be in communication with a central command that performs the planning and strategy, or the field commanders may be isolated and subsequently destroyed. Links to Intelligence Services. By developing relationships with the intelligence services of Arab states, the movement yielded its autonomy and came under the control of these groups. Too Much Time Spent in Training Camps. Much of the time spent in training camps in other Arab countries was wasted because no military or spiritual training was pursued. Leaders must stay close to their troops to properly instruct, train, and inspire them. Concentration of Forces. Too many of the forces were concentrated in Hama, Syria which allowed the Syrian military to concentrate its forces, encircle the city, and destroy the Mujahideen. Detachment from the Masses. Citing a “gang (guerrilla) warfare theorist, the author repeats Mao’s familiar wisdom that “The masses are the sea in which the vanguard organization should swim like a fish.” The masses are the source of information, supplies, personnel, and organization. Successful examples of revolutionary war, Algeria, China, and Vietnam are contrasted with failures like Malaysia, Philippines, and Greece. Adequate Supplies. Prior to launching an operation, the movement must have secured an adequate supply of arms and ammunition. Communications Security. The organization must avoid open transmission of messages and develop a command structure that protects information and personnel from disclosure. Capture of fighters creates a problem if they are knowledgable about the organization and its structure. The movement is encouraged to emulate the Italian Red Brigades, the Baader-Meinhof gang, and ETA to see how organizations can compartmentalize information and still achieve operational effectiveness. Care for the Wounded. Plans must be made to allow for the evacuation of the wounded to care for them and most importantly to prevent them from being captured by the enemy. Role of Families. Mujahideen must accept that their families will be involved in the struggle, and that family members will be subject to punishment and torture by the regime. Retaliatory attacks will raise the morale of civilians and encourage the fighters. An American expert is quoted as follows: “…the brutality a regime uses against the civilians in retaliation to acts committed by the revolution is the best gift a revolution can receive, even neutral people will end up joining their ranks, the regime will be seen as the oppressor and the revolution will be seen as the just and fair side.” Victory. The war will not be won by defeating the enemy on the battlefield. Using the tools of modern communication combined with the power of faith the jihad will ultimately prevail. Victory will come in a protracted war in which the enemy is defeated through exhaustion and annoyance. Mujahideen must be smart, dedicated, and well trained, and only the fighters with the right personality and temperament can make successful mujahideen. Ultimately Allah will provide the victory.
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