Cracks in the Foundation:
Leadership Schisms in al-Qa’ida from 1989-2006

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2001-2006: Dispersal, Reconsolidation and Problems in Iraq

While the attacks of 9/11 made al-Qa’ida a household word, it also made the al-Qa’ida leadership the most hunted men in the world, many of whom have been captured or killed in the years since. The dispersal from its stronghold in Afghanistan seriously degraded the capacities of the central leadership to carry out further operations, and, aside from supporting the Taliban forces still fighting in Afghanistan, al-Qa’ida Central has largely been reduced to efforts at managing the al-Qa’ida “brand.” The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, however, opened up new opportunities for would-be jihadis, and various groups there and elsewhere in the world have continued to attack the United States and its allies under the banner of al-Qa’ida, often with only the most tenuous of connections to al-Qa’ida Central or the original leadership. A number of documents from the Harmony database shed light on leadership quarrels that have arisen in response to these latest developments.

As mentioned above, the 9/11 attacks on the United States led to a fundamental split between two leadership factions within al-Qa’ida. The leadership group that opposed the attacks, even as it was forced to flee to Iran, did not remain silent over its grievances. In one particularly blunt letter, dated 13 June 2002 and addressed by Saif al-Adel to a certain Mukhtar, the former writes bitterly of Usama bin Ladin’s precipitous folly having plunged al-Qa’ida “from misfortune to disaster.”[92]Echoing a view often expressed in the writings of Abu’l-Walid, Saif al-Adel complains of Bin Ladin’s autocratic leadership of the organization, whereby “if someone opposes him, he immediately puts forward another person to render an opinion in his support, clinging to his opinion.” The incompetent leadership, writes Saif, “every time it falters, gets up again and rushes headlong with no understanding or awareness.” In an apparent attempt to wrest some control over al-Qa’ida from Bin Ladin’s disastrous leadership, Saif urges his addressee to “stop all foreign actions, stop sending people to captivity, and stop devising new operations, regardless of whether or not orders come from Abu ‘Abdullah.” He also indicates that he intends to write to Bin Ladin as well, “so that he will stop his onrush in external actions, will discuss the matter appropriately and then start things over against the enemies of God.”[93] As far as Abu’l-Walid was concerned, as he wrote in a number of critical writings that have been published in the Arabic-language press since 2001, the whole enterprise of al-Qa’ida turned out to be a colossal failure; “It was a tragic example of an Islamic movement managed in an alarmingly meaningless way.”[94]

The most recent leadership schism reflected in the Harmony documents is that which developed between al-Qa’ida Central and Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, who pledged allegiance to al-Qa’ida and agreed to fight in Iraq under its banner in late 2004. Friction between him and the al-Qa’ida leadership dated from the beginning of their relationship. When Usama bin Ladin invited Zarqawi to join al-Qa’ida in 2000, the latter refused on the grounds that he could not support Bin Ladin’s jihad against the United States.[95] aif al-Adel, who later wrote that Zarqawi was “a hardliner when it came to disagreements with other groups,”[96] brokered an arrangement whereby al-Qa’ida provided material support for Zarqawi to set up a training camp in Herat, Afghanistan, though at this time Zarqawi remained formally independent from Bin Ladin. After the American-led invasion of Afghanistan in October of 2001, the Northern Alliance destroyed Zarqawi’s camp, though he escaped to Kandahar, and eventually to Iran, from whence he entered Iraq.[97] Emerging soon after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq as an important Sunni jihadi leader, he was eventually convinced to make the pledge to Bin Ladin and change the name of his group to al-Qa’ida in the Land of the Two Rivers. He was not, however, willing to play by al-Qa’ida’s rules.

In “Zawahiri’s Letter to Zarqawi,” a document captured in Iraq and released by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in October of 2005,[98] there is unmistakable evidence of the significant differences in strategic thinking and priorities that existed between al-Qa’ida Central and Zarqawi’s al-Qa’ida in Iraq. Though Zawahiri’s tone is warm, he lays out a frank assessment of the various ways in which Zarqawi appeared to be alienating the Iraqi populace and the broader Muslim community. He warns of repeating the mistake that al-Qa’ida made in allying with the Taliban, who were not representative of the Afghan people and met outright opposition from many segments of Afghani society, and urges Zarqawi to broaden his links to “all leaders of opinion and influence in the Iraqi arena.”[99] He criticizes Zarqawi for making disparaging statements about Iraqi religious leaders, again highlighting how this works at cross purposes with the need to garner popular support. While stopping short of opposing it, Zawahiri raises questions about the possible negative consequences of Zarqawi’s attacks on the Shi’a and incitement of a Sunni-Shi’a sectarian war.[100] Zawahiri reserves his most pointed criticism for Zarqawi’s practice of beheading captives and posting videos of these murders on the Internet. Observing that “more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media,” Zawahiri urges him to desist from the repugnant practice which was clearly losing the hearts and minds of the Muslim world.[101]

While the authenticity of this letter was debated in the Western press and at one point denied by Zarqawi himself, a subsequent communication to Zarqawi from al-Qa’ida Central discovered after Zarqawi was killed in June of 2006 confirmed that it was genuine and showed an expansion of the leadership’s criticisms of Zarqawi’s tactics.[102] Written by a senior al-Qa’ida leader using only the name ‘Atiyah, the letter reiterates many of Zawahiri’s earlier criticisms and advice, though in a significantly more forceful tone.[103] Emphasizing that Zarqawi has attained an international prominence and influence through his leadership in Iraq, ‘Atiyah focuses on Zarqawi’s unrestrained violence and failure to understand how it is alienating the Muslim public. He chides Zarqawi for not seeking or obeying guidance from al-Qa’ida Central, warning him that military action that does not conform to an over-arching policy will accomplish nothing.[104] He orders him to consult with the al-Qa’ida leadership before proceeding, instructing Zarqawi to send a representative to Waziristan, and consult with Iraqi Sunni leaders as well. ‘Atiyah also cautions Zarqawi against letting a fawning inner circle cloud his judgment or blind him to the fact that he has made grave mistakes and must be “taken to task” for “tyranny and oppression upon the people,” committing “corruption within the land” and alienating the people from al-Qa’ida, jihad and even Islam.[105]

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