Cracks in the Foundation:
Leadership Schisms in al-Qa’ida from 1989-2006

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1996-2001: The Taliban Refuge and the War with America

Al-Qa’ida’s return to Afghanistan saw the beginning of a new phase of its activities, bringing with it a new set of leadership problems. Organizational dysfunction continued to dog its operations, and Bin Ladin’s financial resources had been significantly degraded by the fiasco in Sudan.[58] As noted by journalist Alan Cullison, who purchased a hard drive that had belonged to al-Qa’ida in Kabul in late 2001, “not all Arabs were happy with the move.”

Afghanistan, racked by more than a decade of civil war and Soviet occupation, struck many as unfit to be the capital of global jihad. Jihadis complained about the food, the bad roads, and the Afghans themselves, who, they said, were uneducated, venal, and not to be trusted.[59]

More importantly, two issues emerged during this period that created an unprecedented level of disunity within al-Qa’ida, from the leadership down to the rank and file: al-Qa’ida’s relationship with the Taliban and Usama bin Ladin’s decision to directly attack the United States.

The Harmony documents from this period continue to reflect widespread leadership failures at the administrative level. For example, in a letter that appears to have been authored by Sayf al-Islam al-Misri, who had earlier been in charge of certain operations in Somalia, he lays out a series of complaints about organizational malfunction at the Jihad Wal training camp, at which he had just completed a term of service as the camp’s amir (leader). Sayf al-Islam writes bitterly that he was made the leader of the camp with insufficient prior knowledge of the camp’s inner workings and logistics and that there was little overlap time between his term as leader and that of the previous amir, making it impossible for him to get up to speed or resolve questions that arose in the course of his tenure. He prays to God to not be put through a similar experience again, and writes that the whole issue “still pains me immensely.”[60] Nor was this problem unique to Sayf al-Islam or the Jihad Wal camp. In mid June of 2000, in a list of questions submitted by camp trainees to be addressed by Bin Ladin, the latter is asked, “We often hear that you are not fully aware of the camp’s organization and some people say the instructors act on their own. What is your answer to this accusation?”[61]

Abu’l-Walid also continued to frankly communicate his assessments of al-Qa’ida’s persistent organizational failures. In his list of recommendations and questions submitted to Usama bin Ladin after having led a series of trainings at one of the al-Qa’ida camps in Afghanistan in the summer of 2000, Abu’l-Walid presses Bin Ladin to adhere to regularity in holding meetings of the Shura Council, recommending that he deputize Abu Hafs to chair such meetings in Bin Ladin’s absence if necessary.[62] He also notes that most of al-Qa’ida’s operations continue to lack any organization or systematization, and appear to be “random chaos.” Is improving organization progressing randomly as well, or according to some sort of system, he asks.[63]He also points out that recruitment has aimed at quantity and has not been methodically regulated, and complains that there is a lack of coordination between the processing of trainees at the camps and the initiation of operations, which leads to a reduction in the number of trainees who can immediately be absorbed into operations.[62]

The decision to ally al-Qa’ida with the Taliban and to give a pledge of allegiance to Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad ‘Umar was an especially divisive development during this period. There is a great deal of information in the Harmony documents reflecting internal divisions over a variety of issues having to do with al-Qa’ida’s relationship to the Taliban. A faction that appears to have been based in Peshawar, Pakistan, argued that it was heretical for al-Qa’ida to put itself at the service of the Taliban, as the latter were Islamically deviant and puppets of Pakistan’s ISI. In one letter, the unknown author refers derisively to the Taliban as having a mentality “based on fabrications, wrongdoing, beating around the bush and running away from reality,” and bemoans their seeking a seat at the United Nations, a perfidious act for which they were making “insignificant excuses.”[65] In a letter written by a certain ‘Abd al-Hamid, who was later identified in the London-based Islamist press as Syrian jihadi Baha’ Mustafa Jughl,[66]the author writes that “We differ with our people here about the Taliban regime; they see them as God’s righteous saints, while we view them as heretics and apostates.”[67] This author composed a treatise to prove the heresy of the Taliban, full of “evidences and proofs,” but when he shared it with fellow members of al-Qa’ida, “they only became more recalcitrant and estranged.” The treatise and its author were denounced to Abu Qatada al-Filistini, a leading al-Qa’ida ideologue operating out of London, and Abu Qatada wrote a book refuting ‘Abd al-Hamid’s anti-Taliban treatise, a book which ‘Abd al-Hamid complains “was full of lies and false accusations.”[68] ‘Abd al-Hamid was also denounced by the jihadi ideologue Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, though he says that the latter “was the most well-mannered of [those who denounced me]; just imagine a group in which the most well-mannered is the likes of Abu Mus’ab al-Suri!”[69]

‘Abd al-Hamid’s opinions are echoed in another Harmony document from this period, signed only Abu Mus’ab but likely written by Abu Mus’ab Reuters, the pseudonym of Muhammad Najah ‘Abd al-Maqsud, who reportedly was known as “Reuters” because he monitored the international media for al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan in the early 1990s.[70] Abu Mus’ab Reuters was also a member of the Peshawar-based group that opposed al-Qa’ida’s alliance with the Taliban and labeled the latter unbelievers. In a letter addressed simply to “Abu Muhammad” – likely Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, the influential jihadi ideologue and one-time mentor of Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi[71] – Abu Mus’ab Reuters refers to a recent gathering of prominent al-Qa’ida and al-Qa’ida-affiliated individuals in Peshawar that included Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, the above-mentioned ‘Abd al-Hamid, and a certain Abu Mujahid. At this gathering the author presented arguments for regarding the Taliban as outright infidels, their organization “created and controlled by Pakistan.”[72] Abu Mus’ab Reuters also refers in this letter to Abu Qatada al-Filistini and the latter’s refutation of ‘Abd al-Hamid’s anti-Taliban tract (which the author says he co-wrote with ‘Abd al-Hamid), and writes that “I know this man [Abu Qatada] well and want to expose him to the world. When everyone was fighting the Soviets, he was an advisor to the devil. He came to Peshawar after it was all over and issued fatwas in return for Saudi dollars, calling the Sudanese government an Islamic Emirate.[73] Later he went to Europe and helped Bush’s wishes come true...” Finally, the author refers to a previous letter he’d received from Abu Muhammad that criticized Ayman al-Zawahiri; the author chides Abu Muhammad for being too hasty in his judgment and attempts to explain Zawahiri’s position.[74]

Another witness to this internal opposition to alignment with the Taliban – and perhaps in reference to the same group in Peshawar mentioned above – can be found in a report on the state of jihadi affairs in Afghanistan written circa October 1998.[75] This unsigned report discusses the military successes of the Taliban, the global responses to these developments, and the immediate aftermath in Afghanistan following the U.S. missile attack on al-Qa’ida camps in 1998 and Mullah ‘Umar’s subsequent refusal to extradite Bin Ladin or any of the latter’s followers. The final page of the report addresses “controversies surrounding the Taliban and denunciations of them.”[76] The author identifies the most important misgiving raised by certain “young men” against the Taliban as being the latter’s “tomb worship” (‘ibada al-qubur), a broad “crime” in the eyes of Salafi jihadis which refers to local religious practices surrounding the tombs of Muslims saints or historically-important holy people.[77] The author points out that this denunciation of the Taliban is based on the assumption that a lack of Taliban efforts to eradicate these practices amounts to a Taliban endorsement of them, and further that this endorsement is sufficiently serious to warrant takfir, or charging the Taliban as a whole with infidelity. The author raises vehement objections to this takfiri tendency among some of al-Qa’ida’s ranks, pointing out that the people making these accusations have no actual proof that the Taliban has committed any religious deviations and are relying on hearsay. Observing that rumor and hearsay are the greatest threat to internal unity, the author ends his report by quoting scripture: “The Prophet said, ‘Man sins enough [to earn damnation] by relating everything that he hears.’[78] How, then, will it be for one who passes judgments of infidelity on the basis of everything that he hears?”[79]

There was also considerable confusion surrounding the al-Qa’ida-Taliban alliance expressed in questionnaires submitted to the leadership by camp trainees. Though Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad had by this time joined itself to al-Qa’ida, it appears that there was friction in the Egyptian camp about pledging fealty to Mullah ‘Umar. In a series of questions submitted to camp leaders in February of 2001, a number of people asked for clarifications about these disputes and perceived contradictions; one person asked why some of the leaders of Islamic Jihad had refused to pledge allegiance to Mullah ‘Umar and the Taliban, and wondered if there were some finer point of Islamic law that prevented them from doing so.[80] Another asks why the Jihad organization keeps splintering, and several people submitted questions about the failure of closed-door meetings of Jihad leaders to resolve their differences.[81]

The other major fault line within al-Qa’ida during this period surrounded the decision of Usama bin Ladin to directly strike at the United States.[82] As is well known, Bin Ladin’s frequent pre-9/11 media appearances, in which he called for a jihad against Americans everywhere, were perceived by the Taliban leadership as breaches of their agreements, and Mullah ‘Umar ordered Bin Ladin to relocate from Jalalabad to Kandahar in 1997. Bin Ladin’s anti-American rhetoric also endangered al-Qa’ida’s continuing operations in the Horn of Africa; in a letter written in August of 1997 by ‘Abdullah Muhammad Fazul, a leading operative in the eventually-successful plot to bomb the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, Fazul anxiously refers to the new and serious risks of capture that had emerged following Bin Ladin’s declaration of war on the United States, and complains that he had first heard about this declaration while watching CNN.[83] Later that same month the FBI raided the Nairobi home of Fazul’s accomplice Wadih el-Hage.

Bin Ladin’s antics also angered al-Qa’ida leaders in Afghanistan. In a 1999 email addressed to Bin Ladin from Abu Khalid al-Suri (aka Muhammad Bahayah) and Abu Mus’ab al-Suri – the latter having by that time become part of Mullah ‘Umar’s inner circle – Bin Ladin is chastised for not abiding by his pledge of allegiance to Mullah ‘Umar, the “Commander of the Faithful.” They warn that Bin Ladin’s rogue activities risk getting the Arab jihadis kicked out of Afghanistan, which would play directly into the hands of their enemies. At one point the email addresses the al-Qa’ida leader as though he were a disobedient child:

The strangest thing I have heard so far is Abu Abdullah’s saying that he wouldn't listen to the Leader of the Faithful when he asked him to stop giving interviews…. I think our brother [Bin Ladin] has caught the disease of screens, flashes, fans, and applause…. Abu Abdullah should go to the Leader of the Faithful with some of his brothers and tell them that … the Leader of the Faithful was right when he asked you to refrain from interviews, announcements, and media encounters, and that you will help the Taliban as much as you can in their battle, until they achieve control over Afghanistan.… You should apologize for any inconvenience or pressure you have caused … and commit to the wishes and orders of the Leader of the Faithful on matters that concern his circumstances here.…[84]

Similar opposition to Bin Ladin’s activities is manifest in the questions submitted to the al-Qa’ida leadership by trainees in 2000. In a question submitted to Usama bin Ladin at an unidentified camp in mid-June of 2000, one trainee asked, “Has the al-Qa’ida Organization under your leadership made a pledge of allegiance (mubaya’a) to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan [sc., Mullah ‘Umar’s Taliban], and if so, how is that you raise the call to fight America, knowing that the Taliban wouldn’t hear of such a thing, for reasons of the safety and security of Afghanistan (may God protect the Taliban)?”[85] In a similar set of questions presented to Abu’l-Walid at the close of a “political course” of training he had led in February of 2001, there were more questions about this than any other issue. Two people asked whether he expected Mullah ‘Umar to expel Bin Ladin, and if so what would become of him; another handful presented anxious questions about the likelihood of a U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and what the possible results would be for the Arab jihadis.[86] On the basis of these questions, Abu’l-Walid submitted a number of items for clarification, apparently to Bin Ladin personally. He points out that there is confusion about loyalties, some people having understood that pledging their allegiance to Mullah ‘Umar meant that they renounced activities against the United States; in a separate item he asks whether Bin Ladin’s policy of giving trainees the option of working either with al-Qa’ida or the Taliban had changed, since “some of the brothers say that they only pledged allegiance to you and the fight against the Jewish-Crusader alliance.”[87]

As the time of the strikes neared, sustained opposition to the attacks of 9/11 was mounted at the highest levels of the al-Qa’ida leadership. A minority “hawkish” wing dominated by Abu Hafs al-Misri pushed for going forward and for attempting to gather weapons of mass destruction for use in any American response against Afghanistan.[88] According to testimony given by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed after the latter’s capture, however, a majority of the members of al-Qa’ida’s Shura Council opposed a direct attack on both ideological and strategic grounds.[89] This group included Abu’l-Walid, Saif al-Adel,[90] Abu Hafs al-Muritani and Mustafa Abu’l-Yazid (aka Shaykh Sa’id al-Misri). Although their opposition to the attacks turned out to be fruitless, they all appear to have broken with the “hawkish” leaders of al-Qa’ida in the wake of the American military response to the attacks of 9/11, as the two groups fled in separate directions. Usama bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri and the rest of the “hawkish” leadership – with the exception of Abu Hafs al-Misri, who was killed by an American air strike near Kabul in November 2001 – fled into the mountainous border regions of eastern Afghanistan and western Pakistan, while the opposition group from al-Qa’ida’s senior leadership fled south to Iran, where it is believed at least three of the above-named leaders are currently under house arrest.[91]

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