Cracks in the Foundation:
Leadership Schisms in al-Qa’ida from 1989-2006

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Conclusion

The picture of internal strife that emerges from the Harmony documents highlights not only al-Qa’ida’s past failures, but also–and more importantly–it offers insight into its present weaknesses. Al-Qa’ida is beset today by challenges that surfaced in leadership disputes at the beginning of the organization’s history, and it will likely continue to struggle with these issues so long as it survives. In the earliest phase of its development, long before it had formulated a coherent ideological platform, al-Qa’ida’s supreme leader proved himself utterly inept as a military commander. Usama bin Ladin’s initial efforts to fashion al-Qa’ida into an all-Arab guerrilla army were farcical at best, and a source of astonished frustration to the more capable strategists in his orbit. Even when it had a clearly defined objective – to defeat the communists in Afghanistan – al-Qa’ida’s leadership was unable to muster the organizational competency to function adequately in even a supporting role, much less a direct or leading one. In the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal, the leaders of al-Qa’ida were further shackled by disunity over immediate and long-term goals, and in their chauvinistic conviction that jihad was properly an Arab affair Bin Ladin and his senior deputies led the organization into a Sudanese morass, squandering al-Qa’ida’s resources and further demonstrating the extent of its systemic failings and strategic miscalculations. Upon its forced return to Afghanistan, al-Qa’ida found refuge and a potential ideological partner in the Taliban, a group that was (successfully) pursuing the same goal of reestablishing an Islamic Caliphate, but narrow extremism and outright bigotry led to further al-Qa’ida in-fighting over the Taliban alliance. The al-Qa’ida brand took its decisive shape during this period, but by placing the call for war with the United States at the center of that brand, Bin Ladin and the hawkish faction among his senior deputies introduced an even greater fissure into their organization and critically damaged its relationship with its sole protector, the Taliban. Its successful attacks on America, first on the embassies in Africa and then on 9/11, gave al-Qa’ida’s message an immediate global audience, but the American military response to these attacks have so seriously degraded its organizational capacities that management of that message has been virtually all that al-Qa’ida Central has subsequently been able to muster.

There has recently been some speculation that al-Qa’ida has been regrouping in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, perhaps even regaining the organizational capacity to operationally manage terrorist agents, but there is no evidence to suggest that it has overcome the persistent weaknesses identified in this report.[106] On the contrary, recent events have highlighted al-Qa’ida’s continuing vulnerability to them. For example, in 2005, after the capture in Pakistan of senior al-Qa’ida operative Abu Faraj al-Libi, it was revealed that Central Asian jihadis, a contingent of whom have established a foothold in the Waziristan tribal areas, provided the information to Pakistani intelligence that led them to al-Libi. Bad blood generated by the chauvinistic disdain for Central Asian jihadis displayed by Arab al-Qa’ida personnel in the region had led captured Uzbek, Tajik and Chechen jihadis to provide information on al-Qa’ida’s operations, leading to a series of raids and arrests that ultimately led to al-Libi’s capture.[107]

Despite the continued appeal of al-Qa’ida’s message to certain populations, it must not be forgotten that al-Qa’ida’s transition from an extremist cult cloistered in the mountains of South Asia to a publicly-debated global movement creates new sets of vulnerabilities, open to exploitation by any interested party with the means of delivering its message. Lacking a broad command-and-control structure, al-Qa’ida Central finds itself unable to control the uses – and abuses – of its brand by self-starting “affiliate” groups. The gory media tactics of Zarqawi’s al-Qa’ida in Iraq did considerable damage to the mass popularity of the al-Qa’ida message.[108] Letters from al-Qa’ida Central to Zarqawi attempted damage control while he was alive, and in a recent video appearance, Usama bin Ladin himself has tried to shore up his brand against the effects of Zarqawi’s legacy through direct media spin control. For example, he laid blame for the Sunni-Shi`a civil war on the United States, even though he was certainly aware of Zarqawi’s role in igniting the bloody sectarian conflict in Iraq, as is abundantly clear in the letters from Zawahiri and ‘Atiyah discussed above.[109]The damage to the al-Qa’ida name wrought by Zarqawi’s tactics was seen as so bad by his former associates in Iraq that they, supported by al-Qa’ida Central, changed the name of their organization from al-Qa’ida in Iraq to the Islamic State of Iraq, hoping by this move to regain traction with Sunni insurgents alienated by assassinations of Sunni leaders carried out in al-Qa’ida’s name; thus far they have failed.[110]

The continuing failure of the Islamic State of Iraq is emblematic of a larger theme of this report: al-Qa`ida is terrible at state building. As long as Bin Ladin and Zawahiri are at the helm, their inability to organize will dash any hopes they have for creating an Islamist state. And judging from the documentary evidence, it does not seem that state building is more than a slogan in their eyes. Rather, they rely on local grievances and instability to market their brand worldwide.

Bin Ladin and Zawahiri are the incarnation of the al-Qa`ida brand and as long as they are able to broadcast new images of themselves their brand will continue to grow. At the very least, their media distribution must be degraded; at most, they must be eliminated or captured. It is true that capture or death will not stop other jihadis from venerating Bin Ladin and Zawahiri or continuing to fight, but neither will it be insignificant. On the contrary, it will, over time, greatly reduce the appeal of al-Qa`ida as an emblem, which will ultimately reduce the appeal of the ideology they espouse.

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